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EDITOR'S NOTE
What a difference a year can make! This time last year, water usersresidential, commercial and agricultural alike-knew the value of water due
to its little supply. Fire season came early, kayak season never arrived, and
water users dipped heavily into their storage reserves. Drought became a
household word. In the fall, preparing for the worst, litigation ensued. And
then the snow came. After snow, cool temperatures and rain followed. High
country reservoirs continue to reclaim their storage water and rivers flow with
abundance. Mother Nature has staved off catastrophe once again.
California continues to grapple with reining in unfettered groundwater
use. In our lead article, Professor Joseph Sax explains California's internal
clash of determining the best way to regulate its groundwater by looking into
its history of establishing groundwater regulation and related caselaw. While
the state battles over the doctrine of groundwater, in their article, Ellen
Hanak and Caitlin Dyckman explain how California counties took the law in
their own hands and passed groundwater exportation controls.
Traditionally, the Water Law Review has provided accounts of the
numerous Colorado Interstate Compacts, cataloging this important part of
Colorado Water Law History. This issue is no exception. Ken Knox provides
an account of the events leading up to the Costilla Creek Compact formation.
James Lochhead has provided an in-depth look into the Colorado Compact
formation from an Upper Basin perspective in Volume 4, Issue 2. The Water
Law Review is pleased to present Mr. Lochhead's Part II to this article. He
focuses on the past ten years of negotiations, and breakdown thereof,
between all of the Basin States in an attempt to encourage and require
California to live within its 4.4 million acre-feet basic apportionment.
The combination of drought, environmental concerns, and growing
number of water users puts incredible strain on Colorado's water law system
as a whole. In their article, Peter Nichols and Doug Kenney investigate the
Front Range growth and drought issue and its effect on Colorado's water law
system and frame solutions within the confines of established water law
doctrine. Sarah Klahn provides a primer to drought issues in Colorado. In
response to the numerous issues exacerbated by the drought, the 2003
Colorado Legislative Session witnessed numerous bills. Michael Shimmin
provides a summary of both Senate Bill 73 and Simpson v. Biou IrrigationDist.
addressing Colorado State Engineer authority.
Finally, the Staff and Editorial Board took this opportunity to dedicate
Volume 6, Issue 2 to an incredible figurehead of water law in Colorado, Chips
Barry. Chips contributed a bit of humor to the Review in his portrayal of one
of our great Presidents, Teddy Roosevelt. Sit back and enjoy as you read
Chips' impression of President Roosevelt's thoughts on Western Water Law in
his presentation to the Southwestern Water Conservancy District.
This has been an exciting year for water law in the West. Colorado
Supreme Court decisions such as Golden v. Simpson and Simpson v. Bijou
IrrigationDist., and the Tenth Circuit's Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys to
name just a few. Growth and drought consistently challenge water users;
however, combining creative solutions within the confines of Western Water
Law and a little help from Mother Nature, water lawyers and water users
continue to forge workable results. Let us see what next year has in store for
US.
Holly Kirsner
Editor-in-Chief

HAMLET J. ("CHIPS") BARRY III

IN TRIBUTE
HAMLET J. ("CHIPS") BARRY, III
W. CURTIS GRAVES'
Dedicating an edition of the Water Law Review to the most
influential man in local water politics for more than a decade strikes
my colleagues as fairly intuitive. But our humble subject finds the very
idea puzzling. Only when he is told, in no uncertain terms, that he will
be the subject of the dedication does he relent, clearly disappointed in
my unwillingness to hear his list of people who truly deserve the
honor.
Born in 1944, HamletJ. Barry, III ("Chips" to friend and foe alike)
came into this world well positioned for a successful legal career. With
a fine Ivy League education-B.A. American Studies, Yale, 1966; J.D.
Columbia, 1969-and scion to a prominent family with a distinguished
legal history, Barry counts among his ancestors a former law school
dean and a Colorado Supreme Courtjustice.
But early on, Chips began to see traditional legal practice as a lot
of arguing over pieces of paper representing other people's wealth.
He turned instead to a career in public service, where his ability to
make a lasting, positive impact was never in doubt.
In 1969, two months before he was admitted to the Colorado Bar,
Chips relocated to Dillingham, Alaska, for a stint as a Vista Volunteer
and Field Attorney, representing the local Eskimo and Indian
populace. Returning to Denver a year later, Chips clerked for Judge
Robert McWilliams in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals before
jetting off to the Marshall Islands to represent the displaced people of
Bikini and Enewetak Atolls, whose islands the United States hammered
with atomic and hydrogen bomb tests.
Chips returned once more to Denver, this time for good. He held
a series of natural resources positions thereafter, leaving his post as
Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Natural Resources
to take over the top position at Denver Water in 1991, where he has
remained ever since.
Known by his colleagues as a consummate dealmaker with an
innate ability to balance competing interests, "Chips has always been
amazing in his desire to make sure everyone gets a fair deal," says
inveterate water lawyer David W. Robbins of Hill & Robbins, P.C.
Before Chips came to Denver Water, the city had entered into a
twenty-five-year lease agreement for water from the reservoir to be
built on Muddy Creek, believing that Two Forks Reservoir would
supply water to Denver before the lease ran out. When the
Environmental Protection Agency vetoed Two Forks, Denver was left
t Curtis Graves joined the University of Denver Water Law Review in the fall of
2002. He showed such dedication to his work as a staff member on the journal that
the Editorial Board promoted him to Articles Editor for the spring of 2003. Thank
you, Curtis, for writing such a fitting dedication. Your dedication isjust as vibrant as
Mr. Barry.

with a $3.5 million annual lease payment for a water interest from an
unbuilt reservoir, which in any case was too short-lived to be useful.
"What on Earth can we do with water that only exists for twenty-five
years?" Chips recalls thinking. "I can't issue taps on that. This is
completely nuts." Chips phoned the head of the River District and
offered a mutually beneficial solution: "I said, 'look, I'll solve your
problem if you'll solve mine."' Chips suggested that Denver could fund
the completion of Wolford Reservoir in exchange for a permanent
ownership interest in some of its water. But he didn't stop there. He
opened lines of communication and arranged for Summit and Grand
counties and certain ski areas to borrow Denver water for snowmaking.
In the warm months, Denver receives that water back in the form of
runoff. The many beneficiaries of this agreement repay evaporative
losses from Clinton Reservoir, which they purchased from Climax-a
Colorado mining enterprise-for that very purpose. At the very least,
the arrangement turned out to be a win/win/win proposition.
When he isn't ignoring past enmity to forge new relationships
throughout the state, Chips can sometimes be found speaking in the
guise of President Teddy Roosevelt. "He was really the originator of
the conservation movement," Chips says, adding that the former
president's beliefs regarding western water and the environment still
ring true today. He says he doesn't want to impersonate President
Roosevelt too much, yet he carries at all times a pair of spectacles
which allow him to assume the identity of our twenty-sixth president
faster than Clark Kent can become Superman.
Chips has-and appreciates-a great sense of humor, which he
often showcases when speaking publicly or with the media. He has
made light of his own injuries sustained in a serious car wreck ("My
brain damage is no worse than usual"); offered to accurately predict
precipitation in exchange for accurate stock market predictions; and
characterized journalists as stumbling, slurring, and not necessarily
"temperate."
This candor, coupled with the worst drought on record in
Colorado, has made Chips something of a lightning rod for criticism.
For that, Mr. Robbins takes some responsibility: "My wife is his
dentist," he point out. "She keeps his mouth working right." But
Chips bears both slings and arrows with the confidence of a man who
goes to work to make a difference, not simply to collect a paycheck.
Despite his grueling schedule, he still finds time to humiliate men half
his age on the tennis court, and to serve as a member of the University
of Denver Water Law Review Advisory Board.
Colorado Supreme Court Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., who has
known Chips since both were clerks in the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1971, offers the following:
The Colorado Judicial Canons of Ethics prohibit me from
becoming a witness about someone's character. So I shall not say that
Mr. Barry has character. However, to say that he is a character-and
base this on the bully Presidential impersonation he performs early,
late, and often-runs the gratuity of being disciplined enough to
recognize a public versus private tort worthy of Prosserian
predilection. Were I to be called before the Judicial Discipline
Commission, I would invoke history, free speech, art, and hilarity for

the proposition that any person who thinks impersonating Teddy
Roosevelt-as well as Mr. Barry does-does no offense to his office
because he actually is the late Progressive Leader of our country, IS
SURELY FUNNY!
Thanks for everything, Chips. May your hand remain on Denver's
spigot for many years to come.
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"There will always be great difficulty in fixing a line, beyond which
the water in the sands and gravels over which a stream flows, and
which supply or uphold the stream, ceases' to be a part thereof and
becomes what is called 'percolating water.""

I. INTRODUCTION
It must seem surprising to people elsewhere that California, unlike
other western states, continues to treat surface water and groundwater

under separate and distinct legal regimes, even though everyone today
acknowledges that water comprises a continuum through which the
water moves wherever gravity takes it.2 Moreover, whatever "mystery"
there once was about the movement of water underground, and that
induced lawmakers and treatise writers to eschew efforts to regulate
groundwater, is no longer a hindrance to modern management, as
most states have acknowledged. What, then, explains California's
failure to bring its water law into line with contemporary knowledge,
and with scientific reality? The answer (actually there are two answers)

is not very mysterious.
First, while California extensively regulates surface water by an
administrative permit system, groundwater is effectively unregulated.
People who have access to groundwater can just pump it. They need
no one's permission, and no one regulates their use. Water users like
it this way; groundwater is a sort of ace-in-the-hole. When surface
water supplies are restricted, they can pump groundwater as a
substitute, and so it functions as one form of insulation against both
drought and increasing regulation. One may wonder why surface
water users tolerate this situation, since a good deal of groundwater
1. Hudson v. Dailey, 105 P. 748, 753 (Cal. 1909).
2. To hydrogeologists, water is a continuum. The same water may sometimes be
found on the surface of the earth and at other times underground. Water moves by
the force of gravity, and whether it is surface water or groundwater at any particular
moment depends on the slope (known as gradient) and direction of the medium
through which it is moving at a given moment, on obstacles it encounters, and on the
topography of the land. Moreover, from a technical perspective, the distinction
between percolating groundwater and subterranean streams is meaningless, or nearly
so. Water that actually flows like a surface stream beneath the earth's surface, as in
lava tubes or limestone caverns, is very rare in California. Virtually all underground
water percolates through the ground. It may move more or less rapidly; it may be
moving parallel or perpendicular to a surface stream; it may be narrowly confined or
broadly diffused underground. From a geological perspective, these factors are simply
crude and partial descriptions of the enormously varied behavioral characteristics of
subsurface water, depending on a variety of factors, such as the varied transmissivity of
the material in which it is found, the varied obstacles it encounters, and the diverse
gradients over which it travels in its movement through the earth. In addition, at
various points in time or space, groundwater may be in hydraulic connection with a
surface stream, or it may be confined, at least for some distance, beneath a quite
impermeable layer. Water underground may, at one place, or during one season, seep
into a river through its banks (a gaining river), and at another place or time seep out
from the banks into the underground (a losing river). It all depends on whether the
saturated area of the ground is above or below the riverbank at that point.
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pumping draws on waters tributary to surface supplies, and diminishes
them. It is a good question, and there is no obvious answer to it. Of
course, a great many surface water users are also groundwater
pumpers, so they may receive both benefits and detriments from the
existing situation. Probably the most plausible answer is that water
users of all stripes dislike the existing regulatory system, and feel the
less regulation, the better.
Second, California does have a fairly well developed response
system when a basin finds itself in crisis, which undoubtedly relieves
the pressure to reform the system globally. A number of Southern
California basins have been the subjects of litigation leading to the
development of more-or-less comprehensive management schemes.'
Usually overpumping leading to water table decline, saltwater
intrusion, and shortages has stimulated such adjudications or
settlements. While the arrangements vary widely, often a management
entity is created that can limit pumping, and/or impose charges for
excess pumping, purchase substitute water, recharge depleted
aquifers, initiate conjunctive use arrangements, and so on. Such
arrangements have staved off the sort of crisis that has led elsewhere to
systemwide reform of traditional groundwater legal regimes.
California has also tried to empower local agencies to implement
modern groundwater management on a local or regional basis, but the
laws with which it has done this (though of some use) are too limited
to solve the problem. 4
While California has a system in place that averts crisis and system
collapse, it continues to suffer a variety of dysfunctional results
growing out of a system that is at odds with hydrologic reality. One
example that has drawn a good deal of attention recently arises from
assertions that groundwater pumpers are depriving streams of water
needed to meet downstream environmental flow requirements, even
though regulated surface water users are meeting the bypass flow
requirements that have been imposed on them. Such newer concerns
about groundwater pumping, at the behest of interests outside the
traditional water-using constituencies, has generated new controversy
over what had been an almost-forgotten byway of California water law,
the so-called "subterranean stream" exception.
In a legal regime like California's, where groundwater and surface
water are treated differently, the question obviously arose as to
whether any water that was not visible on the surface should be
considered, legally speaking, to be groundwater. The answer lawyers
always gave was "no." First, they said, some water that moves directly
underneath a river in its bed, though beneath the surface, is really just
a component of the river. It would be inappropriate to allow someone
to sink a well in the riverbed and take such water (as groundwater) to
the obvious detriment of downstream surface users. Moreover, they
3. See generally WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING
GROUNDWATER IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (1992).

THE

WATERS:

4. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10753.9, 10754 (West Supp. 2003).
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reasoned, groundwater is only treated separately because we do not
understand its "mysterious" movements.
But if a river, whose
movements are known and knowable, is flowing under the surface,
either as the underftow just described, or through a limestone cavern
as a true stream, it should be treated like any other river on the
surface. Thus, the experts concluded, a river, or component thereof,
though found beneath the surface, should be treated like any other
stream.
The result of this traditional reasoning was to create three
different categories of water: (1) surface streams, which were subject to
permitting and regulation; (2) groundwater - usually called
"percolating groundwater" - which was unregulated; and (3)
"subterranean streams," which were treated the same as surface
streams.
As controversy arose in recent years over the asserted adverse
impact of unregulated groundwater pumping, it was urged that the
"subterranean stream" category be re-examined and interpreted more
broadly so as to enlarge the scope of permitting and regulation over
pumping that was affecting instream values. To put the matter simply,
on one side it was urged that subterranean stream water be limited to
what is usually called underflow or subflow, that is, the water in the
immediate environs of a surface stream and flowing along with it,
though beneath the surface.'
The other side urged that it be
expanded to encompass much if not all the groundwater physically
tributary to a surface stream (under the theory that everything within
the relatively impermeable surroundings of a surface stream be
considered its bed and banks, and thus part of the stream).
I should emphasize at the outset that the terms and categories,
such as "underflow," are utilized in statutes and judicial opinions. 6 As
a legal term, underftow has been defined in various ways. It is said to
5. The term "underflow," though commonly used in the law, is not a technical
term of art used by hydrogeologists. Scientists draw no hydrological line of
demarcation between groundwater that is percolating toward a stream, and
groundwater that has become part of the stream as "underftow." As the Arizona
Department of Water Resources has explained:
In the ideal, subflow [or underftow] can be visualized as just another part of
the stream that lies out of view below the surface. As part of the stream, it
also has distinct bed and banks which define its extent.
This ideal concept of subflow actually does exist in narrow bedrock
canyon streams where both the surface and subsurface components of the
streams are contained within hardrock boundaries. But as these bedrock
canyons descend from the mountains, the valleys become alluvial valleys
between mountain ranges, where the subterranean component of streams
becomes unbounded.
ARIZONA DEP'T OF WATER RES., TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT
INTERLOcUTORY APPEAL ISSUE No. 2 OPINION, IN RE. THE GENERAL ADJUDICATION OF THE

GILA RIVER SYSTEM AND SOURCE 38 (1993).

6. In addition, as noted hereafter in the text, the term has been commonly picked
up from headnote nine in City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 586 (Cal. 1899), and
in Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U.S. 314 (1903), and is often cited in a way that gives an
inaccurate sense both of the trial judge's instructions, and the Supreme Court's
decision, in that case.
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be water "in the soil, sand, and gravel composing the bed of the
[stream] "7which "support[s] the surface stream in its natural state"8 or
"feed[s] it directly."9 The 1899 decision in City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy
is cited for the view that underftow requires the surface and subsurface
be in contact and that the subsurface flow shall have a definite
An additional,
direction corresponding to the surface flow.'0
commonly cited definition of underflow is taken from Wells A.
Hutchins:
The underftow or subflow of a surface stream consists of water in the
soil, sand, and gravel immediately below the bed of the open stream,
which supports the surface stream in its natural state or feeds it

directly.
To constitute underflow, it is essential that the surface and subsurface
flows be in contact and that the subsurface flow shall have a definite
direction corresponding to the surface flow.

The underftow may include the water moving not only in the loose,
porous material that underlies the bed of the surface stream, but also
the lateral extensions of the water-bearing material on each side of
the surface channel. But it must be moving in a course and confined

within a space reasonably well defined, so that the existence and
general direction of the body of water moving underground may be
determined with reasonable accuracy.

"percolating
streams,"
and
"subterranean
"Underflow,"
groundwater," bear little, if any, relationship to geological realities.
Indeed, these water law terms are geographic conceptions
fundamentally at odds with science's understanding of water's
movement. The legal categories seem to assume, for example, that
there is a fixed space within which water is the underlow of a stream,
From a
and beyond that space the water is something else.
hydrogeological perspective, such geographic categories are inapt, and
efforts to fit water into the law's categories by using these technicalsounding classifications give the enterprise a somewhat daffy air. Is the
water moving parallel to the stream, or perpendicular to it? Is the
aquifer more like a lake in shape, or more like a river? Is water
percolating through the ground rapidly enough to be treated as
"flowing" water? Nonetheless, the presence of laws using such terms
and concepts require them to be taken seriously, and given some
meaning.
7. Verdugo Canon Water Co.v. Verdugo, 93 P. 1021, 1025 (Cal. 1908).
8. Huffner v. Sawday, 94 P. 424, 427 (Cal. 1908).
9. City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 198 P. 784, 787 (Cal. 1921).
10. Pomeroy, 57 P. at 594.
11. WELLS A. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAw OF WATER RIGHTS 422 (1956)
(citations omitted).
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The interpretive format for dealing with this puzzle in California is
a provision of section 1200 of the Water Code, which identifies the
scope of jurisdiction of the State Water Resources Control Board
("Board"), the state's water permitting and regulatory agency. 2 That
section states, "[w]henever the terms stream, lake or other body of
water, or water occurs in relation to applications to appropriate water
or permits or licenses issued pursuant to such applications, such term
refers only to surface water, and to subterranean streams flowing
through known and definite channels."13 In an effort to resolve the
dispute over how to interpret section 1200, the Board requested a
review and report on the legislative history of the provision and the
administrative and judicial precedents under it. 4 The pages that
follow are a shortened version of that report. Because the history of
California's efforts to deal with the subterranean stream question
turned out to tell a more richly complex story than anyone expected, it
is edited and offered here, with the thought that it may be of interest
to anyone wanting to understand the evolution of western water law.
The report on which this article is based was done under a single,
straightforward assumption. That assumption was that the statutory
provision in question, section 1200, was enacted to achieve some
legislative purpose, and that however unscientific or outdated the
statutory language may be, it is nonetheless likely the legislators had
some real problem in mind. As will become clear in the pages that
follow, those who drafted the 1913 legislation that became today's
Water Code section 1200 were not ignorant of the interactive
relationship between groundwater and surface water. They knew
perfectly well that much percolating groundwater was on its way to or
from a surface stream, and they knew that water appeared,
disappeared, and reappeared on the surface as streams flowed. The
questions addressed here are these: what were the drafters of that
provision of the law trying to accomplish, and what would be required
to implement their intent today?

12. The provision of section 1200 of the California Water Code, set out here,
defines the scope of Board authority for those provisions in Part II of the Water Code
that require Board approval of diversions from a stream, lake, or other body of water.
There are other important distinctions, but they are not within the scope of this
article, e.g., riparian uses require no permit, CAL. WATER CODE § 1201 (West 1971),
and percolating groundwater is not subject to statutory adjudications, Id. § 2500.
13. Id. § 1200.
14. See generally JOSEPH L. SAX, REVIEW OF THE LAWS ESTABLISHING THE SWRCB's
PERMITTING AUTHORITY OVER APPROPRIATIONS OF GROUNDWATER CLASSIFIED AS
SUBTERRANEAN STREAMS AND THE SWRCB's IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE LAWS No. 0-076-

300-0 (2002).
15. The original language read "[w]henever the terms stream, stream system, lake
or other body of water or water occurs in this act, such term shall be interpreted to
refer only to surface water, and to subterranean streams flowing through known and
definite channels." Water Commission Act of 1913, ch. 586, § 42, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012,
1033.
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II. THE JUDICIAL BACKGROUND OF THE WATER
COMMISSION ACT
A. THE POMEROYCASE

It has always been an article of faith among California lawyers that16
one has to look to the 1899 decision in City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy
for legal guidance in deciding whether certain subsurface waters are,
or are not, a subterranean stream under California law.1 7 Before
turning to that much-cited case, a few preliminary comments are in
order. First, the Pomeroy decision is not legally binding precedent.
The court decided it prior to the enactment of the governing statute18
and its predecessor provision, and, therefore, it does not represent the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the legislature's intent in enacting
the Water Commission Act in 1913. Second, Pomeroy has been more
often plucked for its quotable language than studied for its meaning
and context (many commentators quote the language of its headnotes
rather than the text of the opinion), and at least some of what has
been attributed to it over the years is misleading. Third, any effort to
ascertain the significance of Pomeroy to the 1913 law needs to take
account of subsurface water law developments in the California
Supreme Court between 1899 and 1913. Fourth, and finally, it is
important to understand what the legislature was trying to do when it
enacted the statutory provision in question, rather than just assuming
it meant to codify the Pomeroy opinion. The following section
considers each of these matters, because the Pomeroy case itself had an
interesting history.
Pomeroy was an eminent domain valuation case. 9 In order to
improve its municipal water supply system, Los Angeles had
condemned a narrow strip of land comprising 315 acres, averaging
some quarter-mile in width, adjacent to the Los Angeles River just

16. City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585 (Cal. 1899); Hooker v. Los Angeles,
188 U.S. 314 (1903).
17. For example, the Department of Water Resources stated that "[t]he appropriate
legal test to be applied in distinguishing between percolating water and subterranean
streams was set forth by the California Supreme Court in Los Angeles v. Pomeroy more

than 100 years ago." Dep't of Water Res., Statement of the Department of Water
Resources at the State Water Resources Control Board Workshop 1 (April 24, 2000)
(transcript on file with the author). "In determining the legal classification of
groundwater, the State Board and its predecessors have relied on the California
Supreme Court 1899 decision in Los Angeles versus Pomeroy which established the
distinction between subterranean streams and percolating groundwater."

Erin

Mahaney, Address at State Water Resources Control Board Public Workshop,
Subterranean Stream Flowing Through Known and Definite Channels 6 (April 24,
2000) (transcript on file with the author).
18. CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1971). "This article shall not be construed to
authorize the board to regulate groundwater in any manner." CAL. WATER CODE
§ 1221 (West Supp. 2003). As this provision makes clear, under the California Water
Code a "subterranean stream flowing through known and definite channels" is not
legally considered "groundwater." CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1971).
19. Pomeroy, 57 P. at 586.
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above where it passes through the narrows out of the San Fernando
Valley, between the eastern extremity of the Cahuenga Mountains and
the Verdugo hills."0 The question in the case was how to value the land
taken. It was determined that Los Angeles had a paramount pueblo
right to the water of the Los Angeles River. 1 If the water beneath the
condemned land was water of the Los Angeles River, the city was
entitled to it and the condemnation award could not include the sales
value of the water under the land for use elsewhere.2" Notably, the
case had nothing to do with state regulatory jurisdiction over
groundwater. The question was simply whether the water beneath the
defendants' land was part of the Los Angeles River (Los Angeles wins),
or whether it was part and parcel of the condemned land (defendants
win)

23

The physical situation in the case was that the water of the Los
Angeles River had its source in the mountains surrounding the San
Fernando Valley; water that went underground into the alluvium of
the valley, and then by gravity flow, found its way to the river.24 The
court acknowledged that all, or virtually all, the groundwater from the
San Fernando Valley watershed found its way into the Los Angeles
River.25 The defendants' land lay on both sides of the river, and the
subsurface water beneath it was "in intimate contact" with the surface
flow, and flowing in the same direction at a rate about 1/1000 the rate
of the surface stream.2 The court held the evidence sustained a
finding this subsurface flow was a subterranean stream.2 7 The bulk of
the court's opinion examines the question whether the law, with
respect to subterranean streams, was correctly stated in the trial
judge's instructions to the jury.
Because the narrow question in the case was whether the
subsurface water in question was part of the Los Angeles River, the
instructions dealt with evidence of whether the water underground was
an immediate subsurface element of the river, what is usually called
underftow. For example, the trial judge told the jury that if it found

20. Id. at 586-87.
21. Id. at 600.
22. Id. at 591.

23. Id.
24. Pomeroy, 57 P. at 586-87.
25. Id. at 591.
26. The court said the surface stream flowed "at the rate of 2 or 3 feet per second,"
and the subsurface flow was "14 to 17 miles per [year]." See id. This was probably a
misstatement. "Pomeroy... estimated.., groundwater was flowing... 200 to 250 feet
per day .... Groundwater flows a few feet per day." Dennis E. Williams, Statement at
State Water Resources Control Board Public Workshop, Subterranean Stream Flowing
Through Known and Definite Channels 57 (April 24, 2000) (transcript on file with
author).
27. Pomeroy, 57 P. at 592.
28. In defining underflow, reference is usually made to the elements mentioned in
instruction 16 in the Pomeroy decision which stated that groundwater must be

connected to the surface stream, flow in the same direction as the surface stream, be
confined to a reasonably well-defined space, and be moving in a course. Id. at 594.
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the water moving underground was "in the same general direction as
the surface stream, and in connection with it,"2 then the water should
be considered as part of the watercourse. That instruction, and its
approval by the supreme court, does not decide one way or another
whether the presence of subsurface water flowing in the same
direction as the surface stream is a necessary element of any
subterranean stream, only that it is a sufficient element.30 There is,
however, at least one thing the court does make clear: nothing in the
case was intended as a determination that all tributary underground
water should be classified as a subterranean part of the river to which it
is tributary.'
Taken all in all, Pomeroy can be read broadly or narrowly, and
neither reading can be said definitively to be right or wrong. The case
itself deals only with the underftow of a gaining stream,32 but purports
29. Id.
30. Pomeroy quoted, in its entirety, section 48 from Kinney's first edition. Id. at 598
(CLESSON S. KINNEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION § 48, at 69-70 (W. H.
Loudermilk & Co. 1894) [hereinafter KINNEY I]). Kinney, a lawyer, pictured the
subterranean stream in quite formal and conceptual terms, quite at variance even with
the scientific knowledge of his own time, notions which he spelled out at length in his
second edition. 2 CLESSON S. KINNEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION § 1161, at
2106-07 (2d ed. Bender-Moss Co. 1912) [hereinafter KINNEY II]. He included known
and unknown, dependent and independent, subterranean streams. Underflow is the
classic example of what he calls a known, dependent subterranean stream. Id. at 2106.
While what Kinney had primarily in mind were simply the subsurface elements of
more-or-less perennial surface streams, according to him, a subterranean stream may
also be entirely independent of any surface stream, so long as it ascertainably has the
channel-like characteristics of surface streams. Such flows, which Kinney calls
"independent [of surface] streams" may be identified by "the topographical features of
the country." Id. § 1165, at 2117 (citing McClintock v. Hudson, 74 P. 849, 850 (Cal.
1903)).
31. Pomeroy, 57 P. at 597. As the issue is sometimes raised whether the legal
definition of a subterranean stream might embrace the whole of California's immense
Central Valley or any other broad alluvial valley enclosed by mountains and thus
arguably having a bed and banks, the instructions in Pomeroy are striking. Having just
described a "watercourse," as above, the trial judge goes on to say that "[wiater moving
by force of gravity in a valley or basin of wide extent.. . and moving generally through
the hole [sic] or through a large portion of the basin ... composed of alluvial or other
deposit lying throughout the entire basin ... do not constitute a watercourse .... " Id.
at 595. The supreme court underlines this point, noting that the trial judge:
[W]as not giving, or intending to give, a definition which would make the
whole San Fernando basin a subterranean stream. The instructions.., are
applicable ... exclusively to the comparatively narrow outlet of the
valley ... between the rocky and comparatively impervious mountain sides on
either hand... [including] water moving in a definite direction ... [and]
sides and bed to the channel in which it is moving.
Id. at 597. Well before Pomeroy, California court cases had decided to reject integrated
management of surface and groundwater, even where knowledge of the hydrological
impact was clear and undisputed, Gould v. Eaton, 44 P. 319, 320 (Cal. 1896), and
despite a view that such a rule was not required by precedent, and was unwise, S. Pac.
R.R. v. Dufour, 30 P. 783, 784 (Cal. 1892). Explicit reference to these precedents in
Pomeroy makes clear that the Pomeroy court was not seeking to use the subterranean
stream category to bring about integration of surface rights with uses of tributary
groundwater.
32. There seem to be no early cases finding a subterranean stream that involved
anything other than underftow. For example, only a few months after the Pomeroy
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to set out more generally "the proper definition of a subterranean
stream," which it does by quoting from Clesson Kinney's treatise on
the law of irrigation.33 In so doing, it employs terms that are capable of
differing interpretations, but which the court either does not define,
or defines ambiguously. For example, the court does not indicate
what sort of movement is required for subsurface water to be "flowing,"
a matter of some importance since virtually all groundwater is in
motion to some extent. It says a channel must be "defined," and
defined means "contracted and bounded,0 4 but it does not further
define those terms. Whatever contracted and bounded means, the
court acknowledged in the Pomeroy case the contracted and bounded
area was as much as two and one half miles in width,35 which is hardly
what most people would think of as a contracted channel. Moreover,
one is left unsure whether it is essential to the decision that within
such a channel "there was a subsurface flow corresponding [that is,
parallel] with the surface flow..

.

,,6 If so, that would significantly

narrow the potential for a broad area of an alluvial valley to qualify as a
contracted and bounded channel. As to the "sides and bed" to the
channel,37 the court describes them as "comparatively impervious,"
giving no further definition to that characterization.
The plain fact is that while the outcome in Pomeroy, in favor of Los
Angeles, made good sense, the decision's legal effort to define a part
of the groundwater continuum as a "subterranean stream" was both a
hydrogeological and public policy fiasco.
Virtually everyone
acknowledges this. What is less often noted is that the California
Supreme Court soon abandoned the Pomeroy test. In fact, it is almost
certainly the case that the Pomeroy court itself realized the subterranean
stream category it had fashioned was an unfit tool for water
management (though it continues to be cited and relied on
uncritically by the Board today) .39After all, the judges in the Pomeroy
decision, the court held that the subterranean flow in the bed of the San Gabriel River
was underflow constituting a subterranean stream, and not percolating water that
belonged to the owner of the soil. Vineland Irrigation Dist. v.Azusa Irrigating Co., 58
P. 1057, 1059-60 (Cal. 1899).
33. Pomeroy, 57 P. at 598 (quoting KINNEY I, supra note 30, at 69-70).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 597.
36. Id. at 598.
37.

Id. at 597.

38. Pomeroy, 57 P. at 597. Despite the common use of the word "impermeability" in
discussions of the Pomeroy case rule, neither the instructions, nor the California
Supreme Court opinion used that word. The court attributes to the trial court a

standard of"a well-defined channel, with impervious sides and banks," though the word
"impervious" never appears in the trial court's instructions. Id. (emphasis added).
The trial court said only that the sides and banks "may consist of any material which
has the effect of confining the waters within circumscribed limits." Id. at 594
(instruction 15). In any event, the court then describes the channel as being the
"comparatively impervious mountain sides on either hand." Id. at 597.
39. See Decision Determining the Legal Classification of Groundwater in the Pauma

& Pala Basins of the San Luis Rey River, 2002 WL 31441222, at *3 (Cal. State Water
Res. Bd. Oct. 17, 2002) [hereinafter Decision 1645].
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case were perfectly well aware the water in the Los Angeles River, its
underfiow, and the rest of the surface and subsurface water in the San
Fernando Valley, was part of a single, continuous system. The Pomeroy
Court acknowledged that fact explicitly."
It knew full well the
percolating water outside of the acreage in the case was on its way to
those lands where it would be magically transformed into subterranean
stream water. Why, then, did it write the opinion it did? After all,
unlike today's administrative agencies and courts, it had no
subterranean stream language in a statute it was obliged to interpret
and implement. The court was making law in the common law
tradition.
B. THE POMEROY CASE IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The traditional common law definition of subterranean streams4
was very narrow and essentially limited to flows in limestone regions. 1
Why didn't the court in Pomeroy leave it at that, and instead adopt a
common sense test based on whether the water in question was
tributary to the surface river, and whether its pumping would adversely
affect the rights Los Angeles held in the river? That would have been a
straightforward, hydrologically and legally rational approach, and
would have avoided the need to wrestle with the unwieldy concept of a
subterranean stream.
We now know the answer. It was provided a few years later by the
trial judge in Pomeroy, Lucien Shaw. Shaw subsequently became a
Justice of the California Supreme Court, and wrote several important
groundwater opinions, including the decision in Katz v. Walkinshaw.
The explanation is ironic in the extreme, because the justification for
what the court did in Pomeroy, and for the rule it fashioned - which still
dominates California groundwater law a century later - was repudiated
by the California Supreme Court in 1903." Why did the court do what
it did, and what happened next? The answer is fascinating.
In 1899, when Pomeroy was decided, it was still widely believed that
the common law doctrine of absolute ownership was the law governing
groundwater in California.44 Under that doctrine, a landowner could
pump and bear no responsibility for the impact on other pumpers,
however great the damage to them, so long as he was not actuated by
malice. 5 Indeed, the trial judge, in his instructions in Pomeroy, drew on
40. Pomeroy, 57 P. at 595.
41. The conventional cases spoke of those genuine underground flows "in
limestone regions," and the courts recognized that "[u] nderground currents of such a
description are exceptional in their nature ....
Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 84 Am. Dec.
511,513 (Pa. 1863).

42. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903).
43. Id. at 770.
44. SeeCity of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 198 P. 784, 787 (Cal. 1921).

45. The English common law rule for groundwater is generally traced back to the
1843 decision in Acton v. BlundelL Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (Ex.
Ch. 1843). Chasemore v. Richards recognized a subterranean stream exception to this
rule, but the presence of such streams was considered quite exceptional. 1 Engl. Rul.
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the decision in Hanson v. McCue,4" a California case that cited absolute
ownership as the governing rule for groundwater.
If absolute

ownership was the law governing groundwater, Los Angeles would only
be secure in its rights in the Los Angeles River if the water in question
was a "subterranean stream," and thus not subject to the law governing
groundwater. The assumption that absolute ownership was the law
governing groundwater created the need, in Pomeroy, for a

subterranean stream doctrine. 48 The irony of Pomeroy is that absolute
ownership was not the law in California after all, though the court was

not to so rule until several years after deciding Pomeroy.
Though the Pomeroy court understood the hydrological realities
in the case before it, it accepted the premise that underlay Judge
Shaw's instructions: percolating groundwater was subject to the
absolute ownership rule.50 On that premise, either Los Angeles had to
lose a case that the court undoubtedly believed the city deserved to
win, or the court had to look to a legal theory that solved the
immediate problem before it, but created a hydrologically untenable

distinction among groundwater at different stages of its voyage
through the San Fernando Valley. The Pomeroy court chose to decide
in favor of a result that protected Los Angeles' treasury at the expense
of a coherent legal theory. Since Pomeroy did not actually involve a
dispute over the use of the water itself, it left to another day the
question how much protection Los Angeles would be given against

pumpers generally in the San Fernando Valley, that is, how much
tributary groundwater would be found to be "subterranean stream"
water.

Cas. 729, 754 (Ex. Ch. 1859).
46. 42 Cal. 303 (1871).
47. The Hanson case seems to be the first California decision to use the sort of
formulation that appeared in Pomeroy and then later showed up in California statutory
law. "[A] subterranean stream of a defined character, and flowing in a defined
channel." Id. at 308. It is perhaps worth noting that in its characterization of
subterranean streams, the court in Hanson seems to have had in mind something
much more like a true river underground. "Underground currents of water.., are
known to exist in considerable volume, particularly in limestone regions." Id. But
"[I]imestone in California is insignificant as a water-bearing formation." CAL. DEP'T OF
WATER RES., BULLETIN No. 118 CALIFORNIA'S GROUND WATER 15 (Sept. 1975).
"[D]efinite underground streams are few and of rare occurrence ....
2 SAMUEL C.
WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN TH4E WESTERN STATES § 1077, at 1011-12 (3d ed. 1911).
48. Hanson, 42 Cal. at 309. To be sure, any jurisdiction that had separate legal
regimes for groundwater and surface water (even if absolute ownership was not the
groundwater rule), had to have some way to draw a line between what was
groundwater and what was surface water. It was early recognized that some water,
though physically beneath the surface of the earth, was functionally so much part and
parcel of the surface stream that it was prudent, not to say essential, to manage it
integrally with the surface stream. But, as we shall see, that did not mean one needed
the artifice of a "subterranean stream" doctrine such as that fashioned by Kinney. See
text accompanying note 30.
49. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 771 (Cal. 1903).
50. City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 594 (Cal. 1899).
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C. DOING THEJOB POMEROYFAILED TO DO: KATZ V. WALKINSHAWAND
Los ANGELES V. HUNTER

Only four years after the Pomeroy decision, the California Supreme
Court decided a far more famous case, Katz v. Walkinshaw.5 The facts
were simple enough. The plaintiff was pumping groundwater and
using it on his overlying land, and the defendant was pumping
groundwater from under his nearby land, and taking it off the
overlying land for use. 2 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's
pumping dried up his wells, and that he was entitled to relief.53 The
defendant asserted that California followed the absolute ownership
doctrine of groundwater law whereby "each landowner owns absolutely
the percolating waters in his land, with the right to extract, sell, and
dispose of them as he chooses, regardless of the results to his
neighbor. ' 54 The plaintiff denied absolute ownership was the law in
California, but had a second theory. He claimed they were both
pumping from an underground stream, and as a result, the law
governing percolating groundwater, even if it was absolute ownership,
did not apply.55
What makes the case especially significant here is the court found
that it need not decide whether the water in question was a
subterranean stream or percolating groundwater, because absolute
ownership was not the law of percolating groundwater in California."
Thus, the defendant would lose whether the water in question was
percolating water or the water of a subterranean stream. Today Katz
is universally known as the case that declared correlative rights to be
the doctrine governing competing groundwater pumpers in
California. 5 What is not so well remembered is the decision broke
sharply with tradition and precedent, and rejected claims that absolute
ownership must be the law of percolating groundwater because that
was the common law rule, because California had adopted the
common law, and because Hanson v. McCue, a previous California
9
Supreme Court decision, had stated in dictum that it was the law.5 The
rejection of the common law absolute ownership rule in Katz was at the
time considered "novel, and of the utmost importance" and the case
51. 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Katz, 74 P. at 771.
57. See id. at 772.
58. Id. Amazingly, people still quote the absolute ownership language that
appeared in instruction 12 in Pomeroy. See, e.g., Letter from William H. Baber III, Esq.,
Partner, Minasian, Spruance, Baber, Meith, Soares & Sexton, LLP, to State Water
Resources Control Board 2 (April 18, 2000) (on file with the author). They quote the
language despite the supreme court's express disavowal of absolute ownership as the
law in Katz. Katz, 74 P. at 771.
59. Katz, 74 P. at 770-71; Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303, 309 (Cal. 1871).
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was decided by the court upon rehearing, following exhaustive
briefing. 60
The relevance of the groundbreaking decision in Katz is that it
made the doctrinal gymnastics of the Pomeroy case unnecessary, and
reduced the subterranean stream category to virtual irrelevance. If
landowners pumping groundwater-even percolating groundwatermust respect the rights of other water-rights holders whom their
pumping injures, then it makes no difference in a case like Pomeroy
whether the water in question was a subterranean stream or
percolating water. Since Los Angeles had a paramount pueblo right to
the waters of the Los Angeles River, any diversion of groundwater that
impaired that right would violate Los Angeles' right under the rule of
Katz. 6
Katz essentially determined the resolution of conflict between
contending water users should be based on the impact of one use
upon another, rather than upon some ex-ante classification of the
source. This change was calculated to bring the legal rules into
congruence with hydrological realities; and in doing so, to replace the
legal fiction that groundwater movement was unknowable with casespecific factual inquiries. Was the water's movement known or
practically determinable? If so, what were the impacts? And if there
were impacts, were they legally redressable?
Had the Katz decision preceded Pomeroy, the subterranean stream
concept in California law might well have faded into the mists of legal
history. As the court stated in Katz, "averment[s] that... water
constitute[s] part of an underground stream may be regarded as
surplusage." 6' That statement is especially notable because the author
of the Katz opinion was none other than Lucien Shaw, the trial court
judge in Pomeroy.63 It was Judge Shaw's instructions that were the
subject of the decision in Pomeroy, and it was Shaw who relied on the
absolute ownership doctrine from Hanson v. McCue in his
instructions. 64 His reliance on the absolute ownership doctrine may
have been the very thing that led the Pomeroy court to rely on the
subterranean stream finding, and to equivocate about the status of all
the rest of the percolating, tributary groundwater in the San Fernando
Valley. Yet four years later it was the same Lucien Shaw, now ajustice
(and later chief justice) of the California Supreme Court, who wrote
the Katz opinion stating the "subterranean stream" category was
effectively "surplusage."'5 Indeed, in a law review article he wrote many
years later, Shaw restated the holding of Pomeroy in terms that brought

60. Katz, 74 P. at 766.
61. See City of Los Angeles v. Hunter, 105 P. 755, 757 (Cal. 1909).
62.

Katz, 74 P. at 766.

63. Id.
64. City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 593-94 (Cal. 1899) (referring to

"absolute owners" in instruction 12).
65. Katz, 74 P. at 766-67.
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That case, he said,
it into line with Katz and subsequent decisions.
stood for the proposition that "persons having rights in a natural
stream were threatened with injury by the extraction of the
percolating
[!] water which sustained and supported the stream in its
6
floW.

Why, then, did Shaw give the instruction he did in Pomeroy, which
made the distinction between a subterranean stream and percolating
ground water so important? Shaw gave the explanation in his opinion
in Katz. Speaking of himself, he said:
Inasmuch as the writer of this opinion [in Katz] was also the writer of
the instruction under consideration [in Pomeroy], it may be proper to
say that he did not give the instruction because he approved that part
of it restating the doctrine of Hanson v. McCue. The instruction was
given because ... [it] had been requested by the appellants in the
case, and... [Los Angeles] consented that that part should be given
in substance, rather than take the chances of a reversal of the case
should the Supreme Court hold its refusal to be erroneous [that is,
should the supreme court approve the absolute ownership
doctrine].68
In short, Los Angeles was worried that absolute ownership might
be held to be the law of percolating groundwater in California, and if
it were, then Los Angeles could only prevail if the water under the land
being condemned was not percolating groundwater, but was part of a
subterranean stream. 69 Thus, to be on the safe side, it agreed to the
instruction, and the Pomeroy court, unwilling or unready to repudiate

the absolute ownership doctrine, assumed its validity, and was thus
obliged to draw the subterranean stream/percolating groundwater
distinction."0
It was not until Shaw's opinion in Katz that the court decisively
repudiated absolute ownership.71 Any doubt the subterranean stream
issue was no longer considered significant to groundwater litigation in
California was removed in subsequent supreme court decisions. In a
case decided less than a month after Katz, Justice Shaw wrote:
The case of Katz v. Walkinshaw ...establishes a rule with respect to
waters percolating in the soil, which makes it to a large extent
immaterial whether the waters in this land were or were not a part of
an underground stream, provided the fact be established that their
extraction from the ground diminished to that extent, or to some
substantial extent, the waters flowing in the stream.72

66. Lucien Shaw, The Development of the Law of Waters in the West, 10 CAL. L. REv. 443,
458 (1922).

67. Id. (exclamation point added).
68. Katz, 74 P. at 770.

69. See id.
70. See id.

71. Id. at 771.
72. McClintock v. Hudson, 74 P. 849, 850-51 (Cal. 1903). The court made this
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Then in 1909, in another groundwater case, the court stated
"[t]here is no rational ground for any distinction between such
percolating waters and the waters in the gravels immediately beneath
and directly supporting the surface flow, and no reason for applying a
different rule to the two classes ...if, indeed, the two classes can be
distinguished at all."7
74
That same year the court decided City of Los Angeles v. Hunter.
Hunter dealt with the question raised but left in limbo in Pomeroy: What
right did landowners in the San Fernando Valley further from the
stream than those in Pomeroy (though still within the several-miles-wide
banks area identified in Pomeroy) have to pump tributary groundwater
that diminished flows in the Los Angeles River?" In order to quiet title
to its paramount right to use of the waters of the river, Los Angeles
brought suit against owners of some 5,000 acres in the San Fernando
Valley, of which the owners were pumping water asserted to be
tributary to the Los Angeles River."' The defendants' principal claim
was "that the waters are strictly percolating waters, not belonging to
the subterranean flow of the stream, but if concededly on the way to
join and swell such flow, still percolating waters, to the use of which, as
owners of the land, they have an absolute indefeasible right.""
The court rejected this claim, holding it was immaterial whether
the waters in question were considered percolating or not."' Since
"[t]hese waters percolate.., in the sense that they form a vast mass of
water confined in a basin filled with detritus, always slowly moving
downward to the outlet [which is the Los Angeles River, then insofar
as] Los Angeles has paramount right to the use of all the waters of the
river.., none of these so-called percolating waters may be withdrawn
to the invasion and injury of such right." 79 It was held unnecessary, as
in Katz and McClintock, to classify the water either as percolating or as a
subterranean stream.80
When Kinney, on whose 1894 treatise the Pomeroy court had
relied,' published his second edition in 1912 he acknowledged the
statement in response to a claim by a surface riparian user that a neighboring
landowner was unlawfully interfering with the plaintiff's right by pumping and taking
water offsite for use, because the groundwater being pumped was a "subterranean
stream" drawing from the surface stream. Id. at 849.
73. Hudson v. Dailey, 105 P. 748, 753 (Cal. 1909). The category had not wholly
disappeared, it seems. See Arroyo Ditch & Water Co. v. Baldwin, 100 P. 874, 875 (Cal.

1909). The Arroyo Ditch decision's use of the subterranean stream category is at odds

with the great weight of California Supreme Court opinions of that era.
74. 105 P. 755 (Cal. 1909). Notably the decision in the Hunter case was written by

Justice Frederick W. Henshaw, who participated in both Pomeroy and Katz City of Los
Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 605 (Cal. 1899); Katz, 74 P. at 773.
75. Hunter, 105 P. at 756.

76. Id.
77. Id.
78.

Id. at 757.

79. Id.
80.

Hunter, 105 P. at 757.

81. City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 598 (Cal. 1899) (quoting KINNEY I,
supra note 30, § 48, at 69-70).
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change. Citing the more recent California cases, such as Hunter, he
explained that only a limited class of percolating waters, diffused
percolating waters, "are considered as a part of the very soil itself and
belong to the realty in which they are found."82 Picking up the test of
Hunter,he explained that "these [percolating] waters are those which,
as far as known, do not contribute or are not tributary to the flow of any
definite stream or body of surface or subterranean waters. " " Though
unwilling to let loose of the old terminology, Kinney acknowledged the
groundwater question was becoming a matter of evidence based on the
ability to determine hydrological relationships, rather than a formal
classification based on the geography of the water's movement:
It is plain to see that, as the years go by, the class of diffused
percolating waters will be growing smaller and smaller. This is due to
the scientific investigations of the movements of percolating waters
through the ground, and also to the discoveries which are constantly
being made that certain waters which were once considered mere
percolations flowed in defined subterranean channels which have
become known ....In time, if the courts are as active in establishing
new rules governing subterranean waters within the next few years as
they have been in the past ten years, which rules have but kept pace
with the scientific investigations upon the subject, this class of
subterranean waters will pass from the class of those flowing in
unknown courses to those flowing in known courses, and the 'secret
incomprehensible influences,' and 'practical uncertainties'
will
84
become comprehensible influences and practical certainties.

The newer Californiajudicial approach that Kinney acknowledged,
which focused on whether groundwater was known to be contributing
to a surface stream, as the line of demarcation, continued into modern
times. In 1943, in Los Angeles v. Glendale, the supreme court stated
unequivocally that Los Angeles' pueblo right in the Los Angeles River
extended to all the groundwater in the San Fernando Valley upon
which the flow of the river depended. 5 The court also made clear, by
citing Hunter as authority, it did not view that case as limited to
groundwater in the southeast corner of the valley within the bed and
banks area described by Pomeroy:
It has long been established that as successor to the pueblo of Los
Angeles, the city of Los Angeles has a right, superior to that of a
riparian or an appropriator, to satisfy its needs from the waters of the
Los Angeles River. Because the flow of the river is dependent on the supply
of water in the San FernandoValley, it has also been 86held that the pueblo right
includes a priorright to all of the waters in the basin.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

2 KINNEY II, supra note 30, § 1188.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (citations omitted).
142 P.2d 289, 292-93 (Cal. 1943).
Id. at 292 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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In 1975, in Los Angeles v. San Fernando, the supreme court
reaffirmed Glendale explicitly. 7 But it did something else as well. It
made clear that the scope of Los Angeles' pueblo right grew out of the
scope of the waters of the Los Angeles River, and that the scope of the
Los Angeles River was determined by the extent of the groundwater
that was tributary to the river.88 In other words, for determining
pueblo rights, the Los Angeles River consists of its surface flow and the
groundwater tributary to it. The court decided the subterranean
extent of the Los Angeles River is measured by the tributary nature of
the groundwater in the San Fernando Valley, the very thing that
Pomeroy said it was not deciding.89 Revealingly, both the Glendale and
San Fernando cases cite Hunter, not Pomeroy, as authority for the
expansive view of the subterranean extent of the Los Angeles River. 90
In this respect, it is important to note Glendale and San Fernandodo not
simply say pueblo rights extend to groundwater beneath the pueblo
boundaries." The court conceived of the pueblo right as including,
within the surface stream, its tributary groundwater-the "waters of the
Los Angeles River and the waters supplying it.29

The cases are about

"rights in the Los Angeles River,"93 "the river to which the pueblo right
attaches."" That, of course, is a fundamentally different view both
from the 1894 Kinney classification of waters, 95 and from the boundary
the court in Pomeroy was at pains to identify when it said its decision was
not meant to embrace the entire San Fernando Valley. 96
But - and this is a most important "but" - the legislation upon

which section 1200 of the Water Code rests did not follow the path
that Justice Shaw and the California Supreme Court's subsequent
pueblo rights cases set out. Instead, by a circuitous path, the
legislature was led back to the distinction and formulation the Pomeroy
court had used. How that happened is the subject of the pages that
follow.
III. THE STATUTORY RESPONSE
A. THE WATER COMMISSION ACT OF 1913
Prior to 1911, all appropriation rights to surface water were
acquired under sections 1410 to 1422 of the Civil Code, which

87. 537 P.2d 1250, 1287-88 (Cal. 1975).
88. Id. at 1288.

89. Id.; City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 598 (Cal. 1899).
90.
91.
297.
92.

See City of San Fernando,537 P.2d at 1261, 1286; City of Glendale, 142 P.2d at 292.
See City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d at 1288; City of Glendale, 142 P.2d at 292-93,
City of San Fernando,537 P.2d at 1261 (quoting City of Glendale, 142 P.2d at 293).

93. Id. at 1281 n.23.
94. Id. at 1288.
95.
96.

KINNEY I, supranote 30, at 69-70.

City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 597 (Cal. 1899).
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essentially required filing a notice of appropriation." Failure to
comply made appropriators vulnerable to subsequent claimants who
complied with the statutes.98 The state did not administrate water
rights.99 Groundwater was simply pumped by overlying landowners
In 1911, the
without any state administration or regulation. 09
to study the
Commission
legislature established a State Conservation
of the
resources
need for new laws to control the use of the natural
State (one of which was water), report to the governor, and
recommend measures to the legislature. 10' George C. Pardee, a
progressive Republican, who had been California's Governor from
1903-07, was appointed chairman of the Commission. The other two
members were Francis Cuttle and J.P. Baumgartner. The report of the
Commission was transmitted on January 1, 1913,102 and its legislative
proposal for water was the source for the bill that ultimately became
the Water Commission Act. 03 Section 42 of that Act is, with very slight
The
changes, today's California Water Code Section 1200.1' 4
inspiration for the enactment of a comprehensive water law was
influential 1901 Report of Irrigation Investigations in
Elwood Mead's
05
California.

The original legislative draft prepared by the Conservation
Commission explicitly provided a permit system both for surface and
underground waters, and the two categories were dealt with in
separate, similar sections of the draft bill.'0 Just as the bill recognized
riparian uses of surface water, and did not subject them to permitting,
CAL. CIV. CODE§§ 1410-1422 (1908) (repealed in part 1943).
Id. § 1419.
See id. §§ 1410-1422.
See STATE CONSERVATION COMM'N, 1913 REPORT OF THE CONSERVATION
COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 31 (1913) [hereinafter COMM'N FIRST REPORT]
(transmitted to the Governor and LegislatureJan. 1, 1913).
101. Act of Apr. 8, 1911, ch. 408, §§ 1 & 3, 1911 Cal. Stat. 822. At the same time the
legislature established a State Board of Control (the next year its work was taken over
by the State Water Commission), which had authority to accept applications for the
use of water for power purposes, and which could grant term licenses for twenty-five
years (later extended to forty years). Act of Jan. 2, 1912, ch. 41, § 1, 1912 Cal. Stat.
177; Act of April 8, ch. 406, § 1, 1911 Cal. Stat. 813. See STATE CONSERVATION COMM'N,
97.
98.
99.
100.

1914 REPORT OF THE CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 7 (1914).
102. COMM'N FIRST REPORT, supra note 100, at 19-42. No official version of the

Commission's legislative recommendation is extant. A version found in the Charles
David Marx Papers, at Stanford University, SC 161, Series VIII, Box 1, is undoubtedly
the Commission's bill, as explained more fully below. See discussion infra text
accompanying note 117.
103. Water Commission Act of 1913, ch. 586, § 45, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012, 1033.
104. Id.; CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West Supp. 2003).
105. ELWOOD MEAD, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., REPORT OF IRRIGATION INVESTIGATIONS IN
CALIFORNIA BULLETIN NO. 100 (1901). Elwood Mead, a pioneer in western water law,

was the first state engineer of Wyoming, and later Commissioner of the Federal
Bureau of Reclamation. See COMM'N FIRST REPORT, supra note 100, at 35.
106. SeeWater Commission Bill, §§ 2, 9-13, 27 (proposed to the General Assembly by
the California Conservation Commission in 1913) [hereinafter Water Commission
Bill]. There was some odd lack of parallelism. While the bill required registration of
proposed riparian uses and abolished unused surface riparian rights after four years of
nonuse, no such limitations were imposed on overlying uses of groundwater. See id.
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it recognized the right of overlying landowners to use underground
water on overlying land without permitting. 1 7 But it did require those
seeking either surface stream appropriations, or groundwater
appropriations for use off the overlying land, to obtain appropriation
permits.0 8 In addition, the bill specifically granted the Commission
authority to protect those with surface stream rights against off-tract
underground pumpers "where it is claimed that such development and
carrying away of water is diminishing the supply of water of such
riparian owner or appropriator of water from the streams of water or
underground water of the State of California."'0 9
In short, the Commission bill sought to eliminate substantively
different groundwater and surface water legal regimes, and to institute
integrated, parallel systems. But because the bill still recognized
underground water and surface water as distinct categories, the
Commission had not really rid itself of the need to answer the
question: what is groundwater, and what is surface water?" ° Section 8
of the bill defined "[u]nderground water, for the purpose of this
act.. . as any water that occurs or is found beneath the surface of the
ground," and generated a lengthy discussion in hearings held by the
Commission.
The predictable question was: if a surface stream
moves underground for a certain distance, and then again rises to the
surface, may one put a pump in the below-surface area and then be
subject to the underground water provisions of the act, rather than the
surface water provisions?"' The Commission debated the question
whether there was water that "occurs or is found beneath the surface
of the ground" that should not be treated as underground water, but as
surface water?"
107. Id. §§ 2, 8-12.
108. Id. §§ 13, 27.
109. Id. § 17.
110. Samuel Wiel, a prominent San Francisco attorney and writer on water law, was
in active consultation with the Commission, and had suggested, unsuccessfully, a
"consolidated" system. Wiel says that his "suggestions were not acted upon by the
Commission and form no part of the bill presented to the legislature, nor of the
statute passed." Samuel C. Wiel, A Short Code of Underground Waters, 2 CAL. L. REv. 25,
25 (1914). Wiel's notion was that "[a] definite body of water upon the surface, and
the underground water proximately connected therewith in natural occurrence,
constitute a consolidated underground and surface water-supply" and that rights
should "extend to the whole and every part of a consolidated surface and
underground water-supply.., without distinction between the surface part and the
underground part." Id. at 26.
111. Water Commission Bill, supra note 106, § 8.
112. It is not clear what exactly the differences in result would have been, since, in
general, the bill sought to integrate the two sources, but it seemed to have anticipated
at least one difference: Under section 17 of the bill, groundwater appropriators
making off-tract uses were made subordinate to surface-stream riparians whose supply
their appropriations diminish. Id. § 17. However, there was nothing in the bill that
made surface-stream appropriators subordinate to overlying on-tract users of
groundwater when the surface-stream appropriations diminish their supply, though
groundwater appropriators appear to be thus subordinated under section 15(a). Id.
§ 15(a).
113. Id.§8.
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The following excerpts from a hearing held on the Commission's
original bill on May 28, 1912, are exceptionally revealing of how those
involved in the development of the 1913 legislation were thinking
about the issue at the time. The chair of the Commission, former
Governor George Pardee, was going through the Commission's draft
bill section by section:
MR. PARDEE: Section 8: Underground water, for the purpose of
this Act, is defined as any water that occurs or is found beneath the
surface of the ground

MR. KEECH: ... The sub-surface stream is deemed to be part of
the stream; one minute it is in the open and another minute it is
below the surface. The vested rights in a stream under the riparian
law is [sic] the stream consisting of the running open water on the
surface and also of the sub-surface water in the same bed.

MR. BAUMGARTNER: As we have handled "Stream flow" in the
Bill, does it interfere with the sub-surface stream?
MR. KEECH: You have handled "stream" so far under the term of
riparian rights only, and the riparian rights include that sub-surface
flow and is [sic] sustained by the courts, and sustained by
constitutional provision. Now you propose to take out and destroy it
as a stream flow and put in and classify underground water with subsurface flow.
MR. PARDEE: How would this do: [Underground water ...

is

defined as any water that occurs or is found beneath the surface of
the ground] "[o] utside limits of defined stream."

MR. CUTTLE: All I seek is to determine what is underground
stream and what is percolating water.
MR. KEECH: ... This sub-surface flow is an all important matter
and it is so radical a departure from the law that I do not think it
would stand. I think you have attempted to incorporate riparian law
in accordance with the decisions of the courts, but now you take that
underground flow right out of the rule and class it with water with
which it has never been classed; and since you provide for both kinds
of water, why have you made that radical change?
MR. PARDEE: Put right at the end of the sentence "Exterior to
banks of streams". ["Underground water, for the purpose of this Act,
is defined as any water that occurs or is found beneath the surface of
the ground exterior to banks of streams."]
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MR. KEECH: I should say [except] "Sub-stream flow." You have
not defined stream flow, but nevertheless it is defined under the law.
You have not defined stream, but that is a term known to the law.
Either would be satisfactory to me.
MR. PARDEE: You want it confined to the banks of a stream?
MR. KEECH: Yes, that is all right....
[It was then suggested that confining sub-stream flow to the banks of
the stream was too narrow a definition, narrower than the court had
already determined in Pomeroy].

MR. KEECH: What would you say?
MR. SHORT: I would say stream flow and nothing more.

MR. TAIT: I would say just [water that occurs or is found beneath
the surface of the ground] "[o] ther than stream flow".
MR. CUTTLE: Would not this difficulty crop up of determining
what is underground stream flow or percolating water?
MR. SHORT: You cannot get rid of this difficulty. The rights of
one kind of water is [sic] of one nature, and of the other kind of
water of another nature. You want to leave the stream unimpaired
and call all other kind of water underground water.

MR. WIEL: I suggest this Bill have two or three chapters,
underground water and stream flow,- and provide that no water that
directly effects [sic]
a surface flow sall be affected by this
[underground] chapter....

MR. SHORT: My suggestion would be that the Act, the general
scope, should apply to all waters now unappropriated as stream flow,
andto all underground waters other than stream flow. When you say
that you have done the best you can.

114. Hearing on Proposed Water Commission Bill Before the California State Water

Commission, 8-13 (May 28, 1912) [hereinafter Hearing]. Stenographic transcripts of
these hearings were found in Oakland in the Pardee Home Museum Papers, Water
Conservation, Box 29 (copies of the transcripts are on file with the author). The cast
of characters in the hearings is as follows: Pardee was the chair of the Conservation
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It is clear from this colloquy that the men who drafted the
Conservation Commission's bill understood that any line separating
groundwater from surface water was a human construct made for some
managerial purpose, rather than a line separating two distinct
hydrological entities.
Notably, no one made reference to the
formalism of Kinney, or to traditional conceptions of "subterranean
streams." They seem to have understood perfectly well that water was a
continuum. They conceived their task as drawing a functionally useful,
if hydraulically arbitrary, line at what was effectively part of the stream
flow. Their purpose was to define what uses would come within the
bill's provisions dealing with "underground water," such as section 13,
and "appropriators of waters from the streams," such as section 17. As
Samuel Wiel-the leading water law authority of his day, and a
participant in the above-quoted colloquy-put it, what was needed for
that purpose was a definition sufficient to protect streams against
pumping that "directly effects [sic] a surface flow."" 5
Both the Commission's original bill and the above discussion
demonstrate that these water experts, as of 1913, did not believe
groundwater was too mysterious in its ways to be subject to legal
control. The commonly heard notion that people back then still16
considered groundwater incapable of management is simply wrong.
As we shall see shortly, the legislative reluctance to institute integrated
management was fundamentally based on legal reservations, not
technical or managerial ones.
Commission, and, as noted above, Francis Cuttle and J.P. Baumgartner were the other
two Commission Members. E.E. Keech was a lawyer practicing in Santa Ana, who
represented water users in San Bernardino, Riverside, and Los Angeles Counties.
Samuel Wiel, as noted above, was a very prominent San Francisco lawyer and a prolific
writer on water law. Frank H. Short of Fresno was a prominent water lawyer who
represented Central Valley agricultural interests. Mr. Tait was probably C.E. Tait, who
was senior irrigation engineer, in the office of public roads and rural engineering, at
the United States Department of Agriculture. He was a member of a commission that

issued a report on the utilization of the Mojave River for irrigation in Victor Valley in
1917. 1 have not been able to identify Mr. Lane. He might have been Franklin K.
Lane, who was Secretary of the Interior in President Wilson's Cabinet, and previously a
water lawyer in San Francisco. However, Lane was a member of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, and in Washington, D.C. from 1905-1913, when he became
Interior Secretary.
115. Id. at 12. As described in supra note 110, Wiel personally opposed drawing any
distinction between ground and surface water, though that was never the position of
the Commission. In this same colloquy Wiel said:

I would not make any distinction between stream flow and underground
water, make no distinction whatever, but take water supply. If water supply is
partially underground and partially on the surface, there is no reason why
people should not enjoy it whether underground [or] in the stream. There
should be a right in the supply regardless of whether underground or

surface.
Id. at 12-13. Mr. Keech replied that such a proposal "is a departure from this Bill and

is a radical construction." Id. at 13.
116. The usual source for this belief is an 1850 Connecticut case, in which the court

said groundwater influences "are so secret, changeable and uncontroulable [sic], we
cannot subject them to the regulations of law, nor build upon them a system of rules,
as has been done with streams upon the surface." Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 532, 540

(1850).
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By the time the Commission's bill was introduced in the Assembly
some seven months later, it had been extensively revised." 7 Though
we have the bills themselves, and the votes on various amendments,
the full history of the legislation's development during the legislative
session is lost (or at least has not yet been found), though we do have
numerous newspaper reports on the bill's progress through the
legislature. Most importantly, we have the bill originally drafted by the
Commission, and a full transcript of the hearings (from which the
above excerpts were taken) in which many-probably most-of the
most influential figures participated."' It appears there was another
somewhat modified version that appeared between the time of the
Commission draft and the first introduced bill, and there is a law
review commentary discussing it in some detail," 9 but the draft itself
has not been found. From the commentary, it appears to have been
very similar to the bill introduced in the Assembly.20 As can best be
gleaned from the law review text, that draft contained nothing new or
significant relating to groundwater.
No explicit evidence of authorship has been found as to any of the
bill drafts or amendments, but an undated document supporting the
law, written just prior to the time it was submitted to a public
referendum in 1914, has been found among Governor Pardee's
papers. That document says "This Water Commission Law was drawn
by the State Conservation Commission, aided by a number of
prominent attorneys, among whom may be mentioned Judge Curtis H.
Lindley, of San Francisco; Judge Farraher, of Siskiyou; E.E. Keech, of
Santa Ana..''. In Pardee's hand there is22 an insert at this point saying
"Mention any others you may think of."

Assemblyman W.A. Johnstone introduced Assembly Bill No. 642 on
January 23, 1913.123 The bill seems to follow Wiel's advice given in the
hearings (though not his more general groundwater proposals in his
117.

Compare Water Commission Bill, supra note 106, with A.B. 642, 40th Leg., Reg.

Sess. (Cal. 1913).
118. The existence of these materials was unknown until they were discovered in the
course of preparing the report from which this article is drawn.

The original

legislative drafts were discovered in the archives of the Pardee Home Museum in
Oakland, California, and the transcript of the hearings on them in the Charles David
Marx Papers in the Stanford University Library. Copies of the legislative drafts and

transcripts of the hearings are on file with the author.
119. See generally A.E. Chandler, The "Water Bill" Proposed by the Conservation
Commission of California,1 CAL. L. REV. 148, 161-68 (1913).
120. Compare id., with A.B. 642.

121. Undated unsigned typescript author identified among Governor Pardee's
papers (on file with the author).
122. Id. Franklin Hichborn, while covering the legislature for the Sacramento Bee,

stated "Francis Cuttle ... had much to do with the framing of the measure." FRANKLIN
HIC-IBORN, STORY OF THE SESSION OF THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE OF 1913, at 153
(1913).
123. A.B. 642. Johnstone became Chair of the State Water Commission in 1915,
succeeding Professor Charles David Marx of Stanford University. Johnstone and
Pardee knew each other, and some correspondence between them (though not on
this subject) is among the Pardee papers.
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1914 law review article). 24 The bill makes no distinction between
surface water and groundwater, but simply covers "water" generally. 2 '
It establishes a permit system for the appropriation of all water which
has never been appropriated or applied to riparian use, 26 recognizes
existing appropriations, and abolishes unused riparian rights after five
years from the time the bill is enacted.2 7 This is not different in
substance from what the original Commission bill sought to do, as it
would have created an appropriation permit system for both
groundwater and surface water. Unlike the original Commission draft,
it did not take up groundwater and surface water in separate
provisions. By creating a unified system of appropriation applicable to
all water, the bill as introduced avoided the need to define or
distinguish surface water from underground water, the issue that had
so troubled the Commission members and their advisors during the
hearing quoted above.'28 Section 42 of the introduced bill simply says
"[t]he word 'water' in this act shall be construed as embracing the
of water' in this act shall be
term 'or use of water'; and the term 'or use
12 9
construed as embracing the word 'water.'
That approach did not last for long. The very first amendment to
the bill, dated April 2, added the following sentence to section 42
stating "[w]henever the terms stream, stream system, lake or other
body of water occurs in this act [and those were the operative terms for
water in the bill], such term shall be interpreted to refer only to
surface water." 3 0 Surprisingly, this significant change from both the
Commission draft and the bill as introduced, sweeping away
governance of groundwater, appears to have generated no
controversy, and to have been acceptable to the supporters of the
bill. 3' The most likely reason is that they had been persuaded that
subjecting groundwater to the same permitting system as surface water
exceeded the state's authority, and thereby hangs a most significant
tale .
While I have found nothing documenting the thinking of those

124. SeeWiel, supra note 110, at 25.
125. The bill never mentions groundwater, underground water, or subsurface water
in any form. It is simply implicitly incorporated in the overall definition of water.

126. A.B. 642 §§ 1, 15-16. In what is probably an unintended omission, it does not
explicitly recognize overlying on-tract uses of groundwater, the analogue of riparian
rights on a stream.
127. Id. §§ 11, 34.
128. See Hearing,supra note 114, at 8-13.

129. A.B. 642 § 42.
130. April 2 Amendment to A.B. 642, 40th Leg. Sess. (Cal. 1913), reprinted in 1913
AsSEM.J. 1116, 1128, § 42 (Cal. Apr. 2,1913).

131. See HicHBoRN, supra note 122, at 150 (noting that amendments proposed by the
Conservation Committee were adopted "without difficulty").
132. One bit of evidence in support of the view that the concern was about the
scope of state authority is that when this amendment was adopted, the title of the bill

was also changed. A sentence was added to the beginning of the title saying "to
regulate the use of water which is subject to such control by the State of California,
and in that behalf." Apr. 2 Amendment to A.B. 642 at amend. 1, 1116.
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who drafted the amendment, there is some highly revealing material
in the Commission's hearings during the previous year, and doubtless
those who participated in the Commission's hearings also participated
in the development of the bill as it moved through the legislature. On
the same day the colloquy excerpted above took place, there was also a
discussion of the scope of legislative permitting authority over
groundwater. The Commission's discussion had moved on from
section 8 to section 11 of the bill."' The section dealing with
groundwater provided "[o]wners of overlying land shall have the right
to use such underground water on such overlying land only, and such
use shall be for useful and beneficial purposes only, and may be had
'4
without appropriating the same or filing notice of appropriation.' 1
Section 13 said that " [t] he right to appropriate underground water for
use on other than overlying land may be acquired by filing application
for appropriation of such underground water with the said Water
Commission... and complying with all conditions required from
appropriation of water from streams of water.. . .""' And section 27 of
the bill gave the Water Commission broad discretion to impose
conditions through adoption of rules and regulations that limited the
extent and purposes for which appropriations could be made. 3 "
These provisions generated a lively discussion about the nature of a
landowner's existing property right to use groundwater. All agreed
that beneficial overlying uses should be recognized, and that any uses
37
had to respect the rights of others, as Katz v. Walkinshaw had held.
The question was whether the legislature had the authority to subject
non-overlying uses to a discretionary permit system parallel to the one
that applied to surface streams. The claim effectively was that there
was an important legal difference between the status of surface
streams, whose unappropriated water belonged to the public, and
underground water in which-though subject to correlative rightsthe overlying owner held a property interest. If there was a preexisting property right (even though it was not the absolute ownership
of the common law, and was correlative with other rights as per Katz),
then arguably the effort to give a Commission fully discretionary
permitting authority-to deny a permit for some reason other than to
protect another's water rights-was at odds with the landowner's
property interest in groundwater beneath his land.'
Wiel started the discussion, saying "[i]f you give somebody the
right to appropriate water you assume the right to take it away from

133. See Hearing, supra note 114, at 17. During the hearing Governor Pardee
suggested the following change: "Owners of overlying land shall have the right to use
such underground water on such overlying land only, and such use shall be for useful
and beneficial purposes only .... provided such use is for domestic purposes only." Id.
134. Water Commission Bill, supranote 106, § 11.
135. Id. § 13.
136. Id. § 27.
137. 74 P. 766, 771 (Cal. 1903).
138. See generally Hearing,supra note 114, at 17-29.
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them."'39 Frank Short added "[h]ere [in the bill] it says they cannot
take water from land and put it upon other land. Now [under existing
law], they have the unrestricted riht to take water from any land and
Then, following some further
put it upon any other land....
discussion of this point, Short made the following statement:
MR. SHORT: A man has as much right to extract water as coal[,]
oil or any other part of the substance of this land, and the only
limitation in the doing of that is he must not take it in such a way as
to injure his neighbor. That is the settled right in property. Over the

water percolating the ground he has the power the same as over
other property; it is no more a jurisdiction over the underlying,

percolating water than it is over any other substance in the
ground....

MR. LANE: ...The only question is, would it be unconstitutional
as restricting the use of property, if it required the owner of lot A to
get a permit before he could transport it to lot C. That goes to the
constitutionality and not to the question of policy.

MR. PARDEE: Who owns the water underground?
MR. SHORT: The land owner.
MR. PARDEE: The ownership of the corpus of the water?
MR. SHORT: Sure, yes sir. When you say that something which is
now permitted by law cannot be done, and do say that something

different can be done in a different way, it seems to me the
Legislature would have no authority to do that.

If the law gives the right, as the law now is, we would not object to
restriction possibly, but to say it is unlawful without appropriation to
take water from overlying land to some other land, it would prohibit
the use of underground water....

What we object to is that we cannot use water where we now have
the right to its use, and this law would do away with a right that now
exists.
MR. CUTTLE: Write a section for that.
MR. SHORT: All right, I will do that. 4'
139. Id. at 18.
140. Id. at 19.
141. Id.at 21-22, 26-29. While no documentation of Short as a draftsman has been
found, Short did write a letter to the Commission several months after the hearings, in
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This discussion suggests that Short, who was an influential
representative of Central Valley agricultural interests, had raised
doubts in the minds of the legislation's supporters about the
constitutionality of imposing a discretionary permit system on the use
of groundwater on non-overlying land. "2 Of course, the Commission
had never intended to require a permit for use on overlying land,
43
which was considered a parallel to riparian uses of surface water.
Therefore, it was not surprising that an amendment to limit the
coverage of the bill to surface waters was proposed during the
legislative debate. 4 There seems to have been no controversy over
this amendment, suggesting that Short's legal argument was
persuasive. ""
It should be emphasized Short's claim was a limited one. He did
not assert there was no regulatory authority over non-overlying uses of
groundwater, or that such uses could not be integrated with surface
water rights. He was simply objecting to giving a permitting agency
discretionary authority to deny such uses altogether, except where it
was necessary to protect some other right in that water, such as a
correlative right by another groundwater user. 4 G Short was thus
which he again indicated his concern about the underground water provisions:
What I especially wish to impress, however, is that there appears to be no
sufficient or controlling reason for attempting to change the laws with
respect to subterranean or underground waters at all, as at present decided,
it is perfectly well understood, clearly definite and sufficient for all
purposes ... and I wholly fail to see that anything further is desirable. I have
given this subject considerable thought and study since the proceedings
before the Commission, and I am more than ever convinced that the
proposed legislation as to underground waters, except in so far as it relates
merely to the exercise of public authority thereover, should be entirely
eliminated as wholly unnecessary and hurtful.
Letter from Frank Short, Lawyer, to State Water Commission, at 4-5 (July 18, 1912)
(on file with the author). Mr. Short had elsewhere distinguished authority to regulate
to protect others' rights, for example, versus discretionary permitting to determine
whether water could be taken at all.
142. Short's view drew on language that percolating water belongs to the owner of
the soil, common in cases decided when absolute ownership was still thought to be the
rule in California. See Gould v. Eaton, 44 P. 319, 320 (Cal. 1896). It appears to have
been taken as authoritative, despite the decision in Katz, and even though in 1911 (two
years previously) California amended section 1410 of the Civil Code to read "[a]ll
water or the use of water within the State of California is the property of the people of
the State of California ....
Act of April 8, 1911, ch. 407, § 1, 1911 Cal. Stat. 821. See
CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971).
143. They certainly knew the recent decision in Hudson in which that very issue
arose. Hudson v. Dailey, 105 P. 748, 753 (Cal. 1909).
144. April 2 Amendment to A.B. 642, 40th Leg. Sess. (Cal. 1913), reprinted in 1913
AsSEM. J. 1116, 1128, § 42 (Cal. Apr. 2, 1913). The amendment read: "Whenever the
terms stream, stream system, lake or other body of water occurs in this Act, such term
shall be interpreted to refer only to surface water." Id.
145. HICHBORN, supra note 122, at 150. See also 1913 ASSEM. J. 1116, 2336 (Cal. Apr.
30, 1913) (statement of Assemblyman Brown regarding the April 30th Amendment to
A.B. 642).
146. While section 15 of the water bill, as introduced, gave the commission
discretion, the enacted version omitted discretion even over surface water
appropriations. Compare "The... commission may in its discretion allow ... the
appropriation of unappropriated water.... "A.B. 642, 40th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 15 (Cal.
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apparently making a claim that the plenary power and proprietary
interest in surface waters did not extend to groundwater; and that
property rights in groundwater were, though not absolute, nonetheless
an extant incident of landownership. Though such a claim would
hardly be likely to prevent a grant of discretionary permitting authority
under contemporary understanding of state legislative authority, 147 it
apparently was persuasive to legislators back in 1913.14' This seems to
explain why California decided to grant permitting jurisdiction over
surface water, but not groundwater.
In any event, the legislative decision created the need to
distinguish groundwater from surface water, again raising the problem
that had come up during the discussion of the Commission's original
draft. What, if any, water beneath the surface of the earth should be
included in the term "surface water," and subject to permitting
jurisdiction? Certainly, no one wanted a user to be able to circumvent
the law simply by diverting from a reach of a surface stream where the
water sank below the surface before emerging again, or by sinking a
well in a riverbank. The General Assembly addressed this issue on
April 30, when the following italicized language was added to section
1913), with "The ... commission shall allow.., the appropriation of unappropriated
water." Water Commission Act of 1913, ch. 586, § 42, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012, 1033.
147. Since a version of the language that appears today as Water Code § 102 had
been enacted in 1911, Short may have been pressing the point a bit far even back
then. Compare Act of Apr. 8., 1911, ch. 407, § 1, 1911 Cal. Stat. 821, with CAL. WATER
CODE § 102 (West 1971).
148. An extensive reading of contemporary newspaper accounts in the Fresno
Republican, Oakland Enquirer,Sacramento Bee, San FranciscoDaily News, and San Francisco
Call has turned up no indication of any controversy over changes in the bill regarding
groundwater coverage. For example, the Oakland Enquirer stated in one of its
articles:
[t]here was a preliminary hearing given to the elaborate measure in the
Assembly a few days ago, but there was a continuance of the subject granted
for the purpose of making changes which were considered advisable. The
committee worked Saturday as also last night on the subject, with the result
that it was the opinion of some of the assemblymen who had opposed certain
features when the bill was before the Assembly [that] the measure had been
strengthened in a satisfactory manner and that a number of the features
which had not appealed favorably to some of the members of the lower
house had been so rewritten as to satisfy the most insistent of the critics. The
amendments were ordered printed and the measure, as amended, will come
up for passage in a few days.
Conservation Bill Amended and Strengthened: Brown Amendment to Johnstone Measure
Discussed,OAKLAND ENQUIRER, Apr. 21, 1913, at 6. Similarly, another article states "the
amendments proposed yesterday ... were of a minor character, none of them
touching any of the main features of the proposed enactment." Edward A. O'Brien,
Considering New Conservation Features: Assembly Talks up the Amendments to Measure,
OAKLAND ENQUIRER, Apr. 22, 1913, at 3. Of course the bill was still too strong for its
opponents. See generally Water Bill Held Back by Argument, OAKLAND ENQUIRER, Apr. 29,
1913, at 1; ProposedSupervision of all State Water Rights by Commission, Editorial, OAKLAND

ENQUIRER, Apr. 29, 1913, at 19.
149. The legal concern expressed was limited to discretionary permitting authority,
see supra text following note 140. The legislative result, however, was to deny any
permitting jurisdiction at all over (percolating) groundwater. See Water Commission
Act of 1913, ch. 586, § 11, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012, 1018, and that is still the law; see CAL.
WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1971).
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42: "Whenever the terms stream, stream system, lake or other body of
water or water occurs in this act, such term shall be interpreted to
refer only to surface water, 50 and to subterranean streams flowing through
known and definite channels."

This, of course, is the language from the Pomeroy decision."' It was
enacted into the Water Commission Act of 1913,5 and it remains
today, with only insubstantial change, as section 1200 of the Water
Code." Strikingly, this "subterranean stream" language appeared for
the first time at a late stage in the evolution of the law. It never came
up in the Commission's report,14 in its original bill, 1 5 in any of three

Commission hearing sessions on the bill,'5 6 or in the bill as first
introduced in the Assembly,' 7 even though, as we have seen, efforts to
distinguish surface water and underground water had engaged the
bill's drafters at some length in the May 28th hearings the previous
year. 15 None of the suggested phrasing put forward in that hearing,
such as "sub-stream flow," 59"sub-surface water in the same bed" or
"underground stream flow"' appeared in the final bill as enacted.' 0
Why did the bill's draftsmen use the Pomeroy language, which drew
on the formalistic approach of the Kinney treatise, rather than one of
the phrasings that had been suggested in the previous year's hearings?
No documentation has been found to answer this question, or to
explain the reasoning for any of the other amendments made to
section 42 of the bill. l ' The likeliest explanation is that, rather than
150. April 30 Amendment to A.B. 642, 40th Leg. Sess. (Cal. 1913), reprinted in 1913
ASSEM. J. 2336 (Cal. Apr. 30, 1913) (emphasis added). Though the language was
offered by Assemblyman Henry Ward Brown of San Mateo, an opponent of the bill, it
appears to have generated no objection, either by proponents or opponents. Brown
was a lawyer and a graduate of Hastings College of the Law.
151. City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 598 (Cal. 1899).
152. SeeWater Commission Act of 1913, ch. 586, § 11, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012, 1018.
153. CAL. WATER CODE§ 1200 (West 1971).
154. See generallyCOMM'N FIRST REPORT, supranote 100 (lacking this language).
155. See generally Water Commission Bill, supra note 106.
156. See generally Hearing,supra note 114 (lacking this language).
157. See generally A.B. 642, 40th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11 (Cal. 1913) (lacking this
language).
158, See generally Hearing,supra note 114 (discussing ramifications of the proposed
bill on underground water).
159. See id. at 8-9.
160. See Water Commission Act of 1913, ch. 586, § 11, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012, 1018.
161. See HICHBORN, supra note 122, at 137-73 (Containing a highly opinionated
discussion of the controversy over the bill, but dealing almost exclusively with the
maneuvering of various factions, rather than with the specifics of the amendment
process). There were two legislative meetings on the bill. Id. at 145, 165. No
transcript or other record of them has been found. But see Franklin Hichborn, Heney
Backs the Water Bill: Conservation Measure Made Subject of Debate Before Senate and Assembly
Committees, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 19, 1913, at 1 (describing the first meeting, held on
March 18, 1913). A letter from W.A. Johnstone, Assemblyman, to Governor Pardee,
dated April 4, 1914, gives the final votes on the bill and a brief discussion of two
proposed Senate amendments (not dealing with groundwater), commenting "[t]hese
are interesting to indicate hidden influences in the consideration of the measure."
Letter from W.A. Johnstone, Assemblyman, to George Pardee, California Governor
(April 4, 1914) (on file with the author).
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seeking to devise their own language to identify the subsurface water
that should be included within the surface water system (and
recognizing, after the previous year's hearing, the difficulty of
fashioning satisfactory language), they simply plugged in familiar
language that was already a part of water law terminology:
"subterranean stream [etc.]." The fact that the Pomeroy approach to
groundwater law had been superceded by the California Supreme
Court in Katz and other decisions discussed above, 62 apparently never
came up in the legislative process. Nor did the fact the Pomeroy
opinion is very confusing, and its intended scope very uncertain (it is
routinely cited as support by both sides in litigation), seem to deter the
legislators. In fact the Pomeroy/Kinney language - so patently inapt,
and inept to us today - seems to have generated not a word of
controversy in a bill that was otherwise so controversial and divisive
that it only became law by virtue of a public referendum. 3
There is nothing in any available documentation of the legislative
history to suggest the draftsmen intended to codify the Pomeroy case,
though they did obviously take language from the opinion. 6 4 Since, as
indicated earlier, Pomeroy had been largely repudiated by later
decisions, and its intent was in any event more than a little uncertain,
the notion it was being "codified" by the adoption of some of its
language is itself a rather fuzzy notion. We simply have no evidence of
whether, or how, the legislators, in adopting the subterranean stream
formula, meant to address the geologic perplexities they were creating
in treating groundwater and surface water as separate entities.
While we cannot know anything for certain, based on what we do
know, the following is the most plausible explanation of legislative
intent.
Once the legislature was persuaded that there were
constitutional problems in creating an integrated system, which is what
the Commission and the Johnstone bill had originally sought; they
reconciled themselves to a bifurcated system, and sought to make sure
that they prevented the most egregious opportunities for people to
subvert the surface water permitting system. The subterranean stream
language of Pomeroy was the only established verbal tool for doing so,
as it clearly covered what had been described in the hearings as "subsurface flow" of surface streams, 66 or what Wiel had earlier described
as a line that would protect streams against pumping that "directly
162. City of Los Angeles v. Hunter, 105 P. 755, 757 (Cal. 1909); Hudson v. Dailey,
105 P. 748, 753 (Cal. 1909); McClintock v. Hudson, 74 P. 849, 850-51 (Cal. 1903); Katz

v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 770-71 (Cal. 1903); Hanson v. McHue, 42 Cal. 303, 309
(1871).
163.

See OFFICE OF SEC'Y OF STATE, AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION AND PROPOSED

STATUTES WITH ARGUMENTS RESPECTING THE SAME, TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE ELECTORs OF

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AT THE GENERAL ELECTION ON TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 3,

1914

(1914).
164. Water Commission Act of 1913, ch. 586, § 42, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012, 1033; City of
Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 598 (Cal. 1899).
165. Hunter, 105 P. at 757; Hudson, 105 P. at 753; McClintock, 74 P. at 850-51; Katz, 74
P. at 770-71; Hanson, 42 Cal. at 309.
166. Hearing,supra note 114, at 8-9.
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67
effects a surface flow."

In short, the evidence we have indicates the legislative language
was designed to exclude groundwater generally, except for
groundwater functionally part and parcel of a surface stream - in the
sense that pumping it directly affected surface flow. Probably although there is no evidence one way or another - the legislators
would also have meant to include true subterranean streams, such as
flows in limestone caverns or lava tubes, which would be
"independent" subterranean streams under Kinney's classification.
But even in 1913, it was clear that such features are few and of rare
occurrence in California. 68
The Water Commission legislation was extremely controversial,
though not on the subterranean stream issue. Its far more significant
provisions sought to control monopolization of water by riparian
landowners (a matter that would ultimately be resolved by a
Constitutional Amendment several decades later), 6 ' and to get rid of
unused riparian rights (a provision held unconstitutional, 7 0 but
ultimately achieved by California Supreme Court interpretation). "'
The bill passed the Assembly by a vote of 44-30 ,2 and the Senate
73
version by 28-6.1
The Assembly then
concurred on a 41-10 vote (41
• •
'74
votes being required for passage).
The Governor signed the bill on
June 16, 1913'7 however, it was then subjected to a referendum
following an all-out effort by the law's opponents. California voters
approved the referendum on November 3, 1914, by a margin of 50.7%
to 49.3%.'" It became effective on December 19, 1914.
B. SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Almost as soon as the Water Commission law was enacted,
proposals emerged to revise it and create an integrated management
system for surface and groundwater. As early as 1916, the report of a
legislatively created Water Problems Conference recommended that
groundwater be made appropriable and "placed under the control of
the

State

Water

Commission.'" 77

In

1917,

the

State

Water

167. Id. at 12.

168. CAL.
169. CAL.

47, at 15.
§ 2; Herminghaus v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607, 622

DEP'TOFWATERRES., supra note

CoNsT., art. X,

(Cal. 1926).
170. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 989
(Cal. 1935).
171. See Rowland v. Ramelli, 599 P.2d 656, 669 (Cal. 1979).
172. HICmORN, supra note 122, at tbl.II.
173. Id. at tbl.I.
174. Id. at tbl.II.
175. Water Commission Act of 1913, ch. 586, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012.
176. M ACH FONG Eu, OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF STATE, A STUDY OF BALLOT MEAsuREs:
1884-1986.
177. STATE WATER PROBLEMS CONFERENCE, REPORT 65 (1916). The report said
[t]he conference therefore has recommended legislation which will
recognize the doctrine of prior appropriation as applied to underground
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Commission's annual report cited "the need of [ground water]

legislation" and opined that:
surface and ground water supplies are so intimately related physically
that one can not be completely regulated and administered without
similar control of the other.... [T]he fact that the water passes
beneath the surface and is for a time hidden from view to again
reappear farther down the stream, does not
1 8 offer a logical reason for
its exemption from control and regulation.
In 1957, the State Water Plan observed that:
[w] hile it is not an immediate problem, it is evident that effective

administration of the development and utilization of ground water
resources, either by the State or by local agencies, or by both, will
become mandatory as the stage of full water development is
approached. When it becomes necessary to operate the major
ground water basins for import-export purposes as envisioned under
The California Water Plan, requisite authority to do so must exist....
The following [item is] suggested for consideration in this
connection: ...The requirement of permits and licenses for the
appropriation of ground water. 7 9
In 1971, the chair of the Assembly Committee on Water made two
very modest legislative proposals: including groundwater in the

existing statutory adjudication procedures, and requiring pumpers
statewide (not just in four southern counties) to file statements of the

amounts they were pumping.180

His suggestions were not enacted.

Two years later, Ronald Robie, a respected water law expert who

became director of the Department of Water Resources (and later a
judge), gave an address in which he said "'ad hoc' solutions are not
satisfactory. I find it curious that although regulation of surface waters

is properly a responsibility of the State, groundwater regulation is
somehow viewed as a 'local' concern.... The result is uncoordinated
administration of interrelatedresources." 181
water, so that the one who first develops it shall be entitled to so much water
as is necessary for the beneficial use of the project to which it is applied.
...[T]he appropriation of underground water, like the appropriation of
surface water, should be placed under the control of the State Water
Commission, but... no owner of land of 160 acres or less, should be
compelled to apply to the Water Commission for permission to develop the
water lying under his own land for use upon that land ....
Id. at 65-66.
178. STATE CONSERVATION COMM'N, 1917 REPORT OF THE CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA74 (1917).
179. CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., BULLETIN No. 3, TiiE CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN 221

(1957).
180. CAL. WATER CODE § 5000(c) (West 1971); Carley V. Porter, What's in the
Legislative Cards for Ground Water, in PROC. OF THE EIGHTH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE ON
GROUND WATER 63, 65-66 (1971).
181. Ronald B. Robie, Carley V. Porter Memorial Luncheon Address, in PROC. OF THE
NiNTi BIENNIAL CONFERENCE ON GROUND WATER 137, 146 (Frank T. Bragg ed., 1973).
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Four years later, the background study for the Governor's
Commission to Review California Water Rights Law posed the
questions: "Should permits be required for new wells where critical
groundwater problems exist or are threatened? For new wells in all
basins? For all wells, new and existing, where critical groundwater
problems exist or are threatened? For all wells in all basins?" 's The
Commission itself, however, acknowledged what had become the
political reality when it came to groundwater law reform. After noting
that "[m]ost other western states have integrated groundwater into
state-level appropriation permit systems," it stated that "California's
experience with groundwater management.., differs from that of
other western states. 83 The report therefore concluded "that local
management, if it is properly undertaken, offers the best opportunity
for workable and effective control. 1

1

4

To make clear that it was not

calling for anything like a general permitting system, it said "[t]he
Commission... intends that proposed legislation not require any
unnecessary management actions in areas without critical long-term
overdraft, subsidence, or water quality problems."'8
The Governor's Commission correctly read the political situation
in California. No pleas for integrated management of surface and
groundwater generated statutory change. In a progress update written
in 1988, attorney Kevin O'Brien reported "[t]he California Legislature
has flirted with the concept of ground water management during the
past several legislative sessions. To date, no comprehensive ground
water management legislation has been adopted."'8 '
On the contrary, the legislature made clear its disinclination to
enact comprehensive legislation or to expand the Board's permitting
jurisdiction over groundwater.18 The subterranean stream provision of
section 1200 of the Water Code remains virtually unchanged from
what it was in 1913. 18 Indeed, in a variety of statutory provisions as well
as legislative studies, the legislature's posture toward statewide
groundwater management is unambiguous. For example:

182. ANNE J. SCHNEIDER, GOVERNOR'S COMM'N TO REVIEW CAL. WATER RIGHTS LAW,
GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN CAL., BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 96 (1977).

183. GOVERNOR'S
(1978).
184.

COMMISSION TO REVIEW CAL. WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT

166

Id. at 166-67.

185. Id. at 167.
186. Kevin M. O'Brien, The Governor's Commission Revisited: Ten Years of Not So Benign
Neglect in California Ground Water Law, in PROC. OF THE SIXTEENTH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE
ON GROUND WATER 50 (JohannesJ. DeVries ed., 1988) (citations omitted).
187. A useful, succinct review of legislative activity appears in Anne J. Schneider,
Groundwater Management Options - Vision vs. Reality, Remarks at Forum Sponsored
by the San Francisco Estuary Project, the Water Education Foundation, the
Commonwealth Club of California and Friends of the San Francisco Estuary (Nov. 2,
1999), in WATER RIGHTS, WATER WRONGS: LEARNING FROM THE PAST, LOOKING TO THE
FUTURE 41-46.
188. Compare Water Commission Act of 1913, ch. 586, § 11, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012,
1018, with CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1971).
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In 1962, an Assembly Interim Committee Report, concluded
that "[i]n most areas of the State, the key to the solution of
ground water problems lies in local attitudes and political
feasibility."1 9 "Water agencies expressed a strong desire to solve
their problems themselves and to manage ground water basins
locally. The committee agrees that local management is
desirable and... provides simplified solutions
to many of the
90
ground water basin management problems."

In 1984, in legislation granting area-of-origin rights to a variety
of water systems as against future export projects initiated after a
certain date, the legislation was careful to distinguish between
surface water appropriations dated by the time of "applications
[before the Board] to appropriate," and groundwater
appropriations, dated by the time they are "initiated" [outside of
any permitting process].19"

Because the Article containing the area-of-origin law was
codified in the midst of a chapter of the Water Code that deals
with the Board's administrative responsibilities, the legislature
added section 1221, stating "[t] his article shall not be construed
to authorize the board to regulate groundwater in any
,, 192

manner.

The provision that grants the Board authority over general
adjudications of stream systems specifically excludes "an
underground water supply other than a subterranean stream
flowing through known and definite channels." 93
In one instance where it did give authority to adjudicate a river,
the Scott River, including interconnected groundwater, the
legislature specified that the decision was "necessary ... for a

fair and effective judgment of... rights" in that particular river,
but declared it "necessary that the provisions of this section
apply to the Scott River only."'94 Ironically, the studies that led
to the Scott River legislation demonstrate the legislature had
been fully and unambiguously informed of the inadequacies of
the bifurcated (groundwater and surface water) system it had
created.9
189. ASSEM. INTERIM COMM. ON WATER TO THE CAL. LEGISLATURE, GROUND WATER
PROBLEMS IN CALIFORNIA, 26 ASSEM. INTERIM COMM. REP. 8 (1962).

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 46.
CAL. WATERCODE §§ 1215, 1216 (West Supp. 2003).

Id. § 1221.
CAL. WATER CODE § 2500 (West 1971).
CAL. WATER CODE § 2500.5 (West Supp. 2003).

195. CAL. WATER RES. CONTROL BD., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO PETITION
FOR ADJUDICATION, ScoT RIVER, SISKIYOU COUNTY 5-6 (1971).
[Plumping of groundwater as well as underftow reduces the surface flow of
the various streams and the main stem of Scott River .... It became
apparent.., that underground water was an important part of the water
supply problem in the stream system and that in order to properly determine
the rights to water from the stream system, interconnected underground
water should be included.
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Even where the legislature has wanted the Board to act generally
as to groundwater-as with water quality adjudications-it has
been careful to require it to go to court,196 and to defer to local
public agencies."'
Where the legislature wants to include "percolating
groundwater" within the coverage of a statute, it does so
explicitly, as in a law requiring recordation of certain
groundwater extractions. In that law, the definition section says
"'[g]round water' means water beneath the surface of the
ground whether
or not flowing through known and definite
98
channels.

Finally, the legislature has made clear its view that its preferred
way of dealing with groundwater is through local, basin-specific
management, a position it has held quite consistently over many
years.
This brief review makes clear that the legislature has repeatedly
been made aware of the Board's limited jurisdiction over groundwater
under section 1200 of the Water Code, and has shown no inclination
to expand that jurisdiction beyond the legislative goals that led to the
language in the 1913 statute.
IV. HOW SHOULD SECTION 1200 OF THE WATER CODE BE
INTERPRETED?
The above analysis of the Water Commission Act's history reveals
the legislative purpose of the "subterranean stream" provision was to
protect the integrity of the permitting agency's jurisdiction over
surface stream appropriations. The means for achieving that goal was
the prevention of unpermitted pumping of groundwater that
appreciably and directly affected surface stream flows. The authors of
the Act essentially sought to close a loophole that left the permitting
agency powerless when a pumper took water from a subsurface
location and directly impacted the flow of a surface stream. At the
same time, it is clear the legislature did not intend to create permitting
jurisdiction over all groundwater pumping that would in any way, or at
any time, affect surface streams. The statute undoubtedly meant to
leave much tributary groundwater as part of a separate legal regime
outside the permit system being established. While the "subterranean
Id.

See also CAL. WATER RES. CONTROL BD., REPORT ON HYDROGEOLOGIC CONDITIONS,
ScoTr RVER VALLEY, at ii (1975).

196.
197.
198.
12922

CAL. WATERCODE § 2100 (West 1971).

Id.§2101(b).
Id. § 5000(a); see also CAL. WATER CODE § 1005.4 (West Supp. 2003). Section
of the Water Code expresses the public interest in protecting groundwater

basins from critical conditions of overdraft depletion, sea water intrusion, or degraded
water quality, but it is just a declaration of the public interest, not a grant of
jurisdiction to the Board. CAL. WATER CODE § 12922 (West 1992).
199. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10750-10756 (West Supp. 2003); ASSEM. INTERIM COMM.
ON WATER, supra note 189, at 47-48.
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stream" language in the Water Commission Act was almost certainly
generated by concern about pumping from areas that were very
proximate to the surface stream, such as what is called underflow or
subflow, the central concern was impact, not proximity.2 01 It should be
kept in mind that modern-day high-powered pumps were not extant at
that time.
My conclusion is that the Assembly designed the legislation to
create an impact test (impact of pumping on surface stream flows),
and to extend the Board's jurisdiction to pumping that has an
appreciable and direct impact upon a surface stream. To be sure, any
test of impact necessarily involves a judgment about the boundaries of
inclusion and exclusion. This is an unwelcome task imposed by any
regime that treats groundwater and surface water separately; although
even in states where groundwater and surface water management is
fully integrated, judgments must be made about the point at which
pumping impacts on surface streams are sufficiently attenuated in time
or impact that they should not be considered. 1 In any event, any such
line drawing represents a policy judgment, not a technical one. Since
the groundwater and surface water within a watershed essentially
constitute a continuum, any test intended to separate one part of the
groundwater from another inescapably requires a judgment that
reflects a purposive goal, rather than reflecting a technical line of
demarcation that hydrogeologists or other scientific experts utilize and
for which there is a technically accepted definition.
It may be objected that an impact test is at odds with the explicit
language of section 1200 of the Water Code, whose terms literally
describe a geographic test, rather than an impact test. 2°2 The statute

would seem to require a search for a definite channel and for flowing
water, etc. Such a geographic test is what the Board has traditionally
applied, searching out the limits of a bed and banks, appraising
whether the water was flowing rather than merely percolating, and
asking whether it was moving parallel to a surface stream, as part of a
definite channel.0 3 While the unambiguous meaning of statutory
200. Basing jurisdiction on impact, in light of modern pumping capacity, would
expand the Board's authority beyond its traditional extent. That would raise the
question of how to deal with longstanding unregulated uses, unless they were
grandfathered.
201. For example, both Colorado and New Mexico use a time-based maximum
interference test to identify wells that are sufficiently remote in impact that they do not
need to be actively administered in the prior appropriation system. See also Hubbard v.
Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 936 P.2d 27, 28 (Wash. 1997).
202. The Arizona Supreme Court took the same view of a similar interpretative
question under its groundwater law. In re Gen. Adjudication of the Gila River Sys., 857
P.2d 1236, 1245 (Ariz. 1993).
203. A 1999 State Water Resources Control Board decision illustrates a
contemporary case in which the Board determines whether a subterranean stream is
present. In re Application 29664, Decision 1639, 1999 WL 458786, at *1 to *13 (Cal.
State Water Res. Control Bd. June 17, 1999). A 1926 decision is typical of older cases.
In re Application No. 3883, Decision D. 119, at 7-14 (Cal. Div. Of Water Rights, Aug.
24, 1926). Although a recent Board decision holds to the traditional Pomeroy
approach, a recent draft order has a somewhat more generous interpretive stance.
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language should prevail over efforts to decipher legislative history, it
can hardly be thought that the meaning of the words in section 1200
are unambiguous, though the terms themselves-like channel,
flowing, and stream-seem clear enough. The problem is that the
words used in this statute describe a legal fiction. With only the rarest
exceptions, there is no "flowing" water underground in California, and
nothing that meets the ordinary notion of a stream. Ground water
percolates through earth, which is more and less porous. Nor can it be
concluded that the legislature "clearly" intended to codify some
particular definition embodied in the Pomeroy case, since lawyers have
unceasingly disputed, for nearly a century, the meaning of the
complicated and confusing decision in that case."' Thus, conventional
canons of construction in interpreting statutory language do not fit the
circumstances of section 1200 of the Water Code.
Sometimes statutes use words that are unambiguous in themselves,
and that have a literal meaning, but where that meaning plainly does
not describe legislative intent. Perhaps the most notable example is
found in a United States Supreme Court decision in which an
individual sought to stake a claim on groundwater under federal
mining laws, claiming the mining law covered every "valuable
mineral," and that groundwater was-unambiguously-a valuable
mineral.2 5 The Court sensibly held that in this instance Congress did
not mean what it had literally said: it was indisputable that the valuable
mineral of water was not meant to be appropriated under the law that
governs gold, silver, and other such valuable minerals 0 The extant
history of the Water Commission Act is similarly persuasive as to the
gap between usual literal meaning and legislative intent. Here the
purpose of the provision in question was to insulate surface stream
flows from those groundwater diversions that would have a direct and
significant impact on the surface stream, rather than to seek out some
particular configuration of water as it moved underneath the earth's
surface.
V. EXISTING AUTHORITY FOR MANAGEMENT OF
GROUNDWATER OUTSIDE WATER CODE SECTION 1200
While section 1200 of the Water Code has been the centerpiece of
legal dispute concerning administrative jurisdiction over groundwater,
that provision is not the only source of Board jurisdiction over
groundwater. Conversely, even a very expansive interpretation of
section 1200 would not bring all groundwater under Board authority.
Two important qualifications must be added to any discussion of the
scope of section 1200 of the Water Code. First, even if the definition
Compare Decision 1645, supra note 39, at *1 to *4, with In re Permit 14853, Draft Order

WRO 2003, at 10-13 (Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. Nov. 27, 2002) [hereinafter
SWRCB Draft Order].
204. See supra text accompanying notes 31-40.
205. Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604, 605-06 (1978).

206. Id. at 614.
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of a subterranean stream were very expansively interpreted, the
Board's permitting jurisdiction would still not embrace uses of that
water on overlying land. Second, there are other potentially available
sources of Board authority over the use of subsurface water, outside of
section 1200's permitting jurisdiction.
A. OVERLYING USES OF GROUNDWATER
Land overlying a subterranean stream is considered riparian to
that stream,2 °7 and it has always been understood that "[a] riparian is
entitled to pump and use water on a parcel which overlies a
subterranean stream" just like a rparian on a surface stream, without
seeking a permit from the Board.
While there is no authoritative source of data as to how much
groundwater is used on overlying riparian land, and how much is
being applied to non-overlying land, there is little doubt that a
considerable percentage of groundwater is being used on riparian
overlying land. Thus, it would be outside the Board's permitting
jurisdiction, no matter how expansively the statutory category of
"subterranean streams flowing through known and definite channels"
was applied. The following estimates, provided by the Association of
California Water Agencies ("ACWA") in response to an inquiry by the
author of this article, give a rough sense of the scope of the issue:
For example, in Ventura County, the total groundwater pumping is
about 70% agricultural and 30% municipal and industrial (M&I). It
can be assumed that essentially all the M&I usage is not overlying....
Assuming that some of the agricultural pumping is not overlying,
then the total non-overlying usage could rise to at least 50%....
Of course, this will vary considerably by county. Its likely that a
county in the northern Sacramento Valley could have the highest
percentage of overlying land use whereas urban counties such as Los
Angeles or Orange could have the lowest percentage. Again, this is
all very theoretical and conditions could dramatically vary for each
and every country in California. 9

207. "An overlying right, [is] analogous to that of the riparian owner in a surface
stream." Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 863 (Cal. 2000). See also Prather
v. Hoberg, 150 P.2d 405, 410 (Cal. 1944); WELLsA. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAw OF
All the usual limits on riparian diversion and use
WATER RIGHTS 421 (1956).

presumably apply to subterranean stream riparians as to those riparian to a surface
stream-use is limited to natural flows, must be within the watershed, and no seasonal
storage is permitted. As to the extent of overlying rights, it is "the owner's right to take
water from the ground underneath for use on his land within the basin or watershed."
Barstow, 5 P.3d at 863.
208. See In reAmended Application 27614, Decision 1632, 1995 WL 464946, at *12 to
*14 (Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. July 6, 1995) [hereinafter Decision 1632].
Riparian pumpers of percolating groundwater do not have to file the statements of
diversion and use to which surface riparians are subject. CAL. WATER CODE § 5101
(West Supp. 2003). See the definition of diversion. Id. § 5100(b) (West 1971).
209. Letter from Stephen K. Hall, Exec. Dir., ACWA, to Joseph Sax, Professor of Law
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Whatever the actual numbers, it is significant that concerns about
non-regulation of groundwater use are not attributable solely to
restrictions imposed under interpretations of section 1200 of the
Water Code, and that expanded interpretation of that statutory
provision would primarily affect municipal and industrial users of
groundwater, rather than agricultural pumpers.
B. OTHER SOURCES OF AUTHORITY OVER USE OF GROUNDWATER
1. California Constitution Article X, Section 2, California Water
Code Section 100, the Public Trust, and California Water
Code Section 275
While section 1200 of the Water Code limits the Board's
permitting jurisdiction over groundwater, it does not limit other
sources of authority that may be available to the Board to regulate uses
of groundwater. A lively current question is whether, and to what
extent, the Board may restrict pumping of percolating groundwater
that is adversely affecting surface instream benefits, such as fish
populations and riparian values. The Board's attorneys are of the view
the Board has authority to control such uses where they either: (1)
violate the prohibition of the Constitution and the Water Code on
waste and on unreasonable use and methods of use; or (2) violate the
public trust.
Both jurisdictional and substantive issues arise. In terms of
jurisdiction, there are two distinct issues. First, does the Board have
authority to take jurisdiction itself, and to issue remedial orders against
users water users over whom it has no permitting authority?210 Second,
may the Board go to court and seek judicial relief? Substantively, what
constitutes waste and unreasonable use in the context of groundwater
use that affects surface stream values, and does the public trust extend
to groundwater uses at all? 211 Since this article deals only with the
Board's permitting and regulatory jurisdiction, the following
discussion is limited to that issue, not with the questions regarding
what constitutes waste and unreasonable use, or what constitutes a
212
violation of the public trust.
1 (Oct. 31, 2001) (on file with the author).
210. While the question here relates to users of percolating groundwater, a parallel
question arises as to riparian surface water users, and pre-1914 appropriators.
211. Cf in re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 447 (Haw. 2000) (Waizihole
Ditch case) (extending public trust to groundwater). An unresolved question in
California is whether pumping of tributary groundwater that affects public trust values
in navigable waters would be treated like tributary surface water under Nat'l Audubon
Socy v. Superior Court. 658 P.2d 709, 712, 721 (Cal. 1983).
212. The scope of the Board's public trust authority is a subject of considerable
dispute. See, e.g., David R.E. Aladjem, Is Water Ripe for the Taking? The SWRCB's Lower
Yuba River Decision and the Public Trust Doctrine, 11 CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y REP. 261-65
(July 2001) (criticizing In re Fishery Res. & Water Right Issues of the Lower Yuba River,
Decision 1644, 2001 WL 1880742 (Cal. State Water Res. Bd. March 1, 2001)) (petitions
for reconsideration and petitions for writ of administrative mandamus pending). See
generally Gregory S. Weber, Articulating the Public Trust: Text, Near-Text and Context, 27
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Assuming that a substantive violation exists, there is no doubt 3
that the Board, through the California Attorney General," 4 can
institute litigation to control groundwater use that: (1) constitutes
waste, unreasonable use, or method of use within the meaning of
article X, section 2 of the California Constitution, and section 100 of
the Water Code; 2 1 or (2) violates the public trust.21 6 An Arizona case
filed, but not decided on the merits, asserted the Arizona Department
of Water Resources has an affirmative duty to use the public trust to
protect the state's watercourses from adverse affects of groundwater
pumping.217 However, there may still be some question whether the
Board can assert its own jurisdiction to adjudicate and remedy
complaints about groundwater control where it otherwise has no
jurisdiction over the respondent,2 18 though the California Supreme
Court said that claims of unreasonable uses of water or of harm to the
public trust "may be brought in the courts or before the Board.21 9
Board jurisdiction in such situations is said to be founded primarily
on section 275 of the Water Code,22° secondarily on section 174 of the
ARIz. ST. L.J. 1155, 1173 (1995).
213. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 605 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1980)
[hereinafter EDF II]; State Water Res. Control Bd. v. Forni, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851, 858
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976). Courts may require the parties to accept a physical solution to
resolve a waste problem. City of Lodi v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 60 P.2d 439, 450 (Cal.
1936).
214. CAL. WATER CODE § 275 (West Supp. 2003). Also the Attorney General can
bring an action for equitable relief "for the protection of the natural resources of the
state from pollution, impairment, or destruction." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12607 (West
1992). For definition of "natural resources" see id. § 12605.
215. Forni, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 851-58 (discussing Board suit brought under section 275
of the Water Code to enjoin riparian uses as unreasonable). The prohibition on
unreasonable and non-beneficial use applies to groundwater as well as surface water
use. Joslin v. Main Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 893 (Cal. 1967); Peabody v. City of
Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 494 (Cal. 1935).
216. "Members of the public" have standing to bring an action to restrain violations
of the public trust. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 381 (Cal. 1971); see also Cal. State
Water Res. Control Bd. v. United States, 749 P.2d 324, 338 n.16 (Cal. 1988). The State
acting through the Board has a continuing responsibility and authority under the
public trust doctrine to consider the effect of water diversions upon public trust
resources and to avoid or minimize harm to those resources to the extent feasible.
Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 723 (finding a duty of continuing supervision).
Preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife resources, and recreation, as well as
the public interest in water, are statutory responsibilities of the Board. CAL. WATER
CODE §§ 1243, 1253 (West 1971).

217. See generally Plaintiff's Complaint, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Smith, No.
CV2002-000171 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa County filed on Jan. 7, 2002). The court
later consolidated this case with others in Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. Katz, CASA-02-0168, 1 CA-SA 02-0177, 1 CA-SA 02-0178, but the Arizona Supreme Court denied
certiorari on March 21, 2003.
218. It may be important to distinguish the Board's ability to go to court from its
ability to assert jurisdiction itself, and to issue orders restraining groundwater use.
Sometimes the term 'jurisdiction" is used without making this distinction explicit. See,
e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Legal Disconnections Between Surface Water and Ground
Water, in MAKING THE CONNECTIONS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH BIENNIAL
CONFERENCE ON GROUND WATER 21 (Johannes DeVries &JeffWoled eds., 1996).

219.
220.

Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 749 P.2d at 338 n.16.
"The department [and board] shall take all appropriate proceedings or actions
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Water Code,22" ' and perhaps on substantive provisions article X,
section 2 of the California Constitution, which is self-executing, and on
its statutory parallel, section 100 of the Water Code. There is one
California Fourth District Court of Appeal decision directly on point,
though it did not involve groundwater.
In Imperial Irrigation District v. State Water Resources Control Board
("I1D II'), the issue was whether the Board could take jurisdiction over
pre-1914 surface water appropriations in order to determine whether
the water was being unreasonably used in violation of article X,
section 2 of the Constitution, or whether a complainant would have to
go to court to raise and adjudicate such a claim 2 The argument was
that the Board had no pre-existing jurisdiction over the Imperial
Irrigation District's ("IID") pre-1914 appropriations; and that the
statutory provision upon which the Board relied was not a grant of
jurisdiction to it, but simply an authorization to the Board to go to
court to seek relief. The provision in question was section 275 of the
Water Code. IID claimed this provision was a restriction on the
Board-directing it to petition other agencies to grant relief for
violations-rather than a grant ofjurisdiction to act on its own.22 ' Even
if such a claim were to prevail, however, courts have broad authority to
refer any and all issues to the Board. 4
The court expressly rejected IDD's claim, and said it saw no
distinction between the IID II case and an earlier case, Environmental
Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility District ("EDF I').225

EDF I

sustained Board jurisdiction over a claim of waste and unreasonable
use under section 275 of the Water Code.2 6 However in that case, the
Board already had jurisdiction over the water user, one of its
permittees. 227 Similarly, in the National Audubon Society Mono Lake
before executive, legislative, or judicial agencies to prevent waste, unreasonable use,
unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable method of diversion of water in this
State." CAL. WATER CODE § 275 (West 1971).
221. "The Legislature hereby finds and declares that in order to provide for the
orderly and efficient administration of the water resources of the state it is necessary to
establish a control board which shall exercise the adjudicatory and regulatory
functions of the state in the field of water resources." Id. § 174; see also id. §§ 104, 105.
222. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) [hereinafter 1ID II].
223. Id. at 255-56.
224. "[I]n any lawsuit for a determination of rights to water, 'the court may order a
reference to the Board, as referee, of any or all issues,' or, alternatively, 'may refer the
suit to the board for investigation of and report upon any or all of the physical facts
involved.' " Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 749 P.2d at 338 n.16 (citations omitted).
225. IID II, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 264 n.4.
226. Envtl. Def. Fund v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 572 P.2d 1128, 1136-37 (Cal. 1978)
[hereinafter EDF I]. See also Envtl. Def. Fund v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 605 P.2d 1, 10
(Cal. 1980) [hereinafter EDF II].
227. The EDF II case, where the court held the Board has jurisdiction to determine
whether a water user's failure to reclaim water violated the Water Reclamation Law,
dealt not only with the use of water held under a Board permit, but with a statute that
expressly granted the Board jurisdiction to regulate reclamation and use of waste
water. Such cases essentially raise primary jurisdiction, or concurrent jurisdiction,
issues, rather than dealing with the question whether there is Board jurisdiction at all.
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case, which began in court, not before the Board, Los Angeles was
already within the Board's jurisdiction before the public trust claim
arose. 228
The Imperial IrrigationDistrict v. State Water Resources Control Board
("liD I") decision says that "[n]o case has construed section 275 as a
limitation on the Board's adjudicatory power. In fact, EDF , which
holds the Board had exclusive adjudicatory jurisdiction ...

cites section

275 in support of its conclusion the Board's 'powers extend to
regulation of water quality and prevention of waste.' 22 9 The court in
lID Irelied in addition on the so-called Racanelli decision, 3 ° which also
cited section 275 of the Water Code as authority for the proposition
that the Board has "the separate and additional power to take whatever
steps are necessary to prevent unreasonable use or methods of
diversion."2

3

'

The court in ID I concluded "section 275 is not to be

construed as a limitation on the Board's adjudicatory authority, but
2 2
rather as a statute granting separate, additional power to the Board."
The California Supreme Court has not yet expressly addressed the
question whether section 275 of the Water Code provides an
independent source of jurisdiction over pumpers of percolating
groundwater. However, the holding in ID I, along with the language
of EDFIand the Racanelli decision, are significant authority in favor of
the claim that the Board can assert jurisdiction over percolating
groundwater pumping to adjudicate and remedy claims that come
within the scope of waste and unreasonable use covered by section 275
of the Water Code. Such jurisdiction could be a powerful tool to deal
with pumping that impairs instream flows needed to protect fish and
riparian values, one of the major issues underlying complaints urging
the Board to take a broadened view of its jurisdiction under section
1200 of the Water Code.2 3
Of course, lID I is a court of appeals case, not a supreme court
The Board and the courts have concurrentjurisdiction. EDFII,605 P.2d at 10.
228.

Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 723, 728-29 (Cal. 1983);

In reApplications No. 29919, Decision 1635, 1996 WL 904701, at *12 to *13 (Cal. State
Water Res. Bd. Oct. 2,1996).
229. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 231 Cal. Rptr. 283, 289
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (citing EDFI, 572 P.2d at 1136) [hereinafter ID I].

230. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 195 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986). While there is language in the Racanelli decision that is very broad-the
court says the Board has independent jurisdiction to implement the Constitutional

provision against unreasonable use-this statement was made in the context of a party
holding a Board permit, and the Board was only amending the permit terms. Id. at
187. It did not seek to use an unreasonable use claim to create jurisdiction where it
did not otherwise exist.
231. 1ID I, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 289 (quoting State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. at
195).

232. Id.
233. It should be noted that the Board's limited ability to gather information or
perform monitoring, or to require diverters to report and monitor, significantly
constrains its practical capacity to implement section 275 of the Water Code and the

public trust. Broad substantive authority may be undermined by its inability to obtain
sufficient evidence to sustain a claim. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1051 (West 1971).
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decision, and it deals with surface water. It remains to be seen if the
supreme court's language in EDF I will be applied to groundwater,
where there is no pre-existing Board jurisdiction. No doubt the claim
will be made that percolating groundwater is a special case, and that
the legislature has taken special pains to restrict Board jurisdiction
over groundwater, specifying those (few) instances in which it believes
such jurisdiction may be exercised.3
In anticipation of any such
claim, however, one should recall that back in 1912 and 1913 the only
expressed objection to jurisdiction over groundwater arose over a
discretionary permitting system that could deny a landowner
appropriation of water despite an adequate supply. 2" Both the
supreme court and legislature acknowledged, even then, that when
groundwater pumping adversely affected other water rights, pumping
could be regulated and restricted.3 6
The scope of Board jurisdiction over groundwater to protect
instream values was questioned in North Gualala Water Company v. State
Water Resources Control Board.5 7 In that case, the Board had jurisdiction
over a surface appropriation, which was conditioned by a bypass flow
provision. The permittee then sought a permit (presumably out of an
abundance of caution) to change the point of diversion to a well, while
simultaneously asserting the well did not pump subterranean stream
water, and that the stream was not recharging it anyway.238 The Board
nonetheless insisted on maintaining the bypass flow condition on the
well, and declined to adjudicate the subterranean stream question,

234. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1005.4, 1215, 1216, 2500.5 (West 2003); id. §
12922 (West 1992); id. §§ 2100, 2101(b), 2500, 5000(a) (West 1971).
235. Cf Hearing,supra note 114, at 21, 25-26.
236. See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 771-72 (Cal. 1903) (declaring the doctrine of
correlative rights to govern groundwater pumping in California); Water Commission Bill,
supra note 106, §§ 13, 15, 17.
237. Plaintiffis Complaint, N. Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No.
SCUK CVG 01 86 109 (Super. Ct. Cal. Mendocino County filed July 19, 2001). The
case has a complicated history. See In re Permit 14853, Order WR 2001-14, 2001 WL
1880726 (Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. June 21, 2001) [hereinafter Order 200114]; In re Petitions for Reconsideration by Coast Action Group, Order WR 99-011, 1999
WL 1333373 (Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. Nov. 18, 1999) [hereinafter Order 99011]; In re Minor Protested Petition to Change Permits 5431, Order WR 99-09-DWR,
1999 WL 33512265 (Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. Aug. 27, 1999). On June 21,
2001, the Board issued an Order Denying Reconsideration in the North Gualala Water
Company case. Order 2001-14, supra, at *7. The Order deals with the procedural
failings of the petition for reconsideration. But the Order notes the Company claims
its pumping is not affecting the surface flow, as well as that it is not pumping from a
subterranean stream. Id. at *4. If there is no hydraulic connection between the
pumping and the surface flows, then the case would become moot (there would be no
need to apply stream flow maintenance standards to these wells). Id. at *5. If,
however, there, is a connection, and if it is determined that the Company is not
pumping from a subterranean stream-an issue that the June 21 Order leaves open
for later consideration-the question remains whether, and how, the Board would
seek to control the pumping in order to protect instream flows. Id. at *7. As of the
time of this writing, a new draft order had been issued by the Board finding that the
water is a subterranean stream. SWRCB Draft Order, supra note 203.
238. N. Gualala Water Co., No. SCUK CVG 01 86 109, at 4.
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saying that issue was not properly before it.239 Nonetheless, the Board
made clear its understanding that it had jurisdiction whether or not
the well in question is pumping subterranean stream water. 240 The
applicant filed suit in superior court seeking a determination that it
was not pumping subterranean stream water and that the Board had
no jurisdiction over its well. 41 The case potentially presented a most
interesting issue: if the facts showed that the new point of diversion,
the well, was pumping tributary groundwater with virtually the same
impact on instream values as the previous surface diversion, but that
legally the well was pumping percolating groundwater, has the Board
now lostjurisdiction over the diversion? If so, could it take jurisdiction
The most recent
anew under section 275 of the Water Code?
development, as this article was being written, was a new draft order by
the Board (cited above) finding the water in question was a
subterranean stream. 4 ' The North Gualala Water Co. case, or one like it,
will eventually work its way through the courts and clarify the scope of
the Board's asserted independent authority over percolating
groundwater that threatens surface stream values in violation of the
values protected under section 275 of the Water Code.
2. Remedies for Impairment of Water Rights
While California does not have an integrated permit system for
administering surface and groundwater use, the California courts have
protected surface stream rights against groundwater pumping, and vice

239. Order 2001-14, supra note 237, at *4.
240. The Board's order states the following:
Under article X, section 2 of the California Constitution and Water Code
section 100, however, all diversion and use of water in California is subject to

reasonable use restrictions and a prohibition on unreasonable diversion or

method of diversion. Adverse impacts to fish and wildlife are among the

factors that provide a basis for determining that a water diversion may be
unreasonable. Water Code section 275 directs the SWRCB to take all
appropriate actions to prevent waste or unreasonable use and unreasonable
methods of diversion. The SWRCB's authority to regulate water use to
comply with the reasonable use and diversion requirements of the California
Constitution and Water Code extends to water use under all types of rights.

Thus, the SWRCB's authority to require the operator of a well to prepare a
water supply contingency plan to avoid or reduce impacts on public trust
resources is not limited to situations where the well is deemed to be under the
SWRCB's permitting authority.
Order99-011, supra note 237, at *4 n.3 (citations omitted). Elsewhere in the Order, the
Board says it "has the continuing responsibility and authority under the public trust
doctrine to consider the effect of water diversions upon public trust resources and to
avoid or minimize harm to those resources to the extent feasible." Id. at *4 (citing

Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 726-28 (Cal. 1983)). It should
be noted, incidentally, that since salmon in the river were listed under the federal
Endangered Species Act, the pumpers might have been liable for a "take" under that
law, whether or not the Board had jurisdiction over them. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)

(2000).
241.

N. Gualala Water Co., No. SCUK CVG 01 86 109, at *8.

242. SWRCB Draft Order, supra note 203, at 3.
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versa, at the behest of the injured party, for nearly a century.2" For43
example, in a 1904 case, Cohen v. La Canada Land & Water Company,
the California Supreme Court protected a prior appropriator from a
surface stream against a subsequent appropriator of tributary
percolating groundwater. 44 Similarly in City of Lodi v. East Bay
Municipal Utility District, the court protected a prior appropriator of
percolating groundwater against a subsequent appropriator of surface
stream water.
In a 1903 decision, a riparian surface stream user was protected
against an appropriator of percolating groundwater. 246 The court also
protected Los Angeles' paramount pueblo rights in the Los Angeles
River against diminution by pumping of tributary percolating
groundwater. 47 Still, another early case applied the correlative rights
doctrine as between a riparian user of a surface stream and an
overlying user of tributary groundwater. 48
The effective result of all these cases has been to implement
integrated management of water rights, in hydraulically connected
groundwater and surface stream water, through the medium of private
litigation. 24' Needless to say, the courts also collectively manage surface
water rights with subterranean stream water uses and have, for
example, protected a senior surface appropriator against a junior
pumper.2 50 Indeed, it may be that the determination of the California
243. Eckel v. Springfield Tunnel & Dev. Co., 262 P. 425, 428 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1927); McClintock v. Hudson, 74 P. 849, 850-51 (Cal. 1903). Miller v. Bay Cities Water
Co., 107 P. 115, 125 (Cal. 1910), cited in City of Lodi v. E. Bay. Mun. Util. Dist., 60 P.2d
439, 449 (Cal. 1936).
244. 76 P. 47, 48-49 (Cal. 1904). The court's legal posture in this case is not entirely
clear, as it does not describe the defendant (pumper of percolating groundwater used
off the overlying land) as simply an appropriator, junior to the plaintiff (surface steam
appropriator), but says that a use other than on the pumper's own land is "not for a
reasonable use" Id.
245. 60 P.2d at 440, 447, 452.
246. McClintock, 74 P. at 849, 851.
247. City of Los Angeles v. Hunter, 105 P. 755, 757 (Cal. 1909).
248. Hudson v. Dailey, 105 P. 748, 752-53 (Cal. 1909). The court made clear that
correlative rights would apply whether the groundwater was percolating or was a
subterranean stream. Id. at 753. The Eckel court followed this holding. Eckel, 262 P. at
427.
249. See United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 165 F. Supp. 806, 847 (S.D. Cal.
1958). The Fallbrookcourt cited numerous California cases, and noted:
[A] percolating groundwater supply, although not part of the flow of a
stream, may nevertheless be hydrologically connected with it, with the result
that the extraction of water from either source diminishes the amount of
water in the other. In such a situation, the percolating groundwater and the
stream are regarded as one common water supply; and in considering the
respective rights of those who secure water from the two interconnected
sources, it is "immaterial whether the [underground] waters... were or were
not part of an underground stream, provided the fact be established that this
exaction from the ground diminished to that extent, or to some substantial
extent, the water flowing in the stream.
Id. at 847 (citations omitted) (quoting McClintock, 74 P. at 851).
250. Larsen v. Apollonio, 55 P.2d 196, 198 (Cal. 1936); Barton Land & Water Co. v.
Crafton Water Co., 152 P. 48, 51 (Cal. 1915).
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Supreme Court to integrate groundwater and surface water rights in
litigation explains, at least in part, how California law has been able to
endure the "non-administration" of groundwater under section 1200
of the Water Code for so many decades.
Nor need all such cases be remitted to private litigation. The
Board clearly has and uses its authority to protect groundwater uses
when it hasjurisdiction over permit applications to appropriate surface
water.251 The Board protects groundwater users dependent on
recharge from surface streams by determining whether surface water is
available for appropriation.
The Board also has authority to
condition surface stream appropriation permits to protect
groundwater rights. 253 The courts, of course, can also afford such
protection in private litigation.254
VI. A LAST FEW WORDS: WHAT DOES ALL THIS HISTORY
SIGNIFY FOR TODAY'S PROBLEMS?
Plainly section 1200 of the Water Code is a relic from another
time, and it is hard to imagine any legislature enacting it today.25 5 Yet
251. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1253, 1255, 1257 (West 1971).
252. In two decisions, for example, the Board has created permit conditions
designed to protect prior rights to divert from percolating groundwater (in both cases
Condition 11). In re Permits 10657, Order WR 81-11, 1981 WL 40368, *1 (Cal. State
Water Res. Bd. Sept. 17, 1981); In re Applications 24578, Decision 1486, 1978 WL
21156, at *3, *14 (Cal. State Water Res. Bd. Sept. 25, 1978). In a decision involving a
stream tributary to Pismo Creek in San Luis Obispo County, the Board said:
In order to issue a permit, the Board must find that unappropriated water is
available to supply the applicant. Unappropriated water includes water that
has not been either previously appropriated or diverted for riparian use. The
owner of land overlying a groundwater basin, which is fed by percolation from
a surface watercourse, possesses rights analogous to a riparian owner.
Consequently, water is not available for appropriation from a watercourse
which feeds a groundwater basin if the appropriation would materially
damage the rights of the overlying landowners.
In re Application 28883, Decision 1627, 1990 WL 264522, at *3 (Cal. State Water Res.
Bd. Nov. 27, 1990) (citations omitted).
253. E.g., City of Lodi v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 60 P.2d 439, 441-42 (Cal. 1936). "In
the permits of the District ... it was specifically provided that the District was under
the responsibility of not injuring the underground water users, downstream from the
dam." Id.
254. E.g., Miller v. Bay Cities Water Co., 107 P. 115, 122-25 (Cal. 1910) (prohibiting
an appropriation of surface waters where the appropriation would have reduced
groundwater recharge necessary to support the use of an overlying user of percolating
groundwater).
255. Knowledgeable authorities agree the "right" system is one that integrates
management of hydrologically connected ground and surface waters. "Where ... the
stream and the groundwater are so closely connected that the use of one affects the
other, the same law must be applied to both sources." John D. Leshy & James
Belanger, Arizona Law Where Ground and Surface Water Meet, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 657, 658-59
(1988) (quoting FrankJ. Trelease, Conjunctive Use of Groundwaterand Surface Water, 27
RocKy MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1853, 1856 (1982)). The National Water Commission also
recommended:
State laws should recognize and take account of the substantial interrelation
of surface water and ground water. Rights in both sources of supply should be
integrated, and uses should be administered and managed conjunctively.
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it remains the law in California, and, as described above, the
legislature shows no inclination to change it. In any event, after all
these years, there would be no easy way to comprehensively bring
groundwater under the permitting regime that governs surface water.
For example:
-

-

-

A great deal of subsurface water has been pumped for a long
time, and any comprehensive permitting system would have to
address such perplexing questions as whether a long-standing
pumper would be integrated with surface appropriators of the
same date, or be treated as a new appropriator, as of the date of
a newly required permit application?
Would permitting requirements be applied to adjudicated
groundwater rights, and to established groundwater banking
programs?
Since a considerable percentage of pumped groundwater is
used on overlying land and is thus riparian, it would therefore
be outside any revised permitting system, unless overlying
groundwater use was to be treated differently from riparian
surface water use.

In light of these difficulties and the greater power of modern
pumps, I suggest a practical approach, taking note of the new
information about the intended legislative purpose of section 1200 of
the Water Code, along the following lines:
-

-

Adoption by the Board of clear criteria to implement the
existing statutory purpose, by taking jurisdiction over new
groundwater uses that would diminish appreciably and directly
the flow of a surface stream, substituting an impact test for a
geographic one; and
Proactive use by the Board of its authority under section 275 of
the Water Code, and any other sources of jurisdiction it has, to
implement
the constitutional
prohibitions
on waste,
unreasonable use, and unreasonable methods of use; to protect
the public trust; and to safeguard established rights in surface

There should not be separate codifications of surface water law and ground
water law; the law of waters should be a single, integrated body of
jurisprudence.
NAT'L WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FuTuRE 233 (1973).
256. Priority is ordinarily based on the date of filing of a permit application. CAL.
WATER CODE § 1225 (West Supp. 2003); id. §§ 1450, 1455 (West 1971). However, the
Board has the authority to adjust the priorities of water right applicants. United States
v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). The
Board has adjusted priorities in the public interest where junior applicants had
longstanding claims and uses within the groundwater basin. Decision 1632, supra note
208, at *32 to *33. It might have authority to prefer existing users to new applicants,
notwithstanding the application date, and perhaps grant priorities to existing pumpers
who are new applicants that reflect their actual date of beginning pumping.
Nonetheless, settling priorities would be a deeply troublesome issue.
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stream flows; and
Where
serious
basin-wide
problems
are
presented,
comprehensive basin management (as with successful examples
of adjudicated/managed Southern California basins) 257 as the
most promising tool to achieve genuine integration of surface
water and groundwater administration in California. This
suggestion is made in full recognition of the cost, duration, and
complexity usually associated with settling fights generally
within a basin. 258 Nonetheless, that approach will best position
California to address contemporary groundwater/surface-water
issues such as professional administration,
pumping
assessments, importation of new supplies, replenishment
programs, achievement of sustainable use, allocation of
groundwater storage capacity, quality control, and conjunctive
use.

257. See generally BLOMQUIST, supra note 3, at 17-20.
258. A task that has not been made easier by a recent California Supreme Court
decision. See City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 863 (Cal. 2000).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article chronicles the negotiations among the states of the
Colorado River Basin ("Basin"), the federal government, and various
water agencies within Southern California concerning California's
overuse of water allocated to it by law from the Colorado River. The
negotiations began in 1991, at a time when California was dealing with
the effects of a multiple year drought, and sought the continued
availability of surplus Colorado River water. Many thought the
negotiations had culminated in 2001 when the Department of the
Interior ("DOI") adopted Interim Surplus Guidelines ("Guidelines").
The Guidelines established operating rules for Lower Colorado River
reservoirs for a fifteen-year period, and gave California some assurance
of continued surplus water, but only if it timely put into effect the
California Plan to reduce its dependence on surplus Colorado River
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water.' However, adoption of the Guidelines did not end the debate, it
only set the stage for California agencies and the DOI to attempt to
solve the tough environmental, socioeconomic, and political issues
inherent in implementing the California Plan.
Unfortunately, after more than ten years of negotiations, the
California agencies were unable to finalize the agreements necessary to
effectuate the California Plan. The negotiations continue, and their
success or failure will likely set the tone of the relationship of the
Basin's states and water agencies for years to come. Should the
California Plan fail, the relationship could be characterized by
adversarial politics and divisive litigation. Should the California Plan
succeed, the relationship of the federal government, the states and
water users in the Basin could be characterized, as has been the hope
of the Basin States, by good faith working relationships, innovation,
and problem solving in the best interests of the overall management of
the Colorado River. The importance of a productive working
relationship among the Basin States is critical, not just in resolving
California's water use problems. Such a relationship also is critical to
addressing the pressing issues on the Colorado River in the next
several decades, including Nevada's increasing need for water in
excess of its apportionment, and Mexico's demands for additional
water over and above its Treaty entitlement.
This article consists of two parts. Part I reviewed the development
of the Law of the Colorado River2 ("Law of the River") from an Upper
Basin perspective.
It focused on the motivations of the Upper
Division States, and Colorado in particular, in pressing for the
Colorado River Compact ("Compact") and later federal laws. These
motivations were premised on key themes or principles that remain
relevant today - and which have guided the positions of Colorado and
the other Upper Basin States in their negotiations with California.
Through those negotiations, the Upper Basin States have attempted to
maintain a foundation of security for their right to develop and use
water under the terms of the Compact as economic need dictates. As
its most important principle in protecting that right, the Upper Basin
has insisted that the California issue be resolved within the Lower
1. The California Plan, described in this article, refers to the complex series of
agreements and approvals necessary for California agencies to implement water
conservation measures and transfers from agricultural to municipal agencies so as to
reduce California's overall use of Colorado River water to its basic apportionment of
4.4 million acre-feet of water per year.
2. The "Law of the River" refers to a body of law affecting the interstate and
international use, management, and allocation of water in the Colorado River System,
including the 1922 Colorado River Compact, the Mexican Water Treaty of 1944, the
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, several United States Supreme Court decisions
and the Decree in Arizona v. California,376 U.S. 340 (1964), and a host of federal laws
and administrative regulations.
3. See generallyJames S. Lochhead, An UpperBasin Perspective on California'sClaims to
Water From the ColoradoRiver- Part I: The Law of the River, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 290
(2001) [hereinafter Part1].
4. Colorado River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-61-101 to -104 (2002).
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Basin, in a manner consistent with the Law of the River.
An understanding of the historical development of the Law of the
River, as summarized in Part I of this article, is also important
background to the chronology of the California negotiations that have
occurred since 1991. The Law of the River establishes: (1) the legal
and institutional foundation for the interstate and international
management and allocation of the waters of the Basin; (2) the
underpinnings of relationships between the states, Indian tribes and
the federal government; and (3) the framework within which the
complex state/federal/tribal/water agency negotiations have taken
place.
Part II relates the major events and negotiations leading to the
adoption of the California Plan and the Guidelines, and the
subsequent collapse of the California Plan and suspension of the
Guidelines. As one might imagine, these events did not transpire in a
linear fashion. Politics, economic issues, technical input, changes in
personnel, and other factors influenced them. This article will attempt
to describe those events, and their effect on the changing courses,
ebbs, and flows of the states', the federal government's, and California
agencies' efforts to reach agreement on the outstanding issues before
them.
It should be noted at the outset, this article is not written by a
disinterested observer. The author has been continuously and directly
involved since the beginning of the negotiations, and has developed
strategy and policy on the matters discussed herein on behalf of the
state of Colorado, and subsequently on behalf of the major
municipalities and water districts in Colorado.5 The reader should
recognize this perspective and the inherent bias that may be so
reflected.
The progress and success of the efforts described in this article is
the product of incredible hard work, dedication, and good faith on the
part of the politicians, managers, board members and lawyers of the
federal agencies, states, and water agencies involved in these
negotiations. At the risk of failing to mention many of the fine people
with whom the author has worked, some of the major contributions
were made by Governor Roy Romer, Ken Salazar and Scott Balcomb of
Colorado; Betsy Rieke (later Assistant Secretary for Water and Science
for the Department of the Interior), Rita Pearson Maguire, Herb
Dishlip, and Mike Pearce of Arizona; Jerry Zimmerman, David
Kennedy, Tom Hannigan, Dennis Underwood, Tom Levy, Maureen
Stapleton, and John Carter of California and its water agencies; Pat
Mulroy and Richard Bunker of Nevada; Phil Mutz of New Mexico;
Larry Anderson of Utah; Jeff Fassett, John Shields, and Tom Davidson
of Wyoming; and Wayne Cook, Executive Director of the Upper
Colorado River Basin Commission. Numerous individuals from the
5. The source materials for this article consist primarily of correspondence,
meeting notes and materials, recollections, newspaper articles, government
publications, and other materials that are all on file with the author.
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DOI worked long and hard, and played key roles, in the bit of
Colorado River history outlined in this article. Secretary Bruce
Babbitt, Deputy Secretary David Hayes, and Assistant Secretary Patty
Beneke had intense hands-on involvement in shaping these events.
Bob Snow of the Department's Solicitor's office, and Bob Johnson,
Regional Director of the Lower Colorado Region, played critical roles.
Secretary Gale Norton and Assistant Secretary Bennett Raley
continued the initiatives of the prior administration and have provided
strong leadership on behalf of the DOI in the new "era of limits" on
the Colorado River.
II. THE SITUATION IN 1990 AND THE START OF THE
INTERSTATE DISCUSSIONS ON CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA
WATER SUPPLY ISSUES
The historical interests of the Upper Basin States in security of
supply and interstate allocations began to be tested in 1990, as the
Basin States and the Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") prepared the
Annual Operating Plan ("AOP") for operation of federal Colorado
River system reservoirs.6 At that time, a number of factors converged
to challenge the legal and policy underpinnings of the Law of the
River. The states and federal government faced the following issues:
1. The construction of the Central Arizona Project ("CAP") was
nearing completion, water deliveries had commenced, and demand
for CAP water was projected to increase Arizona total consumptive
water use from the Colorado River mainstem to a level close to
Arizona's basic apportionment of 2.8 million acre-feet per year.'
2. Growth and development in southern Nevada caused the
cessation of "commitments to serve" water to new municipal growth in
the Las Vegas area. Nevada at that time expected to exceed its basic
apportionment of 300,000 acre-feet per year as early as 2002.8
3. For several years, California's consumption of Colorado River
water exceeded the state's basic apportionment of 4.4 million acre-feet
per year.9 However, to this point, California's excess use had not been
a problem; total beneficial consumptive uses of water from the
Colorado River mainstem in the Lower Division States"° had not
6. SeePartI,supra note 3, at 314.
7. Id. at 291-92 n.4.
8. Gerald A. Lopez, Deputy Attorney Gen. for Nev., Speech at the American
Society for Public Administration 3 (Sept. 10, 1991).

9. In 1981, California used 4.839 million acre-feet of Colorado River water.
BuREAu OF RECLAMATION,

U.S.

DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,

COLORADO

RIVER

SYSTEM

CONSUMPTIVE USES AND LOSES REPORT 1981-1985, at iv (1991). By 1991, California's use

of Colorado River water had increased to 5.163 million acre-feet.

BuREAu

OF

RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM CONSUMPTIVE USES

AND LOSSES REPORT 1986-1990, at iv (1998).

10. The "Lower Division States" are defined as "the States of Arizona, California,
and Nevada." Colorado River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-61-101, art. II(d)
(2002).
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exceeded the total amount of consumptive use allowable in "normal"
years of 7.5 million acre-feet." Thus, California users had, to this
point, been able to use the apportioned but unused water of Arizona
and Nevada. However, projected uses in the Lower Basin for 1991
were about 7.8 million acre-feet, necessitating a decision by the
Secretary of the Interior under the Decree in Arizona v. California2 and
the Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado River
Reservoirs" ("Operating Criteria") as to whether to declare a surplus
condition and allow for all uses,
or to declare a normal condition and
14
limit water use in California.
4. The Colorado River Aqueduct operated by the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California ("MWD") for the municipal
water delivery to the California Coastal Plain, has a capacity of about
1.3 million acre-feet per year. 5 Of California's basic apportionment of
4.4 million acre-feet per year, the first 3.85 million acre-feet is
allocated, under the 1931 Seven Party Agreement, for use by irrigation
districts in the Imperial, Coachella, and Palo Verde Valleys. The next
550,000 acre-feet are allocated for use by MWD. MWD then has the
next priority for the water use in California over 4.4 million acre-feet,
which totals 0.662 million acre-feet. 6 Therefore, roughly one-half of
MWD's Colorado River supply exceeds California's basic
apportionment. Because of California's ability to use the unused
apportionments of Arizona and Nevada, MWD, until 1991, diverted
nearly the full capacity of its aqueduct. Any reduction in California's
ability to use water, however, would directly reduce the supply of water
to MWD - the entity most in need of a full and secure supply.
5. Recognizing the need to firm up its supply, in 1988 MWD and
the Imperial Irrigation District ("ID") negotiated an agreement to
transfer conserved water from IID to MWD. One of the primary
factors precipitating the shift from agricultural to urban uses in
California involved legal action commenced in 1980 by the California
Department of Water Resources and the State Water Resources
Control Board ("SWRCB") to enjoin wasteful irrigation practices by
IID."7 The SWRCB had ordered IID to undertake various measures to
11. Under the Criteriafor CoordinatedLong-Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs
("Operating Criteria"), the Secretary determines each year in the AOP whether
"surplus," "normal" or "shortage" conditions exist with respect to the release of water
from Lake Mead for use in the Lower Division States. See Part I, supra note 3, at 291-92
n.4.
12. 376 U.S. 340, 342 (1964).
13. Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs,
35 Fed. Reg. 8951, 8951-52 (June 10, 1970).
14. Projected water uses as of July 1990 were 2.435 million acre-feet in Arizona,
5.194 million acre-feet in California, and 175,000 acre-feet in Nevada, totaling 7.804
million acre-feet. 1990 PROJECrED LOWER BASIN STATES WATER USE.
15. PLANNING & MGMT. CONSULTANTS, LTD., THE REGIONAL URBAN WATER
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

58 (1990) [hereinafter MVJD PLAN].
16. Part I, supra note 3, at 307-09.
17. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250, 254
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stop the loss of water from sources such as canal spill, resulting in
losses of 53,000 to 135,000 acre-feet per year, and excessive tailwater,
resulting in losses of 312,000 to 559,000 acre-feet per year. 8 Under the
IID/MWD transfer agreement, MWD agreed to fund the necessary
water conservation improvements in the IID system.
These
improvements included lining existing canals, constructing local
reservoirs and spill interceptor canals, installing non-leak gates and
automation equipment, and instituting distribution system and onfarm management activities. Upon the completion of these measures,
IID agreed to reduce its diversions from the Colorado River by an
amount equal to the water saved. In theory, MWD could increase its
firm water supply from the Colorado River by one acre foot for every
acre foot saved, MWD would fund IID's improvements ordered by the
Water Resources Control Board, and no irrigated acreage would be
lost in the Imperial Valley. 9 Although the agreement was expected to
yield a total of 106,110 acre-feet per year upon full implementation,"' it
did not cover all of the possible areas of conserved water. Therefore,
MWD and IID began negotiations on a Phase II agreement, which
would save an additional 150,000 acre-feet per year." The parties
contemplated other measures to allow MWD greater firm yield within
California's basic apportionment. For example, MWD estimated that
All-American Canal and Coachella Branch lining would yield 100,000
acre-feet per year, and land-fallowing programs would result in
additional yield.22
6. California had experienced a five-year period of severe
drought.23 Moreover, the years 1988-90 were the driest three-year
period of record in the Upper Colorado River Basin. Thus, Colorado
River system reservoirs were in a declining storage condition,
increasing the sensitivity2of the other Basin States to more water being
withdrawn from storage. 4
7. The population of the service area of MWD in 1990 was about
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991) [hereinafter lID II]; Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res.
Control Bd., 231 Cal. Rptr. 283, 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
18. lID II, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
19. However, for MWD to realize these benefits, both parties needed agreement
from the Coachella Valley Water District, as entitled to water under the third priority.
See Part I, supra note 3, at 307-09.
20. MWD PLAN, supra note 15, at 58.

21.

Id. at 62.

22. Id. at 62-63. In 1992, MWD entered into a pilot land fallowing program with
the Palo Verde Irrigation District. This agreement demonstrated the feasibility of land
fallowing programs in California.
23. In early 1991, before the 1991 "March Miracle" rains which put the drought on
temporary hold, there had been no significant precipitation since November of 1990.
California officials estimated that deliveries to the MWD through the State Water
Project would be only fifty percent of a requested order of 1.645 million acre-feet.
Agricultural water users received sixty-five percent cutbacks from State Water Project
deliveries. Memorandum from Clint Stevens, Chief Eng'r, Upper Colo. Water
Comm'n, to Wayne Cook, Exec. Dir., Upper Colo. Water Comm'n (Jan. 3, 1991).
24, In July 1990, storage levels in Upper Basin reservoirs were between forty-five
and sixty-four percent of normal. Reservoir Status as ofJuly 23, 1990.
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fifteen million people, and was projected to increase to 18.2 million
people by the year 2010, translating to an increased water demand of
about one million acre-feet by the year 2010.25 MWD projected
shortfalls in its water supply by the year 2010 of between 0.74 and 1.71
million acre-feet. 2 As a result, MWD perceived an urgent need to
"firm up" the yield of MWD's Colorado River water supply so as to
assure its ability to divert the full capacity of its Colorado River
Aqueduct.
8. In contrast to the Lower Basin situation, the Upper Division
States of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming" had yet to
reach development of their entitlements to consumptive use of the
Colorado River System under the Compact, and were not expected to
reach full development for many years.
With the above circumstances in play, the draft AOP for 1991, for
the first time since the adoption of the Operating Criteria in 1970,20
proposed that the Secretary issue a normal declaration, thus limitin
deliveries to California water users to 4.4 million acre-feet per year.
Wanting to maintain deliveries of 5.1 million acre-feet per year, the
state of California took the position that the 1991 AOP should be
premised on a surplus declaration, allowing for a full water supply to
all water users in California, particularly MWD.31 California argued
that the amount of water remaining in storage in the Colorado River
system, together with the fact that the Upper Basin did not plan on
developing its entitlement for many years, was sufficient to meet
California's needs without significant adverse risk to the water supplies
of other Basin States. California also complained that the Secretary, in
proposing to issue a normal declaration involving application of the
25. MWD PLAN, supra note 15, at 11, 36.
26. Id. at 60 tbl.III-6.
27. Colorado River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-62-101, art. II(c) (2002).
28. At the time, provisional water consumption estimates for the Upper Division
States totaled about 3.7 million acre-feet. UPPER COLO. RIVER COMM'N, UPPER
COLORADO RIVER STATES' DEPLETION SCHEDULE (1994). When combined with the

estimated reservoir evaporation losses in the Upper Basin, total consumption in the
Upper Basin were at that time about 4.2 million acre-feet per year. Id. This compares
with the Bureau's estimate (with which the Upper Division States do not agree), of a
firm developable yield in the Upper Basin of 6.0 million acre-feet per year. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, HYDROLOGIC DETERMINATION, WATER
AVAILABILITY FROM NAVAJO RESERVOIR AND THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN FOR USE IN

NEW MEXICO (1987).

29. Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs,
35 Fed. Reg. 8951, 8951-52 (June 10, 1970).
30. See PartI, supranote 3, at 313-316.
31. California's position was that the "draft plan's limitation against meeting all
contracts with the United States and other California rights.., does not have a
technical or legal basis." Position paper of the Colorado River Bd. of California; Letter
from Carl Boronkay, Gen. Manager of Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., to Edward M.
Hallenbeck, Reg'l Dir., Bureau of Reclamation Lower Colo. Region (July 13, 1990);
RESOLUTION OF THE COLORADO RIVER BOARD OF CALIFORNIA REGARDING ADOPTION OF
THE 1991 ANNUAL OPERATING PLAN FOR THE COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM RESERVOIRS (Aug.

8, 1990).
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Operating Criteria, based his proposed decision on politics, rather
than technical criteria.
The Central Arizona Water Conservancy District ("CAWCD"), CAP
operator, along with the states of Arizona and Nevada, adamantly
opposed California's request. The CAWCD asserted that continuing to
meet all of California's demands with unused Arizona supply increased
the risk of long term shortage to Arizona (and in particular to the
CAP).'2 However, Bureau projections showed little, if any, risk of
future shortages to the other states if California's water needs were
met." Arizona responded that it was entitled to rely not only on not
increasing its risk of shortage, but also on the availability future
surpluses as part of the water supply for the CAP.3' Additionally, the
Upper Colorado River Commission opposed a surplus declaration,
asserting that a surplus declaration in 1991 would increase future risks
of shortages in the Upper Basin.35
With the Basin States deadlocked, the Bureau tentatively
recommended to the Secretary that he declare a normal condition and
limit California's water use, since there was "no clear basis in the
existing legal and institutional framework of the Colorado River to
allow consumptive uses in the Lower Basin greater than 7,500,000 acrefeet without the consensus of all seven Basin States." 6 However, the
Bureau also proposed that its recommendation to the Secretary
contain the separate views of the states, and given the severe drought
in California it was clear that California would lobby the Secretary
heavily to declare a surplus condition. The Basin States other than
California 7 thus faced the risk the Secretary would disagree with the
Bureau's recommendation. In the event of such a disagreement, the
states would have to decide whether to acquiesce in the decision, or
litigate the issue, asserting the Secretary was obligated under the
Operating Criteria to declare a normal condition on the Colorado
River. The prospects for success in such a lawsuit were doubtful. The
states, especially in the Upper Basin, would have difficulty proving
injury, because system reservoirs were relatively full. Moreover, the
Upper Basin States did not project full development of their compact

32. Letter from Thomas C. Clark, Gen. Manager of Cent. Ariz. Water Conservancy
Dist., to Edward M. Hallenbeck, Reg'l Dir., Bureau of Reclamation Lower Colo.
Region (June 18, 1990).
33. James S. Lochhead, Personal Notes, 1991 Annual Operating Plan Meeting, Las
Vegas, Nev., at 2 (Aug. 9, 1990).
34. Id. at 4. When the Central Arizona Project was authorized, the assumptions of
its water supply and financial feasibility were based on projections the Upper Basin
would not develop its Compact entitlement for several decades, thus allowing surplus
system water to be available to the CAP for continued agricultural diversions until
increasing urbanization and a shift of water from agricultural to urban use would allow
for a decreased water supply.
35. Letter from Jack Ross, Chairman of the Upper Colo. River Comm'n, to Roland
G. Robison & Edward M. Hallenbeck, Bureau of Reclamation 1-3 (Aug. 14, 1990).
36. Draft Memorandum from Comm'r, Bureau of Reclamation, to the Secretary,
U.S. Dep't of Interior 2 (Aug. 21, 1990).
37. Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming.

Issue 2

AN UPPER BASIN PERSPECTIVE PART H

entitlement for many decades.
In view of this risk, and the severe drought conditions in
California, representatives of the Basin States met in San Diego in
August of 1990 to discuss a potential accommodation that would
provide California some relief, while creating a precedent that
California would not be entitled to endless surpluses. They discussed
several options, including a review of the Annual Operating Plan based
on snowpack conditions, and methods for California to assume risks of
shortages in the event of continued drought conditions. 38 The state
representatives adopted a tentative plan to allow California to receive
an additional 400,000 acre-feet of water in 1991. If runoff conditions
in subsequent years were not "above normal," California would be
required to pay this water back to the system by foregoing deliveries in
those years. If runoff conditions in subsequent years were "above
normal," California would be relieved of the payback obligation. 39 The
state representatives did not know it at the time, but this San Diego
meeting on a proposed system of credits and payback would launch
over ten years of meetings and negotiations between the states, the
DOI, and California water agencies, eventually cumulating in the
adoption of the Guidelines and the California Plan.
The states continued negotiations among themselves and also with
the Bureau as to the language of a memorandum from the
Commissioner of Reclamation to the Secretary of the Interior
outlining the Bureau's recommendation for an AOP. After several
drafts, California retreated from its initial insistence on a normal
declaration, and the states reached agreement on a recommendation
for a normal declaration.
To accommodate California, the
memorandum also referenced the ongoing discussions between the
Basin States toward a mechanism for allowing California to divert an
additional 400,000 acre-feet of water in 1991, and the possibility the
AOP would be re-opened in 1991 to allow for this additional use.
The 1991 AOP issued by the Secretary made a normal declaration,
providing that releases of water from Hoover Dam would be made to
satisfy up to 7.5 million acre-feet of consumptive use in the Lower
Basin in 1991.4' However, the AOP also provided that California would
be able to utilize the apportioned but unused water from Arizona and
Nevada. 2

38. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Colo. Water Conservation Bd.
Members 4 (Sept. 4,1990).
39. Memorandum from Clint Stevens, Chief Eng'r, Upper Colo. River Comm'n, to
Upper Colo. River Comm'rs & Eugene I. Jencsok, Colo. Water Conservation Bd. 2
(Aug. 28, 1990);James S. Lochhead, Personal Notes, supra note 33.
40. Memorandum from Comm'r, Bureau of Reclamation, to the Secretary, U.S.
Dep't of Interior 1-3 (Sept. 28, 1990).
41. BUREAu OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, OPERATION OF THE COLORADO
RIVERBASIN 1990, PROJEcTED OPERAIONS 1991, 20THANNUALREPORT4 (Jan. 1991).

42. Under the Decree in Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), the Secretary
may make unused water in one Lower Division state available for use in another Lower
Division state, on a temporary basis. Part i, supra note 3, at 312.
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Encouraged by the Basin States, other than California, and in
anticipation of the new "era of limits," the Bureau also began a public
discussion of stricter administration and accounting of uses in the
Lower Basin.
These proposed measures included adoption of
regulations for administration of Colorado River entitlements in the
Lower Basin.43 Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, the Bureau
would not follow through on its desire to implement tighter
administration. The issue of administration and overrun accounting
remains of critical importance and significant debate in the Lower
Colorado River basin.
In early 1991, the Basin States continued to discuss a mechanism
by which California could access additional water from Lake Mead.
These discussions began to form the outlines of agreements that
would, ten years later, result in the adoption and anticipated
implementation of the California Plan. The Upper Basin States
suggested they would not oppose the release of up to 400,000 acre-feet
of water from Lake Mead, but stipulated the water be accounted as if it
were still in Lake Mead so as to avoid the potential for equalization
releases from Lake Powell." The proposal asked for California's
commitment to a program to reduce its use of Colorado River water to
4.4 million acre-feet per year within a reasonable time, to commit to
operations within the Law of the River, and not to engage in interbasin water marketing or transfers.5 There was mixed reaction by the
Lower Basin States. In particular, Arizona opposed the idea of credits,
because in its view, by keeping water in the Upper Basin, the Upper
Basin proposal only shifted the risk of shortage to Arizona. 6
However, the Upper Basin was not so interested in the idea of
credits per se, as it was in assuring that Lower Basin water supply issues
be resolved within the Lower Basin, and that the Lower Basin States
would assume any risk of shortage resulting from deliveries of surplus
water. 7 The genesis of the Upper Basin proposal was its historical
concern that California's growing dependence on surplus water would
one day ripen into a legal entitlement. Colorado, in particular, was
also adamantly opposed to inter-basin water marketing or leasing as
antithetical to the perpetual right to develop under the Compact, as
putting Colorado's future economic development up for bid, and as
perpetuating California's dependence on water in excess of its basic
apportionment. 4 Colorado's strategy was to use California's desire for
43. Bob Johnson & Walt Fite, Bureau of Reclamation, Presentation to the Upper
Basin States, Managing the Colorado River in the Lower Basin in an Era of Limits (Jan. 7,

1991).
44.

PartI, supranote 3, at 314.

45. James S. Lochhead, Personal Notes, Meeting of Basin States, Las Vegas, Nev., at
4 (Jan. 16, 1991).
46. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado
and Ken Salazar, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res. 11 (Jan. 22, 1991).
47. See Letter from Wayne E. Cook, Exec. Dir., Upper Colo. River Comm'n, to
Gerald R. Zimmerman, Exec. Dir., Colo. River Bd. of Cal. (Jan. 31, 1991).
48.

See PartI, supra note 3, at 322-29.
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short-term surpluses during the drought to obtain California's
commitment to live permanently within its means, and to implement
that commitment through programs and water transfers within
California. By doing so, Colorado could reduce the threat of interbasin water marketing, and achieve the security of solidifying the
framework of interstate apportionments that are the foundation of the
Law of the River.4
As discussed in Part I of this article, the biggest threat to the Upper
Basin's entitlement was Southern California municipal users'
If California
dependence on surplus Colorado River water.50
agricultural and municipal agencies could be convinced to expand on
the MWD/IID water conservation agreement, and thereby satisfy
MWD's Fifth Priority within an overall California water delivery of 4.4
million acre-feet, that dependence could be eliminated. MWD also
saw the opportunity presented by the Upper Basin proposal, and put
forward its own proposal to engage in a program of increased water
conservation-based transfers from the California agricultural agencies
to MWD, based on the MWD/IID water conservation agreement.
III. THE COLORADO INITIATIVE AND THE 1991 MEETING IN
TORRANCE, CALIFORNIA
As the Basin States continued their discussions with little result, the
drought in California worsened, prompting national attention. In
1991, the Senate Subcommittee on Water, Power, and Offshore
Resources held a hearing on the California drought. In California, the
state developed a water bank to facilitate agriculture to urban water
transfers within the State Water Project.52 MWD imposed watering
restrictions within its service area.53 IID was under increasing pressure
to either cut back on its water use or enter into additional water
conservation and transfer agreements with MWD . In Colorado, the
political pressure to market or lease water increased when Secretary of
the Interior, Manuel Lujan, suggested that Colorado and the other
Upper Basin States "donate" surplus water to California.55 Colorado
Congressman Ben Nighthorse Campbell responded with a letter to
Secretary Lujan offering to work together to transfer water rights
decrees for Congressionally authorized, but unbuilt, projects in the
Upper Basin to instream flows and then lease the water under such
49. Id. at 291-92.
50. See id. at 309.
51. Metropolitan's Planfor More Effective use of California'sColorado River Apportionment
(Jan. 15, 1991).
52. Wilson Unveils Water Transfer Battle Plan, IMPERIAL VALLEYPRESS, Feb. 19, 1991, at
Al.
53. Kathryn Dettman, Water Rationing.MWD OKs 50 Percent Cut for Farmers, IMPERIAL
VALLEY PRESS, Feb. 19, 1991, atA8.
54. P.A. Rice, Concrete Lining of All-American Canal Emotional Issue, IMPERIAL VALLEY
PRESS, Feb. 19,1991, at A5; P.A. Rice, MWD May Get FullRequest, IMPERIAL VALLEY PRESS,

Feb. 19, 1991, at Al.
55. Mark Obmascik, Send CaliforniaOur Water?, DENVER POST, Feb. 13, 1991, at 1A.
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decrees to California."
Congressman Campbell proposed that
payments from the lease would be used to build water projects in
Colorado. 57
The pressure on the Upper Basin was more than political.
Secretary Lujan's comment carried with it the subtle implication that if
the Upper Basin States did not reach some accommodation with
California, there was a possibility the Secretary could - in the future accept California's arguments that additional surpluses would not
create increased risk of shortages to the other states, and declare
surplus conditions in the Lower Basin over the other states' objections.
This would force the states either to accept the delivery to California of
additional water, or sue to overturn the Secretary's determination.
With increasing pressure to do something before Congress or the
federal government acted, and out of frustration at the lack of
definitive progress in the interstate discussions on the mechanism for
providing additional Colorado River water to California, Governor Roy
Romer of Colorado sent a letter to Governor Pete Wilson of California5
that sent shockwaves through the Colorado River water community.
Governor Romer offered to "move quickly to work with the River Basin
states and the United States to reach accommodations to assure that
the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California receives a full
supply of Colorado River water this year."59 He placed four conditions
on his offer: (1) that the discussions occur on a state-to-state basis, thus
repudiating private water marketing schemes; (2) that any agreement
be made and implemented within the current framework of the Law of
the River; (3) that the discussions identify how California would
reduce its dependence on surplus water; and (4) that other issues of
interest to the Upper Basin also be discussed, such as environmental
issues, river operations and continued development.0 The Governor's
proposal was intended to: (1) move the interstate discussions off "dead
center;" (2) firmly establish Colorado's opposition to inter-basin water
marketing; (3) maintain state control over discussions relative to
Colorado River operations (as opposed to federal intervention or
private water marketing schemes); (4) promote Colorado's desire to
affirm interstate allocations, and; (5) achieve a reduction in California
water use to its basic apportionment through internal California
programs.

56. Press Release, Ben Nighthorse Campbell, United States Representative, Colo.
(Feb. 15, 1991) (quoting Letter from Ben Nighthorse Campbell, United States

Representative, Colo., to Manuel Lujan, Sec'y of the Interior).
57. Id.

58. Letter from Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado, to Pete Wilson, Governor of
California (Feb. 21, 1991); Statement, Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado, California's

Request for Colorado River Water (Feb. 21, 1991); Letter from Roy Romer, Governor
of Colorado, to Members of the Colorado General Assembly (Feb. 25, 1991).
59.

Letter from Roy Romer to Pete Wilson, supra note 58, at 1.

60. Id. at 1-2.
61. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Members of the Colo. Water
Conservation Bd. (Feb. 24, 1991).
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In the meantime, the Basin States and the Bureau continued to
discuss 1991 Colorado River operations, and whether all of California's
needs could be accommodated within a total Lower Basin use of 7.5
million acre-feet through the allocation of unused apportionment
water from Arizona and Nevada. 2 Given the difficulty in predicting
precipitation and water demands in the other states, the amount of
unused water that would be available to California was uncertain.
Therefore, with the support of the other Basin States, the Bureau
began a campaign to bring IID "to the table" to agree to water
conservation and transfers that would, in both the short and longterm, bring California's water use within its apportionment."' Dennis
Underwood,64 United States Bureau of Reclamation Commissioner,
met with the IID Board to urge the Imperial Valley to undertake
voluntary water conservation or "have somebody do it for you."65
Commissioner Underwood then wrote to the governors of the Basin
States, informing them MWD's full delivery requirement would be
honored.66 But, the Bureau would also undertake efforts to keep total
Lower Basin uses below 7.5 million acre-feet, and would require MWD
to pay back to the Colorado 6River
any overuse by the Lower Basin in
7
excess of 7.5 million acre-feet.
Within Colorado, as part of the strategy behind Governor Romer's
initiative, officials privately discussed a negotiating concept that would
later be instituted as part of the Law of the River in the Interim
Surplus Guidelines adopted by Secretary Babbitt in 2001. The concept
was that in exchange for California's commitment to reduce its use of
water in normal years from 5.2 million acre-feet to 4.4 million acre-feet
over fifteen years on a fixed schedule, the other Basin States would
agree not to oppose surplus deliveries of Colorado River water to
California in accordance with that schedule. 8 Part of this strategy was
62. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to David Walker, Deputy Dir., Colo.
Water Conservation Bd. 1-2 (Feb. 28, 1991).
63. Id. at 1.
64. Before his appointment as commissioner of the United States Bureau of
Reclamation, Dennis Underwood was the director of the Colorado River Board of
California. He later became a vice president of MWD, and spearheaded MWD's efforts
to negotiate and implement the California Plan.
65. P.A. Rice, Underwood Requests Huge Water Cuts, IMPERIAL VAL.LEY PRESs, Mar. 3,
1991, at Al.
66. Letter from Dennis B. Underwood, Comm'r, Bureau of Reclamation, to Pete
Wilson, California Governor 1-2 (Mar. 11, 1991).
67. Id. at 2. The letter would find an echo in 2002. Faced with the prospect that
overuse of water by California agricultural agencies would exceed the quantities
approved in the 2002 AOP, Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton wrote to the
Governors a letter amending the AOP, but requiring repayment of any excess water
use. Letter from Gale A. Norton, Secretary of the Interior, to Gray Davis, Governor of
California (Nov. 22, 2002), at http://www/usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/
2002suppaop.pdf.
68.Memorandum from Eric Kuhn, Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., to Roland C.
Fischer, Sec'y, Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., David Merritt, Eng'r, Colo. River
Water Conservation Dist, Mike Gross, Eng'r, Colo. River Water Conservation Dist, Ray
Tenney, Eng'r, Colo. River Water Conservation Dist, & Donald Hamburg, Gen.
Counsel, Colo. River Water Conservation Dist 1-3 (Apr. 1, 1991); Memorandum from
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to achieve an actual reduction of water use in California. The other
part of the strategy was for California to explicitly recognize the
limitation on its water use imposed by the Law of the River, and at least
attempt to achieve such a reduction. If the states and the DOI agreed
to the concept, California would be bound not just by its 1929
commitment to limit its use to 4.4 million acre-feet per year, 9 but also
by a defined and enforceable program to reduce its uses to its basic
apportionment over a specific period of time. Therefore, if California
were unsuccessful in its effort to reduce its water use, the limitation
could more easily be imposed upon California by operation of law and,
as importantly, as a matter of politics. The proposal had a further
underlying purpose: providing the Secretary of the Interior with the
non-discretionary obligation to enforce a scheduled reduction in
California's water use, thus eliminating any threat that political or legal
pressure by California would cause the Secretary to declare surpluses
and perpetuate California's overuse of water to the detriment of the
other states. If California failed to adhere to its obligation to reduce
its use, the Secretary would have to enforce that obligation.
On March 11, 1991, Governor Wilson responded to Governor
Romer's letter." Governor Wilson recognized that discussions should
occur at the state level, and offered California's willingness to "fully
discuss the issues raised in your letter, as well as any other of interest to
the Basin [S]tates."71 In response to the letters from Commissioner
Underwood and Governor Wilson, Governor Romer contacted the
governors of all the Basin States, asking each governor to designate a
high-level negotiating team to begin state-to-state discussions.2 A
delegation of Colorado representatives then met with each state
individually. Although the reaction from some of the other states was
guarded
(if not suspicious), the other states did agree to a meeting in
71
June. Colorado presented to the other states an outline of issues for
Eric Kuhn, Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., to Jim Lochhead, David Walker, Dir.,

Colo. Water Conservation Bd. & Eugene I. Jencsok, Colo. Water Conservation Bd.
(Apr. 19, 1991); Memorandum from Wayne Cook, Exec. Dir., Upper Colo. River

Comm'n, to Upper Colo. River Comm'rs (May 24, 1991).
69. In 1929, in order to secure the construction of Hoover Dam, the State of
California through its legislature, irrevocably and unconditionally, and as a covenant

for the benefit of the other Basin States, limited its use of Colorado River water to 4.4
million acre-feet per year. Act of Mar. 4, 1929, ch. 16, 48 Cal. Stat. 38, 38-39 (1929).

70. Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to Roy Romer, Governor of
Colorado (Mar. 11, 1991).

71.

Id. at 1.

72. Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado, Statement Regarding the Colorado River 1

(Mar. 19, 1991); Memorandum from Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado, to Ken
Salazar, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res., David Walker, Dir., Colo. Water
Conservation Bd., Jeris Danielson, State Eng'r & Jim Lochhead, Upper Colo. River
Comm'r I (Mar. 20, 1991).
73. See Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Ken Salazar, Exec. Dir., Colo.
Dep't of Nat. Res., David Walker, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd. & Jeris

Danielson, State Eng'r (May 20, 1991) (discussing meetings with New Mexico and
Utah representatives); See also Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Ken Salazar,
Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res., David Walker, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd.,
& Jeris Danielson, State Eng'r (May 30, 1991) (discussing meetings with Arizona,
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resolution at the June meeting.
Consistent with other
communications from Colorado, the framework proposal was that:
1. California would agree to reduce its use of water from the
Colorado River in normal years to 4.4 million acre-feet over a
reasonable time.
2. During this time, the Secretary of the Interior would deliver
Colorado River water to the full capacity of MWD's aqueduct.
3. The states would explore the concept of consideration and
mitigation of impacts associated with MWD's continued use of water
during the specified period.
4. Beneficial consumptive use in the Upper Basin would not be
curtailed.
5. The Basin States would confirm the respective entitlements to
use water under the Law of the River and agree not to deal with private
interests in the interstate marketing of water.74
The meeting of the state representatives, together with a number
of the California water agencies, took place in Torrance, California
over three days in June 1991." s
At this meeting, the state
representatives - other than California's - expressed their concern

about California's reliance on water in excess of its basic
apportionment. The states expressed their willingness to find ways to
accommodate the continued needs of California.
Arizona, in
particular, insisted the risk of shortage be on California, and that
California water agencies be willing to commit to a program to reduce
normal year water use to 4.4 million acre-feet per year. At one point in
the meeting, the state representatives put the question to California
and the California water agencies of whether they would be willing to
engage in discussions based on the Colorado framework.
The
California parties adjourned to an animated outdoor caucus, and
returned to the meeting to announce they would agree to such
discussions.
However, California continued to insist the definition of "surplus"
under the Operating Criteria be more specifically defined. This
definition proposed by California would increase fluctuation in the
federal reservoirs on the Colorado River, make more water available
for use in California, and maximize the use of water within the United
States by reducing the risk of surplus deliveries of water to Mexico

Nevada, and California representatives).
74. Memorandum from Ken Salazar, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res., to
Colorado State Senator Tilman Bishop, Chairman, Senate Agric., Nat. Res. Energy
Comm. & Colorado State Representative Danny Williams, Chairman, House Agric.,
Livestock & Nat. Res. Comm. (June 4, 1991).
75. Included at the meeting were representatives of MWD, IID, the Coachella
Valley Water District ("CVWD"), and the Palo Verde Irrigation District ("Palo Verde").
Attendance List, Meeting of the Seven Colorado River Basin States on Long-term
Issues on the Colorado River (June 24, 1991).
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under the Mexican Treaty. 76 California also presented a conceptual
proposal to create a seven state interstate water bank, patterned after
the water bank instituted in California during the 1991 drought in the
Central Valley - through which water could be purchased from willing
sellers by willing buyers on an interstate basis. Although the other
states applauded burgeoning negotiations within California to transfer
water from agricultural to municipal uses, they were wary of
California's water bank proposal.
The meeting ended with a general consensus that if California
would agree to an enforceable program over a defined period of time
to reduce its use of Colorado River water in normal years to 4.4 million
acre-feet, the other states would agree to discuss a potential
mechanism that would assure California of additional water during
that period of time. California agreed to take this concept under
advisement and develop a proposed approach in response to the
position of the other states.
IV. THE CALIFORNIA WATER BANK PROPOSAL
At a meeting of the state representatives in Denver in August 1991,
California, in response to the agreements reached at the Torrance
meeting, formally presented its "Conceptual Approach" for a Colorado
River Basin water bank. 78 The approach contained a number of
proposals that are relevant to current discussions and issues among the
states. California presented three principle elements to its proposal.
The first element was an "escrow account" concept. 79 MWD would

undertake a program of agricultural water conservation measures and
water transfers within a twenty-year timeframe, resulting in it being
able to divert water to the full capacity of its Colorado River Aqueduct
within California's overall 4.4 million acre-feet limitation. In its
proposal, California offered general descriptions of programs that
eventually would result in anticipated reductions in agricultural water
use in California by 721,000 acre-feet per year." In exchange for the
California commitment to embark on this program, California
proposed the other states agree not to oppose MWD receiving a full
supply during the twenty-year period."
The escrow account part of the proposal allowed California to buy
its way out of non-compliance with its commitment to reduce its use of
76. Letter from James S. Lochhead, to Eric Kuhn, Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist. (July 11, 1991).
77.

P.A. Rice, States Wary About Proposalfor Water Bank, IMPERIAL VALLEYPREsS, June

26, 1991, at Al.
78.

See generally STATE

AGREEMENT

ON

OF CAL., CONCEPTUAL APPROACH FOR REACHING BASIN STATES
INTERIM OPERATION OF COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM RESERVOIRS,

BAsic APPORTIONMENT, AND
(Aug. 28, 1991) [hereinafter

CALIFORNIA'S USE OF COLORADO RIVER WATER ABOVE ITS

IMPLEMENTATION OF AN INTERSTATE WATER
CALIFORNIA CONCEPTUALAPPROACH].

79. Id. at 15.
80. Id. at 9.
81. See id. at 13.
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water within the twenty-year period. California proposed that if MWD
caused California's total water use to exceed the sum of 4.4 million
acre-feet, plus unused apportionments from Arizona and Nevada, plus
any surplus water, then MWD would place a specified sum of money
into an escrow account for each acre-foot of water over such amount to
compensate the other states for any impact or risk of future shortage
occasioned by MWD's excess water use.82 California proposed the
states support the adoption by the Secretary of the Interior of Interim
Operating Criteria for Colorado River system reservoirs that would
recognize MWD's right to receive an assured supply of water under the
above terms. The escrow account concept followed the lines of the
Colorado framework proposal made at the Torrance meeting, and,
except for the actual establishment of an escrow account, was
consistent in concept with the approach eventually taken by California,
the other states, and the DOI in the adoption of the California Plan
and the Guidelines.
The second element of the California approach was a seven-state
interstate water bank. Under this concept, any state could deposit
water with the bank for sale or lease to other states. This would be
water presently being consumed in the depositing state, what is
referred to as "wet water." The bank would then broker the water to
other states wishing to purchase this water. 3 A version of this water
banking concept would eventually be implemented in the Lower
Basin, through the Arizona groundwater bank, in which other Lower
Division States could participate.
The third element of California's approach was for the states and
the DOI to agree on clearer (in California's view) definitions of the
circumstances under which the Secretary would declare surplus
conditions under the Operating Criteria.84 California continued to
express that it wanted more surplus water to become available to
California than under the current determinations made by the
Secretary.85 This element would later be implemented through the
Guidelines adopted by the Secretary in 2001.
Although the Basin States' representatives discussed the California
Conceptual Approach for some time, the reaction to the proposal by
the other states over the next several months was mixed. There was,
not surprisingly, unanimous support for a California commitment to
reduce its uses to its basic apportionment. Most of the states were
interested in the escrow account concept (although not necessarily in
the exchange of money). However, the states were concerned the
water banking concept would erode the security of their entitlements
and violate the Law of the River.
In Colorado's view, the California Conceptual Approach provided
a "responsible and comprehensive response to the issues raised in
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 15.
CALIFORNIA CONcEPTUAL APPROACH, supra note 78, at 15-19.
Id. at 19.
See id. at 1-3.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 6

Torrance.""6 Colorado found favor with the escrow account concept,
as generally consistent with and responsive to the framework Colorado
had proposed at the Torrance meeting."
Although Colorado
remained open to discussions of a water bank, it expressed a number
of reservations and questions as to how such a bank could operate
consistently with the Law of the River and the protection of the
entitlements of future development of the other states.88 Colorado
Governor Roy Romer stated the water bank concept would not "offer
the necessary incentive to California to solve its own water supply
problems." 9
Because of its own need for additional water over its entitlement,
Nevada expressed interest in the concepts of banking, wheeling,
conservation investments, exchanges and transfers of water, on both
an inter- and intra-basin basis. However, Nevada's major concern was
its view that the combination of redefined surplus and water banking
as proposed by California would increase the risk of shortages shortages Nevada could not tolerate. Nevada was only interested in
water, not money in an escrow account arrangement. 90
Arizona seemed less receptive. Arizona's basic concern was that
the California
proposal would result in California continuing to
0
request and receive water in excess of its basic apportionment.
Arizona urged California to resolve its problems within its own state,
and not at the expense of future risk of shortages to the other states.
In Arizona's view, California's priority established under the 1968 Act
increased Arizona's risk of shortages and heightened Arizona's
concern about surplus water use in California.9 ' Arizona expressed no
interest in either the monetary aspect of the escrow account or the
water bank, and insisted that any program allowing California to use
any Colorado River water over its basic normal entitlement give
"absolute assurance" to Arizona that its future water supplies not be
impaired. 92
Utah posited that unused Colorado River system water should be
available for use by states with a need, so long as such use did not

86. STATE OF COLO., COMMENTS OF THE STATE OF COLORADO ON THE CONCEPTUAL
APPROACH FOR REACHING BASIN STATES AGREEMENT ON INTERIM OPERATION OF
COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM RESERVOIRS, CALIFORNIA'S USE OF COLORADO RIVER WATER
ABOVE ITS BASIC APPORTIONMENT, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AN INTERSTATE WATER BANK 6
(Oct. 23, 1991).
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 7.
Id.
Mark Obmascik, Romer Douses California's Water Request, DENVER POST, Oct. 24,

1991, at 3B (quoting Colorado Governor Roy Romer).
90. Letter from Jack L. Stonehocker, Dir., Colo. River Comm'n of Nevada, to
Gerald R. Zimmerman, Exec. Dir., Colo. River Bd. of California 1-3, 8 (Oct. 22, 1991);

James S. Lochhead, Personal Notes, Meeting of Basin States, Phoenix, Ariz. 2 (Nov. 6,
1991).
91. See PartI, supranote 3, at 313.
92.

Letter, Elizabeth Ann Rieke, Dir., Arizona Dep't of Water Res., to Gerald R.

Zimmerman, Exec. Dir., Colo. River Bd. of California, 1-2 (Oct. 23, 1991); James S.
Lochhead, Personal Notes, supra note 90, at 1.
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increase risk or injury to other states. Utah expressed interest in
continued discussions of the escrow account and water banking
concepts, although it expressed that legal, institutional, political, and
practical obstacles to implementation of a water bank would be
"virtually insurmountable."3
However, Utah expressed continued
interest in a credit system similar to that which had been discussed by
the states in relation to the development of the 1991 AOP.
New Mexico expressed appreciation for California's offer to
commit to reduce its uses over a period of time to its basic
apportionment, and interest in continued discussions over the escrow
account concept. However it was "nervous" about the monetary aspect
of the escrow account proposal, and opposed the water bank
proposal.94
Wyoming supported an enforceable schedule of reductions in
California's use of water to its basic apportionment, and found the
escrow concept worthy of further discussion. However, Wyoming
offered "no encouragement or support" on the water banking concept
"until the in-state and regional (lower basin) opportunities of this
concept have been fully exhausted."'
V. A HIATUS IN THE SEVEN STATE PROCESS: LOWER BASIN
DISCUSSIONS
Despite the fact that the states apparently agreed to the substantive
elements of the framework proposal made by Colorado and the escrow
account concept proposed by California, progress of the seven state
negotiations stalled. The states could not reach consensus on a basis
for moving forward with discussions. California and Arizona expressed
a desire to address issues between themselves, and, due to internal
political issues, Nevada asked for additional time to develop its
position." Arizona Director of Water Resources, Betsy Rieke, then
criticized the original Colorado proposal as "playing fast and loose
with Arizona's water," and asserted that, with increasing Arizona uses,
California should be required to reduce its use of water as a matter of
law, not agreement."
93. Letter, D. Larry Anderson, Dir., Utah Div. of Water Res., to Gerald R.
Zimmerman, Exec. Dir., Colo. River Bd. of California (Oct. 24, 1991); James S.
Lochhead, Personal Notes, supra note 90, at 4. Utah's position is curious, given its

later advocacy of interbasin water marketing. See Memorandum from D. Larry
Anderson, Dir., Utah Div. of Water Res., to Upper Basin State Comm'rs 1-3 (Dec. 13,
1994).
94. Letter from Eluid L. Martinez, New Mexico State Eng'r, to Gerald R.

Zimmerman, Exec. Dir., Colo. River Bd. of California (Oct. 25, 1991); James S.
Lochhead, Personal Notes, supra note 90, at 3.

95. Letter from Gordon W. Fassett, Wyoming State Eng'r, to Gerald R.
Zimmerman, Exec. Dir., Colo. River Bd. of California 2 (Oct. 28, 1991); James S.
Lochhead, Personal Notes, supra note 90, at 5.
96. Heather McGregor, Water Talks Delay 7-State Negotiations,GRAND JUNCrION DAILY
SENTINEL, Dec. 23, 1991; Letter fromJack L. Stonehocker, Dir., Colo.River Comm'n of
Nevada, to James S. Lochhead (Dec. 10, 1991).
97. Heather McGregor, Arizona Rips Romer's Water Offer, GRAND JUNCrION DAILY
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As a result, the states agreed the Lower Division States should meet
among themselves to discuss river operations. The Lower Division
States discussed issues beyond the use of water in California including:
(1) Nevada's anticipated growth and demands for water; (2) the
worsening agricultural economic conditions in Arizona;9 and (3) the
resulting decreased demand for CAP water that was threatening the
viability of local irrigation districts. 99 The states also discussed issues
such as redefining "surplus," wheeling of tributary water, and interstate
transfers and exchanges. ' 00

Of particular note, the states discussed a concept of groundwater
storage in Arizona as an element of Colorado River management. The
discussion included proposals to store underground Colorado River
water as a supplement to storage in Lake Mead, and to store Arizona's
unused entitlement in exchange for allowing California and Nevada to
exceed their apportionments.' ' Through these discussions, California
and Arizona developed a pilot groundwater recharge program, by
which MWD would be allowed to store water in Arizona groundwater
aquifers for recovery in later years.
MWD also pursued a pilot land fallowing program with the Palo
Verde Irrigation District ("PVID"). Under this program, MWD paid
farmers in PVID to fallow portions of their fields for no more than two
years. MWD proposed the Bureau store the water saved by the
program in Lake Mead. There the water would be banked under
defined terms for subsequent release for use by MWD.' 2 Although
both Arizona and Nevada opposed the proposed Lake Mead banking
03
arrangement as illegal under the decree in Arizona v. California1
the
Bureau executed an agreement with MWD and PVID that allowed "top
banking" in Lake Mead of water saved from fallowed land in the PVID.
Under this arrangement, the banked water would be the first to spill in
the event of flood releases from Lake Mead.1 4 MWD also entered into
SENTINEL, Jan. 25, 1992, at LB (quoting Elizabeth Ann Rieke, Dir., Arizona Dep't of
Water Res.).
98. STATUS REPORT: ARIZONA-NEVADA-CALIFORNIA DISCUSSIONS, LOWER BASIN USE OF
COLORADO RIVER WATER (Apr. 8, 1992) [hereinafter STATUS REPORT].

99. Joel Nilsson, Perspective, Use it or Lose it, THE ARIZONA
at C1-C2.
100.

REPUBLIC,

May 10, 1992,

STATUS REPORT, supra note 98, at 1, 3.

101. ARIZ. DEP'T OF WATER RES., SCOPING REPORT: POTENTIAL FOR GROUNDWATER
STORAGE AS AN ELEMENT OF COLORADO RIVER MANAGEMENT 2-3 (Mar. 10, 1992); CENT.
ARIZ. WATER CONSERVANCY DIST., OVERVIEW OF CAWCD/MWD DEMONSTRATION
PROJECT ON INTERSTATE UNDERGROUND STORAGE OF UNUSED COLORADO RIVER WATER 1
(June 18, 1992).
102. Agreement between MWD and PVID Regarding Test Land Fallowing Program
§ 5 (undated); Revised Agreement between MWD and PVID Regarding Test Land
Fallowing Program § 5 (undated).
103. Letter from Elizabeth Ann Rieke, Dir., Arizona Dep't of Water Res., to Robert
Towles, Reg'l Dir., Bureau of Reclamation 1 (Apr. 8, 1992); Thomas E. Cahill, Dir.,
Colo. River Comm'n of Nevada, to RobertJ. Towles, Reg' Dir., Bureau of Reclamation
1-2 (May 22, 1992).

104. Memorandum fromJames S. Lochhead, to Ken Salazar, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't
of Nat. Res., Hal D. Simpson, State Eng'r, Eugene I. Jencsok, Colo. Water
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a similar test land fallowing and water banking agreement with IID. 05
The Basin States' discussions, and particularly the California
proposal for a Colorado River water bank, piqued the interest of inBasin Indian tribes and private interests attracted to the idea of interbasin water marketing. With its need for additional water, the State of
Nevada was more than happy to accommodate them.
VI. THE TEN COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES
In reaction to the state discussions concerning the California and
Nevada issues, and in particular to the California water bank proposal,
ten Colorado River Indian Tribes... formed a "Tribal Partnership" to
participate in the discussions. In the Tribes' view, the California
escrow proposal would compensate the Basin States for California's
use of unused water that the Tribes were entitled to under their
unused (and, in many cases, unquantified) reserved rights. The Tribal
Partnership presented to the states a position paper expressing the
Tribes' desire to engage in off-reservation marketing of both unused
tribal entitlements as well as water currently being put to use onreservation.0
Following a meeting between the states and tribes in
September 1992, the Tribal Partnership presented to the states a
proposed memorandum of understanding between the states and the
tribes that outlined a framework for endorsing off-reservation leasing
of Tribal reserved water rights.' 8
Nevada was interested in the proposal, but the Upper Basin States
and Arizona expressed concern, for much the same reasons as they
were concerned about the California water bank - the proposal would
violate the Law of the River, erode the entitlements to use water within
the states, and lead to wholesale inter-basin water marketing. These
states preferred to seek ways to resolve the California and Nevada
issues through operational mechanisms sanctioned within the Law of
the River, and thus drifted back to the type of operational
arrangement first proposed by Colorado and fleshed out in the

Conservation Bd. & Wendy Weiss, 1st Assistant Attorney Gen., Colo. (July 13, 1992).
105. Letter from Robert J. Towles, Reg'l Dir., Bureau of Reclamation, to Wayne
Cook, Exec. Dir., Upper Colo. River Comm'n (Dec. 23, 1992) (with attached
AGREEMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A TEST WATER SAVINGS PROGRAM AND USE OF
SAVED WATER).

106. The ten tribes included the Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, the Cocopah Indian
Tribe, the Colorado River Indian Tribes, the Fort Mojave Indian Tribe, the Jicarilla

Apache Tribe, the Navajo Nation, the Northern Ute Indian Tribe, the Quechan Indian
Tribe, the Southern Ute Indian Tribe, and the Ute Mountain Ute Indian Tribe.
POSITION PAPER OF THE TEN INDIAN TRIBES WITH WATER RIGHTS IN THE COLORADO RIVER
BASIN 5-7 (undated).

107.

Letter from Scott B. McElroy, Partner, Greene, Meyer & McElroy, to James S.

Lochhead (May 11, 1992) (with attached POSITION PAPER OF THE TEN INDIAN TRIBES

(undated)).
108. Draft Memorandum of Understanding between the Ten Tribes of the Colorado
River Basin Tribes Partnership and the Seven Basin States of the Colorado River
Regarding Tribal Water Leasing Proposals (Sept. 23, 1992).
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California escrow account proposal." 9
At a meeting of the states and tribes in Newport Beach, California,
in November 1992, the parties agreed to a process for continuing
discussions based on needs in California and Nevada, economic needs
of the tribes, preservation of the entitlements of the states and tribes,
and preservation of state/tribal control of the water resources within
their borders. l0 Thus began a series of communications and meetings
between representatives of states and tribes called the "7/10 Process."
Although the tribes continued to present various proposals to the
states, the process failed to produce specific agreements. The broad
scope of the proposals by some of the participants, such as the tribes
and Nevada, would have resulted in such major changes to the
institutional and operational framework governing the Colorado River
that neither the states nor the tribes could have effectively dealt with
those changes.
In contrast, Upper Basin States based their proposals on the
principle that Lower Basin water supply problems should be solved
within the Lower Basin. As a result, the Upper Basin proposals were
much more modest (and, in the opinion of the Upper Basin, more
doable) than some of the other, more aggressive, proposals. m Two
additional factors contributed to the disruption and failure of the 7/10
Process: Chevron Shale Oil Company's proposal to develop a reservoir
in Colorado and lease Colorado water to Nevada;11 2 and the financial
crises in Arizona associated with the repayment obligations of the CAP.
VII. NEVADA'S AGGRESSIVE APPROACH TO ACQUIRING
WATER
With pressing demands in excess of Nevada's basic entitlement of
300,000 acre-feet per year, southern Nevada embarked on an
ambitious campaign to obtain water from any source. The following
factors pressured the Southern Nevada Water Authority ("SNWA"),
which encompassed a consortium of water districts in the Las Vegas
area, to take some action: (1) its policy of not extending taps without a
long-term supply of water to support new growth; (2) the speculative
purchasing and holding of taps by developers; and (3) increasing
political pressure from the casino industry to develop additional water
supplies. Nevada made the intentions of its new campaign known
109. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Ken Salazar, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't
of Nat. Res., Hal D. Simpson, State Eng'r, Chuck Lile, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation
Bd., & Trish Bangert, Deputy Attorney Gen., Colo. (Oct. 13, 1992) (with attached
Draft Memorandum from Gen. Counsel, to Upper Colorado River Comm'rs discussing
Indian Water Rights and the Law of the River) (Oct. 7, 1992).
110. James S. Lochhead, Personal Notes, Meeting of Basin States and Tribes,
Newport Beach, Cal., at 3 (Nov. 17, 1992).
111. See Memorandum from Wayne E. Cook, Exec. Dir., Upper Colo. River
Comm'n, to Lower Colo. River Basin States Representatives & Colo. River Tribal
P'ship Representatives (Mar. 3, 1993).
112. For a discussion of the Roan Creek proposal, and some of the reasons why
Colorado was adamantly opposed to the proposal, see PartI, supra note 3, at 322-29.

Issue 2

AN UPPERBASIN PERSPECTIVEPART II

shortly after the Newport Beach meeting. Nevada then proposed
state/tribal discussions over several controversial alternatives
including: interstate banking; fallowing and conservation transactions
in the Lower Basin; Upper-to-Lower Basin water marketing; tribal
river commission; and
leasing and marketing; creation of a basin-wide
3
Lake Mead and Lake Powell water banks."
Southern Nevada expanded its campaign in late 1993, when the
Colorado River Commission of Nevada held a hearing - the "Southern
Nevada Water Summit" - inviting anyone with water to sell to make a
proposal. Over two days, the Commission heard proposals by water
speculators for schemes such as shipping glacial water from Alaska,
exchanging water with Mexico, leasing water from the Upper Basin,
transferring water from northern Nevada, and establishing "water
ranches" in Arizona."4 Nevada also invited the other Basin States to
make presentations. However, the other states were not willing to
encourage Nevada to work outside the context of state-to-state
institutional discussions and arrangements. For example, the State of
Colorado warned Nevada that "[e]mbracing, or even considering,
private interbasin water marketing proposals may be destructive of the
process to resolve long term issues on the River.""' Even California,
which also needed additional water, commented that Nevada's need
for additional water "can only be accomplished through joint,
cooperative efforts among the states. " " '
These cautions did not deter the Nevada interests. Nevada and
Utah officials met to discuss exchanges of water on the Virgin and
Colorado Rivers, and a proposed pipeline from Lake Powell to St.
George, Utah, which could serve the needs of both southern Utah and
southern Nevada."' At a follow-up summit on February 8, 1994, the
boards of the Colorado River Commission of Nevada and the SNWA
asked their staffs to prepare a white paper on "wheeling" Virgin River
and Colorado River water to Nevada."' Board members expressed
113. Memorandum from Thomas E. Cahill, Dir., Colo. River Comm'n of Nev., to
7/10 Committee Representatives 7-8 (Jan. 22, 1993).
114. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Ken Salazar, Exec. Dir., Dep't of
Nat. Res. & Chuck Lile, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd. 1-2 (Nov. 12, 1993); See
generally

COLO. RIVER COMM'N &

SUMMIT, WATER CATEGORYANALYSIS

S.

NEV. WATER

AUTH., SOUTHERN

NEVADA WATER

3-37 (Feb. 8, 1994).

115. James S. Lochhead, Colo. Comm'r, Upper Colo. River Comm'n, Presentation
of the State of Colorado Before the Colorado River Commission of Nevada and the
Southern Nevada Water Authority 5 (Nov. 5, 1993).
116. Gerald R. Zimmerman, Exec. Dir., Colo. River Bd. of Cal., Presentation at the
Nevada Water Summit 1 (Nov. 5, 1993).
117. Letter from James S. Lochhead, to Ken Salazar, Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res. &
Chuck Lile, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd. 1-2 (Feb. 8, 1994).

118. Memorandum from Wayne E. Cook, Exec. Dir., Upper Colo.River Comm'n, to
Upper Colo. River Comm'rs 1 (Feb. 11, 1994). The term "wheeling" as applied to the
Virgin River referred to obtaining the legal right to use, or a physical supply of water

from, the Virgin River. However, instead of developing an intake or wells from the
Virgin River watershed and pipeline to Las Vegas, Las Vegas would let the Virgin River
water flow into Lake Mead, and would take the water through its existing intake.
California and Arizona opposed the wheeling concept, on the basis that under the
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frustration that the Law of the River was an apparent impediment to
their access to additional water. One board member stated, "[w]e
must change the 'Law of the River.' Congressional people listening
take note. The 'Law of the River' is blocking most of the best
proposals because they cannot be delivered." "'
Nevada officials
followed the summit with public calls for changing the allocations
among the states.' ° Nevada then piqued the interest of Congress, and
convinced Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey, Chair of the
Subcommittee on Water and Power of the Senate Energy Committee,
to schedule oversight hearings on Colorado River management.
However, because of progress in the Lower Basin interstate discussions
on water banking, Nevada did not follow-up on its threats to try to
redefine the Law of the River, and quickly moderated its approach.
VIII. FINANCIAL CRISES IN ARIZONA
In the early stages of the negotiations between the states on the
issue of California's reliance on surplus water from the Colorado River,
Arizona was a reluctant participant. Arizona took the position that
California's obligation to reduce its use of water was a legal
requirement that was not subject to negotiation, and openly criticized
Colorado's approach. However, in 1991, Arizona began facing a
critical financial problem in the operation of the CAP that was a factor
in causing it to look at financial alternatives, including striking a "deal
with the devil" - California.
Due primarily to low agricultural demand for CAP water, deliveries
of CAP water dropped significantly in 1991.121 Contracts obligated
agricultural districts to continue to pay for CAP water even though
they were not receiving it, causing some of these districts to file for
bankruptcy. At the same time, the Secretary of the Interior prepared
to declare the construction of the CAP substantially complete, which
would trigger additional payments and financial hardship.
Contributing to the crises, the DOI and the CAWCD disputed the
amount that CAWCD would owe the United States once the Secretary
declared substantial completion declaration.
These problems forced Arizona to look for potential alternative
solutions. A task force, appointed by the governor, looked at
opportunities to increase agricultural water use, and also considered
Decree in Arizona v. California,once water from the Virgin River entered Lake Mead, it
became subject to federal control and allocation pursuant to the Decree. See Part I,
supra note 3, at 328-29.
119. Memorandum from Wayne E. Cook, Exec. Dir., Upper Colo.River Comm'n, to
Upper Colo. River Comm'rs 1 (Feb. 11, 1994) (quoting Tom Coward, Colo. River
Comm'n of Nev.).
120. Timothy Egan, Las Vegas Stakes Claim in 90's Water War, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 10,
1994, at Al.
121. Central Arizona Project deliveries dropped from 745,000 acre-feet in 1990 to
420,000 acre-feet in 1991.
GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON CENT. Axiz. PROJECr,
GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON CENTRAL ARIZONA PROJECT ISSUES: REPORT TO GOVERNOR

FiFE SYMINGTON 1 (1992).
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the possibility of interstate marketing of CAP water. Early in 1993, a
report by the Arizona Department of Water Resources rejected the
idea of interstate water marketing, stating:
[A]rizona faces considerable risks by pursuing a marketing
agreement. If Arizona attempts to market a share of its low priority
CAP water, other parties will likely demand the right to market their
water, including currently unused water. Arizona may find that once
this currently unused water is marketed, its low priority supply is
diminished and it no longer has any water to market. If Arizona seeks
to negotiate a change in the Law of the River that allows a direct
marketing of water, it may find, after the negotiations, that the state
has lost more than it is willing and can afford to give up.122

However, by the end of 1993, Arizona was more willing to discuss
the subject. A Governor's Task Force report stated that "[the Arizona
Department of Water Resources] should study the feasibility of
arrangements in which California and Nevada take advantage of
unused entitlement and canal capacity to store water in Arizona in
exchange for the right to increased Colorado River diversions in the
future."1 23 Arizona, Nevada, and MWD entered into a demonstration
project allowing for Nevada or MWD to pay the CAWCD to deliver
Colorado River water to farmers who normally used groundwater. In
exchange, Nevada or MfWD would then receive rights to the
groundwater the farmers did not pump. When necessary, Nevada or
MWD could later gain access to this "in-lieu" storage through a
forbearance agreement whereby Arizona agreed to forbear, in the
future, the use of an equal portion of its Colorado River entitlement to
124
Nevada or MWD.
This arrangement increased the use and financial
feasibility of the CAP, gave to Arizona farmers water at a cheaper price
than their pumped groundwater, and created a storage water bank for
Nevada and MWD.
Negotiations between Arizona and the DOI over the repayment
obligation of the CAWCD for the CAP eventually broke down in 1995;
the matter then went to litigation.12 5
However, the concepts of
developing a market for Arizona's unused entitlement and canal
capacity became important components in developing an incentive for
California to develop the California Plan, and for Arizona to develop
122. ARiz.

DEP'T OF WATER RES.,

GOVERNOR'S CENTRAL ARIZONA PROJECT ADVISORY

COMMITTEE: PRELIMINARY DRAFT, MARKETING COLORADO RIVER WATER TO CALIFORNIA OR

NEVADA USERS 27 (1993).
123. ARIZ. DEP'T OF WATER RES., GOVERNOR'S CENTRAL ARIZONA PROJECT ADVISORY
COMMITTEE: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 29 (1993).

124. Jon Christensen, Las Vegas Wheels and Deals for Colorado River Water, HIGH
COUNTRYNEwS, Feb. 21, 1994, at 12-13. The vehicle for implementing the forbearance

arrangement is Article II (B)(6) of the Decree in Arizona, which authorizes the
Secretary of the Interior to make unused water in one state available for use in another
state, on a temporary basis. See Part I, supra note 3, at 312.
125. Editorial, CAP Agreement Collapses: Playing Politics With Water, THE ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, June 21, 1995, at B8. See also Memorandum fromJames S. Lochhead, Exec.
Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res., to Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado (June 23, 1995).
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its groundwater bank. Additionally, the concept of Arizona forbearing
a portion of its unused apportionment would find utility in the
Guidelines that were later developed by the DOI, and in the
implementation of the California Plan.
IX. DISCUSSIONS ON A LOWER BASIN WATER BANK AND
LOWER BASIN OPERATIONS
In 1994, in the context of renewed discussions among the seven
Basin States, Nevada proposed to form a publicly controlled water
bank in the Lower Basin. The bank would collect and allocate unused
and voluntarily contributed water "to assure a full aqueduct for
[MWD], an effective end to the [CAP] subordination, and a long-term
augmentation of the water supply of the [SNWA] (starting with the
transportation of appropriated Virgin River water in Lake Mead) .
Nevada proposed that a commission, composed of representatives
of
27
each of the three Lower Division States, operate the bank.
The proposal was generally well received by the other states. In
particular, the Upper Division States felt the proposal was consistent
with two of their fundamental principles - that the Lower Basin resolve
its water allocation issues within the Lower Basin, and that no private
2
water marketing occur between the Upper and Lower Basins. 1
Arizona responded that a Lower Basin Commission might be
appropriate, but suggested that, instead of a central water bank, the
states allow for the creation of individual state water banks.1 29 In
Arizona, the legislature would create the bank with the authority to
secure long-term supplies through sources such as underground water
storage credits, Colorado River water available through land fallowing,
and interim contracts with CAWCD for excess CAP water for
groundwater storage.1 30 The bank could then contract with other
126. Nevada's Approach to a Lower Division Regional Solution 1 (Apr. 29, 1994).
127. Id. at 1, 4; Janet F. Rogers, Chair, Colo. River Comm'n of Nev., Statement
before the Subcommittee on Water and Power of the Senate Energy Committee for
the Lower Colorado River Oversight Hearings 4-8 (June 8 & 9, 1994); COLO. RIVER
COMM'N OF NEV.,

AMPLIFICATION OF NEVADA's APPROACH TO A LOWER DVIsION/BASIN

(July 8, 1994).
128. Heather McGregor, "Water Bank" Could Help State Rivers, GRANDJUNCnON DAILY
SENTINEL, May 6, 1994, at 1B; Memorandum from D. Larry Anderson, Div. Dir., Utah
Div. of Water Res., to Basin States Representatives 1 (May 25, 1994); Memorandum
from Philip B. Mutz, Upper Colo. River Comm'r for New Mexico & Eluid L. Martinez,
Sec'y, New Mexico Interstate Stream Comm'n, to Colo. River Basin States
Representatives & Wayne Cook, Exec. Dir., Upper Colo. River Comm'n 1 (May 26,
1994); Memorandum from Gerald R. Zimmerman, Exec. Dir., Colo. River Bd. of Cal.,
to Colo. River Basin States Representatives 1 (May 26, 1994); Memorandum from
Gordon W. Fassett, Wyoming State Eng'r, to Seven Colo. Basin States Representatives 1
(May 31, 1994).
129. Memorandum from Rita P. Pearson, Dir., Arizona Dep't of Water Res., to Seven
Colo. Basin States Representatives 1 (May 27, 1994); See generally ARIz. DEP'T OF WATER
REGIONAL SOLUTION 1-2

RES.,

ARIZONA WATER BANK PROPOSAL (July 14, 1994).

130. See Larry Linser, Deputy Dir., Ariz. Dep't of Water Res., Testimony Before the
Water and Power Subcommittee of the United States Senate Energy and Nat. Res.
Committee 6 (June 8-9, 1994).
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states for their acquisition of such supplies, and arrange to store those
supplies (including underground storage). The transfer of water from
the bank to California or Nevada would be made through a
"forbearance agreement" entered into under the provisions of Article
II(B) (6) of the Decree in Arizona v. California, under which the
Secretary can deliver the unused entitlement of one Lower Division
state in any one year for use in another Lower Division state."'
Arizona recognized the Secretary would have to promulgate
regulations to implement transfers between the states under Article
II(B) (6).32

The DOI also put forth a proposal for improving the management
of Lower Basin supplies. In early 1994, the DOI circulated draft
regulations for managing Colorado River water entitlements in the
Lower Basin. The regulations addressed many of the issues being
discussed by the states, including marketing Colorado River in the
Lower Basin, banking conserved water in Lake Mead, administering
reasonable beneficial use, imposing fees, and wheeling non-project
water.1 33 The Lower Division States expressed numerous reservations
and concerns as to these draft regulations, resulting in the DOI
agreeing to suspend publication pending further discussion.
In response to the seeming progress on state water banking
discussions and the suspension of draft regulations, the Lower Division
States appointed a technical committee charged to develop
alternatives to more efficient management of the Colorado River
system in the Lower Basin. The committee discussed the operation of
an interstate water bank, surplus and shortage operating criteria,
overrun criteria, transfers of Tribal water, modeling, establishment of a
"Lower Basin Forum," facilitators, public involvement, and other
issues.'3

5

Throughout these discussions, Nevada continued to push the idea
that the states not oppose the wheeling of 60,000 acre-feet of water per
year from the Virgin River through Lake Mead for use in Nevada.
Nevada felt that this wheeling could be in lieu of a water development
project on the Virgin River. Arizona and California opposed the idea,
however, on the basis that once water entered Lake Mead, it became
subject to the allocation scheme under the Boulder Canyon Project
131. See id.; Memorandum from Daries C. Lile, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd.,
to Colo. Water Conservation Bd. Members & Colo. River Policy Advisory Council 1-2
(June 14,1994).

132. See Larry Linser, supra note 130.
133. Elizabeth Ann Rieke, Assistant Sec'y for Water & Science, Dep't of the Interior,
Statement Before the Water and Power Subcommittee of the United States Senate
Energy and Nat. Res. Committee 12-14 (June 8, 1994).
134.

COLO. RIVER LOWER BASIN TECHNICAL COMM., PROGRESS REPORT 1 (Oct. 11,

1994).
135. LOWER CoLo. RIVER BASIN TECHNICAL COMM., PROGRESS REPORT No. 4, at 2-6, 810 (June 1, 1995); LOWER COLO. RIVER BASIN TEHNIcAL COMM., PROGRESS REPORT No.
3, at 1-5 (Mar. 22, 1995); LOWER COLO. RIVER BASIN TECHNICAL COMM., PROGRESS
REPORT No. 2, at 2, 4-9, 11 (Jan. 19, 1995); COLO. RIVER LOWER BASIN TECHNICAL
COMM., PROGRESS REPORT 3-4, 6 (Oct. 11, 1994).
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Act and the Decree in Arizona v. California. Also, MWD pushed the
idea of a water bank in Lake Mead. Arizona opposed this idea as
well. 36 These disagreements effectively stalled the discussions for
about a year.
Further complicating the negotiations, similar to earlier proposals
for interstate transactions, other interests on the Colorado River
desired to "get in on the action." The Colorado River Basin Tribes
Partnership presented its own water banking proposal to the states.'37
Much to the consternation of the other Upper Division States, the
State of Utah broke ranks by proposing an Upper Basin water bank
that could market Upper Basin water to the Lower Basin. 38 The other
Upper Basin States expressed no interest in the proposal. After
meeting with the governor's representatives of each of the other
Upper Division States, the Utah Director of Natural Resources
characterized the reaction of the other states as "'Not interested. No.
Hell no.' Depending on the state.', 39 One might view this as a kneejerk response to a progressive proposal, but the reasons for the Upper
Basin's historical opposition to Upper-to-Lower Basin water marketing
have their roots in the very foundation of the Law of the River for the
Upper Basin-the protection in perpetuity under the Compact to
develop the Upper Basin's share of the Colorado River. 40
After more than a year of negotiations, the Lower Basin technical
committee failed to reach any substantive agreement. In apparent
frustration over the lack of progress, the Bureau wrote a paper to the
committee outlining Bureau proposals for managing surpluses,
shortages, and unused apportionment "until a lower basin consensus
on these issues is achieved."''
The paper proposed to declare more
surpluses, resulting in more and deeper drawdowns in Lake Mead than
had historically occurred. 42 Although MWD supported the proposal,

136. Letter from Rita P. Pearson, Dir., Ariz. Dep't of Water Res., to Bruce Babbitt,
Sec'y of the Interior (June 2, 1995); LOWER COLO. RIVER BASIN TECHNICAL COMM.,
PROGRESS REPORT No. 4, at 4-6, 9 (June 1, 1995).
137. COLO. RIVER BASIN TRIBES P'SHIP, PROPOSED FUNDAMENTAL COMPONENTS OF
COLORADO RIVER MARKETING/BANING (Oct. 11, 1994).
138. Memorandum from D. Larry Anderson, Dir., Div. of Water Res., to Upper Basin
State Comm'rs (Dec. 13, 1994) (including Upper Basin Water Bank Working Paper).
139. Utah PondersSelling Las Vegas $20 Million in Water Annually, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb.
12, 1995 (quoting Ted Stewart, Exec. Dir., Dep't of Nat. Res.).
140. See PartI, supra note 3, at 322-29.
141. Letter from V. LeGrand Neilson, Dir., Office of Colo. River Water & Power
Mgmt., Bureau of Reclamation, to Abraham Sofaer, Facilitator, Lower Colo. River
Basin Technical Comm. (Sept. 29, 1995).
142. The Bureau recommended a shortage criterion of eighty percent assurance of
protecting Lake Mead elevation of 1050 feet and a surplus criterion of eighty percent
assurance of not triggering a shortage. This was opposed to the historic operational
surplus strategy based on a seventy percent assurance of avoiding flood control
releases (the so-called "70R strategy"). These criteria are of vital importance to the
states. The six states other than California favored the 70R strategy because it keeps
system reservoirs fuller than other strategies and minimizes risks of shortages.
California had argued for greater reservoir fluctuations, which would give it greater
access to surpluses.
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IID and other agencies opposed it.
In late 1995, Arizona set forth its position with respect to the
technical committee discussions. It explained that it would view any
proposals against two basic criteria. Would the proposal: (1) "increase
the risk of shortage to the CAP?"; or (2) "in any way threaten Arizona's
entitlement to consumptively use 2.8 million acre-feet per year from
Against these criteria, Arizona announced its
the mainstream?"14
willingness to discuss a number of proposals, but its unwillingness to
discuss water banking in Lake Mead (a proposal of much interest to
MWD) or144party-to-party transfers of water not authorized by the states
Faced with proposals by the other two states that it did not
involved.
support, and the Bureau proposal to increase surplus releases of water
to California, Arizona also presented a proposal that would put
additional pressure on California and Nevada by hastening the day
when Arizona would fully utilize its apportionment.
The Arizona Department of Water Resources proposed that the
Arizona legislature enact legislation to: (1) provide state funding and
mechanisms to divert Arizona's unused apportionment through the
CAP and store the water in groundwater basins for future use during
times of CAP water shortages; and (2) replace some existing uses of
groundwater by central Arizona agricultural entities with CAP water
Arizona also
that would otherwise be unused and unstored.14
proposed creation of an "Arizona State Water Bank" through which
California and Nevada could store additional amounts of Arizona's
unused apportionment. In the future, California and Nevada would
be able to exchange the unused apportionment stored in Arizona for
limited amounts of Colorado River water-amounts additional to their
decreed apportionments. 6 This proposal sought to put Arizona out in
front of the other states by adopting a banking plan acceptable to
Arizona, increasing Arizona's use of its apportionment, and
developing a mechanism to create a market, and thus a repayment
source for the financially troubled CAP. The proposal would achieve
all of these goals.
X. THE DREAM TEAM
But Nevada and MWD had other ideas. As the discussions in the
technical committee broke down, MWD and the SNWA entered into
secret negotiations and formed an alliance they called the "Dream
Team.",4 7

MWD and the SNWA proposed a "long-term partnership"

under which they agreed to explore and develop programs to enhance
their water supplies and support the Bureau's recommendations

143. COLORADO RIVER ISSUES, THE ARIZONAPERSPECTIVE 2 (Nov. 7, 1995).
144. Id. at 2, 13-14.
145. ARiz. DEP'T OF WATER RES., DISCUSSION PAPER: A PROPOSAL TO INCREASE THE USE
OF COLORADO RIVER WATER IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA 2 (Oct. 1995).

146.

Id.

147.

Susan Greene, Pact may Bring More Water, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 22, 1995.
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concerning surplus and shortage criteria.148 MWD also agreed to pay
for lining of the All-American Canal, which diverts water to IID. Part
of this water would be sold at a discounted rate to the San Luis Rey
Indian Tribe in settlement of its reserved rights claims.
Nevada
would fund a portion of the canal lining, and MWD would forbear use
of up to 30,000 acre-feet per year to the benefit of Nevada.5 ° Both
states would seek to bank water not needed in any one year in Lake
Mead for later release. 51
However, the forbearance would have to be approved and
implemented by the Secretary of the Interior, and the secret nature of
the negotiations had a poisonous influence on MWD's and SNWA's
relationship with the Lower Basin States and agencies within Southern
California. Governor Symington of Arizona blasted the proposed deal,
in particular the Lake Mead "top-banking" proposal that Arizona had
opposed in the technical committee discussions, in letters to the
governors of California and Nevada and to Secretary of the Interior
Babbitt. 5 ' Governor Symington illustrated the bitterness of the
political atmosphere, stating that the secret negotiations "[have]
severely undermined our confidence in the ability of Nevada to
negotiate in good faith ...Arizona will not sit idly by while such a
disingenuous plan is put into operation."' Governor Miller of Nevada
responded "Arizona's been kicking sand in our face for a long time.
And now with the political might of Southern California, it's like we've
got a big brother to stand behind us.'

54

MWD moved quickly to assuage the concerns of Arizona. In a
meeting between the General Manager of MWD and the Arizona
Director of Water Resources, MWD offered to discuss giving up
California's priority to the first 4.4 million acre-feet of water in the
Lower River. 5 California's priority had been a burr under Arizona's
saddle since 1968, and MWD's
overture caused Arizona to inch back
56
toward the negotiating table.
However, the MWD/SNWA deal had created greater problems
within California. In addition to leaving Arizona out of the mix, MWD
and the SNWA had not involved the agricultural districts in Southern
California from whom the water would be generated. The Coachella
148. Draft Memorandum of Understanding Between the Southern Nevada Water
Authority and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California 1, 3 (Nov. 16,
1995).
149. See id.
at 2.
150. Id.at 4.
151. Id.at 5.
152. Letter from Fife Symington, Governor of Arizona, to Pete Wilson, Governor of
California 2 (Nov. 17, 1995); Letter from Fife Symington, Governor of Arizona, to
Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior 1 (Nov. 22, 1995).
153. Susan Greene, Arizona Raps Water Alliance, LAs VEGAS REv.-J., Nov. 23, 1995
(quoting Fife Symington, Governor of Arizona).
154. Id.(quoting Bob Miller, Governor of Nevada).
155. See Part I,supra note 3, at 313.
156. Letter from Rita P. Pearson, Dir., Arizona Dep't of Water Res., to John R.
Wodraska, Gen. Manager, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. (Dec. 5, 1995).
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Valley Water District ("CVWD"), IID, and Palo Verde Irrigation District
jointly complained to MWD that MWD's actions would jeopardize the
Districts' water rights. 57 The San Diego County Water Authority
("SDCWA"), which is a member agency of MWD and was engaged in
water transfer negotiations with IID and also negotiations with MWD
for "wheeling" conserved IID water through MWD's Colorado River
Aqueduct to San Diego, expressed its concern to MWD that it should
have a "right of first refusal" to participate in conservation
California Governor Pete Wilson quickly backed away
transactions.
from any implication that the State had any part in the negotiations.
He then went further, writing a letter to the Chairman of MWD
chastising the agency for "usurping the authority of the State of
California in dealing independently with Arizona and Nevada. In
particular, Metropolitan is acting as though it has the authority to sell
Colorado River water to Nevada and to potentially ve up California's
statutory priority over the Central Arizona Project."
The DOI also took a step back from the proposal, stating that it
would not approve any forbearance until it received a formal proposal
and analyzed the impacts on the rest of the states. 61 Secretary Babbitt,
in what would become an annual ritual, then appeared before the
December 1995 meeting of the Colorado River Water Users'
Association meeting in Las Vegas. He noted the efforts the DOI had
undertaken to work with the states in formulating new management
strategies, and his preference for consensus solutions to be developed
Noting further that the Seven-Party
by mutual agreement.162
Agreement of 1931163 authorizes MWD, Los Angeles, and SDCWA to
bank in Lake Mead an aggregate of up to five million acre-feet of water
by reason of diversions reduced below their entitlements, he called
He went on to state his
such banking "vintage Law-of-the-River."'
support for voluntary market transactions within the legal framework
of the Law of the River, and announced that it was his responsibility, as
River Master, to consider applications for willing buyer-seller transfers

157. Letter from Tellis Codekas, President Coachella Valley Water Dist., William R.
Condit, President, Imperial Irrigation Dist. & Virgil Jones, President, Palo Verde
Irrigation Dist., to Jack Foley, Chairman, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. (Nov. 28, 1995).
158. Letter from Mark Watton, Chair, Bd. of Dirs., San Diego County Water Auth.,
to jack Foley, Chairman, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. (Dec. 12, 1995).
159. Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to Fife Symington, Governor
of Arizona (Dec. 4, 1995).
160. Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to Jack Foley, Chairman, Bd.
of Dirs., Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. (Jan. 24, 1996); see also Steve La Rue, Water Deal
Assailed by Wilson, SAN DIEGO UNION, Jan. 27, 1996, at A3.
161. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Statement of the Department of the
Interior (Nov. 24, 1995); Jeffrey Cohen, Water Decision on Hold, LAs VEGAS REv.-J., Nov.
25, 1995.
162. Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior, Address to the Colorado River Water Users
Association, 1995 Annual Conference 9-12 (Dec. 8, 1995).
163. SeePartI,supra note 3, at 307.
164. Bruce Babbitt 1995 Address, supra note 162, at 8.
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of conserved water between the Lower Basin States. 65 Stating he would
"move cautiously," he nonetheless signaled he would not wait for the
three states to arrive at final agreements before he approved individual
Lower Basin interstate transfers.'6
The controversy within California precipitated a new facilitated
consensus-building process. The six major Southern California water
agencies - MWD, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, the
SDCWA, IID, Coachella, and PVID - convened the Six Agency
Committee closed-door discussions to try and close the gap on their
positions relative to issues such as interstate transactions, the
IID/SDCWA conservation transfer, and wheeling of IID water through
MWD's Colorado River Aqueduct to San Diego.
Finally, the political
pressure was enough to break up the "Dream Team." In March 1996,
the General Manager of MWD announced to a California General
Assembly hearing the MWD/SNWA proposal was "off the table."' 8
In 1996, the SNWA created some relief for itself by reversing its
previous policy requiring a permanent water supply to be in place to
support the issuance of new water taps, and that had allowed
developers to hoard taps for speculative purposes. The new policy
allowed SNMA to issue taps that contemplated a need for water in
excess of Nevada's basic apportionment. Thus, Nevada "defined" its
way out of the current political crises, but still had not come up with
real water beyond the limitation of its entitlement.
XI. THE ARIZONA WATER BANK AND INCREASING TENSIONS
(AND WATER USE) IN CALIFORNIA
In response to the ongoing discussions and positions of California
and Nevada, Arizona went on the offensive by implementing the plan
for water banking that it had proposed earlier. The Arizona legislature
enacted a groundwater banking law creating a state-run water banking
authority.'
The Arizona Water Banking Authority ("Banking
Authority") is a state government organization authorized to purchase
unused Colorado River water. The Banking Authority diverts water
through the CAP for storage directly or indirectly in groundwater
aquifers in Arizona in order to protect against future shortages and
provide water supply augmentation opportunities to meet state water
management objectives. The Banking Authority can then sell and
recover the water. Additionally, the Banking Authority is able to store
water on behalf of California or Nevada, and guarantee a mechanism
to allow the states to recover the stored water. The storage and
banking arrangements are operated under Arizona's Underground
165.
166.

Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 18-21, 24.

167. Sue McClurg, ColoradoRiver Controversies,W. WATER, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 4-5.
168. Id. at 13.
169. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-105, -107, -421(7), -566(A)(13)(a)-(c), 567(A) (11) (a)-(c), -611 (C) (3), -615(4), -802.01, -852.01, -896.01, -2401 to -2472 (West
2003); Id. §§ 48-3710, -3713, -3715.
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Water Storage statutes 7 ' and Article II(B) (6) of the Decree in Arizona
v. California.7' The Banking Authority immediately began diverting
Colorado River water through the CAP, causing diversions to increase
dramatically7 2 towards Arizona's full 2.8 million acre-feet per year
entitlement.
Meanwhile, in California, interagency disagreements broke out as
water use in the Imperial Valley also increased. The Six Agency
Committee negotiations broke down. IID did not renew its water
conservation agreement with the MWD, but did enter into a letter of
intent with the SDCWA (which, as the largest but mostjunior member
of MWD, was trying to establish a degree of water independence),
under which water conserved in IID and paid for by SDCWA would be
transferred either through MWD's Colorado River Aqueduct or
through a new aqueduct to be constructed from the Colorado River.'73
MWD objected to the agreement, arguing that SDCWA had no right
independent of MWD to "wheel" water through the Aqueduct, and
raised several other obstacles and legal arguments.'7 4
Coachella, which holds an unquantified right to Colorado River
water junior to IID but senior to MWD, also joined the fray. CVWD
faced its own problems in the form of groundwater overdraft.
Coachella argued that any water saved by conservation in the IID
should go to it, not to MWD. CVWD asserted that only after its needs
were satisfied should water then be allowed to go to ajunior user."
The combination of increasing water use in IID and diversions by
Arizona to bank water pushed total Lower Basin mainstream water use
to about eight million acre-feet in 1996.176 The clear prospect was that
this use would continue. However, Colorado River system reservoirs
were full enough, and runoff was large enough, that the Secretary was
justified in declaring surplus conditions in 1996, 1997, and 1998. If a
normal year were justified, the Secretary would have been forced to
reduce MWD's diversions, to return total California water use to 774.4
million acre-feet and total Lower Basin use to 7.5 million acre-feet.
170.

Id. §§ 45-801.01 to -836.01.

171. 376 U.S. 340, 342 (1964).
172. Arizona projected its diversions of Colorado River water would increase from
2.15 million acre-feet in 1994 to 2.59 million acre-feet in 1996 and 2.7 million acre-feet
in 1997. Memorandum from Chuck Lile, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd., to James
S. Lochhead, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res. 2 (May 16, 1996).
173. Press Release, San Diego County Water Auth., Directors Release Summary of

Draft Terms for Water Transfer 2-4 (July 23, 1996).
174. See generally Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., Preliminary Comments Re:
Cooperative Water Conservation and Transfer Proposal Summary of Draft Terms
(Sept. 30, 1996).
175. Letter from Tom Levy, Gen. Manager, Coachella Valley Water Dist., to Michael
J. Clinton, Gen. Manager, Imperial Irrigation Dist. 2-3 (Oct. 16, 1996). See also PartI,

supra note 3, at 307-09.
176. Letter from Governor's Representatives on the Colorado River Operations,
States of Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, to David

Kennedy, Dir., California Dep't of Water Res. & Gerald R. Zimmerman, Exec. Dir.,
Colo. River Bd. of Cal. 2 (Dec. 9,1996).
177. COLO. RIVER BD. OF CAL., FIRST
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XII. THE SIX-STATE ALLIANCE
Sitting on the sidelines, the representatives of the six Basin States
other than California became increasingly concerned that, despite
nearly continuous discussions among the states and water agencies
since 1991, there was no measurable progress in achieving a reduction
in California water use.
Despite the MWD/IID water transfer
agreement, not only were agricultural uses in California increasing,
but also California agencies apparently were also under the
assumption that California's demands would continue to be met into
the foreseeable future by surplus releases."" The states requested a
meeting with California water agency representatives, which took place
in San Diego on November 22, 1996. The six states made a
comprehensive presentation of their concerns to the California
agencies. The states reviewed the lack of progress in the discussions
that had taken place since 1991, and the concurrent increase in uses in
the Lower Basin in that same period.'79 The states presented to
California a choice: either commit to a defined and enforceable
program to reduce its water use to its 4.4 million acre-feet
apportionment, or face the risk the states would ask the Secretary of
the Interior to reduce California's use to its basic apportionment on a
year-to-year basis. Going back to the positions developed by Colorado
in 1991, the states told California:
We are available to engage in serious discussions toward the
development of multiple year surplus and shortage criteria, that will
meet, for an interim period only, at least part of the demand for
surplus water in the Lower Basin, and will allow for more secure water
planning and more efficient use in the United States.
These discussions must be preceded by, and based upon, California's
commitment to enter into a defined, enforceable program to reduce

its dependence on Colorado River water over its basic entitlement, in
a way that avoids undue risk of shortage to the other Basin States. We
are also interested in moving forward with the steps necessary to
implement the interstate storage component of the Arizona Water
Bank. However, the states are extremely concerned with proposals in
California to bank surplus system water within Lake Mead in a "top
water bank" or a "transitional water bank."

CALIFORNIA's ANNUAL COLORADo RIVER APPORTIONMENT 3 (1997).

178. Letter from Governor's Representatives on the Colorado River Operations,
supra note 176, at 2.

179. Id. at 1-2. Summarizing Lower Basin States' water use, the letter stated:
Nevada's use of Colorado River water increased from about 175,000 [acrefeet] in 1992 to about 245,000 [acre-feet] in 1996. Arizona's use of Colorado
River water increased from about 1.8 [million acre-feet] in 1992 to about 2.6
[million acre-feet] in 1996 ....

[U]se of Colorado River water by California

agriculture increased from about 3.2 [million acre-feet] in 1992 to over 4
[million acre-feet] in 1996-despite the purported conservation of up to
106,000 [acre-feet] of water under the ID/MWND [water conservation and
transfer] agreement.
Id at 2.
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If we cannot proceed on this basis, our states will continue to review
Colorado River operations on a year-to-year basis.
Under this
approach, conditions change rapidly. However, it is possible that a
surplus condition will not be justified in 1998. Therefore, we will
expect use of Colorado River water in California will be reduced to or
toward 4.4 [million acre-feet] in 1998, if the Secretary makes a
normal or limited surplus declaration.' 0
The six states had coordinated their position statement with the
Secretary of the Interior. Immediately following the six-state letter,
Secretary Babbitt addressed the situation in his annual speech to the
Colorado River Water Users' Association in Las Vegas."" The Secretary
underscored the concerns expressed in the six-state letter and
announced several actions he would take.
He instructed the Bureau to work with IID to quantify beneficial
use within IID. 2 This action would serve to limit deliveries to IID, and
establish a baseline for the quantification of conservation savings that
could be transferred to MWD. He also instructed the Bureau to
develop targeted management regulations in the Lower Basin. These
regulations would focus on intrastate water marketing and
implementation of the Arizona Water Bank.'
The Secretary then
announced his desire to clarify the relative rights of California
agricultural agencies, in order to resolve the CVWD/IID dispute."' He
announced his intent to proceed with the development of surplus
criteria, but stated he would defer finalizing any such guidelines
pending the development of a California strategy to reduce its
dependence on surplus water.8 5 Finally, he recognized the concerns
of the six states over surplus top-water banking proposals, and stated
88
he would defer consideration of top-water banking proposals.
Echoing the six-state letter, he warned California water agencies that
California could expect cutbacks in water deliveries at any time, if he
declared a normal condition on the Colorado River.
It was a
warning that Secretaries Babbitt and Norton would frequently repeat.
Shortly after the Secretary's speech, the Bureau denied IID's
request for a water order of 3.3 million acre-feet of water in 1997.
"This action was taken despite the anticipation of surplus conditions in
the [Colorado] River, and therefore represent[ed] a first step in
placing beneficial use limitations on [California agriculture] .,,88
180. Id. at 2-3.
181. Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior, Address to the Colorado River Water Users
Association, 1996 Annual Conference (Dec. 19, 1996).

182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6-7.

186. Bruce Babbitt 1996 Address, supra note 181, at 7.

187. Id. at 7-8.
188. Letter from James S. Lochhead, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res., to Don
Ament, Chairman, Colo. State Senate Agric., Nat. Res. and Energy Comm. & Lewis H.
Entz, Chairman, Colo. House Agric. Comm. 2 (Dec. 20, 1996).
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XIII. THE CALIFORNIA 4.4 PLAN
Following the six-state letter and the Secretary's speech, the IID
and CVWD began discussions over an issue they had not been able to
resolve since 1931 - the quantification of California agricultural
priorities within the first 3.85 million acre-feet of water to which
California is entitled.' 9 IID made a proposal to CVWD that included a
limit on ID's uses of 3.1 million acre-feet per year, and a limit on
CVWD's uses of 330,000 acre-feet per year. This started discussions
over one of the most basic issues that had hampered any proposal to
transfer conserved water from IID to the Colorado River Aqueduct,
quantification of IID's and CVWD's priorities. 90 Additionally, the
California agencies began discussions over the development of a
"California Plan."
At a meeting of the Basin States in Las Vegas on March 31-April 1,
1997, California agency representatives outlined to the six states the
status of their internal negotiations toward the development of a
California Plan. Overall, under State of California facilitation, the
California agencies were negotiating five issues: (1) quantification of
the liD and CVWD priorities; (2) the meaning of "conservation" as
against reasonable beneficial use requirements; (3) the amount and
administration of any transfers of conservation savings from
agricultural to municipal agencies; (4) issues of wheeling SDCWA
water through MWD's Colorado River Aqueduct; and (5)
administration and accounting of overruns in use by California
agencies.""
California designed the California Plan to respond directly to the
concerns of the states and the Secretary by articulating a water budget,
timetable, and program to reduce total California water use to 4.4
million acre-feet. The Plan contained components on conservation
measures that would support additional water for MWD, dry year land189. See PartI, supra note 3, at 307-09.
190. In her 1994 testimony before Congress, Assistant Secretary for Water and
Science, Betsy Rieke, had summarized the problem as follows:
The administration problem stems from the fact that the separate rights
of the California agricultural entitlement holders have not been quantified.
Rather, the irrigation districts share ajoint entitlement to 3.85 [million acrefeet] of California's 4.4 [million acre-feet] apportionment. The separate
rights are prioritized so it is clear who has the prior right in normal and
shortage years. However, each district has the right to utilize all the water it
can put to reasonable beneficial use within its service area as long as the 3.85
[million acre-feet] is not exceeded. Such a system of elastic water rights will
make it difficult to assign responsibility for overruns if the 3.85 [million acrefeet] entitlement is exceeded, and places extreme pressure on the junior
entitlement holders. Such a system also hampers water marketing and
transfers when a high priority user tries to transfer water to lower priority
users; users with intervening priorities generally take action to block any
transfers.
Elizabeth Ann Rieke, Assistant Sec'y for Water & Science, U.S. Dep't of the Interior,
Statement Before the Water and Power Subcommittee of the United States Senate
Energy & Nat. Res. Comm. 15 (June 8,1994).
191. Minutes, Record of the Colorado River Basin States Meeting, Las Vegas, Nev. 12 (Mar. 31-Apr. 1, 1997).
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fallowing options, accounting, administration, overrun accounting,
credit for unmeasured return flows, reasonable and beneficial use,
seepage recovery, settlement of the San Luis Rey claims, conjunctive
use of groundwater, desalinization of drainage water, Salton Sea
impacts, Colorado River impacts, surplus water criteria, Lake Mead
water banking, and use of the Arizona groundwater bank, all of which
were designed to keep MWD's Colorado River Aqueduct essentially full
within California's basic apportionment of 4.4 million acre-feet of
water per year.192
However, there were many unresolved issues. First, the plan did
not deal with present perfected rights within California's 4.4 million
acre-feet per year basic apportionment. These rights included Indian
and non-Indian claims totaling about 85,000 acre-feet per year.
Second, the transfers from agricultural agencies to MWD identified in
the Plan (referred to as "core transfers") totaled only about 600,000
acre-feet per year, about 200,000 acre-feet per year short of that
needed for California to get down to 4.4 million acre-feet per year.
Third, perhaps as a result of this shortfall, the Plan relied heavily on
surplus operations and Lake Mead water banking - the very issues that
had precipitated the six-state letter of concern in 1996. Fourth, the
plan did not have a schedule for implementation."' The Director of
the California Department of Water Resources characterized the Plan
as a "work in progress.,194
The California agencies had not reached agreement on many
fundamental issues necessary to implement the core transfers. The
agencies began working on three "lynchpin" issues: (1) SDCWA and
M WD had to finalize an agreement to wheel water, conserved under
the SDCWA/IID agreement, through the Colorado River Aqueduct;
(2) IID and CVWD had to agree on the relative quantification of their
entitlements within California's third priority; and (3) the California
agencies, the DOI, and the Basin States had to agree on the
implementation of surplus and shortage criteria on the Colorado River
- identified as a critical component of establishing a "soft landing" for
California to reduce its water uses to 4.4 million acre-feet per year.
Additionally, the issue of environmental compliance associated
with the implementation of the California Plan came to the forefront.
The implementation of conservation measures in the Imperial Valley
would reduce agricultural return flows to the Salton Sea, thus
increasing salinity levels and hastening the decline of the fishery
resource in the Sea, impacting several listed or candidate species of
192.

See generally Colo. River Bd. of Cal., Draft Policy and Principles of the Colorado

River Board of California: California's Colorado River Plan (Apr. 17, 1997).
193. Memorandum fromJames S. Lochhead, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res., to
Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado, Don Ament, Colorado State Senator, Lewis Entz,
Colorado State Representative, Colo. Water Conservation Bd. & Colo. River Advisory
Council (Aug. 20, 1997).
194. Alec Rosenberg, Water Plan Doesn't Float, yet, IMPERIAL VALLEY PRESS, Aug. 12,

1997, at Al.
195.

FiRsT QUARTERLYPROGRESS REPORT, supra note 177, at 3.
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wildlife under the federal Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). The
United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS") requested that no
action be taken for three years, so the impacts to the Sea could be
studied.
Moreover, the California agencies recognized that
implementation of the California Plan required environmental
compliance under both California and federal law.196 These clearly
were complex issues.
Therefore, although the outline of the
California Plan was a start, California was still a significant distance
from having a plan it was ready to implement.
With continued work, the California Plan did get a bit more
specific. For example, a revised plan released in November 1997
established a goal of reaching 4.7 million acre-feetper year by the year
2010 or 2015, with an unspecified second phase.
However, the six
states were not satisfied, and continued to ask questions and seek
specificity to the plan.
In his 1997 speech to the Colorado River Water Users' Association,
Secretary Babbitt highlighted a number of the concerns the six states
had expressed with regard to the lack of specificity and definition in
the California Plan. He stated he would not approve water transfers
from agriculture to urban uses within California unless the agricultural
uses had been quantified. He reiterated his warning to the California
agricultural agencies that they faced reductions based on beneficial
use limitations. He also assured the six states he would support and
implement their proposal for river operating criteria that would
provide California with a soft landing to 4.4 million acre-feet per year,
but only if and when the California Plan was ready to be implemented,
and only if the Plan provided enforceable mechanisms to assure
California stayed on track in its water use reduction program. The
Secretary stated:
When further steps are taken so that firm commitments are in place

for implementation of [Phase I of the California Plan], including the
execution of binding contracts, agreed-on arrangements for
transportation, and resolution of quantification and beneficial use
issues, I will adopt surplus criteria that will permit California to

continue to meet its beneficial use needs from the Colorado River. I
anticipate that these criteria will be effective for a specified number

of years, at which time they will expire of their own terms, and will be
reviewed before they are renewed, in order to ensure that California
continues to make
9 8 reasonable forward progress in implementation of
its strategic plan.

196. Memorandum fromJames S. Lochhead, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res., to
Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado, Don Ament, Colorado State Senator, Lewis Entz,
Colorado State Representative, CWCB Members & Colo. River Advisory Council 1-2
(Nov. 3, 1997).
197. COLO. RIVER Bo. OF CAL., DRAFT COLORADO RIrVER BoARD 4.4 PLAN, CAUFORNIA'S
USE OFITS COLORADORIVERALLOCATION 5, 14-15 (Oct. 8, 1997).

198. Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior, Address to the Colorado River Water Users
Association, 1997 Annual Conference 6 (Dec. 18, 1997).
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Following up on his previous year's commitment, the Secretary
also announced the Bureau would publish regulations allowing for
offstream storage of Colorado River water and interstate redemption
or transfer of storage credits in the Lower Basin. Essentially, the
proposed rule would provide a framework and authority for the
implementation of the interstate aspects of the Arizona Groundwater
Banking regulations, primarily between Arizona and Nevada. 99 Under
the regulations, Arizona could store to Nevada's account surplus or
unused Nevada entitlement. In later years, Arizona would then forego
the use of Colorado River water to Nevada's credit, and would take the
stored groundwater in exchange, under the authority of Article
II(B) (6) of the Decree in Arizona v. California.
Although the states supported the regulations as a small but
important step in achieving greater flexibility under the Law of the
River, the Bureau did not adopt the regulations. The Bureau withheld
the regulations over the dispute between the DOI and the State of
Arizona over whether the regulations required a separate federal
contract for contractors to receive and deliver water, or whether the
regulations necessitated only a state contract. The Bureau finally
adopted regulations in 1999.0
The California agencies continued to work on negotiating the
lynchpin issues, but with little to show for their efforts. The California
agencies also presented, and the states discussed, concepts for
applying surplus criteria for Colorado River operations during the
implementation phases of the California Plan. Surplus criteria were
not the focus of any real negotiation, as the basic components of the
California Plan still were not in place.
In April 1998, SDCWA and IID finalized the water conservation
and transfer agreement they had been working on for several years.
The agreement provided for incremental increases in transfers to up
to 200,000 acre-feet, with a possible additional 100,000 acre-feet
available, over a term of up to seventy-five years. IID's statement in the
agreement that land "fallowing will not be a permitted Water
Conservation effort" 2°1 posed one of the most significant issues later
frustrating negotiations to finalize the California Plan. Previous
versions of the IID/SDCWA agreement had included land fallowing as
a source of water to be transferred. However, the agreement had a
number of contingencies such as the need for the SDCWA to reach
agreement with MWD over a wheeling arrangement through the
Colorado River Aqueduct and the requirement for the parties to
mitigate environmental impacts and obtain necessary federal and state
199. Id. at 3; Offstream Storage of Colorado River Water and Interstate Redemption
of Storage Credits in the Lower Division States, 62 Fed. Reg. 68492 (Dec. 31, 1997).
200. Offstream Storage of Colorado River Water and Development and Lease of
Intentionally Created Unused Apportionment in the Lower Division States, 43 C.F.R.
pt.414 (2003).
201. David E. Lindgren, Colorado River Update: The Cliff-Hanger Continues, But is it all
Motion or is There Real ProgressBeneath the Surface?, 3 W. WATER L. & POL'Y REP. 237, 239
(1999).
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approvals. °2
The six states were becoming increasingly frustrated that the
California agencies were not making any progress in resolving the
lynchpin issues and developing a specific California Plan. In May
1998, the six states sent a letter to Secretary Babbitt expressing their
position that, despite the ongoing negotiations in California, the
Secretary should implement the Law of the River by reducing
California water use to 4.4 million acre-feet in the first year in which he
did not declare a surplus.0 3 Reservoirs on the River had been relatively
full, allowing the Secretary to declare surplus conditions, and enabling
MWD to continue to receive a full supply. Concerned these conditions
would not last, the states wanted to put California on notice that time
was wasting. If reservoir conditions turned less favorable, the states
again would not hesitate to ask the Secretary to make a normal
declaration and enforce reductions in MWD's supply. The states told
the Secretary:
The state of California has taken aggressive steps to facilitate
discussions, but the California 4.4 Plan has not progressed beyond
the concept stage. Southern California agencies have been unable to
bridge internal disagreements over details in the implementation of
the proposed Plan. In the meantime, as each year goes by, we all face
the risk of inevitable drought conditions, which will necessitate the
drawdown of system reservoirs. In short, we are concerned that the
California agencies are squandering the opportunity and the
flexibility the system is currently providing to reduce their excessive
reliance on the Colorado River.
Our states will continue to cooperate in and support the development
of the California 4.4 Plan. However, we also have the obligation to
minimize the risk of shortage and protect for our citizens the right to
use water, now and in the future, under the Law of the River. Our
states continue to rely, among other things, on the limitations
imposed on California under the Self-Limitation Act of 1929.
Absent a California Plan, our states will insist on the enforcement of
normal or shortage conditions on the River when conditions warrant.
Our states also may insist on appropriate limitations on surplus
declarations that support the operational integrity of system
reservoirs and the appropriate beneficial use of water.
In August 1998, SDCWA and MWD reached agreement over the

wheeling issue. The agreement established a mechanism for MWD to
take conserved IID water through the Colorado River Aqueduct for
which SDCWA paid. MWD would then deliver a like amount to San

202. Press Release, San Diego County Water Auth., Landmark Water Conservation
and Transfer Agreement Ratified 3 (Apr. 29, 1998).
203. Letter from the Governor's Representatives on Colorado River Operations,

States of Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, to Bruce
Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior 1-2 (May 27, 1998).
204. Id.

Issue 2

AN UPPER BASINPERSPECTIVE PART II

Diego. A legislative appropriation of $235 million to line IID's canals
assisted the deal.2 0 5 However, the California agencies remained stuck
on the quantification issue, and discussions on the development of
surplus Colorado River criteria remained on hold.
The
SDCWA/MWD wheeling agreement was specifically contingent on:
A. The promulgation and application by the Secretary of the
Interior (the "Secretary") of surplus criteria, including river reoperations, that are sufficient, together with those other water
supplies that are under the control of MWD, to assure that the
Colorado River Aqueduct is full at least through 2015; and
B. The establishment and completion of a process, acceptable to
the Secretary and the State of California, in which the Colorado River
Board and the California public agencies that hold contracts with the
Secretary for delivery of Colorado River water would participate,
which quantifies or otherwise resolves Colorado River agricultural
water entidements in a manner that will assure that water conserved
from reasonable and beneficial uses can be transferred from an

agricultural to an urban agency.206

The six states did not find the first contingency acceptable, that
new surplus criteria "assure" the Colorado River Aqueduct would
remain full through 2015. At a Basin States meeting in San Diego in

September 1998, the six states expressed their opposition to such a
concept, stating that any guarantee of a firm supply for MWD would
create an unreasonable risk of shortage to the other states, and
objecting that, in any event,
the Secretary did not have the authority to
207
make such a guarantee.
The states also laid out some principles to
develop surplus criteria, which they would later put in writing. Equally
discouraging, David Hayes, Deputy Secretary of the Interior, who had
been attempting to facilitate discussions between IID and CVWD on
the quantification issue, reported the negotiations were at an
impasse. 201
XIV. THE SIX STATES TAKE THE INITIATIVE ON INTERIM
SURPLUS GUIDELINES
The six states found the contingency in the IID/SDCWA transfer

agreement concerning surplus criteria substantively unacceptable. In
addition, the states realized they did not want to be pressured by
contingencies in California agency agreements into accepting surplus
criteria put forward by California. The states felt it was important that
205.
MWD
206.
207.

Memorandum of Understanding of Essential Terms of a Contract Between
and SDCWA 5 (Aug. 12, 1998).
Id. at 2-3.
Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to the Governor's Representatives on

Colorado River Operations, States of Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah,
and Wyoming 2 (Sept. 11, 1998).

208. James S. Lochhead, Personal Notes, Seven States Meeting, San Diego, Cal., at 1
(Sept. 21, 1998).
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they, rather than California, control the agenda as to the terms of any
criteria the Secretary might adopt. Therefore, in October 1998 the six
states prepared and forwarded to California and to the DOI their

Background and Principles for Negotiation - Special Interim Criteria for
Releases of Water From Lake Mead During Implementation of the California
4.4 Plan.209 The states designed the document to "lay down a marker"
by them as to the bottom-line positions they were willing to negotiate.
Stated below, the document articulated principles under which the
states would negotiate interim surplus criteria.
There is no need or justification for the Secretary to modify the
existing Operating Criteria to accommodate the California 4.4 Plan.
The existing Operating Criteria should remain in effect during
implementation of the 4.4 Plan, and upon termination or expiration
of the special interim criteria. Instead of modifying the Operating
Criteria, the Secretary should adopt special interim criteria for
releases of water from Lake Mead. The six states will prepare a more
detailed proposal that describes acceptable interim Lake Mead
operating criteria. The following elements should be addressed in
the adoption of the special interim criteria:
1. No water user, including MWD and SDCWA, can be
guaranteed or assured of a firm supply for any specified period. Any
assurance or guarantee of supply to MWD and SDCWA will create
unreasonable risk to other states. Moreover, the Secretary of the
Interior does not have the authority to adopt any criteria that would
assure any water user of a full supply. Any risk created by the
implementation of the interim criteria shall be borne by the Lower
Division State(s) which benefited from the additional water made
available.
2. The interim criteria will not take effect until firm commitments
are in place in California to implement Phase I of the 4.4 Plan,
including the execution of binding contracts, agreed-on
arrangements for transportation, and resolution of the quantification
and beneficial use issues.
3. Any interim criteria will be effective only for a specified period
of years, after which the interim criteria will expire on their own
terms. The states and Interior will need to discuss the time-frame for
the interim criteria suggested in the MWD/SDCWA agreement. After
expiration of the interim criteria, the existing Operating Criteria will
continue to control operations, unless the Secretary modifies the
Operating Criteria pursuant to his authority and under the process
set out in the Criteria.
4. Any interim criteria should include triggers that will implement
different surplus or shortage deliveries at specified target elevations
of storage. Such triggers may need to include an assessment of the

209. STATES OF ARIZ., COLO., NEv., N.M., UTAH AND WYo., BACKGROUND AND
PRINCIPLES FOR NEGOTIATION - SPECIAL INTERIM CRITERIA FOR RELEASES OF WATER FROM
LAKE MEAD DURING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CALIFORNIA 4.4 PLAN
[hereinafter SIX STATES PRINCIPLES].

(Oct. 20, 1998)
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water available to MWD and SDCWA from all sources of supply. The
criteria should also include benchmarks, reporting mechanisms, and
reviews, by which California will demonstrate measurable and defined
progress in meeting the goals of the 4.4 Plan. If sufficient progress is
not being made, the interim criteria should automatically and by
their own terms terminate or suspend, and operations will revert back
to the existing Operating Criteria under a 70R strategy with no lookahead.
5. Interim criteria should expire by 2015. Phase I of the Plan
does not achieve a reduction in use in California to 4.4 [million acrefeet per year]. California should identify how Phase II will be
developed and implemented concurrently with Phase I, such that use
in California in normal years will be reduced to 4.4 [million acre-feet]
by 2015.
6. Any amount declared by the Secretary as surplus above the 7.5
[million acre-feet per year] basic apportionment available to the
Lower Division States must be apportioned 50% to California, unless
Arizona and Nevada choose not to divert and use the 46% and 4% of
the surplus amount that is available to those states, respectively. Any
interim criteria should address the conditions under which Arizona
and Nevada would agree not to divert and use their respective 46%
and 4% interests in such surplus.
7. The interim criteria should address use of water during
shortage and surplus conditions by the states of Arizona and Nevada,
in order to optimize operations agreed to by those states under the
Arizona Water Bank.
8. The interim criteria may need to address the issue of off-stream
storage, whether during surplus or flood control release conditions,
and whether such storage should be accounted under the
equalization and 602(a) storage requirements of the Operating
Criteria.
9. The Secretary of the Interior should implement measures to
water in the
curtail all illegal uses
.210of mainstream Colorado River
Lower Basin by
In December 1998, the six states issued a detailed proposal for
interim surplus criteria that would meet the articulated principles.
The states based the proposal on making surplus water available not
only to MWD, but also to Southern Nevada. The states predicated the
proposal on the agreement of Arizona to temporarily waive, under
defined circumstances, all or a portion of its legal entitlement to fortysix percent of any surplus.1
The states proposed that the Secretary declare surplus conditions
in tiers, depending on the water level in Lake Mead. In a normal year,
the proposal limited each state to its basic apportionment. In a year of

210. Id. at 2-4.
211. SeePartIl, supra note 3, at 309, 312.
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partial municipal and industrial ("M&I") surplus, the proposal allowed
MWD and the SNWA to meet a portion of their needs, but no other
surplus water would be available from the system to any other water
user. In a full M&I surplus year, the proposal allowed MWD and
Southern Nevada to meet all their needs, but again no other water
user would receive surplus water.
The Secretary would make
additional surplus water available in years when warranted based on a
70R strategy.
The six states preferred the 70R strategy because it results in fuller
reservoirs, and thus creates less risk of shortage when drought
conditions exist. California preferred strategies that resulted in more
frequent and deeper surpluses, providing more water to MWD,
drawing system reservoirs down further. The six states viewed these
strategies as increasing risks of shortage conditions, elevating delivery
costs, potentially degrading water quality, and losing recreational
benefits. Moreover, the Upper Basin States opposed other operating
strategies supported by California because they would receive no direct
benefit from surplus declarations, but must bear the negative impacts
of having Lake Powell lowered as a result of equalization requirement
in the 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act and the Operating
Criteria.Y
XV. THE IID/COACHIELLA PEACE ACCORD AND THE MWD/IID
MELTDOWN
As the six states worked on their interim surplus guideline
proposal, the DOI and the California agricultural agencies re-engaged
in intense negotiations. However, neglecting to include MWD in these
negotiations turned out to be one of the major flaws in this new round
of negotiations. In December 1998, Secretary Babbitt made his annual
speech to the Colorado River Water Users Association. He spoke on
four basic subject areas: (1) a newly negotiated quantification
memorandum of understanding between IID and CVWD;114 (2) the
development of interim surplus criteria; (3) the Lower Basin water
banking regulation; and (4) the Salton Sea.21
First,
Secretary
Babbitt outlined
the
terms of the
Interior/IID/CVWD
agreement.
This
memorandum
of
understanding established the basis for more detailed negotiations
212. This operational strategy is based on providing adequate reservoir storage
capacity necessary to capture an assumed runoff without spilling, rather than an actual
annual forecast. The 70R strategy is based on an assumed runoff value of the
seventieth percentile of excedance based on the historic period of record.
213. See PartI, supra note 3, at 314.
214. Memorandum of Understanding between IID/CVWD/DOI Regarding
Quantification of Colorado River Rights (Dec. 16, 1998) [hereinafter IID/CVWD/DOI
MOU].
215. Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior, Address to the Colorado River Water Users
Association, 1998 Annual Conference (Dec. 17, 1998); Memorandum from James S.
Lochhead, to Colo. Water Conservation Bd. & Colo. River Advisory Council 2 (Dec.
26, 1998).
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over the next six months, but was subject to a number of
contingencies. Nonetheless, the agreement appeared to represent
significant progress by the California agencies in the resolution of
three "lynchpin issues" on which they had been working. Some of the
key provisions of the agreement were as follows:
The agreement would cap IID's entitlement under Priority 3 of
the 1931 Seven Party Agreement at 3.1 million acre-feet per
year (which was about its current level of use), from which
would be deducted conserved water transferred under the 1988
MWD agreement and the IID/SDCWA agreement. This cap
would provide the necessary baseline from which to measure
the conservation transfers to MWD and SDCWA.
CVWD would have a base entitlement of 330,000 acre-feet per
year under Priority 3, plus another 50,000 acre-feet per year
under a 1989 agreement that otherwise would have been
available to MWD, plus the right to another 138,000 acre-feet
per year of conserved water when the 1989 agreement
terminated.
Under the Seven Party Agreement, the PVID and Yuma Project
rights under Priorities 1 and 2 are quantified by acreage, not by
amount of water. To the extent that diversions under those
priorities exceeded an average of 420,000 acre-feet per year
and caused total diversions under the first three priorities to
exceed 3.85 million acre-feet, IID and CVWD would absorb
that excess on a 90/10 basis.
IID and CVWD entered into a "peace agreement," by which
they would agree not to challenge each other's water practices,
i.e. assert they are wasting or not beneficially using water.
The agreement recognized that MWD was not a party and was
not involved in the negotiations. The agreement obligated the
parties to a six-month period not only to finalize an agreement
with MWD's participation, but also to allow for a period for the
DOI to develop surplus operating criteria for the Colorado
River reservoirs.
IID and CVWD also wanted a "peace
agreement" with MWD, by which MWD would agree to allow
conserved water to be transferred from IID to CVWD and not
challenge IID's or CVWD's use of water. CVWD also wanted
MWD to invest in groundwater
recharge
facilities within the
• .
_
217
Coachella Valley, to store its wet-year water.
Second, Secretary Babbitt turned to interim surplus criteria. The
Secretary stated his desire to move forward with the development of
interim criteria through an "open public process."1 8 Although he
216.
217.
MOU,
218.

Part I, supra note 3, at 307-09.
Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, supra note 215, at 2; IID/CVWD/DOI
supra note 214, at 2-5.
Bruce Babbitt 1998 Address, supranote 215, at 4.
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noted the six-state proposal and urged the states to reach agreement,
he stated that if the states did not reach agreement, he would move
unilaterally after the six month period referenced in the IID/CVWD
agreement, giving "due regard" to the views of the states.1 9
Significantly, he also seemed to accept California's proposal that the
California Plan be developed in two phases, reducing its use of water
only half way to 4.4 million acre-feet by the year 2015 - as opposed to
all the way as proposed by the six states.20 The Secretary's position on
this issue troubled the other states. If it were implemented, in light of
the "peace agreement" proposed' in the Interior/IID/CVWD
agreement, the other states would be the only parties left to make
beneficial use challenges to California agencies, with California still
400,000 acre-feet short of its goal.
Third, the Secretary referred to the deadlock between the DOI
and Arizona over the proposed Lower Basin banking regulations that
had been published a year earlier. The DOI had not finalized the
regulations because of disagreement between the DOI and Arizona
over whether the Arizona water bank would need to enter into a new,
separate contact with the Secretary, or whether the existing agreement
with the CAWCD, which runs the CAP, would suffice. The Secretary
stated that if these regulations were not finalized, he would look at
"other possibilities" to meet the needs of Nevada.2
Finally, the Secretary reported on the status of the Salton Sea.22
He noted the passage of the Salton Sea Reclamation Act,223 and
reminded the audience of the difficulty of implementing water
conservation in the Imperial Valley in a way that resolved the Salton
Sea environmental problems.22 ' This statement was prophetic, as the
environmental issues surrounding the Salton Sea would be one of the
major reasons why the negotiations over the finalization of the
California Plan would ultimately fail.
The "peace accord" began to unravel almost immediately. Shortly
after the Secretary's speech, the MWD Board of Directors considered a
proposed policy that questioned some of the basic premises of the
IID/CVWD agreement. It questioned whether MWD should give up
its right to judicially challenge waste and beneficial use in the Imperial
Valley, whether urban rate payers should be required to pay for
agricultural water that federal taxpayers had already subsidized, and
whether the Secretary of the Interior should simply unilaterally 2re25
allocate water among the parties to the 1931 Seven Party Agreement.
The IID became aware of the policy questions and fired off a letter to
219. Id.
220. See id.
at 3.
221. Id. at 4.
222. Id.
223. Salton Sea Reclamation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-372, 112 Stat. 3377, 33773380.
224. Bruce Babbitt 1998 Address, supra note 215, at 5.
225. Memorandum from Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. Negotiating Team, to Bd. of
Dirs. 3-4 (Jan. 6, 1999).
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MWD asserting that relinquishing beneficial use claims was indeed
necessary to reach an accord on the quantification of agricultural
priorities within Southern California, and denied receiving subsidized
water, having paid the debt on its diversion facilities. 26
Secretary Babbitt met with MWD in an attempt to diffuse the
impending breakdown in negotiations. He denied that he had the
2 27
authority to reallocate water under the 1931 Seven Party Agreement.
Refusing to back down, in a letter to the Secretary immediately after
the meeting, MWD stated, "the Department owes a duty to urban
Southern California water users to determine whether the public
interest warrants continuing the 1931 allocations of Colorado River
water made available through federal reclamation programs among
agricultural and urban users within California."2 ' The letter went on
to express a concern that was shared by the six states, the proposed
quantification agreement would not achieve a full reduction in
California water use, and would therefore "leave urban Southern
California with assurances of only half the water it needs to fill its
Colorado Aqueduct in the long run."22
MWD then circulated a draft resolution to its member agencies
urging the Secretary to "review and adjust California's Colorado River
allocations for the highest and best use of this precious public
resource."2 0 The Secretary responded that "MET's newly-articulated
interest in reappropriating Colorado River water undercuts the basic
policy commitment and approach adopted by California in its 4.4 Plan,
and undermines the actions that many California entities and the
[DOI] have been making to implement the California Plan."2 1 IID
went on a spirited defense of its water rights and the permanency of its
allocation under the 1931 Seven Party Agreement, writing letters,
generating articles, and articulating its legal position. Following
another exchange of letters between MWD, IID, and the Secretary's
office, Secretary Babbitt decided he had had enough. Expressing his
hope the disagreements would not "signal the onset of yet another
western water war," the Secretary backed out of any further meetings
with the California agencies. 2

226. Letter from Bruce Kuhn, President, Imperial Irrigation Dist., to Phil Pace,
Chairman, Bd. of Dirs., Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. (Jan. 11, 1999).
227. Tony Perry, Babbitt Deals Setback to MWD, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1999, at A3.
228. Letter from PhillipJ. Pace, Chairman, Bd. of Dirs., Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal.,
to Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior 1 (Jan. 25, 1999).
229. Id. at 2.
230. See Letter from Tellis Codekas, President, Coachella Valley Water Dist., Bruce
Kuhn, Imperial Irrigation Dist. & Robert Micalizio, President, Palo Verde Irrigation
Dist., to Phillip J. Pace, Chairman, Bd. of Dirs., Metropolitan Water Dist. of S. Cal.
(Feb. 2, 1999) (quoting parts of the resolution).
231. Letter from DavidJ. Hayes, Counselor to the Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Interior,
to Phillip J. Pace, Chairman-Elect, Bd. of Dirs., Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. 3 (Feb. 1,
1999).
232. Letter from Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior, to Phillip J. Pace, Chairman,
Bd. of Dirs., Metropolitan Water Dist. of S. Cal. (Feb. 10, 1999).
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XVI. RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS: THE "KEY TERMS"
AGREEMENT
In March of 1998, the California legislature held a hearing on
Southern California water issues. 3 Several legislators were openly
critical of MWD's approach to water negotiations, even threatening to
pass legislation that would dismantle MWD or strip it of a significant
amount of its powers. Legislators also urged IID and the SDCWA to4
press forward in the negotiation of their water transfer agreement.2
Secretary Babbitt testified at the hearing, and announced that he
would initiate a "process" to seek input to the development of surplus
criteria on the Colorado River.2 5 The Secretary attempted to instill a
sense of urgency in California, stating, "' [i]t is past time for California
to get suited up, out of the locker room and into the game .... Unless
we can get together on the terms of this contract, the whole thing will
collapse.' He continued, '[y]ou'll be sitting on the bench... I can't
wait any longer.'"2 3' 6 Babbitt warned that "within [thirty] days he would
begin the process of promulgating new criteria for the operation of
Colorado River facilities, the declaration of 'surpluses,' and the
apportionment of its waters. He added that the rules would be 'less
favorable 2to37 California unless a [IID/SDCWA] transfer plan is
approved.'
Shortly thereafter, at a meeting with state representatives, he
explained his proposal. He stated that he had no preconceived notion
as to the form or substance of what he might do, or whether he would
even do anything at all. He announced that the DOI would publish a
federal register notice soliciting comment as to whether, and if so
what, it should do with respect to surplus criteria. The Secretary
intended the proposal as a way to put additional pressure on California
to resolve and finalize the California 4.4 Plan.2 " The DOI worked with
the Basin States to develop the notice, which was worded so as to warn
California it could either be included in the process or left out.23 9
233. MIWD's Policy Toward the California4.4 Plan: HearingBefore the Senate Select Comm.
on S. Cal. Water Districts'Expenditures& Governance, 1999 Leg. (Cal. Mar. 17, 1999).
234. Rudy Yniguez, Water Districts Told to Move Ahead With Transfer, IMPERIAL VALLEY
PRESS, Apr. 28, 1999, at Al.

235. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Greg Walcher, Exec. Dir., Colo.
Dep't of Nat. Res., Peter Evans, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Randy Seaholm,
Colo. Water Conservation Bd.,Jennifer Gimbel, Deputy Attorney Gen., Colo., & Carol
Angel, Deputy Attorney Gen., Colo., at 1 (Apr. 5, 1999) [hereinafter Colo. River
Update].
236. W. States Water Council, Water Resources, California/ColoradoRiver, W. STATES
WATER, Apr. 2, 1999, at 2.
237. Id.
238. Colo. River Update, supranote 235, at 1-2.
239. The notice stated, in part:
[R]eclamation intends to scope and, if appropriate, to develop and
implement specific criteria under which "surplus" determinations will be
made for the Lower Basin States.
Reclamation may implement the surplus criteria by revising the LongRange Operating Criteria set forth in Article 111(3) or by developing interim
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Secretary Babbitt, through his Deputy Secretary David Hayes, also
entered back into the California agency negotiations on the 4.4 Plan as
a mediator. 240 The internal negotiations immediately focused on the

most important and contentious issue: quantification of the California
agricultural priorities, specifically IID's. The core issue remained the
same - what was the appropriate cap on IID's right, as compared to the
amount of water that was reasonably required to meet the beneficial
use needs of Imperial Valley farmers? 2 Also at issue were: (1) a
proposal to eventually transfer 500,000 acre-feet from IID to SDCWA
2 42
and MWD; and (2) the impacts to the Imperial Valley economy.
However, this time, the reluctant party was the Coachella Valley
Water District. Under the Seven Party Agreement, CVWD shared
priority 3(a) with LID. 242 It faced a continuing groundwater overdraft
problem, and its leverage was its threat to assert its legal right under
the Seven Party Agreement to take and use ahead of MWD and
SDCWA any conserved water that MWD or SDCWA might pay for
within IID. Using its leverage, CVWD bargained for its share of a
shrinking California pie.
After months of intense negotiation, Secretary Babbitt and the
California agencies announced they had reached agreement on the
critical issue of quantifying the California agricultural priorities. In
October 1999, the DOI, IID, CVWD, MWD and the State of California
signed what became known as the "Key Terms Agreement.

44

The

Agreement was conceptual and not legally binding, and was also
subject to several contingencies, but nevertheless represented a
significant step forward in finalizing the California Plan. It filled in the
missing pieces of the IID/CVWD "peace accord" of nearly a year
earlier. Notably, the Agreement established a "quantification period"
of seventy-five years from the date of the first water transfer under the
implementing criteria pursuant to Article 111(3)
Operating Criteria....

of the Long-Range

...Reclamation recognizes that efforts are currently underway to reduce
California's reliance on surplus deliveries.
Reclamation will take account of progress in that effort, or lack thereof,
in the decision-making process regarding specific surplus criteria.
Reclamation also intends to make full use of technical information and
approaches that have been developed through on-going discussions with the
Basin States.
Intent to Solicit Comments on the Development of Surplus Criteria for Management
of the Colorado River and to Initiate National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
Process, 64 Fed. Reg. 27,008, 27,009 (May 18, 1999).

240. Tony Perry, Mediator Will try to Keep Water war From Boiling Over, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
6, 1999, at A3; Colo. River Update, supra note 235, at 2.
241. See generally Michael Gardner, Agreement on Colorado River Water use Nears, SAN
DIEGO UNION TRiB., May 29, 1999, at A3-4 (summarizing discussions between water
users about quantification of their water rights, and 3.1 million acre-feet cap for IID).
242. See Rudy Yniguez, IID Puts 500,000 acre-feet on Table, IMPERIAL VALLEY PRESS, June
4, 1999, at Al.
243. See PartI, supra note 3, at 308.
244. CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES. ET AL., KEY TERMS FOR QUANTIFICATION SETTILEMENT
AMONGTHE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, lID, CVWD AND MWD (Oct. 15, 1999).
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1998 IID/SDCWA water transfer agreement.15 Also, it established a
"water budget" for the agencies during the quantification period
consisting of a 3.1 million acre-foot cap on IID's water use and a
330,000 acre-foot cap on CVWD's water use."'
The Agreement provided a basis for quantifying transfers of water
between the three agencies. It not only allowed MWD and SDCWA
access to conserved IID water, but also allowed CVWD access to IID
water in order to resolve its groundwater overdraft problem. 47 If the
parties implemented all the transfers, at times when California would
be limited to its 4.4 million acre-foot basic apportionment, IID would
be limited to 2.61 to 2.69 million acre-feet, CVWD would receive
456,000 acre-feet, and MWD would have the ability to run a full
Colorado River Aqueduct, with 771-851,000 acre-feet of Priority 4
water combined with obligations to the San Luis Rey Indian water
rights settlement, and water made available from water put into
groundwater storage in MWD's Hayfield, Cadiz, or other projects when
surplus water was available. 8
The parties also honored what was now becoming a California
tradition of making agreements subject to a wide array of conditions
precedent or subsequent. The effectiveness of the Agreement was
subject to a dozen conditions precedent drafted to the advantage of
the California agencies that allowed them discretion to terminate the
agreement if matters did not work out to their satisfaction. Four such
conditions precedent included: (1) completion of environmental
reviews with an ESA Section 10(a) "no surprises" assurance; (2) DOI
adoption of revised surplus criteria for Colorado River operations that
would "assure" MWD a full Colorado River Aqueduct for fifteen years;
(3) Bureau adoption of standards and procedures for decree
accounting and "inadvertent overruns" of the caps to which the parties
had agreed; and (4) California State Water Resources Control Board
approval of the contemplated water transfers.4
Following a briefing by California and the DOI in Ontario,
California in December 1999, the six states submitted their written
reaction to the Key Terms Agreement. In particular, they stated they
would not back down from the principles for negotiation and the
proposed interim operating criteria they had submitted to California
and the DOI a year earlier. The states also made clear they felt the
California agencies still had a long way to go in the development of a
California Plan. The states wanted to make their views known before
Secretary Babbitt gave his annual speech to the Colorado River Water
Users Association in Las Vegas. The states said:

245. Id. at 23.
246. Id. at 3-4, 12.
247. Id. at 5-10.

248. Id. at 16A.
249.

CAL. DEP'T OF WATERRES. ET AL., supra note 244, at 17-19.
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The Ontario briefing made it clear that while the Quantification
Agreement was an integral part of the 4.4 Plan, it is not the 4.4 Plan.
That document is still being developed. It is apparent from the text
of the Quantification Agreement and the responses to our questions,
that the proposed conservation transfers will not, by themselves, allow
MWD to maintain a full aqueduct within California's 4.4 [million
acre-feet] basic apportionment.
We cannot over-emphasize the need for California to commit to
reduce its Colorado River uses to 4.4 [million acre-feet] in order to
gain support within our states for the more flexible operating criteria
California desires....
As the representatives of our states' governors, we must be able to
explain the benefits, and justify the risks, of adopting more liberal
operating criteria to our legislators, congressional members, water
users and the general citizenry. The sole benefit to our states is
California's guarantee that it will reduce its basic demands for
Colorado River water to 4.4 [million acre-feet]. This issue has
concerned the Basin States for over seventy years. The temporary use
of some surplus water to provide a 'soft landing' to California may
well be worth the risks created but without the promise of a 'light at
the end of the tunnel' through the implementation of a 4.4 Plan,
there is very little hope that we can muster support within our states
to liberalize the operating criteria.

All six states have repeatedly stated that we are willing to engage in
serious discussions about the development of multi-year surplus and
shortage criteria that will meet, for an interim period only, at least
part of the demand for surplus water in California. In order for those
discussions to be fruitful, however, certain steps must be taken by
your water agencies. First and foremost, a 4.4 Plan must be adopted
that commits California to an enforceable program to reduce its
dependence on Colorado River water. Second, we expect that any
operating criteria will be focused on meeting California's objective of
protecting its M&I economy within the 4.4 [million acre-feet] base
apportionment. Third, any criteria must be of an interim nature
only, sufficient to provide a cushion to California while it steps down
its use through meaningful conservation measures and water
transfers. Fourth, we expect that in the development of interim
operating criteria, full consideration will be given to the impacts and
risks that extraordinary releases from Lake Mead may create. And
finally, we expect that the direct beneficiaries of the "soft landing"
interim surplus criteria should be responsible for bearing the risks,
and mitigating the impacts on others caused by those critena."O

250. Letter from Governors' Representatives on Colorado River Operations, States
of Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming, to Tom Hannigan,
Dir., Cal. Dep't of Water Res.,Jerry Zimmerman, Dir., Colo. River Bd. of Cal. 1-3 (Dec.
6, 1999).
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XVII. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERIM SURPLUS GUIDELINES
The pieces were finally in place. California was working on the
development of a specific California Plan, and the DOI had begun the
scoping process necessary to comply with NEPA in preparation of
surplus criteria and was preparing alternative sets of criteria for
analysis in an environmental impact statement ("EIS"). The DOI
broadcasted to the states that they should develop a "consensus" set of
surplus guidelines to include in the NEPA analysis, or the DOI would
make its own assumptions and determination.
With that impetus, the states - this time including California began to negotiate. California prepared a set of interim surplus
criteria as a counter proposal to the six-state proposal prepared in
October 1998. The California agencies tied their criteria to the
implementation schedule of the 4.4 Plan. The California criteria
agreed with the six-state criteria in allowing a fifteen-year period for
California to implement its Plan and prepare to live within its basic
apportionment. But the Plan did not provide for enough water
transfers for MWD's priority to be fully met within California's basic
apportionment for the fifteen-year period.
California based its criteria, like the six-state criteria, on a tiered
approach under which the Secretary would make different types of
surplus declarations based on the water elevation in Lake Mead, with
more restrictive surpluses, and finally a normal declaration, as Lake
Mead levels dropped. However, the California criteria contemplated
more anticipated surpluses, which would allow MWD to put some two
million acre-feet of surplus water into groundwater storage during the
fifteen-year period. That groundwater storage would then allow MWD
time to implement the Phase II portion of the California Plan to
effectuate enough transfers to actually get its priority within
California's basic apportionment. Both sets of criteria also allowed
Nevada access to surplus water during the fifteen-year period, in order
to put some surplus water away into groundwater storage.2 5 1
Concurrently with the state negotiations to develop consensus
criteria, California produced a new Colorado River Water Use Plan in
May 2000. Unfortunately, there was not much new in the Plan. It
outlined a menu of water conservation based transfers within Southern
California that would reduce demand for Colorado River water of
about 480,000 acre-feet over a fifteen-year period, thus resulting not in
a "4.4 Plan" but a "4.8 Plan." The Plan also reiterated the "Lynchpin
Components" - key elements needed to be in place for the Plan to be
effective. In particular, the Plan recognized, as essential, the Key
Terms for Quantification Settlement. The Plan stated:

251.

See Memorandum from Dennis B. Underwood, Vice-Pres. Metro. Water Dist. of

S. Cal., to Greg Walcher, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res. (Mar. 15, 2000); Notes
from Seven States Meeting - Phoenix (Mar. 22, 2000). See generally S. NEv. WATER
AuTH., COMPARISON OF INTERIM CRITERIA PROPOSALS (Mar. 22, 2000) (showing tiered

plan based on Lake Mead elevations, graphically comparing proposals).
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The lack of further quantification of the third priority would make it
difficult to develop and implement cooperative water supply
programs and can cast uncertainty as to water supply reliability.
Further quantification of the third priority also can provide the
needed quantum baseline
which conservation and transfer
programs can be measured. 2 by
To their credit, the California agencies were working hard on the
enormously complex array of agreements and environmental
compliance processes necessary to implement the California 253
Plan.
The California agencies identified some thirty-two such elements.
A. ISSUE RESOLUTION TO FINALIZE THE INTERIM SURPLUS GUIDELINE
PROPOSAL
Through their negotiations, the state representatives neared
agreement on a seven-state interim surplus guidelines proposal. In
essence, California agreed to the six-state proposal, and, of particular
importance to the six states, to the adoption of the 70R strategy as
guiding baseline operations and operations after the termination of
the Guidelines after fifteen years. The states, working with the DOI,
also identified several issues they needed to resolve to finalize the
Guidelines.
1. Mitigation
The basic principle of the mitigation approach was that those who
would benefit from the interim surplus criteria must also mitigate for
the incremental harm to others attributable to their use of surplus
water under interim criteria as compared to a base case (70R)
operating strategy for making surplus water available. This concept
was consistent with the 1998 six-state letter setting forth their
principles of negotiation.254
California proposed two potential
approaches to mitigation: a "volume-based approach" by which the
incremental difference in reservoir volume as compared to the base
case would be mitigated; and a "risk based approach" by which
mitigation would be provided up front for the risk of shortages.
The other states preferred volume-based approach, and also
suggested an approach by which mitigation would be measured in
three forms: a shortage being triggered sooner than would otherwise
252.

COLO. RIVER BD. OF CAL., DRAFT: CALIFORNIA'S COLORADO RIVER WATER USE PLAN

25-26 (May 11, 2000).
253. CAL. DEP'T OF

WATER

RES.,

CALIFORNIA'S

QUANTIFICATION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT MILESTONES

COLORADO

RIVER

WATER

USE

(June 13, 2000) (provided to

Senate Agriculture & Water Committee and Assembly Water, Parks & Wildlife
Committee). Among the required elements were the QSA Agreement; four water
transfer agreements among IID, CVWD, MWD and San Diego; a federal approval
agreement for each of the transfer agreements; construction and funding agreements
for implementation of canal lining and other construction activities; Indian reserved

rights settlement agreements; and California and federal environmental and
endangered species compliance.

254.

See SIx STATES PRINCIPLES, supra note

209, at 3.
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be the case under 70R; a "deeper" shortage than would otherwise be
the case under 70R; and a longer shortage than would otherwise be
the case under 70R. California would mitigate this impact by actually
foregoing the delivery of water in the year of the shortage in the
amount of the incremental difference by which California had
benefited. The obligation to mitigate would extend beyond the
interim surplus period, since the risk also would extend beyond this
period. The mitigation obligation would terminate either when
reservoir levels converged with a 70R operation, or in the event of a
spill, whichever occurred first. The states also discussed mitigation for
impacts to Las Vegas Wash, including erosion and water quality
impacts as well as recreation impacts at Lake Mead resulting from
lower lake levels. 55
2. Enforcement
Both the six states and the DOI insisted the Guidelines should be
enforceable. In other words, they wanted California's water use
reduction to be placed on a schedule, and measures in place to assure
California would not benefit from the interim criteria unless it met the
schedule. This was also consistent with the 1998 six-state principles.2 5 6
The states and the DOI discussed and rejected alternative enforcement
mechanisms, such as federal legislation or a stipulation in Arizona v.
Californiathat would embody the schedule for California to step down
to 4.4 million acre-feet over the fifteen-year period. State discussions
centered on enforcement mechanisms within the Guidelines
themselves, such as automatic termination and reversion to 70R
operating criteria at the end of the fifteen-year period and automatic
reversion to 70R criteria if California did not meet identified water use
reduction benchmarks. 7
3. Overrun Accounting and Averaging
The California agencies had, throughout the negotiation process,
linked their desire for a mechanism to pay back "inadvertent overruns"
in their use of water to the implementation of the California Plan.
The agencies proposed the DOI approve "inadvertent overrun
accounts" for each of the California agencies equal to ten percent of
the quantities specified in the Key Terms agreement, with a five-year
period to pay back such overruns. 258 The states and the DOI discussed
255. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Greg Walcher, Exec. Dir., Colo.
Dep't of Nat. Res., Peter Evans, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Randy Seaholm,
Colo. Water Conservation Bd.,Jennifer Gimbel, Deputy Attorney Gen., Colo., & Carol
Angel, Deputy Attorney Gen., Colo., at 1-2 (June 8, 2000).
256. See SIx STATES PRINCIPLES, supra note 209, at 3.
257. COLO. RIVER BD. OF CAL., DRAFT: ENFORCEABIUT OF INTERIM LAKE MEAD
OPERATING CRITERIA 1-4 (June 15, 2000); See Six STATES PRINCIPLES, supra note 209, at 3.
258. COLO. RIVER BD. OF CAL., DRAFT: JUSTIFICATION FOR CUMULATIVE INADVERTENT
OVERRUN ACCOUNTS FOR THE IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT, COACHELLA VALLEY WATER
DISTRICT, AND THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 6-7 (June

7, 2000).
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a draft federal register notice that would solicit comments on the
development of an administrative policy to deal with these issues.259
Additionally, MWD presented the states a paper outlining a
proposal concerning decree averaging. The paper described the
difficulty of MWD's position as being junior to the unquantified senior
260
rights of the Palo Verde Irrigation District and the Yuma Project.
For example, deliveries to PVID varied between 314,000 and 504,000
acre-feet per year, resulting in uncertainty in scheduling for MWD.
The paper proposed allowing these senior rights to be accounted, for
purposes of scheduling water deliveries, based on a defined historic
average as opposed to actual use in any one year, thus allowing MWD
to schedule a firm delivery for any particular year. This operation
would, however, also result in California exceeding 4.4 million acrefeet even in normal years, with MWD being required to "pay back" any
overruns through the "inadvertent overrun" procedures. 2 ' The six
states opposed this proposal as inconsistent with the Decree in Arizona

v. California,since the Decree and the Operating Criteria contemplate
only annual determinations and operations.
4. Environmental Mitigation
The California agencies and the DOI had underway, on parallel
tracks, a multitude of environmental compliance processes, in addition
to the EIS process underway to develop Guidelines. These included a
programmatic environmental impact review ("EIR") under California
law to implement the Key Terms agreement, a joint EIR/EIS for the
implementation of the IID/SDWCA water transfer, an EIR for
Coachella groundwater management, ESA section 10(a) no surprises
assurance and section 7 consultation, and an environmental
assessment to settle the San Luis Rey Tribal reserved rights
Settlement. 62 Consultation with the USFWS began regarding potential
impacts of reduced water use in the Imperial Valley on the Salton Sea.
Reduced return flows would increase salinity levels, accelerating the
decline of the Salton Sea ecosystem. IID insisted on a $15 million
limitation on the amount of money it would spend on mitigation
measures,
and looked to other agencies to pick up all costs above this
263
amount.

259. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DRAFT DEFINITION AND
PAYBACK OF INADVERTENT OVERRUNS, AND USE OF LONG TERM AVERAGING METHOD FOR
DELIVERY OF COLORADO RIVER WATER (Aug. 17, 2000).
260. Part I, supra note 3, at 307-09.
261. COLO. RIVER BD. OF CAL., DRAFr:

ACCOUNTING OF CONSUMPTIVE USES AS THE
AVERAGE ANNUAL CONSUMPTIVE USE OVER PRECEDINGYEARS 3-4, 7 (Aug. 16, 2000).

262. CAL. DEP'T OF WATERRES., supra note 253, at 3-4.
263. Sue McClurg, A Colorado River Compromise, W. WATER, Nov./Dec. 2000, at 4,13.
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B. ISSUES ARISING DURING THE EIS PROCESS
In July 2000, the DOI published a draft EIS ("DEIS") on the
proposed adoption of interim surplus criteria.Y" The DEIS analyzed
four alternatives: a baseline (no action) alternative premised on a 75R
strategy; 6" a "flood control" alternative that limited surpluses to times
when the Bureau made flood control releases from Lake Mead; a "sixstates alternative" that was a modified version of the Guidelines
proposed by the six states; and a "California Alternative" based on the
criteria proposed as part of the Key Terms Agreement.
At about the time the DOI published the DEIS, the seven states

completed negotiations on their draft of proposed interim surplus
criteria, and forwarded the draft to the DOI. After discussing the draft
with the states, the DOI published the states' alternative in the federal
register as "supplementary information" received in the EIS process,

paving the way for the alternative to be incorporated within the final
EIS ("FEIS"). 2 6
The Bureau issued the FEIS in December 2000, which described
six alternatives: no action; the preferred Basin States Alternative; the

Flood Control Alternative; the Six States Alternative; the California
Alternative; and the Shortage Protection Alternative.2 67 The preferred
alternative was based on the criteria the seven states had jointly

proposed to the DOI in July.
The FEIS included a summary
description of the preferred alternative, and attached a "Draft Interim

264. The proposed federal action was described as:
[T]he adoption of specific interim surplus criteria pursuant to Article
III(3) (b) of the [Operating Criteria]. The interim surplus criteria would be
used annually to determine whether the conditions exist under which the
Secretary may declare the availability of "surplus" water, as defined, for use
within the states of Arizona, California and Nevada. The criteria must be
consistent with both the Decree entered by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1964
in the case of Arizona v. California (Decree) and the [Operating Criteria].
The interim surplus criteria would remain in effect through calendar year
2015, subject to five-year reviews, concurrent with the [Operating Criteria]
reviews, and applied each year as part of the Annual Operating Plan.
Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Draft EnvironmentalImpact Statement
Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria, at S-1 (filed July 7, 2000), at
http://www.lc.usbr.gov/g4000/surplus/SURPLUS_DEIS.HTML.
265. A 75R strategy:
[R]efers to a value for which 75 percent of the historic natural flow at Lee
Ferry is less than this value (18.1 [million acre-feet]).
Spill avoidance
strategies assume a particular percentile historical runoff, along with normal
depletion projections for the next year .... If the calculated space available at
the end of the next year is less than the space required by flood control
criteria, then [the Secretary determines a surplus condition].
Id. at S-4. This is contrasted to the 70R strategy that the six states advocated as the
proper baseline, which was based on a seventy percent of the historic natural flow.
266. Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,531, 48,531 (Aug. 8,
2000); Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria; Correction, 65 Fed. Reg. 57,371 (Sept.
22, 2000).
267. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, FinalEnvironmental Impact
Statement, Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria § 2.2 (Dec. 2000), at
http://www.lc.usbr.gov/g4000/surplus/SURPLUS_FEIS.HTML [hereinafter FEIS].
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Surplus Guidelines." Significantly, neither the description of the
preferred alternative nor the draft guidelines in the FEIS included
several elements that were in the seven states proposal, and which were
important to the six states in particular. With these differences noted,
and with the end of the Clinton administration approaching in
January, the states and the DOI immediately began discussions as to
what to include within the record of decision. Following these
negotiations, at a ceremony in San Diego under a banner proclaiming
"Peace on the River," Secretary Babbitt signed the Record of Decision
adopting the Guidelines as his last official act as Secretary of the
Interior.
The issues of importance to the states in the Guidelines are
summarized below, together with a description of how the issues were
handled by the DOI in the final Record of Decision.6 8
1. Effective Date
The states' alternative provided that the guidelines would not
become effective until the California settlement agreements become
effective. 26" This was important to the states because the guidelines

were not necessary or desirable unless California was implementing
the California Plan. In contrast, the draft guidelines in the FEIS would
become effective thirty days after the Secretary of the Interior issued
publication of the Record of Decision. The Record of Decision was still
effective thirty days after publication, as previously provided. However,
the interrelationship of the effective date of the Guidelines and the
California implementation agreements was handled by language in the
enforcement, benchmark and termination provisions, discussed below.
2. Relationship of the Interim Surplus Guidelines to the Existing Law
of the River
The draft guidelines in the FEIS did not include statements,
particularly important to the six states, which were in the authority and
purpose section of the seven-state proposal.
However, these
statements and disclaimers were restored in total into the Record of
Decision. 70
These Guidelines are not intended to do, and do not
a. Guarantee or assure any water user a firm supply for any specified
period.
b. Change or expand existing authorities under [the Law of the
River] ....

268. Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines 66 Fed. Reg. 7772 (Jan. 25, 2001).

269. Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria, 65 Fed. Reg. at 48,535.
270. See Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 7772, 7780 (Jan.

25, 2001).
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c. Address intrastate storage or intrastate distribution of water ....
d. Change the apportionments made for use within individual States,
or in any way impair or impede the right of the Upper Basin to
consumptively use water available to that Basin under the Compact.
e. Affect any obligation of any Upper Division State under the
[Compact].
f. Affect any right of any State or of the United States under Sec. 14
of the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956; Sec. 601(c) of the
Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968; the California Limitation
Act; or any other provision of [the Law of the River].
g. Affect the rights of any holder of present perfected rights or
reserved rights, which shall be satisfied within the apportionment of
the State within which the use is made in accordance with the
Decree7
3. Allocation of Unused Apportionment Water
Before surplus water is available, the Secretary allocates water
apportioned to one of the Lower Division States, but unused by that
state, pursuant to Article I1(B) (6) of the Decree in Arizona v.
7
California."
' The seven-states proposal provided that the Secretary
would allocate this water in a specified order of priority, before
allocating any surplus water. The draft guidelines in the FEIS did not
address this issue, instead leaving this matter up to the Secretary's
discretion each year. The Record of Decision restored the states'
priority allocation. The Guidelines provided the Secretary would
allocate unused water from basic apportionments first to meet the
requirements of MWD and the SNWA, second to meet off-stream water
banking needs of MWD and SNWA, and third to meet other needs in
California in accordance with the Seven Party Agreement as modified

by the Quantification Settlement Agreement ("QSA").173 This priority
provision is of critical importance to the SNWA. Nevada is at its basic
apportionment, and has no buffer of a "bank" of irrigated agriculture
within Nevada to which to turn to meet municipal demands.
Therefore, this provision allows Southern Nevada first access to
unused apportionment water together with MWD.
4. Allocation of Surplus Water
The draft guidelines in the FEIS used the same trigger elevations
in Lake Mead as in the seven-state proposal, but did not provide for
the allocation of such surplus water to the specific uses contemplated
in the seven-state plan. This was because the Decree in Arizona v.
271. Id. at 7780 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
272. 376 U.S. 340, 343 (1964); see also PartI, supra note 3, at 311-12.
273. Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7780.
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Californiasimply provided the Secretary will allocate surplus water 50%
to California, 46% to Arizona and 4% to Nevada, leaving the Secretary
with no discretion to allocate water in any other manner absent
agreement with and among the states. 74 The Record of Decision
contains much more detailed language than the draft guidelines in the
FEIS concerning the allocation of the surplus water under the various
triggers in the guidelines, based on the states' proposal.
In summary, the Guidelines make surplus water available when the
water elevation in Lake Mead is above 1125 feet. Then, depending on
the Lake Mead elevation, surplus water is made available to an
increasing number of different uses, starting with limited domestic
uses in the three states, then full domestic uses, then water banking,
and then finally, all other uses. 2" The Record of Decision recognized
the allocation of surplus water and unused apportionment water, as set
forth in the Guidelines, can be implemented by the Secretary only
through forbearance agreements and water orders submitted by Lower
Colorado River water users. It stated the Secretary will honor such
arrangements, but will allocate surplus water according to the
percentages in the Arizona v. California Decree if such agreements are
not executed.276
5. Mexican Treaty Deliveries
The states' proposal provided that in a flood control release, the
Secretary would make surplus water available for release in excess of
delivery only after all uses in
the 1.5 million acre-foot Mexican Treaty
•
277
This provision was not
the United States had been satisfied.
included in the draft guidelines or in the Record of Decision. The
DOI determined this proposal was beyond the purpose and need of
the proposed action, since it dealt with a different question of
"surplus" (i.e., Mexican Treaty surplus) than that being considered in
the interim surplus criteria. However, the Record of Decision did
contain a statement that the modeling upon which the Record of
Decision was based assumed that water is released to Mexico in excess
of 1.5 million acre-feet only in a flood control release situation.278

274. Id. at 7781.
275. Id. at 7780-81.

276. Id. at 7780.
277.

See Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,351, 48,357 (Aug.

8, 2000).
278. The Record of Decision states:
Under current practice, surplus declarations under the Treaty for Mexico are
declared when flood control releases are made. Modeling assumptions used
in the FEIS are based on this practice. The proposed action is not intended
to identify, or change in any manner, conditions when Mexico may schedule
up to an additional 0.2 [million acre-feet]. Any issues relating to the
implementation of the Treaty, including any potential changes in approach
relating to surplus declarations under the Treaty, must be addressed in a
bilateral fashion with the Republic of Mexico.
Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7781.
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6. 602 (a) Storage Levels for Lake Powell
The states' proposal included a provision that during the interim
period, 602 (a) storage requirements for Lake Powell would use a value
of not less than 14.85 million acre-feet. 79 For the same scoping reason
the Record of Decision did not include reference to Mexican Treaty
deliveries, the DOI did not include this provision in the Record of
Decision. Instead, the states and the DOI agreed to include reference
to the 602(a) trigger of 14.85 million acre-feet in all operating plans
during the fifteen-year interim period.28 °
7. Termination
The states' proposal provided the surplus guidelines would
terminate in 2016, and that upon termination, Lake Mead operations,
for the purpose of determining surplus, would immediately revert to a
70R strategy. 8 ' In contrast, the draft guidelines were not as specific on
termination, and were not automatic in their operation. They did not
provide that surplus determinations would be based on a 70R
operation upon termination. In the Record of Decision, the DOI
specifically strengthened the termination provisions. The Record of
Decision provided the interim guidelines terminate on December 31,
2015 (with the 2016 AOP). The guidelines did not specify that 70R
would be the guiding criteria upon termination of the guidelines.
However, the Record of Decision contained a statement that all the
modeling assumptions of the Record of Decision were based on a 70R
strategy upon termination, and that the entire purpose of the
guidelines and the "California Plan is that California shall have
implemented sufficient measures to be able to limit total uses" within
California to 4.4 million acre-feet unless a surplus is determined under
the 70R strategy.282
8. Benchmarks and Reparations
The states' proposal included enforcement and mitigation
measures that provided the guidelines would terminate in the event
California did not implement conservation measures as set forth in the
279. Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria, 65 Fed. Reg. at 48,357; see PartI, supra
note 3, at 314.
280. The 2003 Annual Operating Plan states:

The Secretary is considering information submitted to the Department of the
Interior by the Colorado River Basin States whereby 602(a) storage
requirements determined in accordance with Article II(1) of the Operating
Criteria would utilize a value of not less than 14.85 [million acre-feet]
(elevation 3630 feet) for Lake Powell through the year 2016. The Secretary,

through Reclamation, may initiate a NEPA process in 2003 to determine the
impacts of the Basin States proposed 602(a) storage.
Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 2003 Annual Operating Plan For
at
Reservoirs
15
(Dec.
2002),
Colorado
River
System
http://www.uc.usbr.gov/wrg/aop/aop03-final.pdf (citation omitted).

281. Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria, 65 Fed. Reg. at 48,357-48,358.
282. See Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7782.
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California Plan, which actually would reduce its need for surplus
Colorado River water by specific amounts on given dates, called
"benchmarks." The states' proposal went on to provide an accounting
of water that MWD proposed to groundwater bank during this period.
This provision, referred to by the states as "reparations," required
MWD to pay this water back to the river. MWD would thus lose the
benefit of the Guidelines if California did not meet its conservation
benchmarks. The draft guidelines did not include the MWD payback
provision, although they did provide that if California did not meet the
benchmarks, operations would revert to 70R for the interim period
only.
The Record of Decision strengthened the benchmark and
reparations provisions. Of critical importance to the states was a
requirement the Secretary would suspend the Guidelines if the
California agencies have not executed the agreements necessary to
implement the California Plan (including specifically the QSA) by
December 31, 2002, and would be reinstated when and if the
California agencies do so.23 This issue was important because the QSA
was the basis upon which conservation measures and water transfer
agreements could be measured and implemented. The Guidelines
clearly set forth the ultimate goal: "At the conclusion of the effective
period of these Guidelines, California shall have implemented
sufficient measures to be able to limit total uses of Colorado River
water within California to 4.4 [million acre-feet], unless a surplus is
determined under a 70R strategy., 284 The guidelines contained threeyear benchmarks to reduce California agricultural agencies' use by and
transfer such use to MWD. If any benchmark is not met, the
guidelines suspend until California meets the benchmark. Upon
suspension of the guidelines, the system operates under the 70R
strategy, and California water use must be limited to 4.4 million acrefeet in any normal year under such a strategy. If the guidelines remain
suspended, 70R will be the strategy for the entire fifteen-year period. 85
XVIII. THE IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENTS
In order to implement the California Plan and the Interim Surplus
Guidelines, state and local water agencies in the Lower Basin had to
prepare several implementation agreements. Important components
of the negotiation between the states and with the DOI on the
Guidelines were arrangements in the Lower Basin: (1) the types of use
and specific agencies to whom surplus water would be delivered; (2)
shortage criteria; (3) the allocation of apportioned but unused water
under Article II(B) (6) of the Decree in Arizona v. California; and (4)
283. The Guidelines provide: "In the event that the California contractors and the
Secretary have not executed [the QSA (and its related documents)] by Dec. 31, 2002,
the interim surplus determinations under sections 2(B)(1) and 2(B)(2) of these
Guidelines will be suspended and will instead be based on the 70R Strategy .. " Id.
284. Id.

285. Id.
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reparations by MWD in the event that they did not implement the
California Plan on schedule. In December 2000, the California
agencies released drafts of the key agreements that had to be in place
for the Guidelines and the California Plan to be effective. After the
Record of Decision on the Guidelines, the California agencies
intensified their negotiations on these agreements and efforts to
undertake environmental permitting and financing of the elements of
the California Plan. The major intra-California agreements are
discussed below.
A. QUANTIFICATION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This agreement, between IID, MWD and CVWD, also known as the
QSA, established the "water budget" for each agency necessary to
implement the water transfers contemplated in the California Plan.
The agencies patterned this agreement after the Key Terms
agreement. For example, IID would limit its use to 3.1 million acrefeet per year, and CVWD would limit its use to 330,000 acre-feet per
year. Saved water transferred to MWD would reduce deliveries to that
agency by an equal amount. The parties agreed on the amount of
water to be saved by All American and Coachella Canal lining projects,
and made a portion of that water available to the Secretary in
settlement of the San Luis Rey Indian Rights Settlement Act.
This agreement would not be effective until several contingencies
were satisfied, before December 31, 2002. The contingencies included
finalization of all federal and California administrative, environmental
and ESA compliance approvals; adoption by the Bureau of an
inadvertent overrun program, decree averaging, and the Guidelines.
Once effective, the term of the agreement was for seventy-five years.286
B. AGREEMENT FOR ACQUISITION OF CONSERVED WATER BETWEEN
IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT AND COACHELLA VALLEY WATER
DISTRICT

This agreement provided for Coachella to acquire up to 100,000
acre-feet of IID saved water per year, in 5,000 acre-foot annual
increments.287
C. AGREEMENT FOR ACQUISITION OF CONSERVED WATER BETWEEN
IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT AND THE METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

This agreement amended the 1988 IID/MWD agreement, by
which MWD paid for conservation measures in the IID to acquire
110,000 acre-feet of water per year, to provide an additional right of
first refusal to MWD for any water referenced above in the IID/CVWD
286.

Imperial Irrigation Dist. et al., Draft Quantification Settlement Agreement 2

(Dec. 12, 2000).
287. Draft Agreement for Acquisition of Conserved Water Between Imperial
Irrigation District and Coachella Valley Water District 5 (Oct. 17, 2000).
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agreement and not acquired by CVWD, together with an option to
acquire up to 85,000 acre-feet of conserved water from IID. The 88time
frames and contingencies were the same as the other agreements.2
D. AGREEMENT FOR ACQUISITION OF WATER BETWEEN COACHELLA
VALLEY WATER DISTRICT AND THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

In this agreement, MWD agreed to reimburse CVWD for a portion
of its costs in acquiring the second 50,000 acre-feet of water from IID
under the IID/CVWD agreement, and to keep CVWD whole in its
ability to acquire that water, by providing replacement water if the IID
agreement expires.
E. IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT
This agreement was to be executed between the Secretary of the
Interior, IID, CVWD, MWD, and the SDCWA. In this agreement, the
Secretary would agree to exercise his authority to: implement the
terms and limit water deliveries to IID to not more than 3.1 million
acre-feet per year under Priority 3 (a), less conserved water transferred
to others; implement the IID/MWD agreement, the SDCWA/IID
agreement, and the IID/CVWD agreement; make conserved water
from the All-American Canal and Coachella Canal lining projects
available to the San Luis Rey Tribe under its settlement; deliver not
more than 330,000 acre-feet per year to CVWD under Priority 3(a),
less conserved water transferred to others; deliver to or withhold water
from MWD so that MWD bears the burden if total use under Priorities
1 and 2 (the PVID and the Yuma Project) exceed 420,000 acre-feet,
and the benefit if such use is less than 420,000 acre-feet (the effect of
this provision is that Priorities 1 and 2 are effectively quantified, and
IID and CVWD waive their rights to take any excess water over 420,000
acre-feet); deliver to CVWVD any water by MWD as set forth in the
MWD/CVWD agreement; deliver Priority 6(a) water as agreed by the
agencies; take no action against IID concerning whether IID has made
reasonable and beneficial use of water, and to take IID's water
conservation activities into account in future assessments on that issue.
The Secretary would agree in this agreement to implement a Decree
Accounting Program and Inadvertent Overrun Program, and not
modify them for thirty years. The Secretary would also "acknowledge"
the importance of the Guidelines.2 0
In sum, the implementation agreements would provide the
baseline by which conservation and water transfer agreements under
288. Draft Agreement for Acquisition of Conserved Water Between Imperial
Irrigation District and the Metropolitan Water District Southern California 5, 6 (Dec.
12, 2000).
289. Draft Agreement for Acquisition of Water Between Coachella Valley Water
District and the Metropolitan Water District Southern California 5, 6 (Dec. 12, 2000).
290. U.S. Dep't of the Interior et al., Draft Implementation Agreement (Dec. 12,
2000).
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the California Plan would be implemented and accounted. The
agreements would also alter the structure of priorities established by
the 1931 Seven Party Agreement.2 1' This structural alteration would be
the key to California limiting its use to its 4.4 million acre-foot basic
apportionment in normal years. Table I below shows the difference
between the priorities established under the 1931 Seven Party
Agreement and the quantified priorities that would be established
under the various California implementation agreements.
TABLE I: CALIFORNIA SEVEN-PARTY AGREEMENT PRIORITIES BEFORE
AND AFTER THE CALIFORNIA IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENTS

Priority

Description

Acre-feet

Comment

Annually

2

Palo Verde
Irrigation
District C gross
area of 104,500
acres

420,000

Palo Verde is not limited to
420,000 acre-feet under the
Seven-Party Agreement, but
only to the amount of water
necessary to irrigate 104,500
acres. Under the QSA,
MWD benefits if water use in
Palo Verde is less than
420,000 acre-feet, and must
bear the burden or shortfall
if Palo Verde is over 420,000
acre-feet.

Yuma Project

no

Under either agreement, here

(Reservation
Division) not
exceeding a
gross area of

specific
limitation

is no specific limitation. This
project uses about 125,000
acre-feet per year.

Imperial

Imperial

Under the Seven-Party

Irrigation
District and
lands in
Imperial and

3,100,000
Coachella
300,000

Agreement there is no
quantification between IID
and Coachella. In 1934,
Coachella agreed that IID

25,000 acres

3(a)

Coachella

291.

would have first priority, but

See PALO VERDE IRRIGATION DIST. ET AL., BOULDER CANYON PROJECT AGREEMENT

(Aug. 18, 1931), at http://www.lc.usbr.gov/gl000/pdfiles/ca7pty.pdf (apportioning

California's share of the waters of the Colorado River among the applicants in the
State).
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Description

Acre-feet
Annually

Valleys to be
served by the
All-American
Canal

3(b)

Palo Verde

Comment
the amount is unquantified.
Under the implementation
agreements, IID's limitation
would decline over the fifteenyear period of the California
Plan, to 2.72 million acre-feet.
Coachella's limit would
increase slightly, because of
transfers from IID.

see above

see above

Irrigation
District C
16,000 acres of
mesa lands
Metropolitan

550,000

Water District
and/or City of
Los Angeles
and/or others
on coastal plain
5(a)
and (b)

Metropolitan
Water District
and/or City of
Los Angeles
and/or others
on coastal plain

662,000

Under the Seven-Party
Agreement, this priority was
over California's basic
apportionment of 4.4 million
acre-feet per year. After the
implementation agreements
and the California Plan were
realized, about 260,000 acrefeet of this priority would be
over California's basic
apportionment on a
permanent basis. MWD was
to be prepared to have this
water available only in surplus
years under a 70R Strategy.

In addition to the intra-California agreements necessary to
implement the California Plan, the California agencies and Lower
Division States began negotiations on the interstate arrangements
necessary to implement the Guidelines. MWD and the State of
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Arizona signed a reparation/forbearance agreement 29 2
This
agreement was necessary to implement two aspects of the guidelines.
First, Arizona agreed to forebear its entitlement to forty-six percent of
any surplus declared in the Lower Basin under the Decree in Arizona v.
California,so that MWD could take that surplus under the various tiers
of surplus that will be declared by the Secretary. 3
Second, MWD agreed to implement the California Plan, to limit its
orders for water to comply with the California Plan, and to provide
reparations to Arizona, in the form of paybacks to the River, in the
event the Secretary terminates or suspends the Guidelines for
California's failure to meet the benchmarks in the 4.4 Plan.
Significantly, as a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the
Forbearance Agreement, California agencies had to execute the QSA
before December 31, 2003. If this condition was not met or waived,
the Forbearance Agreement would be void. 4
XIX. THE MEXICAN CONNECTION
Further complicating matters, due to the implications of the
development of surplus criteria on relations with Mexico, the United
States, through the International Boundary and Water Commission
("IBWC"), consulted with Mexico on the development of the
Guidelines. The information developed through this consultation
could then be incorporated into any NEPA process the Bureau might
undertake. In the early 1990s, the IBWC held a consultation on the
effect of the lining of the All-American Canal, one of the conservation
measures identified in the California 4.4 Plan as providing water for
transfer to MWD. The lining would affect Mexican irrigation interests
dependent on seepage from the canal to supply groundwater and
seeps for the irrigation of about 60,000 acres of land, much of which
was under lease to United States interests. 5
The new consultation jumpstarted a Mexican interest letter writing
campaign to protest the canal lining2 6 However, the United States
side of the IBWC took the position that the consultation on the lining
had already taken place, the issue was closed and could not be
reopened, and in any event there was nothing Mexico could do or that
the United States was obligated to do under international law to
292. Interim Surplus Guidelines Agreement Between the State of Arizona and the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (May 23, 2001).
293. Id. §§ 5, 6. This forbearance was accomplished through a Joint Resolution of
the Arizona Legislature. S.J. Res. 1001, 45th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2001).
294. Id. §§ 2.1.2, 5.6, 7.

295. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Greg Walcher, Exec. Dir., Colo.
Dep't of Nat. Res., Peter Evans, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Randy Seaholm,
Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Jennifer Gimbel, Deputy Attorney Gen., Colo., Carol
Angel, Deputy Attorney Gen., Colo., at 1 (Apr. 12, 2000) [hereinafter Status Meeting].
296. Letter from Lic. Federico Diaz Gallego, President, Econ. Devel. Council of
Mex., to Patricia Mulroy, S. Nev. Water Auth. (Apr. 5, 2000). Letter from Arq. Victor
Hermosillo Celada, Mayor, Mexicali City, to Patricia Mulroy, S. Nev. Water Auth. (Apr.
5, 2000).
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prevent the efficient use of water in the United States. Moreover, both
the United States side and the Bureau asserted that the canal lining
issues and the surplus criteria issues were separate, and should not be
joined.29 7
The United States' position in the consultation on the idea of a
new surplus criteria was that: (1) United States has the right to make
maximum use of the waters within its boundaries; (2) under the
United States-Mexican water treaty, Mexico has the right to 1.5 million
acre-feet per year, plus 200,000 acre-feet in surplus years, and no
more;" (3) a flood control release constitutes a surplus for Mexican
Treaty purposes, but the United States can develop surplus criteria for99
another purpose, operating federal facilities under United States law;

(4) there is a need for surplus criteria to resolve issues in the United
States, and the United States can implement spill avoidance measures
so long as it meets its Treaty obligations; (5) the United States is under
no obligation to mitigate the impacts of such operations in Mexico;
but (6) under principles of international comity, there may be
circumstances in which the United States would agree to provide
mitigation.0 0
During the EIS process for the Guidelines, the Bureau consulted
with the USFWS on the "discretionary action" of the Bureau in
adopting interim surplus criteria and the California water transfers. 0 '
The USFWS identified the action area for the biological assessment as
the 100-year flood plain below Lake Mead and the full pool elevations
of the Lower Basin reservoirs, within the United States.
It also
consulted on the following species: southwestern willow flycatcher,
brown pelican, Yuma clapper rail, razorback sucker, bonytail chub,
Desert tortoise, Bald eagle, and Desert Pupfish.3 3
Ongoing consultation between the Bureau and USFWS and the
National Marine Fisheries Service (now NOAA Fisheries) affected the
consultation on the Guidelines with respect to ongoing operations of
Lower Colorado River Reservoirs. In this consultation, the Bureau
initially defined the action area for its biological assessment as

297. Status Meeting, supra note 295, at 1.
298. See PartI, supra note 3, at 309-10.
299. Id.
300. Status Meeting, supranote 295, at 2.
301. The consultation requirements of section 7(a) (2) of the ESA only apply if an
agency action may affect the continued existence of a listed species. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a) (2) (2000). The ESA regulations define agency action to mean "all activities
or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by
Federal agencies .. " 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2002). The regulation further states that
section 7 applies to "all actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or
control." Id. § 402.03. The regulation gives several examples of an ESA agency action,

including the granting of licenses, contracts, easements, leases, right-of-ways and
permits. Id. § 402.02.

302. "Action area [is] all areas to be affected directly or indirectly by the Federal
action and not merely the immediate area involved in the action." Id.
303. Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 7772, 7777 (Jan. 25,
2001).

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 6

extending from Lake Mead to the Southern International Boundary.
In response to comment from the USFWS, the Bureau expanded its
biological assessment to include analysis of impacts on species in
Mexico. However, despite a "may affect" determination as to the
Totoaba Bass (a species located only in Mexico), the Bureau did not
seek formal consultation, asserting that it lacked any discretion over
water deliveries to or within Mexico.
On June 28, 2000, Defenders of Wildlife and a number of other
United States and Mexican organizations sued the Secretary,
challenging his failure during the consultation to consider the adverse
effects of his actions in operating Lower Colorado River reservoirs on
endangered species in the United States and Mexico that depend on
the Colorado River delta in Mexico for their survival and recovery. 304
Species alleged to have been adversely affected included species found
only in Mexico, such as the Totoaba Bass and the Vaquita Harbor
Porpoise. The Lower Basin States and several water user organizations
in the Lower Basin filed a motion to intervene, which the court
denied. No Upper Basin state sought intervention. The lawsuit raised
the significant and heretofore unanswered legal question as to the
scope of the ESA, whether the Act requires federal agencies to consult
on the extraterritorial effects on listed species of actions undertaken
within the United States.
In response to the lawsuit, DOI Solicitor John Leshy sent a
memorandum to the Commissioner of Reclamation, asking the
Bureau to continue consultations with the USFWS and the National
Marine Fisheries Service on effects in Mexico.3

5

The carefully worded

memorandum stated:
The continuation of consultation does not reflect any conclusion on
our part that the consultation is required, as a matter of law or
regulation, on any possible impact the adoption of interim surplus
guidelines may have on United States-listed species in Mexico.
Rather, Reclamation's consultation on these effects should proceed
with the express understanding that it may exceed what is required
under applicable federal law and regulations and does not establish a
legal or policy precedent....

The ongoing discussions with the consulting agencies should also
take into consideration the fact that the United States cannot
unilaterally control hydrologic conditions in the Colorado River
south of the international boundary.... Finally, the discussions
should take into account mandates and limitations on Reclamation's
actions pursuant to the Supreme Court's 1964 Decree. 6

304. Plaintiff's Complaint at 17, Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, No. 1:00CV01544
(D.D.C. filed June 28, 2000).
305. Memorandum from John Leshy, Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Eluid

L. Martinez, Comm'r, Bureau of Reclamation (Aug. 14, 2000).

306. Id. at 2.
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The FEIS on the Guidelines undertook an analysis of effects on
listed species and species of concern in Mexico, including the desert
pupfish, Vaquita Harbor Porpoise, Yuma clapper rail, California black
rail, Clark's grebe, Totoaba Bass, southwestern willow flycatcher,
yellow-billed cuckoo, elf owl, and Bell's vireo. 7 In general summary,
the FEIS concluded that under both baseline conditions and all
alternatives, the United States Treaty deliveries to Mexico will be the
same: 1.5 million acre-feet per year. It noted that Mexico has
complete discretion and sovereignty over this water, and the Bureau
has no discretion or authority over how that water is used in Mexico.
According to the FEIS, each of the alternatives would slightly decrease
the frequency of surplus flow events into Mexico, including flows in
excess of 250,000 acre-feet, which had been identified by
environmental organizations as beneficial for environmental
restoration. However, it found "there are only minor differences in
the potential magnitudes and potential frequencies of excess flows
between baseline conditions and the Basin States Alternative."3 8
It is important to note that Colorado River deliveries to Mexico are
diverted at Morelos Dam, just below the border, and from there are
distributed to farming operations. Irrigation return flow patterns may
serve to maintain groundwater table levels and maintain riparian
vegetation more than channel deliveries from the United States. Flows
to the Cien6ga de Santa Clara, an important wetland, are delivered
directly from irrigation return flows from the United States not
currently counted as part of the Treaty delivery obligation, and are
therefore unaffected by Lower Basin Colorado River reservoir
operations. Also, irrigation return flows, not Colorado River deliveries,
maintain flows in the Rio Hardy. Therefore, the Bureau concluded
that other factors affect all of the species by a much greater degree,
such as over fishing, habitat alteration, and irrigation operations in
Mexico, than by whether the interim surplus criteria were
implemented. The Bureau thus concluded there would either be a
"no effect" or "not likely to be any adverse effect" on all the species
considered.3 9
In the FEIS, the Bureau did not analyze an alternative Pacific
Institute proposed that was based on the Six State Alternative, but
which in addition proposed the Bureau provide 32,000 acre-feet of
water each year to Mexico in addition to its Treaty obligation, and
260,000 acre-feet periodic flow, for environmental restoration
purposes in the delta, in addition to United States Mexican Treaty
deliveries. As it did with the states' request that Mexican Treaty
deliveries be specifically referenced in the Record of Decision as
limited to 1.5 million acre-feet per year, the Bureau determined the
Pacific Institute proposal was beyond the purpose and need of the
proposed action, since it dealt with a different question of "surplus"
307. FEIS, supra note 267, at 3.8-1.
308. Id. at 3.16-18.
309. Id. at 3.8-24 to 3.8-27.
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(i.e., Mexican Treaty surplus) than that being considered in the
interim surplus criteria. The Bureau also determined that the Pacific
Institute proposal would cause the Bureau to violate the mandatory
operating injunctions in Arizona v. California.
The Guidelines articulated the official position of the United
States. The Guidelines state:
Though it is the position of the United States through the United
States International Boundary and Water Commission that the
United States does not mitigate for impacts in a foreign country, the
United States is committed to participate with Mexico through the
IBWC Technical Work Groups to develop cooperative projects
beneficial to both countries concerning the issues expressed by
Mexico. 10

The DOI argued that consideration of additional flows to Mexico
was further inappropriate because Mexico has sovereign control and

authority over water once it crosses the international boundary, and
the United States was not in a position to dictate to Mexico whether it
directed the additional water for use for environmental restoration

purposes in the delta, or developed the water for irrigation or
municipal use. Moreover, the DOI asserted, that without additional
Treaty authorization, it lacked the authority to exceed the required
deliveries set forth in the Treaty."'
In January 2001, the Government of Mexico sent to the United
States a diplomatic note, expressing concern with respect to
anticipated reductions in deliveries of surplus water to Mexico.312 The
United States responded with a continued reaffirmation

that it is

under not obligation to deliver313 any water to Mexico beyond that

expressly required by the Treaty.

310. Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 7772 (Jan. 25, 2001).
311. FEIS, supra note 267, at 2-3 to 2-4, 3.16 to 3.23.
312. Alberto Sz~kely, Advisor to the Sec'y of Foreign Relations, Address at the
Colorado River Delta Bi-National Symposium
16
(Sep. 11-12, 2001);
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/FAO/CRDS0901/EnglishSymposium.pdf.
313. In Sept. 2001, Paula Dobrioski, Undersecretary for Global Affairs, State Dep't,
prepared a statement to be read by Dennis Linsky, which said:
[T]he Department of State is aware of Mexico's concerns that certain U.S.
actions with respect to the management of the Colorado River system within
the United States have failed to take into account the potential impacts on
our neighbor Mexico.
However, the Department of State believes,
nonetheless, that the United States carefully considered such transboundary
impacts during a series of consultations held with Mexico under the auspices
of International Boundary and Water Commission over the past year, as well
as during the development of the Environmental Impact Statement called for
by the United States National Environmental Policy Act.
The Department of State also believes that in taking these actions the
Unites states is acting in a manner that is consistent with the 1983 La Paz
agreement.
The United States concluded that adjustments to the
management of the Colorado River system within the United States [sic].
Those adjustments which have occurred will not result in appreciable adverse
impacts on Mexico.
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In 2003, the Federal District Court made its determination in
Finding that "Mexico is an
Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton. 4
independent sovereign not answerable to this Court,"3 15 the court held
that the Bureau did not have a duty to consult with the USFWS under
the Endangered Species Act, since its actions with regard to the
delivery of water to Mexico and over the use of water within Mexico
were nondiscretionary. 31' The court found that "[t]he formulas
established by the Law of the River strictly limit Reclamation's
authority to release additional waters to Mexico, and Section 7(a) (2)
of the ESA does not loosen those limitations or expand Reclamation's
authority. 3 1 7 The Court went on to hold that even discretionary
actions by the Secretary with regard to water deliveries within the
United States, such as adoption or implementation of the Guidelines
or orders with respect to deliveries of water in the United States, do
not implicate any duty under the Endangered Species Act to address
the impacts of such actions to species or habitat in Mexico. The Court
held that, "Reclamation does not have the discretion to manipulate
water delivery in the United States in order to create excess releases
for the delta."3 8 Nor can the Secretary:
interpret the Law of the River in a way that will divert or somehow
'indirectly result' in excess flows to Mexico.... [I]t seems unlikely
that any case will present facts that more clearly make any agency's
actions nondiscretionary than this one: a Supreme Court injunction,
an international treaty, federal statutes, and contracts between the
government and water 9users that account for every acre foot of lower
Colorado River water.31

XX. THE BEGINNING OF THE END (OR THE END OF THE
BEGINNING): THE UNWINDING OF THE CALIFORNIA PLAN
Nearly a year after Secretary Babbitt's Record of Decision adopting
the Guidelines, the states were beginning to grow restless with a
continuing perception the California agencies were not finalizing the
agreements and processes necessary to put the California Plan into
action. The DOI shared this concern. At the December 2001
In closing, it's important to add that the United States intends to fulfill
its treaty obligations to deliver to Mexico 1.5 million acre-feet of Colorado
River water per year as provided for in the 1944 Water Treaty. And the
United States will continue to comply with its legal obligations concerning
the salinity of those waters as provided under International Boundary Water
Commission Minute 242.
Dennis Linsky, U.S. State Dep't, Address at the Colorado River Delta Bi-National
Symposium 17-18 (Sep. 11-12, 2001).

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, No. 00-1544, slip op. (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2003).
Id. at 20.
Id. at 29.
Id.
at 27.
Id. at 29.

319. Defenders of Wildlife, No. 00-1544, slip op. at 30-31.
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Colorado River Water User's meeting in Las Vegas, Assistant Secretary
for Water and Science, Bennett Raley, delivered the DOI's annual
message. He affirmed that the DOI, under the new Bush
administration, intended to "stay the course" with respect directions
established on the Colorado River over the last several years. He also
took up the annual task, started by Secretary Babbitt, of scolding
California for being dilatory in getting its water use within its
apportionment. Raley affirmed that Secretary Gale Norton would
enforce the terms of the Decree in Arizona v. California, which would
hold California to 4.4 million acre-feet in normal years, thus cutting off
MWD and potentially setting off a string of political and legal battles
on the Colorado River and in California.
Raley also expressed concern about the environmental compliance
issues in the implementation of the 4.4 Plan. The California agencies,
particularly the IID, wanted an ESA Section 10 habitat conservation
plan approach to ESA compliance, believing that more regulatory
certainty for the agencies could be achieved. ° However, with this
process stalled in issues related to the Salton Sea, he stated the DOI's
intent to proceed with an alternative approach under Section 7,
asserting that restoration of the Salton Sea "is separate from what is
necessary to implement the California 4.4 Plan.... The California 4.4
Plan cannot and should not2 be held hostage to the larger issues
presented by the Salton Sea."0 1

The QSA was hung up on issues surrounding the Salton Sea, and
environmental compliance with the federal and state endangered
species acts ("ESA and CESA"), which was required in order for the
California agencies to implement the water conservation measures
necessary to meet the water reduction benchmarks established in the
Record of Decision. The water conservation measures would reduce
agricultural return flows to the Sea, thus accelerating the inevitable
decline of the Sea.
California agencies were working on an
amendment to the California ESA, and were involved in hearings
before the state Water Resources Control Board, to obtain
environmental compliance for the California Plan.
MWD also
developed a plan for "transitional land fallowing" designed to allow
the California Plan to avoid Salton Sea restoration issues. However,
IID resisted the plan because of political opposition to land fallowing.
IID presented to the other California agencies and the DOI what
can only be euphemistically described as a "Santa's wish list" of
demands and assurances that it needed in order to even consider land
fallowing. It claimed that it must be protected by agreement and
legislation from any challenges to the reasonability of its beneficial use
of water. It insisted on protection by agreement and legislation from
future demands for additional land fallowing. IID demanded: (1) ESA
320. Bennett Raley, Assistant Sec'y for Water & Science, U.S. Dep't of Interior,
Address to Colorado River Water Users Association, 2001 Annual Conference (Dec.

13, 2001).
321. Id. at 7.
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and CESA "coverage" for all identified (not just listed) species of
concern, which number over twenty-five species, under incidental take
permits; (2) "no surprises" assurances under the ESA and CESA, by
agreement and legislation, for the effects of implementation of the
fallowing and conservation measures; and (3) a new federal law
limiting statutes of limitation for citizen suits under both NEPA and
the ESA. IID wanted full mitigation of the social and economic
impacts of land fallowing. Finally, IID demanded federal liability
protection from any lawsuits that might be filed related to322air quality
or other impacts from fallowing or conservation programs.
With IID's demands on the table and no apparent progress in the
California negotiations, in mid-2002 the DOI began its annual process
of developing the AOP for 2003. The issue immediately arose as to
how the AOP should deal with the possibility that the California
agencies might not reach agreement on the QSA before the December
31, 2002, benchmark. The Guidelines provided that they would be
suspended if California did not meet the specified benchmarks for
reductions in water use, and would be replaced by a 70R operating
regime until such time as the benchmark is met. The first benchmark
was that the agricultural agencies in California reduce their total water
use to 3.74 million acre-feet in 2003.2 California would be able to
meet this first water reduction benchmark, because this involved the
already-implemented MWD/IID agreement to conserve 110,000 acrefeet reached in 1988.
However, without quantification of the California agricultural
priorities, there was no way to measure or administer the water transfer
upon which the 1988 MWD/IID agreement was based. Therefore, the
Guidelines also provided that in the event the California water
agencies did not execute the QSA before December 31, 2002, the
Secretary would suspend the Guidelines, "until such time as California
completes all required actions and complies with the reductions in
The issue faced by the states and the DOI was
water use . . . ,
whether signing the QSA before December 31, 2002 was in and of
itself a benchmark, regardless of whether California would be able to
meet the reduction in water use in 2003. Several states took the
position that the QSA was indeed a stand-alone benchmark that must
be met in order for California to continue to receive the benefit of the
Guidelines. The MWD/Arizona forbearance agreement affirmed this
position because it was expressly contingent on execution of the QSA
by the end of this year.325 In response to an inquiry from IID on the
issue, Assistant Secretary Raley made the DOI's position clear that the
Secretary would in fact suspend the Guidelines if the QSA were not
322. Letter from John P. Carter, Partner, Horton, Knox, Carter & Foote, to Warren
Weinstein, Legislative Assistant, Office of U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein (Mar. 1,
2002).
323. Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 7772, 7782 (Jan. 25,
2001).
324.

Id.

325.

Id. at 7779-80.
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signed, stating, "the Department is fully committed and prepared to
take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that California's use of
Colorado River water fully complies with the requirements of the
32 6
Decree of the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. California."
In subsequent Congressional testimony, he put it even more bluntly.
"The draft QSA is a cornerstone of the California 4.4 Plan.... Absent
completion of the [QSA], the contemplated water transfers cannot
proceed.
Absent these water transfers, the California 4.4 Plan will
27
fail.

3

As negotiations between the California agencies proceeded on a
full-time, daily basis, with shifts in the negotiations occurring hourly,
the DOI proceeded to make plans for a potential suspension of the
Guidelines on January 1, 2003. The then-current draft of the 2003
AOP, being circulated by the DOI, included two options for the
operation of Lower Basin reservoirs depending upon whether or not
California agencies executed the QSA. "Option A" assumed California
agencies would execute the QSA, and provided for a Full Domestic
Surplus under the Guidelines.
"Option B" assumed California
agencies would not execute QSA as required by the Guidelines; thus,
the DOI would suspend the Guidelines and under a 70R strategy a
normal condition would apply, reducing deliveries to California to 4.4
million acre-feet in 2003.
In addition to the penalty to California, the Option B operation
would reduce deliveries to Nevada by about 18,000 acre-feet from its
2001 deliveries. This meant Nevada would not be able to undertake
underground storage operations for use in future years, as it had
contemplated it would be able to do under the surplus declarations
established by the Guidelines."' As a result, the DOI issued a Federal
Register notice outlining the DOI's position that the Guidelines
required California agencies to execute the QSA, and raising the
question as to the effect of suspension of the Guidelines on entities
outside of California. The notice raised the question of whether
special treatment should be afforded to affected agencies such
329 as the
Southern Nevada Water Authority, and requested comments.
Nevada asserted the drought and the failure of California to
finalize the QSA were elements outside its control, and that the
Secretary should not penalize Nevada for California's failure. It asked
the states to support a position to the Secretary that the Secretary
should penalize only California, and not limit Nevada's access to the
326. Letter from Bennett W. Raley, Assistant Sec'y for Water & Science, U.S. Dep't
of the Interior, to Stella Mendoza, President of Bd. of Dirs., Imperial Irrigation Dist.
(May 31, 2002).
327. Implementation of the California Plan for the Colorado River: Opportunities
and Challenges Before the House Comm. on Res., Subcomm. on Water and Power,
107th Cong., 6, 9 (June 14, 2002) (statement of Bennett W. Raley, Assistant Sec'y for
Water & Science, U.S. Dep't of the Interior).
328. See Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7782.
329. Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, Notice Regarding Implementation
of Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,733, 41,734 (June 19, 2002).
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surplus waters it would have had if the Guidelines were in effect.
Despite sympathy with the equities of Nevada's position, the states
declined to support Nevada's requested position, because there was no
support for special treatment of Nevada under the Law of the River.
The states took the position the Operating Criteria, to which the
Guidelines are subservient and implement, and the Decree in Arizona
v. California,do not contemplate differential treatment of Lower Basin
States with regard to normal, shortage and surplus declarations, except
as expressly set forth in the Decree or by Congress. For example,
surpluses are to be shared fifty percent to California, forty-six percent
to Arizona, and four percent to Nevada.33 ° In a shortage situation, CAP
deliveries
are
subordinated to 4.4 million acre-feet of deliveries to
C 1.r
•
331
California.
In all other cases, normal, shortage and surplus
declarations are made based on water supply and demand conditions
of the Lower Basin as a whole.
The other states also pointed out to Nevada that there was a
precedent Nevada could use, in the form of the MWD/Arizona
forbearance agreement in place, for the states to agree on and the
Secretary to allocate, unused apportionment or surplus water. For
example, if Arizona did not use its full 2.8 million acre-foot
apportionment, MWD could forbear its entitlement to the use of such
water so as to maximize the amount of water available to Nevada.
However, due to the drought and continuing demands in Arizona,
Arizona could not guarantee that it would not use its full
apportionment in 2003, and refused to enter into a forbearance
agreement.
Moreover, California representatives made repeated
assurances of their "cautious optimism" that the QSA would be
executed by the end of the year. As a result of this discussion, Nevada
and the other states agreed to defer any discussion of the issue of
differential treatment until such time as the QSA was not signed.332
Meanwhile, back in California, new developments continued
apace. By the fall of 2002, House Speaker Emeritus Bob Hertzberg
facilitated negotiations, and the California agencies had imposed a
deadline of October 15 to reach agreement on a term sheet that could
then form the basis for the QSA. Both California and federal
environmental permitting agencies were proceeding under the
premise the interim land fallowing programs proposed by MWD would
eliminate any adverse effect on the Salton Sea or listed species with
respect to implementation of the QSA.
Moreover, there was an apparent crack in the wall of IID's
opposition to land fallowing. IID had announced in August that it was
willing to consider a five-year land-fallowing program, but later agreed
330. SeePartI, supranote 3, at 311-12.
331. Id. at 316 n.122.
332. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to City of Grand Junction, Colo. River
Water Conservation Dist., Denver Water Dep't, N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist.,
Southeast Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., Southwestern Water Conservation Dist. 2-3
(Sept. 24, 2002).
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to a possible ten-year, 500,000 acre-foot per year program-for a price.
The SDCWA responded in late August with an offer of a schedule of
payments for a larger fallowing program. The SDCWA offer illustrated
the lengths that metropolitan Southern California was prepared to go
to satisfy IID's demands. San Diego proposed limiting fallowing to ten
percent of the irrigated lands in the Imperial Valley, and for a period
not to exceed fifteen years. San Diego would pay to farmers a onetime enrollment fee of $700 per acre, plus $550 per acre (escalated at
2.5% per year) for each acre of land fallowed. It would also create an
escrow fund for on-farm/system improvements of $800 per acre of
land enrolled in the program, totaling $354 million over the life of the
fifteen-year program. San Diego would fund a community benefit
fund at $100 per acre per year of enrolled land, totaling $40 million
over the fifteen-year program. San Diego would create a $50 million
environmental fund. Finally, San Diego would pay 1ID $25 per acrefoot for transferred water to cover IID's administrative costs, together
with $175 per acre-foot for water transferred through system
33
improvements, totaling $73 million over the fifteen-year program.
Not swayed, IID's response held firm reiterating its initial 500,000 acre
foot/ten-year proposal, demanding additional up front payments, and
requiring that IID be held harmless from environmental risk.3 4
Thus, as of late August, the parties still seemed far apart. However,
other activities were also ongoing, and pressure from all sides mounted
for resolution of the stalemate over the QSA, and in particular, for IID
to agree to land fallowing. On August 30, 2002, the California
Legislature passed Assembly Concurrent Resolution 251 ("ACR 251"),
which declared that signing the QSA by December 31 was of "utmost
importance to the people of California." If the parties did not sign the
QSA, the Legislature declared it would "consider appropriate
legislative actions" to ensure implementation of the QSA.33 The
legislature transmitted the resolution to the parties by a letter from
legislative leadership underscoring the importance of reaching
3 6 Governor
agreement."
Davis added his voice in support of ACR 251,
in a letter to legislative leadership.3 7
333. Letter from Maureen A. Stapleton, Gen. Manager, San Diego County Water
Auth., to John P. Carter, Partner, Horton, Knox, Carter & Foote 2-3 (Aug. 23, 2002).
334. Letter from John P. Carter, Partner, Horton, Knox, Carter & Foote, to Maureen
A. Stapleton, Gen. Manager, San Diego County Water Auth. 3 (Aug. 30, 2002); Letter
from John P. Carter, Partner, Horton, Knox, Carter & Foote, to Maureen A. Stapleton,
Gen. Manager, San Diego County Water Auth. 2 (Sept. 11, 2002).
335. A.C.R. 251, 153rd Leg., Spec. Sess. 2-4 (Cal. 2002), at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/asm/ab_02510300/acr251_bi11_20020918_chaptered.pdf.
336. Letter from John L. Burton, President Pro Tempore of the State Senate, and
Herb J. Wesson, Jr., Speaker of the California State Assembly, to Maureen A.
Stapleton, Gen. Manager, San Diego County Water Auth., Tom Levy, Gen.
Manager/Chief Eng'r, Coachella Valley Water Dist., Ronald R. Gastelum, Chief Exec.
Officer, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., Jesse Silva, Gen. Manager, Imperial Irrigation
Dist. 1-2 (Aug. 31, 2002).
337. Letter from Gray Davis, Governor of California, to Herb Wesson, Speaker of
the State Assembly, & John Burton, President Pro Tempore of the California State
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Shortly thereafter, Governor Davis signed Senate Bill 482, which
provided for allocation of $50 million from a statewide referendum,
Proposition 50, the Water Security, Clean Drinking Water, Coastal and
Beach Protection Act of 2002. Proposition 50 provided $3.4 billion in
bond funds for various environmental programs in California. 38 The
funding in Senate Bill 482 depended on voter passage of Proposition
50 at the November election, execution of the QSA by December 31,
and determination by California agencies that the QSA would not
adversely affect the Salton Sea. The money was to be used for
environmental mitigation purposes at the Salton Sea. Also, the
legislation authorized the take of specified species in the Salton Sea, as
a result of the QSA implementation, if the QSA implementation did
not result in a material increase in the salinity of the Salton Sea during
the first fifteen years of the QSA. The act also confirmed that
fallowing was an authorized water conservation measure under
California law.339
Additionally, Governor Davis signed into law Senate Bill 1473, a bill
that made available an additional $150 million in funding allocated
from Proposition 50 funds for projects contributing to achieving the
benchmarks in the Guidelines (including desalination projects). 340
Thus, the San Diego and legislative proposals alone put over $700
million on the table to IID.
With great fanfare, on October 15, the day of their deadline and
following several straight days of negotiation well into the night, the
California agencies announced agreement on a term sheet providing a
framework for a QSA by December 31, 2002. House Speaker Emeritus
Bob Hertzberg, who led the
"341 negotiations, hailed the agreement as a
"lasting peace on the river.
However, as was the history over the last several years of
negotiations of California announcements about reaching agreement,
the term sheet and the draft QSA that was released by the California
agencies about a month later did not resolve all issues. Instead of the
usual conditions precedent, the draft QSA contained a condition
subsequent that the Habitat Conservation Plan be completed before
December 31, 2003, "acceptable in form, substance and coverage to

Senate (Sept. 10, 2002).
338. S.B.
1473,
153rd
Leg.,
Spec.
Sess.
(Cal.
2002),
at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_14511500/sb_1473_biL20020917_chapte red.pdf.
339. S.B. 482, 153rd Leg., Spec. Sess., ch. 617, §§ l(b), 1(f), 2(a), 3, 7(b) (Cal.
2002), at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_04510500/sb_482_bill2002091 7chaptered.pdf.
340. Letter from Gerald R. Zimmerman, Exec. Dir., Colo. River Bd.of Cal., to Colo.
River Basin State Representatives (Sept. 13, 2002); S.B. 1473, 153rd Leg., Spec. Sess.,
ch. 617.
341. Press Release, Imperial Irrigation Dist., Agreement Reached on Landmark
Colorado River Water Accords (Oct. 16, 2002) (quoting Bob Hertzberg, House
Speaker Emeritus).
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liD" 41 "in its sole, complete and absolute discretion."343 The QSA also
capped IID's costs of environmental mitigation at $30 million. The
MWD and SWCDA would bear the costs above that amount, but the
draft QSA also contained a condition subsequent that if the costs
became unacceptably high, MWD or SDCWA could back out of the
QSA. 4
As a practical matter, these conditions subsequent illustrated that
the California agencies had in fact not reached agreement on the
important issues necessary for a QSA, and the conditions subsequent
simply would have amounted to an extension of the Guideline
benchmark that required the QSA be finally executed by December
31, 2002. The other Basin States and the DOI found these conditions
unacceptable, and asserted that California could meet the benchmark
only by executing a final and binding QSA. On December 9, 2002, on
the day the IID Board was scheduled to vote to approve the QSA,
Assistant Secretary Bennett Raley wrote to the California agencies
expressing the DOI's opposition to the conditions subsequent. He
wrote:
[R]ecent proposed revisions that add new conditions subsequent to
the QSA will not meet the requirements of the Interim Surplus
Guidelines. In this regard, I have become aware that some have
suggested that the Quantification Settlement Agreement should be
subject to termination unless a Habitat Conservation Plan is approved
by the Department relating to potential impacts on the Salton Sea.
This proposal is unacceptable because it would destroy the long-term
certainty that is required if California is to have access to surplus
water under the Interim Surplus Guidelines.
The Department has no interest in a QSA that does not represent
a long term Quantification of the parties' portion of California's
apportionment of Colorado River water, lest in fifteen years we find
ourselves as Gatsby did - 'So we beat
3 45 on, boats against the current,
borne back ceaselessly into the past.'
On December 9, 2002, amid defiant statements against the DOI
and the other California agencies, the Imperial Irrigation District
Board voted 3-2 to reject the proposed QSA, the terms of which had
been agreed to in October. One of the District's board members
served on the IID negotiating team that agreed to the term sheet in

342. Draft Quantification Settlement Agreement Between Imperial Irrigation Dist.,
Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., and Coahcella Valley Water Dist., art. 6, § 6.2(2) (ii) (c)
(Nov. 27, 2002).
343. Summary Term Sheet-Principal QSA Revisions 4 (Oct. 15, 2002).

344. Id.; Draft Quantification Settlement Agreement Between Imperial Irrigation
Dist., Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., and Coahcella Valley Water Dist. (Nov. 27, 2002).
345. Letter from Bennett W. Raley, Assistant Sec'y for Water & Science, U.S. Dep't
of the Interior, to Tom Levy, Gen. Manager/Chief Eng'r, Coachella Valley Water Dist.,
Ronald R. Gastelum, Chief Exec. Officer, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., Stella Mendoza,
President, Imperial Irrigation Dist. & Maureen A. Stapleton, Gen. Manager, San Diego

County Water Auth. 2 (Dec. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Letter to Cal. water agencies].
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October, yet voted against the full agreement when it came before the
Board in December.

46

In truth, it would appear that IID was never interested in actually
entering into an agreement. A "proposal" made by IID 6n December
13, four days after it voted to reject the draft QSA illustrates the wide
gulf between the positions of IID and the other California agencies. In
the proposal, IID backed away from many of the commitments that it
had previously made, both in the QSA document it had agreed to in
2000 and in the term sheet that its negotiators had endorsed in
October. Among other demands, IID proposed a shorter-term
fallowing program, a shorter overall term, and renegotiated
environmental and socio-economic mitigation measures.34
In the wake of the IID vote, the Governor's or their representatives
of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming wrote letters to
Secretary Norton, urging the Secretary to suspend the Guidelines,
according to their terms on Janua 7 1, 2003, if the agencies did not
sign the QSA by the end of the year.
The Colorado River Water Users Association meeting in Las Vegas
provided a fitting occasion for the Secretary to reflect on the year's
events and set direction for the upcoming year. Clear and forceful in
her comments, Secretary Norton told the California agencies that, in
fact, she would order reductions in California's use of water if the
California agencies did not sign an acceptable QSA by the end of the
year. She further warned the reduction might not come to California
as a whole (which under the Seven Party Agreement would hit MWD
only as the junior-most priority). Secretary Norton implied that
individual California water users could face reductions in water use in
the DOI's enforcement of the Arizona v. CaliforniaDecree.
We are at a turning point in the history of the Colorado River. For
the first time, a Secretary of the Interior faces the need to enforce the
limits confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the historic Arizona v.
Californialitigation. The issue is not whether but when California will
live within its apportionment of 4.4 million acre-feet of water.

As Secretary and River Master, I must enforce the Law of the River.
This means I will hold California to the express covenant it made in

346. Tony Perry, Inland Water Sale Rejected; Coastal Cutback Threatened, L.A. TIMES,

Dec. 10, 2002, at Al.
347. Imperial Irrigation District Proposal for Short-Term Fallowing Transfer
Pending Resolution of Outstanding Issues and Conditions for Long-Term Transfer 1,
3 (Dec. 13, 2002).

348. Letters from Jane Dee Hull, Governor, State of Arizona (Dec. 17, 2002), Greg
E. Walcher, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res. (Dec. 12, 2002), Philip B. Mutz, Upper

Colo. River Comm'r, New Mexico, &Thomas C. Turney, State Eng'r & Sec'y Interstate
Stream Comm'n, New Mexico (Dec. 16, 2002), D. Larry Anderson, Dir./Interstate
Streams Comm'r (Dec. 13, 2002), Patrick T. Tyrrell, Wyoming State Eng'r (Dec. 13,
2002), to Gale Norton, Sec'y of the Interior.
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1929 to limit its use of the Colorado River to 4.4 million acre-feet. No
alternative is permitted under the Decree of the United States
Supreme Court in Arizona v. California. Absent enforcement of the
limits established in the Law of the River, the allocation of the right
to consume water among the states would be meaningless.

The Department will be carefully considering all of these issues in the
course of acting on the pending water orders for 2003. In this
context, the Department may take other steps to ensure that all
requirements
of the Decree of the United States Supreme Court are
rn t349
met.
Secretary Norton also affirmed what the Guidelines said, that if the
California agencies executed a QSA after the first of the year, the
Guidelines could be reinstated. However, she did not back down on
the DOI's position that a QSA must effect a permanent quantification
of the agricultural priorities within the first 3.85 million acre-feet of
California's apportionment, with no strings attached.
In the event that the QSA is not signed by the deadline, it is possible
for California to have the Guidelines reinstated. Reinstatement can
occur if the QSA is signed, or if California takes such actions as are
required by the Department. For those who rest hope on the "all
required actions" option in the Guidelines, you should be aware that
the actions that will be required must be real and permanent. It
makes no sense to respond to a failure to meet the first deadline in
the Seven States agreement [the Guidelines] by lessening the
requirements for enhanced
access to surplus water. To the contrary,
350
the bar will be raised.
Finally, recognizing the hardship on Nevada for California's failure
to meet the benchmark, Secretary Norton held out a small ray of hope.
311

[A]s noted in our Federal Register notice last summer, we are
aware of the impact of a suspension of the enhanced surplus on
Nevada. We will continue our discussions with Nevada and the other
basin states to address this issue. We understand the equity issues,
and are wrestling with the legal issues associated with separating
Nevada's future from the consequences of California's actions.3 52
If the QSA was not finalized, the California agencies would lose
more than just the benefits of the Guidelines. In addition to a
suspension of the Guidelines, a number of pieces to the California
Plan would unravel if there was not a QSA by the end of the year. One

349. Gale Norton, Sec'y of the Interior, Address to the Colorado River Water Users
Association, 2002 Annual Conference 1, 3-4 (Dec. 16, 2002).

350. Id. at 3, 4.
351. See supra text accompanying note 328-29.
352. Gale Norton 2002 Conference, supranote 349, at 4.
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of the most significant pressures on the California agencies to enter
into a QSA was the fact that the California legislation that provided an
exemption from the "take" of species under the California fully
protected species law would expire on December 31, 2002, if there was
no QSA.353 The MWD/Arizona forbearance agreement, an important
piece of the California Plan implementation, would also4 expire at the
end of the year if the agencies did not execute the QSA.1

At meetings in Las Vegas between representatives of the Basin
States and the California water agencies, during the Water Users
Association conference, the three California agencies other than IID
(MWD, SDWCA and CVWD) expressed their continued desire to make
proposals to IID that might bring IID back to the table before the end
of the year. Yet at the same time there was a realistic assessment of the
prospects for success. Although the Basin States had both formally
and informally expressed strong support for an immediate suspension
of the Guidelines after the first of the year, they also expressed a
continued desire to work with the California agencies to implement a
"soft landing" for reductions in California's water use.
However, the states also expressed some principles that should be
met by the California agencies in any renegotiation of the QSA. First,
the states expressed there should be no conditions subsequent in the
QSA. The Guidelines require, and the states insisted upon, a firm
quantification. Second, the states expressed that it might be possible
to consider conditions subsequent, if California would agree to allow
the Guidelines to go into suspension, or if MWD would agree to forego
any surplus water deliveries, until the parties met the conditions
subsequent.
The California agencies continued negotiations on the terms of a
QSA. On December 31, 2002, the IID Board voted three-to-two in
favor of a revised QSA. The ILID-approved version of the QSA
continued to contain conditions subsequent that allowed IID to back
out of the deal, and also contained an additional provision for a $150
million loan guarantee and an additional $50 million to be provided to
IID for mitigation water. However CVWD and MWD had already
rejected the version of the QSA that IID approved, rendering the act
meaningless.355
On December 31, Assistant Secretary Bennett Raley held a press
conference, and announced that the DOI would institute two basic
actions. First, it would declare the Guidelines in suspension, limiting
California to 4.4 million acre-feet in 2003 and running the Colorado
River under a 70R strategy. Second, it would limit IID diversions to a
duty of water set forth in the 1979 Decree in Arizona v. California. This
latter action would limit IID to about 2.9 million acre-feet, as opposed
to the 3.1 million acre-feet that would have been allowed under the
Guidelines or the approximately 3.3 million acre-feet that IID
353. See supra text accompanying note 338-39.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 292-93.
355. Rudy Yniguez, Transfer:A Done Deal?, IMPERIAL VALLEY PREs, Jan. 1, 2003.
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Shortly before the end of 2002, the DOI sent letters to seventeen
Colorado River contractors in Nevada, California, and Arizona
informing them how much Colorado River water would be available to
them under their water delivery contracts in 2003. The DOI approved
all water orders as submitted except for those of the State of Nevada,
1ID, and MWD. The amount of water use for 2003 approved for these
entities depended on whether or not the California agencies would be
able to agree on a QSA. This approval process represented a
milestone in Lower Colorado River accounting and administration. It
was the first time the Secretary had exercised administrative authority
with respect to individual water orders pursuant to contracts under the
Boulder Canyon Project Act.
Because the California agencies did not sign a QSA, the DOI
restricted Nevada's consumptive use to its basic apportionment of
300,000 acre-feet, as opposed to the 337,000 acre-feet it requested. It
restricted the cumulative requests for the State of California to its basic
apportionment of 4.4 million acre-feet, as opposed to cumulative
requests of 5.02 million acre-feet. The DOI approved the Arizona
requests, up to the state's full allocation of 2.8 million acre-feet.
The adjustments to California water orders from the MWD, IID
and CVWD water order requests are described in Table II, below.
TABLE II: ADJUSTMENTS TO CALIFORNIA WATER ORDERS

Entity

2002 Water Order
(acre-feet)

Order with
QSA (acrefeet)

Order without
QSA (acre-feet)

Imperial

3,003,200357

2,974,5003"

2,769,600

338,82039

347,0000

347,000

1'250'00'

1,128,600

713,500

Irrigation District
Coachella Valley
Water District
Metropolitan
Water District

356. See generally Tony Perry, Southland Share of Water to be cut as Deal Collapses;
Farmers,MWD Fail to Reach Accord That Would Allow ColoradoRiver Allotments to Continue,

L.A. TIMwES, Jan. 1, 2003; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Interior Department
Transmits 2003 Water Order Approvals to Colorado River Users (Dec. 27, 2002).

357. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 2003 Water OrderApprovals 2

(Dec. 27, 2002), at http://www.lc.usbr.gov/pao/2003orders/2003approvals.pdf.

358. "From this amount, 104,000 acre-feet [is] be delivered to MWD under the 1988

[IID/MWD water transfer] agreement, 11,500 acre-feet will be provided for present
perfected rights and miscellaneous users, and 10,000 acre-feet will be provided to San
Diego County Water Authority under a separate agreement." Id. at 2 n.2.
359. Id. at 2.
360. This amount is based upon a "330,000 [acre-foot] consumptive use cap, plus
20,000 acre-feet from conserved water use under [the 1988 IID MWD water transfer]

agreement, minus 3,000 acre-feet for present perfected rights and miscellaneous
users." Id. at 2 n.3.
361. Id. at 2.
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The DOI's letter to lID carefully set forth the basis for its action in
reducing liD's water order. First, the letter asserted the DOI had no
discretion in ordering the reduction. This statement is important with
respect to the issue of whether the DOI is required to comply with
Section 7 of the ESA in the implementation of its action.36 ' The letter
stated:
The Supreme Court has specifically enjoined the United States, its
officers, attorneys, agents and employees in the 1964 Decree in
Arizona v. California from releasing Colorado River water other than

pursuant to valid contracts. The Department is therefore compelled
by the Supreme Court and the terms of IID's 1932 contract to release
water to IID only in such quantities as might be 'reasonably required
for potable and irrigation purposes within the boundaries of the

District,' to ensure that the junior right holders are not deprived of
water lawfully theirs.
Second, the letter based the DOI's approval on the 1979 Decree in
Arizona v. California." That decree approved ajoint motion by various
litigating parties, including 1ID, which quantified their present
perfected rights3 65 for the use of mainstem water within each of the
Lower Division States. The Decree quantified IID rights at 2.6 million
acre-feet, or the amount necessary to irrigate 424,145 acres, whichever
amount is less. The DOI found that this admission by IID formed the
basis for a duty of water within IID.366 Its letter noted that the actual
duty of water within IID might be less, but that for the purpose of
approving 2003 water orders, it could not be more than this amount.
Third, the letter required the IID delivery in 2003 might be further
reduced to repay the Colorado River for overuse by IID that occurred
in 2002. This repayment requirement was pursuant
367 to an amendment
to the AOP, as amended by letter of the Secretary.
Finally, the DOI's letter signaled a change in the historic
administration of water in the Lower Colorado River. Historically, the
DOI simply delivered whatever water the contractors ordered, and
then made an accounting at the end of the year. Because of system
inefficiencies and contractor tendency to order more than actually
needed, there have often been overruns in water deliveries. In
contrast to this historic practice, the DOI's letter announced:
362. The ESA applies to actions "authorized, funded, or carried out by [a federal]
agency," but only where there is "discretionary federal involvement or control." 16
U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (2000); 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2002); see also supra text accompanying
note 301.
363. Letter from Bennett W. Raley, Assistant Sec'y for Water & Science, U.S. Dep't
of Interior, to Jesse P. Silva, Gen. Manager, Imperial Irrigation Dist. 4-5 (Dec. 27,

2002) [hereinafter Letter to IID].
364. 439 U.S. 419 (1979).
365. Present perfected rights are rights in existence prior to June 25, 1929, the
effective date of the Boulder Canyon Project Act. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340
(1963); Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. at 429.
366. Letter to IID, supranote 363, at 5.
367. Id. at 7. Letter from Gale Norton, supra note 67.
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Reclamation will be monitoring and projecting consumptive use of
Colorado River water during calendar year 2003 to ensure the annual
entitlement of each water service contractor is not exceeded. These
projections will be made available to IID on a monthly basis. It is
expected that IID will use this information to adjust diversions to
remain within approved annual quantities.
In the dawning of the new-year, Governor Davis of California
called the agencies back to the negotiating table "with the goal of
having the Surplus Guidelines reinstated early this year," and initiating
new rounds of negotiation. 369
However, MWD denied that the
suspension of the Guidelines had precipitated a southern California
water crisis.
MNWD asserted that it had been planning for the
contingency of the suspension of the Guidelines by developing
programs to rely more heavily on groundwater storage, shifting
delivery schedules, accelerating conservation and seawater desalination
with
programs, and entering into a series of dry-year option contracts
water districts and farmers in the Central Valley.
There were other
factors that made MWD less motivated to agree to a QSA. Without the
Guidelines, and with operation of the Colorado River system under a
70R strategy, MWD is not denied all access to surplus water. That
water will simply not be available in every year, and will not be available
on a reliable basis. Additionally, the onset of dry years in 2000-2002
meant that MWD might not receive as much surplus water under the
Guidelines as originally projected.
Finally, the Secretary's
enforcement of reductions in water orders to lID, if upheld, would
mitigate the adverse effect on MWD of termination of the Guidelines
by some 200,000 acre-feet per year.
On January 10, 2003, IID filed suit in federal district court against
the DOI, challenging the DOI's water orders. The complaint outlined
the priority system established under the 1931 Seven Party Agreement,
and asserted liD's right to the delivery of any amount up to 3.85
million acre-feet, less deliveries to priorities 1 and 2 under the
California Seven Party Agreement.37' The complaint then summarized
the history of the QSA negotiations, and accused the DOI of
attempting to "strong-arm" IID into executing a QSA, in order to avoid
DOI-imposed water reductions."
The suit sought to enjoin the DOI's asserted reductions based on a
violation of IID's water rights under the 1931 Seven Party Agreement
Asserting the DOI's action was
and a taking of IID property.
368. Letter to IID, supra note 363, at 5.
369. Letter from Gray Davis, Governor of California, to Dede Alpert & Dennis
Hollingsworth, California State Senators (Jan. 14, 2003).
370. See generally Written Statement ofJeffery Kightlinger, Gen. Counsel, and Debra
Man, Vice Pres. of Water Transfers & Exchanges, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal.
InformationalHearing of the Assembly Water, Parks and Wildlife Committee, 2003 Leg., XX
Sess. (Cal. 2003).
371. Plaintiffs Complaint at 17-18, Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. United States, No. 03

CV 006 (S.D. Cal., filed Jan. 10, 2003).
372. Id. at 23-27.
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discretionary; the complaint further sought an injunction based on the
failure of the DOI to undertake compliance with NEPA, ESA, and the
environmental justice provisions of federal law. Although the DOI's
letter did not base its authority under 43 C.F.R. Part 417, s17 the
complaint sought to invalidate the 417 regulations and to enjoin based
on improper application of the 417 regulations. lID also based its
request on a separation of powers argument (asserting the DOI had
asserted judicial functions), violation of state's rights under the Tenth
Amendment, and violation of an alleged oral contract by lID to pay
37,
back overruns.
lID also began a campaign to try to put political pressure on the
DOI to back down from its position and diffuse attempts by the
California legislature to exact retribution on lID for the failure of the
QSA negotiations. 5 lID convinced some members of the California
congressional delegation to send a letter to Secretary Norton blaming
the DOI for the collapse of the QSA negotiations. lID started a
campaign to assert the DOI's action was one of an oppressive federal
government that has impacts on and should be resisted by water users
all over the West. In a letter to Secretary Norton, the lID stated:
Your Department has falsely blamed lID for the failure to execute the
QSA by December 31st, and has wrongfully sought to punish lID by
attempting to cut lID's water supply for the 2003 water year. Simply
stated, the action of your Department is misguided, unjustified,
unsupported by the law or the facts, and is an example of heavyhanded and unwarranted federal interference with intrastate water
allocation matters.

[F]inally, your action also sends a message to all water rights holders
throughout the West: comply with the desires of the Department of
Interior s7and the urban populations, or your water rights will be
the
confiscated.

373. These regulations, known as "beneficial use regulations," provide for the
Regional Director of the Lower Colorado Region of the Bureau of Reclamation to
make a determination each year of a Contractor's estimated water requirements for
the ensuing calendar year, "to the end that deliveries of Colorado River water to each
43
Contractor will not exceed those reasonably required for beneficial use ....
C.F.R. 417.2 (2002).
374. Plaintiff's Complaint at 36-38, 46-50, Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. United States,
No. 03 CV 006 (S.D. Cal., filed Jan. 10, 2003).
375. For example, two California legislators introduced a bill to limit IID's water
supply to 2.6 million acre-feet per year. SeeJim Sanders & Dale Kasler, Senators Target
Imperial Water Agency, THE SAcRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 8, 2003; S.B. 117, 154th Leg., Spec.
at
2003),
3,
Feb.
(Introduced
2003)
(Cal.
Sess.
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb -01010150/sbl 17_bill_20030203_introduced.pdf.
376. Letter from Lloyd Allen, President, Imperial Irrigation Dist., to Gale Norton,
Sec'y of the Interior (Jan. 10, 2003).
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At a hearing on March 18, 2003, the court granted IID's motion
for preliminary injunction, finding that IID had "established a
likelihood of success on the merits" of its claims of a violation of DOI's
43 C.F.R. Part 417 regulations and breach of contract.377 The court
ordered DOI to restore IID's full water allotment of 3.1 million acrefeet. 8 The court asked for briefing on whether Interior should
conduct a complete Part 417 review, or whether the parties (including
Coachella and MWD) should commence a reasonable beneficial use
challenge to IID in an alternative forum. 3 79 Following the briefing, the
court approved a process proposed by DOI to conduct a Part 417
review of IID's water use practices.8
The DOI immediately reversed its December 27, 2003 water order
approvals,' the effect of which was that California was still restricted to
4.4 million acre-feet, but IID's allowed use increased by about 330,000
acre-feet, Coachella's approved use decreased by about 108,000 acre82
feet, and MWD's approved use decreased by about 121,000 acre-feet.
The DOI initiated the Part 417 process, with the intent to complete
the administrative part of the process by the fall of 2003.383
Despite the litigation, and at the urging of the California
Governor's office, the California parties hammered out a new version
of the QSA ("2003 QSA"). At a March 13, 2003 meeting of the Basin
States, the State of California and the California water agencies
presented a new packet of materials they touted as the "new and final"
QSA. Re-using a phrase that has become almost tiresome, Governor
Davis hailed the agreement as a "peace treaty" among the water
agencies.384 The negotiators for the State of California and the
southern California water agencies signed a statement that they would
seek approval of the 2003 QSA from their respective boards when:
the conditions precedent to the [2003] QSA... are all satisfied;...
the Interim Surplus Guidelines are reinstated; the overrun payback
issue is resolved; the legal action of ID v. U.S.... is settled and/or
dismissed; the California legislature... enact[s] the implementing
377. Transcript of Motions for Preliminary Injunction, Imperial Irrigation Dist. v.
United States, No 03CV0069-TJW, at 126 (S.D. Cal. argued Mar. 18, 2003).

378. Id. at 134.
379. Id. at 134-35.
380. Order Remanding Action, Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. United States, No
03CV0069 W (JFS) (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2003).
381. Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 357.
382. Letter from Bennett W. Raley, Assistant Sec'y for Water & Science, U.S. Dep't
of the Interior, to Jesse P. Silva, Gen. Manager, Imperial Irrigation Dist., Steve

Robbins, Gen. Manager, Coachella Valley Water Dist., and Ronald R. Gastelum, Chief
Exec. Officer, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., at 3 (Apr. 28, 2003).
383. Colorado River, Notice of Opportunity for Input Regarding Recommendations
and Determinations Authorized by 43 C.F.R. Part 417, 68 Fed. Reg. 22738 (Apr. 29,

2003).
384. Associated Press, "Peace Treaty" Drafted for Colorado River use California Presents
Water

Supply

Agreement

Bid

for

Federal

Review,

"at

http://www.familyfarmalliance.org/news/Colorado%20River%20%27Peace%Treaty%
27.shtml.
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legislation; and the [2003] QSA and related agreements are
satisfactory to the Department of the Interior and the other Basin
States. ""
All of these measures must be completed by October 30, 2003.
This is a formidable list, raising serious doubts that these matters can
be satisfied before that time. Moreover, the 2003 QSA differs in
significant respects from the QSA negotiated in 2000, that was the
basis for the agreement between the Basin States and DOI to the
Guidelines ("2000 QSA").386
First, the fundamental structure of the program to reduce
California's water use changed from the time the 1999 California Plan
documents and the 2000 QSA were prepared. These changes were a
result of the need to address environmental mitigation issues, and
were the subject of intense negotiation among the California agencies.
Rather than permanent conservation-based water transfers, the 2003
QSA was now predicated on temporary land fallowing in the early
years of the fifteen-year program, with a sudden increase in
conservation-based transfers late in the fifteen-year period. Land
fallowing is a measure that can be quickly implemented, but also
quickly reversed. Moreover, IID has throughout the opposed land
fallowing as a permanent measure to reduce water demands. As a
result, the permanence of the program to reduce California's reliance
on surplus Colorado River is again brought into question.
Second, the 2003 QSA was subject to four off-ramps, including if
the costs of environmental mitigation exceed $243 million, and if IID
is afforded sufficient environmental regulatory assurance. One of the
objectionable off-ramps to the 2002 QSA was IID's ability to terminate
the QSA if a Habitat Conservation Plan was not completed before
December 31, 2003, "acceptable in form, substance and coverage to
lID," "in its sole, complete and absolute discretion." 7 Assistant
Secretary Raley specifically rejected such an off-ramp in his December
9, 2002, correspondence to IID.388 However, the off-ramp remained in
substance, albeit in different form, in the 2003 QSA.
Third, the 2003 QSA listed over fifteen conditions precedent that
must be satisfied before October 30, 2003. 39 The difficulty of
completing all these matters casts doubt on the viability of the 2003
QSA. For example, the 2003 QSA provided that all permits and other
resource approvals necessary to implement the 1998 IID/SDCWA
Transfer Agreement, the conservation by IID of up to 303,000 AFY,

385. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Davis, Water Agencies Present
Colorado River Water Transfer Proposal 2 (Mar. 12, 2003).

386. Compare Imperial Irrigation Dist. et al., Draft Quantification Settlement
Agreement (Mar. 10, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 QSA], with Imperial Irrigation Dist. et
al., Draft Quantification Settlement Agreement (Dec. 12, 2000) discussed in Part
XVIII.
387. See supra notes 342-43.
388. See Letter to Cal. water agencies, supra note 345, at 2.
389. 2003 QSA, supra note 386, § 6.1.
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and IID's priority 3a cap, including ESA and CESA compliance, be
finalized, that all appeals there from be exhausted, and that the
governing board of each entity approve the measures. Additionally,
the pending litigation in ID v. U.S. must be settled or dismissed. This
may be particularly difficult given the beneficial use claims in the
litigation, the initiation of the Part 417 process by DOI which was
scheduled to be complete by October 2003, and in light of the
beneficial use provisions in the proposed Secretarial Implementation
Agreement, discussed below.
Fourth, part of the "related agreements" associated with the 2003
QSA include a proposed Secretarial Implementation Agreement
("SIA"), by which the Secretary would agree to implement the water
transfers contemplated by the QSA. "0 The SIA is similar to a draft
implementation agreement that was part of the 2000 QSA. However,
that portion of the SIA concerning reasonable and beneficial use is
substantially different. This paragraph, as amended, potentially limits
the authority of the Secretary under the Boulder Canyon Project Act
and section 5 water delivery contracts thereunder, and the Secretary's
ability to meet her obligations under the Decree in Arizona v.
California. In the SIA, the Secretary is asked to foreclose consideration
of the reasonableness of both past and current beneficial use within
IID. The Secretary is asked to acknowledge that the creation and use
of conserved water by IID is within the scope of the IID's Section 5
Contract.39" ' Thus, the Secretary is asked to deliver water to IID under
its contract that is not needed for irrigation use, and allow IID to use
that water for other purposes, including for environmental mitigation.
The Secretary is asked to take the implementation schedule in the
2003 QSA into account in connection with any future assessment of
reasonable and beneficial use of Colorado River water within IID.
Although called "conservation" in the 2003 QSA, land fallowing is
more accurately described as forbearance of use. As discussed above,
the QSA implementation schedule is based on land fallowing in the
early years of the program, with true water conservation measures not
being implemented until the later years of the fifteen-year program.
The Secretary is further requested not to assess IID's reasonable and
beneficial use until year 24. 39 Thus, IID would appear to avoid
scrutiny of its reasonable and beneficial use, which was first initiated by
the State Water Resources Control Board in the 1980s, for another
quarter of a century.
The adoption by the Bureau of Reclamation of an Inadvertent
Overrun and Payback Program acceptable to the California agencies is
390.

Secretarial Implementation Draft Agreement (2003).

391. The concept in the 2003 QSA of IID retaining dominion and control over
conserved water, changing the point of diversion of such water, and retaining the right
to subsequently use such water, is an unusual concept in western water law. Normally,

conserved water is available to the stream system and subject to use by other water
users. Such a concept is certainly true under the 1931 Seven Party Agreement absent
agreement among the California Parties and DOI.
392. 2003 QSA, supra note 387, § 7 (g).
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a condition precedent to the 2003 QSA. The SIA solidifies the
program by requiring that the Secretary shall not materially modify the
program for a period of thirty years. This provision is not only of
questionable legality, but also hamstrings the potential efficient
management of the Colorado River. If effective, it forecloses the
ability of the Basin States and the Bureau of Reclamation to modify the
program based on operating experience, drought, or other issues.
So, the California agencies continue to circle endlessly around the
same set of issues. In the meantime, the window of opportunity
presented by the relatively full reservoir conditions in the Colorado
River Basin, that in part prompted the Basin States to offer additional
surplus water,393 may have closed. As California continues to
negotiate, system reservoir levels continue down in the course of a new
drought cycle. Even if the Guidelines are restored, the availability of
surplus water may be less than originally anticipated when the
Guidelines were adopted in 2000. In the words of Assistant Secretary
Bennett Raley, quoting from The Great Gatsby, "[s]o we beat on, boats
against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.""'
XXI. EPILOGUE
After twelve years of negotiation, tens of thousands of hours of
meetings, millions of dollars-mostly public-in resources spent on
environmental studies, legal and engineering fees, facilitated
processes, lawsuits and lobbying, the success or failure of the California
Plan came down to the vote of five people, the board members of the
Imperial Irrigation District. Those five votes, representing about
100,000 people, determined, for the time being, the destiny of a
portion of the water supply for twenty million people in the Southern
California coastal plain, and the management of a river system serving
seven states. Those five votes, along with everything that led up to the
vote of the IID Board, illustrated so much about the dynamics of the
complex yet fragile nature of our democratic public process, of the
tension between urban and rural cultures in the western United States,
of the paralysis sometimes caused by our environmental laws, and of
the difficulty in dealing with the ultimate public resource - water.
It would be easy to lay the blame for the failure of the California
Plan at the doorstep of the Imperial Irrigation District. Certainly, the
IID Board asked for far more than any agency could ever deliver, not
only in money, but also in regulatory certainty and freedom from legal
and political liability. The certainty demanded by IID simply does not
exist in the water supply business. But the IID Board was not just
protecting a water supply; it was protecting a culture, an economy, and
a lifestyle. And for that, as members of their community and as
elected representatives, they could hardly be blamed. Certainly, every

393. Letter from the Governor's Representatives on Colorado River Operations,
supra note 203.
394. See Letter to Cal. water agencies, supra note 345, at 2.
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agency involved in the processes that began in 1991 made mistakes or
overplayed their hand at one time or another. The IID Board was just
the last.
Perhaps one could place the blame on "the system," and in
particular on the Law of the River. One could argue that it was an
arcane, complex, rigid, and shortsighted set of allocations and
operational regimes that ultimately could not be made to
accommodate the need for additional water in southern California
and southern Nevada. Yet the negotiators for the Basin States and the
DOI demonstrated the Law of the River can, in fact, be modified to
meet changing needs, while still protecting the fundamental public
interests of security of supply and economic stability the Law of the
River was developed to serve. The states and the DOI put in place the
framework necessary to meet California's needs, and are fully capable
of doing so in the future to meet new challenges. It was not the
inflexibility of the Law of the River, but the failure of negotiations
within California, that led to the demise of the California Plan.
Without the foundation of the Law of the River, that framework
negotiated by the states and the DOI could not have been put in place.
As was stated in Part I of this article,95 and as echoed by Secretary
Norton in her 2002 speech to the Colorado River Water Users
Association, if California were not required, either by agreement or
legal fiat, to honor its commitment to live within its apportionment,
then the allocation upon which the entire Law of the River is based
would have no meaning whatsoever.
Perhaps the process illustrates the ultimate reality, as the West
faces the challenge of balancing the needs of a booming population,
the need to maintain agricultural water supplies, the need to quantify
and honor commitments to Tribal interests, the need to address
increasing interest in in-stream recreational values, and the urgent
need to protect a water-dependent environment under siege. The
reality is in the era of limits, which will define the future of water
supply planning and negotiation, in which increased supply for one
segment must be balanced by the loss of supply for another. For better
or worse, the prior appropriation doctrine has established individual
property rights, contract rights, reserved rights, and public
expectations far in excess of the water supply available. And also for
better or worse, even though the Upper Basin has not developed its
full entitlement under the Law of the River, the water of the River is
over-allocated and over-appropriated.
This over-allocation is
exacerbated by the uncertainties associated with unresolved issues such
as reserved rights and whether the Upper Basin must bear the burden
of sharing the Mexican Treaty delivery obligation.
The dawning of the era of limits is precisely the reason that the
Upper Basin, and Colorado in particular, pushed the issue of
California's reliance on water in excess of its apportionment. The
395.
396.

See PartI, supra note 3, at 292.
See supra text accompanying note 349.
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Upper Basin's future, based as it is on hydrologic and legal leftovers,
could not tolerate the additional uncertainty of a California addiction
to surplus water.
From the perspective of the Upper Basin, the process achieved
precisely what Colorado intended when Governor Romer of Colorado
initiated the process with his letter to Governor Wilson in 1991.' 9'
Colorado did not care whether the limits to California's allocation
were realized by the mutual negotiation of the California Plan, or by
the operation of law through the enforcement of entitlements by the
DOI. Colorado sought to have California live within its means, so that
Colorado's interests could be protected. However, Colorado also
never intended that California, Nevada, or any other water user would
be forced to suffer shortages or hardship through the imposition of
limits to water use.
The negotiated solution of the California Plan and the Interim
Surplus Guidelines represented a remarkable achievement in good
faith public interest negotiation-a management regime developed by
public entities interested in sharing and managing a public resource
for the benefit of the greatest number of people. Such a solution is
obviously preferable to litigation, divisiveness, and competition
between states and agencies, and illustrates why water should continue
to be a public resource rather than a private commodity. It will be in
Colorado's and other Basin States' interest to continue those
negotiations, and seek ways to accommodate the interests of California
and Nevada in achieving a more secure water supply consistent with
the interests and allocations established under the Law of the River.
The economics, land use, recreation, environment, law,
technology, and political landscape of the Colorado River Basin will
continue to evolve and change. The fundamental error of the original
negotiators of the Colorado River Compact in overestimating water
supply will be magnified as global climate change alters the hydrology
of the Basin. The public trust held by the agencies responsible for
managing the river system demands that these dynamics be
recognized. Perhaps at some point in the future, and with an
appropriate change in the law, interbasin water marketing will be a
reality. Perhaps at some point in the future the allocations of the
states may have to be renegotiated. However, there is a significant
distance that must be covered before those fundamental cornerstones
are revisited. As demonstrated in these negotiations, there is plenty of
flexibility in the system to accommodate the needs of the Colorado
River over the next several decades, and those issues should be left to
another generation. Despite the inability of the California agencies to
reach agreement on implementation of the California Plan, there are
sufficient resources within California and within the Lower Basin to
take care of the relatively modest needs of MWD and southern Nevada.
The agricultural transfers and interstate water banking arrangements
397. Letter from Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado, to Members of the Colorado
General Assembly, supra note 58.
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already being negotiated or in place provide ample demonstration of
that fact.
In continuing their negotiations, and in light of the reality of the
era of limits, the states and the DOI should continue to be mindful of
the basic principles that underlie the allocation framework established
by the Law of the River, and the principles reflected in the six-state
positions taken in the negotiations of the interim surplus criteria. In
particular, no water user has been or can be guaranteed a firm supply
of water. Water use, efficiency, and transfers must be maximized at a
local level before proceeding to a regional, interstate or interbasin
level, and these levels must be addressed sequentially and on the basis
of good-faith negotiation. For the time being, the fundamentals of the
1922 Colorado River Compact398 and the interests articulated by Delph
Carpenter39 ' on behalf of Colorado, which have formed the basis for
the Colorado negotiating position, remain.

398. Colorado River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-61-101 to 104 (2000).
399. See generally PartI, supra note 3, at 293-306; Daniel Tyler, DelphusEmoy Carpenter
and the Colorado River Compact of 1922, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 228 (1998).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 2003 session of the Colorado Legislature, some predicted as
many as 100 water-related bills would be introduced.' While water has
always been a hot political issue in Colorado, this level of legislative
attention is likely unprecedented, and reflects the convergence of two
forces discussed in Part II: growth and drought. Together, these two
phenomena are playing havoc with urban Front Range water budgets.
Urban growth increases municipal water demands while drought-and
the prospect that the current drought forbears more fundamental,
long-term climate change--devastates supply. The impacts of this
convergence are varied, but include municipal water shortages, loss of
agricultural crops and rural economies, depletion of stream flows and
associated aquatic habitats, deteriorating water quality, renewed Front
Range/West Slope controversy, and increased tension with
neighboring states.
It is almost too obvious to observe that the Environmental
Protection Agency's veto of the proposed Two Forks dam signaled the
end of major new on-stream dam building in 1990 and, some will say,
an inevitable crisis. What is more important is what happened after
the veto. We believe it is impossible to understand the current
situation without seeing Two Forks as symbolic of a larger, systemic
problem: escalating transaction costs. Discussed in Part III, these are
the various costs that precede the construction and/or delivery of
water to new residents, and the most important factor in municipal
water decisions of the past decade. After Two Forks, Front Range
providers naturally turned to the most cost effective and most likely to
succeed alternatives, the conversion of existing agricultural water
rights to municipal use, particularly involving trans-basin and/or
already adjudicated water.
Drought, of course, further challenged a system already under
stress. Municipal providers responded with their only real option,
enforced conservation. And while the state may be coming out of the
drought - at least in the areas most under growth pressure - the
experience was serious enough that we must sincerely think about
doing things differently.
The legislature responded to the challenges of the drought with
enthusiasm, if not directly to the challenges of growth. New statutes
t Attorney at law, Trout Witwer & Freeman, P.C., Denver, Colo; Former Interim
Executive Director, Colorado Water Trust; Former Chair, Colo. Water Quality Control
Comm'n; B.A., The Colorado College; M.P.A., University of Colorado Graduate
School of Public Affairs; J.D., University of Colorado School of Law.
I Research Associate, Natural Resources Law Center, and participant in the
Western Water Assessment, University of Colorado School of Law; B.A., University of
Colorado; M.S., University of Michigan; Ph.D., University of Arizona.
1. Erin Johansen, Legislature to be Flooded With Water Issues in 2003, DENVER Bus. J.,

Dec. 13-19, 2002, at A18.
2. See generally PETER D. NICHOLS ETAL., WATER AND GROWTH INCOLORADO (2001)
(discussing the legal and policy challenges facing Colorado's water managers during a
period of unprecedented growth).
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address interruptible supply contracts, temporary loans, incentives to
repair restricted dams, and water banking, in a word: cooperation.
And while the Supreme Court continues to define the outer reaches of
the State Engineer's authority,3 the General Assembly nearly as quickly
grants new statutory powers, bolstered with additional procedural
safeguards.' These new laws do not represent fundamental changes,
but numerous improvements on the margins. And, while the new
statutes do not directly address growth, cooperating in times of
shortage will make it easier to meet the needs of growth without
permanently reducing the water base of the rest of the state. In fact,
cooperative agreements to give the cities the water they must have for
their residents in dry years could not only maintain, but also bolster
the state's important agricultural economy.
Cooperation is similarly at the core of a strategy that holds promise
to meet growth demands, discussed in Part IV. Specifically, trans-basin
cooperation can make additional supplies of new water available to
meet urban Front Range growth, at least where the basin of origin has
unmet needs.
Conservation and efficiency, including demand
management, reuse, and regional coordination are other promising
strategies. Finally, conjunctive use of ground and surface water
supplies can meet substantial growth needs, as well as provide drought
insurance.
H. SINKING FURTHER INTO A WATER CRISIS
In 1999-2001, the authors of this article researched and wrote a
detailed review of Colorado legal and policy issues associated with
growth built upon: (1) interviews with seventy key water leaders in the
state; (2) a major conference the authors organized on the subject at
the University of Colorado Natural Resources Law Center;5 and (3)
findinFs of several recently completed studies on Colorado water
issues. As evident from the title of the resultant publication, Water and
Growth in Colorado, the issue that most demands the attention of the

3.

Simpson v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 69 P.3d 50 (Colo. 2003); Empire Lodge

Homeowners Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139 (Colo. 2002).
4. See, e.g., H.B. 1414, 63rd Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2002); S.B. 73, 64th
Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003).
5. See generally NATURAL RES. LAW CTR., UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO SCHOOL OF LAW,
WATER AND GROWTH IN THE WEST, 21ST SUMMER CONFERENCE, June 7-9, 2000.
6. See generally HAL D. SIMPSON & CHUCK LIE, DENVER BASIN AND SOUTH PLATTE
RIVER BASIN TECHNICAL STUDY, S.B. 96-074 (1998) (prepared for the Special Water
Committee of the Colorado General Assembly); HYDROSPHERE RES. CONSULTANTS, INC.
ET AL., METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY INVESTIGATION: FINAL REPORT (1999) (prepared
for the Colo. Water Conservation Bd.); DENVER BD. OF WATER COMM'RS, WATER FOR
TOMORROW: THE HISTORY, RESULTS, AND PROJECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED RESOURCE
PLAN (1997); DENVER REG. COUNCIL OF Gov'Ts, METRO VISION 2020 (1997);
MONTGOMERY WATSON, COLORADO WATER DEVELOPMENT STUDY (1997) (prepared for
the Colo. Farm Bureau); GEI CONSULTANTS, INC., SECWCD/ARKANSAS BASIN FUTURE

WATER AND STORAGE NEEDS ASSESSMENT (1998) (prepared for the Southeastern Colo.

Water Conservancy Dist.).
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Colorado water community is growth.' At the time of our research, few
of our interview subjects mentioned the deepening drought, a
situation that by spring of 2002 had become impossible to ignore.
Together, growth and drought are the twin pillars of Colorado's
current water crisis. But while the drought will likely end soon, growth
likely will not.
A. GROWTH
Colorado is the nation's third fastest growing state, behind only
Nevada and Arizona, and is home to eight of the eighteen fastest
growing counties nationally.8 During the 1990s, Colorado welcomed
more than 400,000 immigrants from other states-the seventh highest
immigration rate in the country-as well as over 65,000 new residents
from other countries.' This trend is expected to continue over the
long term. State population projections suggest that the state will grow
from approximately 4,327,164 in 2000 to 6,009,713, in 2020, a thirtynine percent increase.10 Numerically, most of this growth will occur
along the urban Front Range, where a thirty-six percent projected
increase will boost the population from 3,512,768 in 2000 to 4,774,120
in 2020." One Front Range town, Superior, is already the nation's
fourth fastest growing city, by percentage, from 1990 to 1999.12
The rest of the West, with few exceptions, is also in a boom
period. 3 Since the early 1970s, the population of the western states
has grown by about thirty-two percent, compared to the national
growth rate of approximately nineteen percent.'4 The Interior West
Natural
states are experiencing the largest amount of growth.
increases, for example, birth rates as compared to death rates,
contribute to the boom. However, a main source of population
growth stems from out-of-state immigration; people who once moved
from the East Coast to the West Coast now settle in the states in the
In addition, people from the West Coast are
Interior West.'6
7. See generally NICHOLS ETAL., supra note 2.
8. David Olinger, West's Growth Still Tops, Census Finds, THE DENVER POST, Apr. 3,
2001, atAl; NICHOLS ET AL., supra note 2, at ix.
9. Sandra Fish, Colorado is Fifth-Fastest-GrowingState, DAILY CAMERA, Dec. 29, 1999,

at lA.
10. Colo. Dep't of Local Affairs, Colorado Population Projections System, State of
ColoradoPopulationProjections,at http://www.dola.colorado.gov/demog/Population/
wideprol.cfm.
11.
12.

Id. at Front Range PopulationProjections.
Chris Barge, Superior Growing Fastest, DAILY CAMERA, Oct. 20, 2000, at IA.
MARCJ. PERRY ET AL., UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION CHANGE AND

13.
DISTRIBUTION 1990-2000, at 2 (2001), http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/
c2kbrOl-2.pdf.
14. PAMELA CASE & GREGORY ALWARD, PATTERNS OF DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC

AND
VALUE CHANGE IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES: IMPLICATIONS FOR WATER USE AND

MANAGEMENT 10 (1997) (report to the Western Water Policy Review Advisory
Comm'n).
15. PERRYETAL., supra note 13, at 2.
16. CASE & ALWARD, supra note 14, at 10-13.
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rebounding back into the Interior West. Nowhere is this more
apparent than in Las Vegas, the fastest growing metro area in the
nation during the 1990s.' These trends did not escape the attention
of the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission, which called
the demographics of the past fifteen years "the most dramatic.., of
any region or period in the country's history," and warned that if
"present trends continue, by 2020 population in the West may increase
by more than 30 percent." 8
One implication of the current population boom is that the West is
no longer predominately rural.' 9 With few exceptions, new residents
are locating in urban settings, giving the West a higher ratio of urban
to rural residents than the East. ° These urban centers are increasingly
in competition with the agricultural sector for water and land
resources. The situation in Colorado is typical of the "New West."
Colorado is a major agricultural state with over five billion dollars
generated annually by agriculture." Much of this agricultural crop
production and associated revenue relies on irrigation, which is the
impetus behind well over ninety percent of the water diverted from
streams and aquifers in Colorado. However, agriculture takes a back
seat to the "service sector" as the economic engine of the state.2" As
municipal water demands increase, economic pressures encourage the
retirement of irrigated lands to free up water supplies,24 because the
price of water for municipal use is often many orders of magnitude
greater than for agriculture.25
PERRYET AL., supra note 13, at 6.
18. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER IN THE WEST: THE CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT
CENTURY,at xii (1998) (report to the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Comm'n).

17.

19. D. CRAIG BELL, WATER IN THE WEST TODAY: A STATES' PERSPECTIVE 3 (1997)
(report to the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Comm'n).
20. ATLAS OF THE NEW WEST: PORTRAIT OF A CHANGING REGION 55 (William E.
Riebsame et al. eds., 1997).
21. Colo. Agric.
Statistics
Serv.,
Farm Sector Indicators, 2000, at
http://www.nass.usda.gov/co/pub/prof-sc.pdf.
22.

WAYNE B. SOLLEY ET AL., ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1995,

at 11 (1998), at http://water.usgs.gov/watuse/pdf1995/html/.
23. The service sector is multi-faceted, including business services (e.g., software
development, advertising, and temporary employment agencies), professional services
(e.g., legal, health, and engineering services), recreation, lodging, food, services and
so on. COLO. OFFICE OF ECON. DEV. & INT'L TRADE, COLORADO DATA BOOK 1 (2002),
http://www.state.co.us/oed/busfin/Databook2OO2/ecbase.pdf.
24. An interesting look at how market incentives manipulate water and land use is
provided by Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth Management and Western
Water Law: From Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw.J. ENVrL.L. & POL'Y 163
(1999). The authors state that almost fifty percent of irrigation water is allocated to
grow crops that feed livestock, e.g., alfalfa hay which absorbs more water per acre than
any other crop. Id. at 169.
25. For example, irrigation water sells for as little as $500 per acre-foot of
consumptive use on the lower South Platte River, near the Nebraska border. Interview
with Robert E. Brogden, P.E., Bishop-Brogden Engineers, in Englewood, Colo. (Sept.
8, 1999). Municipal demand has driven the price to over $14,000 per acre-foot for
Colorado Big-Thompson Project water farther up in the basin. Water Market Indicators,
in WATER STRATEGIST: ANALYSIS OF WATER MARKETING, FINANCE, LEGISLATION AND

LITIGATION 13 (Rodney T. Smith & Roger Vaughan eds., Feb. 2001).
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Municipal appetite for agricultural water supplies is evident in the
projections of the Colorado Water Development Study.26 For example, the
report projects municipal water demands in Division 1-the South
Platte Basin home to the Denver Metro region and the northern urban
Front Range-to increase from approximately 689,000 acre-feet in
2000, to 853,000 acre-feet by 2020, to 1,453,000 acre-feet by 2100.27 It

is the urban Front Range, from Colorado Springs to Ft. Collins, that is
the thirsty and growing 900-pound gorilla of Colorado water.
Conventional wisdom to the contrary, there is no place in the
United States where the physical supply of water is a limitation on
growth. 8 The reality is that municipal and industrial growth decisions
are rarely based on water availability. 29 Douglas County, Colorado and
Las Vegas, Nevada are just two examples of staggering growth in
regions with questionable water supplies. 0
The more salient
relationship between water and municipal growth concerns the costs,
and distribution of costs, associated with developing water for new
residents. As a practical matter, other regions and water-reliant
sectors, to the detriment of the environment and agriculture, quench
increasing municipal water demands." For example, trans-mountain
water diversions serving Front Range cities often do so at the expense
of stream flows on the West Slope and foothills, and have left some
mountain communities struggling to find locally available water not
already claimed by distant cities. Other communities, such as those
in the Rocky Ford area in southeastern Colorado, have seen local
irrigation water-and the associated agricultural economy-exported
to distant municipalities."3 Other negative impacts, such as water
pollution, simply flow downstream to other communities and
neighboring states. The municipal sector, in most cases, will be the
26. MONTGOMERY WATSON, supra note 6, at 5-5 through 5-11.
27. Id. at tbl.5.
28. Interview with Hamlet J. "Chips" Barry, III, Manager, Denver Bd. of Water
Comm'rs, in Denver, Colo. (July 29, 1999).
29. "Economic research in the 1960s showed that, for better or worse, water has
rarely been a major factor in municipal and industrial land use decisions (e.g.,
compared with access to transportation, employment, or markets) and current land
use trends and policy continue this tradition." WILLAM RIEBSAME ET AL., WESTERN
LAND USE TRENDS AND POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR WATER RESOURCES 37 (1997) (report to
Western Water Policy Review Advisory Committee). The City of Pueblo had an
economic development project to attract new industries to the area using the city's
plentiful water supply as the carrot, but could find few interested parties. Interview
with Roger L. "Bud" O'Hara, Water Res. Div. Manager, City of Pueblo Bd. of Water
Works, in Pueblo, Colo. (June 30, 1999).

30. In the 1990s, Douglas County was the nation's fastest growing county, while Las
Vegas was the fastest growing large city. PERRYET AL., supra note 13, at 5, 6.
31. NIcHOLS ET AL., supra note 2, at ix.
32. Many of the best examples are from Summit County, where Colorado River
headwaters are subject to trans-mountain diversions, leaving limited water available
locally. Id. at 94; Interviews with Glenn E. Porzak, Esq., in Boulder, Colo. (Aug. 30,
1999 &June 22, 2001).
33. LAWRENCE J. MAcDONNELL,

FROM RECLAMATION

TO

SUSTAINABILrIY:

WATER,

53 (1999).
34. For example, the use of the Arkansas River as a drinking water source in the
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last in the state to directly feel the impacts of growth on water because
of its economic power in the water marketplace.3 5 Moreover, if
frustrated enough, municipalities can afford to solve their problems
via statewide initiative at the ballot box.36
B. DROUGHT

Precipitation varies significantly within the state from about seven
inches to over fifty-five inches annually, with a statewide average of
approximately seventeen inches per year.3 ' Generally, mountain
snowfall annually replenishes late-spring snowmelt storage reservoirs
used to serve cities and farms in the more arid and populous regions
of the state.38 While flooding is a threat in many regions, drought is
the greater climatic concern to water managers and legislators in
Colorado-especially at the current time.39
Although the current drought is several years old in most regions
of Colorado, the impact on urban Front Range water supplies did not
become apparent to the public until 2002. Most municipal water
systems had little problem with the relatively dry years in 2000 and
2001, as end of summer reservoir storage in the South Platte and
Upper Colorado basins, the major supply sources for the Urban Front
Range, remained strong, at eighty-eight and ninety-eight percent,
respectively, of the long-term average.40 Winter of 2001-2002, however,
was among the driest winters on record in Colorado; as of May 1, 2002,
snow pack in the South Platte and Upper Colorado measured only
twenty-three percent and twenty-eight percent, respectively, of the
long-term average."
Recognizing the looming disaster, in April,
Governor Owens sought a federal "emergency drought designation"
for the entire state,42 while municipalities enacted a variety of watering
Town of Lamar is compromised by the high concentration of dissolved solids

originating in agricultural return flows upstream. Interview with David W. Robbins,
Esq., in Steamboat Springs, Colo. (Aug. 28, 1999).
35. Interview with James R. Sullivan, Douglas County Comm'r, in Castle Rock,

Colo. (Nov. 4, 1999).
36.

Interview with Rod Kuharich, Exec. Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd., in

Denver, Colo. (Jan. 16, 2003).
37.

COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., PLANNING FOR DROUGHT, DRAft (May 2000),

availableat http://cwcb.state.co.us/owc/drought-planning/planningfordrought.pdf.
38. Id. at 3.
39. See Cathy Proctor, Battle Over Water Rights Gains Momentum, DENVER BUS. J., Jan.
3, 2003, at A3.
40. Detailed records of reservoir levels, snow pack, and related statistics are posted
online by the Colo. Office of Emergency Management, Reservoir Reportsfor Colorado,at
http://www.co/nrcs.usda.gov/snow/reservoir-reports.htm.
The statistics are
complied from the reservoir storage reports. Colo. Office of Emergency Mgmt., Basin
Wide Reservoir Summay, at ftp://ftp.wcc.nrcs.usda.gov/data/water/basinreports/
colorado/wy2001/bareco8.txt [hereinafter Colo. Emergency Mgmt.].
41. Figures compiled by the Natural Res. Conservation Serv., Basin Wide Snowpack
May 2002, at ftp://ftp.wcc.nrcs.usda.gov/data/snow/basin.reports/colorado/
wy2002/basnco5.txt (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
42. Letter from Bill Owens, Governor, State of Colorado, to Ann Veneman, Sec'y,
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (Apr. 22, 2002), http://cwcb.state.co.us/owc/
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restrictions designed to limit summer use. Despite these efforts, end
of summer reservoir storage in the South Platte and Upper Colorado
basins dropped to forty-eight and forty-four percent of the long-term
average.43 Thus, with the drought cushion largely gone, the winter of
2002-2003 had to be wet for Colorado to sustain normal levels of use.
Until the current drought, the state had been highly fortunate in
recent decades, enjoying an unusual span of wet years without any
sustained multiple year droughts. In fact, Colorado's last sustained
drought occurred from 1951 to 1957, although shorter and regionally
isolated drought events occurred in 1976-77, 1980-81, 1989-90, 1994,
and 1996. 4 Previously, the South Platte and Upper Colorado River
watersheds serving the Front Range had been particularly free from
drought. 45 Consequently, most of Colorado's urban Front Range
residents had little or no experience with drought, and most
municipalities were caught without drought plans or with plans
shortages rather than more extreme or
focused only on seasonal
4
longer-term events. 6
The net result of an extreme drought following many years of
sustained wet conditions and rapid growth has been to dramatically
elevate water supply concerns on the public policy agenda.47 As often
seen, the dramatic but likely short-term phenomenon of drought
appears to have generated more political momentum than the more
gradual but longer-term phenomenon of growth. However, it is the
combined impact of both phenomena that is most attention grabbing,
as illustrated by several notable events. First, the Colorado legislature
seriously considered a bill proposing $10 billion in water development
bonds for new, unspecified projects." Another example is the reThe most
emergence of long-tabled water project proposals.
that
"Big
Straw"
project
ambitious of these efforts is the so-called
River
of
Colorado
least
400,000
acre-feet
would annually pump at
water from the Colorado-Utah border for urban Front Range use.49
Drought-Planning/Disaster-Designation-Request.pdf.
43. Colo. Emergency Mgmt., supra note 40, at ftp://ftp.wcc.nrcs.usda.gov/data/
water/basinreports/colorado/wy2002/bareco8.txt.
44. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., COLORADO WATER CENSUS AND ASSESSMENT:
SCOPE OF WORK 2 (2001).
45. THOMAS B. MCKEE ET AL., HISTORICAL DRY AND WET PERIODS IN COLORADO,
CLIMATOLOGY REPORT No. 99-1A, at 19-20 (1999).
46. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., supra note 37, at 6.
47. SeeJerd Smith, Owens Urges Calm in State Water Debate, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,

Dec. 20, 2002, http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/state/article/
0,1299,DRMN_21_1622196,00.html.
48. House Bill 1022, sponsored by Rep. Dianne Hoppe, initially called for $5
billion, but was later doubled at the urging of several legislators in the House of
Representatives, which gave preliminary approval to the measure in July 2002. SeeJerd
2002,
Smith,
Water Wave Builds, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 10,
http://rockymountainnews.com/drmn/legislature/article/O,1299,DRMN_37_125679
4,00.html.
49. Deborah Frazier, Mega Water Plan, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 25, 2002,
http://rockymountainnews.com/drmn/state/article/O,1299,DRMN_21_1285878,00.h
tml.
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Other proposals call for revisiting the proposed Two Forks dam
project on the South Platte River, a project vetoed by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency in 1990.50 As Marc Waage of Denver
Board of Water Commissioners ("Denver Water") recently remarked,
"I've heard more about Two Forks this summer than in the past ten
Still another idea making a comeback is vegetation
years."5
management-for example, increasing timber harvests with an eye
The Colorado Department of
toward increasing water runoff."
vegetation management
addressing
bill
a
Natural Resources supported
law in 2003. 53
into
it
enacted
legislature
the
and
land
on state
While the present drought provides an important wake-up call for
cities and residents unaccustomed to the harsh realities of climatic
variability, it is nonetheless a temporary event. In fact, there is
considerable research suggesting that the past couple of wet decades
may be a more likely precursor of future wetter climatic regimes than
suggested by both the previous longer-term record and, certainly, the
current drought. " The long-term water management challenge is best
described as accounting for the uncertainty of climate variability
and/or climate change in management regimes that address the more
predictable, and ongoing, demographic transformations in the statenamely, population growth, urbanization, land-use conversions, and
related sector shifts in how water is used and valued.5 While there is
no way to "solve" the current drought, the public climate offers a huge
opportunity to do something to prepare for the next one."

50. Daniel F. Luecke, Two Forks: The Rise and Fall of a Dam, 14 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 24, 24-28 (1999).

51. Marc Waage, Denver Bd. of Water Comm'rs, Remarks at the Thirteenth Annual
South Platte Forum (Oct. 23, 2002).
52. Theo Stein, A Clear-CutDrought Solution? Logging Urged to Boost Run-off but EcoGroups Object, THE DENVER POST, Nov. 10, 2002. See also CHARLES A. TROENDLE &JAMES
M. NANKEIRS, ESTIMATING ADDITIONAL WATER YIELD FROM CHANGES IN MANAGEMENT OF
NATIONAL FORESTS IN THE NORTH PLATrE BASIN (FINAL REPORT) (2000) (prepared for

the Platte River EIS Office).
53. See H.B. 1092, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003).
54. PETER H. GLEICK, WATER: THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE VARIABILITY
AND CHANGE FOR THE WATER RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES 4, 31-32 (2000) (the

Water Sector Assessment Team of the National Assessment of the Potential
Consequences of Climactic Variability and Change prepared this report for the U.S.
Global Change Research Program).
55. The significance of climatic variability and change in the South Platte and
Upper Colorado basins is the subject of the ongoing Western Water Assessment, a
joint research project of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
("NOAA") and the Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences
("CIRES"), University of Colorado. Discussion on the Western Water Assessment is
available at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/wwa/.
56. Interview with Greg Walcher, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., in Denver,
Colo. (Jan. 13, 2003).
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III. SWEPT ALONG BY TRANSACTION COSTS
Municipalities generally use one of two major strategies to meet
Historically, cities simply
the water demands of new growth.
developed new water as needed to meet growing needs.57 More
recently, municipalities have acquired existing, usually agricultural,
water rights and changed them to urban use.' Transaction costs are
significant in either approach.
There is substantial time and uncertainty associated with changing
a water right in water court, adjudicating a trans-basin diversion, or
permitting a new water project to develop existing water rights. To
understand the municipal Front Range providers' water supply
decisions of the past decade, it is useful to conceptualize the various
pre-delivery/pre-construction costs as different facets of transaction
costs. Transaction costs play a key role in shaping the behavior of
Colorado's water providers.
In fact, transaction costs are the most
important factor in municipal water decisions of the past decade.
A.

WATER COURT

Many of the most significant transaction costs are associated with
water court. In Colorado, the determination of water rights is a
'judicial function under the adjudication statutes."w Not only must an
appropriator go to water court to adjudicate her water right or change
it, she must also go to water court to protect it, and in the case of a
conditional right, to maintain it.61 It makes no difference if the right is
for 1 or 100 cubic feet per second or 100,000 acre-feet; the process is
identical.6 ' Water court is not simple, fast, painless, or cheap. A
routine unopposed change of water right and augmentation plan for a
domestic well can take over a year, with engineering and legal costs
exceeding the value of the water involved by more than an order of
magnitude. 3 Complex cases can stretch over years, and attract dozens
of opponents. For example, litigation over Union Park extended from
are
1984 through 2000, and included over twenty parties.6 Appeals
5
common, and go directly to the Colorado Supreme Court.
57.

MAcDONNELL,

supra note 33, at 258-59.

58. Id. at 259.
59. See Charles W. Howe et al., TransactionCosts as Determinantsof Water Transfers,61
U. COLO. L. REv. 393, 394-405 (1990).
60. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 58 (Colo.
1999).
61. Michael F. Browning, A Summary of Colorado Water Law, 21 COLO. LAw. 63, 64
(1992).
62. See generally id.
63. For example, legal costs for a simple domestic well augmentation plan can
easily exceed $1,000 for less than 0.1 acre feet of senior decreed consumptive use
water worth no more than $100.
64. Bd. of County Comm'rs of County of Arapahoe v. Crystal Creek Homeowners
Ass'n, 14 P.3d 325, 329 (Colo. 2000).
65. Bagwell v. V-Heart Ranch, Inc., 690 P.2d 1271, 1272 (Colo. 1984).
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The lack of clearly defined information, a necessary prerequisite
for an efficient market, contributes to high transaction costs.' For
example, water right decrees typically specify a diversion rate, whereas

the measure of a water right is its consumptive use.67 Although
engineers can estimate the yield of a water right, adjudication is
necessary to determine consumptive use. Thus, purchasers of existing
rights for new municipal uses may not know in advance the actual yield
of the rights they are purchasing for transfer. The junior protection
rule 68 guarantees in many, perhaps most, situations that not all of a
water right can be transferred, and it is not apparent at the time of
filing a change case which junior appropriators will be injured and
what will be necessary to keep them whole, even with extensive
engineering. The unknown level of risk and time required to traverse
water court appears in the purchase price; water that has gone through
a previous change case usually carries a higher value than water that
has never had its consumptive use adjudicated. 9
Colorado water
Efficient markets minimize transaction costs.
yield-are well
rights-the
markets are most active where the property
defined and where conveyance facilities exist to easily move water to
higher value uses. The premier Colorado example-on both pointsI
is the Colorado-Big Thompson Project ("C-BT").
1. The Influence of Water Court on Municipal Water Decisions
There is substantial evidence that water court transaction costs
significantly influence the decisions of municipal water managers. A
significant long-term trend is the purchase and conversion of so-called
7
For
"foreign" water from agricultural uses to municipal uses. '
example, municipalities such as Colorado Springs, Pueblo, Pueblo

66.

See

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,

COMMITTEE

ON WESTERN WATER MANAGEMENT,

43 (1992).
Colorado-Big Thompson (C-BT) shares are the exception that proves the rule;
information (yield and price) for C-BT shares is both good and widely available, and
the market in C-BT shares is the most developed in the nation.
67. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 52-54
(Colo. 1999).
68. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(3) (2002).
69. E-mail from Carol Ellinghouse, P.E., Coordinator of Water Res., City of
Boulder, Colo., to authors (May 12, 2003) (on file with author).
70. Note that prices are likely to go up due to reduced transaction costs. To the
extent that transactions costs paid by the buyer are lowered (e.g., the cost of finding
willing sellers), the buyer can now offer a slightly higher purchase price for the water
since this added expense is offset (or perhaps more than offset) by the reduced
transactions costs. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 66, at 34-42.
71. Water Market Indicators, in WATER STRATEGIST: ANALYSIS OF WATER MARKETING,
FINANCE, LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION 8 (Rodney T. Smith ed., Nov. 2002).
72. Under Colorado law, foreign water is the term applied to water imported from
other watersheds. This water is highly valued because it can be completely consumed
or used to "extinction", unlike native water whose return flows must be available for
use by downstream appropriation. Few restrictions are placed on the timing and use
of foreign water. See, e.g., City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 70
(Colo. 1996).
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West, and Aurora now own almost all of the water from the Twin Lakes
project located south of Leadville, a trans-basin project originally
designed to serve irrigation interests." Shares sell for $10,000 to
$15,000, a price dramatically higher than the cost of native Arkansas
River water. 4 Yet, buying shares of trans-basin water for municipal use
makes better economic sense than buying native water since it is
generally possible to unilaterally
change the use without the
75
uncertainty or risk of water court.
C-BT shares exhibit a similar trend. Municipal water providers
concerned about water court costs to convert native water dramatically
bid up the price of C-BT units. 71 Weighted C-BT prices rose steadily

from around $3,600 per acre-foot in June 1996 to nearly $26,000 per
acre-foot in April 2000. 7 In contrast, competing native irrigation water
sells for $500 to $1,000 per acre-foot, depending on location.7 The
percent of C-BT water in municipal and industrial hands has increased
from fifteen percent in 1956, to fifty-nine percent in 2002. 79 C-BT
water is preferred since it is readily available, and the right to use the
water for municipal purposes has already been adjudicated. In
addition, C-BT water is backed by storage, substantially insuring dryyear yield.
The minimal transaction costs of acquiring existing trans-basin
diversions for municipal use are a sharp contrast to the extreme costs
associated with newly proposed trans-basin diversions. For example,
the American Water Development, Inc. ("AWDI") proposal to export
water from the San Luis Valley to the Denver Metro area consumed
nine years and several million dollars in attorneys' fees and
engineering fees associated with expert testimony presented in court.0
The Colorado Supreme Court ended AWDI's plans
when it upheld the
water rights application.
District Court's dismissal of AWDI's
Maintaining and eventually exercising conditional trans-basin
water rights also incurs extremely high transaction costs. These costs
have made it enormously expensive to implement large-scale projects
73. MACDONNELL, supranote 33, at 52-53.
74. Interview with Roger L. "Bud" O'Hara, supra note 29.
75. Nonetheless, many attorneys still recommend going through the change of use
procedure for transfers of foreign water. Id.; Telephone interview with Roger L. "Bud"
O'Hara, Water Res. Div. Manager, Bd. of Water Works (Aug. 2, 2001).
76. Interview with Eric Wilkinson, Gen. Manager, N. Colo. Water Conservancy
Dist., in Loveland, Colo. (July 20, 1999).

77.

Water Market Indicators, in WATER STRATEGIST: ANALYSIS OF WATER MARKETING,
LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION 6 (Rodney T. Smith & Roger Vaughan eds.,June
2000). Calculated based on 0.5 acre-feet per unit firm yield; Interview with Eric
Wilkinson, supra note 76. Prices reached $28,000 in September 2002, with continuing
drought conditions expected to push prices higher. WATER STRATEGIST, supra note 68,
at 9-10. The 2002 drought reduced the 2003 allotment to 0.3 acre-feet per unit,
implying a new, lower firm yield, that would indicate per acre-foot prices fifty percent
higher than discussed. Id. at 9.
78. Interview with Eric Wilkinson, supra note 76.
79. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., C-BT Ownership (2003) (on file with author).
80. Am. Water Dev., Inc. v. City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352, 357, 359 (Colo. 1994).
81. Id. at 368.
FINANCE,
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in phases, as each step in the process provides a new opportunity for
opponents to impose delays and new conditions, as the Homestake
project demonstrates.2 For conditional rights, a trip to water court is
required every six years to prove due diligence.
Each change to a
proposed project may require new court proceedings, as the impact on
juniors must be reconsidered. Theoretically, some of these repetitive
costs could be avoidable through trans-basin decrees that outline
general terms and conditions. However, vague language in these
decrees or unforeseen circumstances virtually guarantees further
litigation. The Blue River decree, for example, requires Denver Water
to "exercise due diligence" to reuse water imported from the Colorado
River to meet Denver's municipal needs, "within legal limitations and
subject to economic feasibility." 5 This requirement obviously means
different things to Denver Water and to the West Slope.86
Agricultural-to-urban water transfers often involve changes in the
type of use, the place of use, the point of diversion, and the season of
use, as well as the care of formerly irrigated land, all of which are issues
that require a trip to water court.
An agricultural-to-municipal
transfer can potentially affect every downstream user on the stream.
The larger and/or the more senior the water right and the more
significant the change, the more likelihood there is of injury, with a
corresponding incentive for other appropriators to oppose the
change.
Ironically, because of resulting high transaction costs,
developers of formerly irrigated agricultural lands often import
foreign water for municipal use rather than changing the use of
irrigation water associated with the land's agricultural use. 8 Most
developers are unwilling or unable to defer their development and
incur the carrying costs necessary to complete a water court change
case to supplement municipal needs; it is cheaper for them to acquire
an existing supply already adjudicated for domestic use, such as Twin
Lakes water." However, when open space in the subdivision needs

82.

SeeJAMES N. CORBRIDGE,JR.

& TEREsAA. RIcE,

VRANESH'S COLORADO WATER LAW

525-526 (Rev. ed. 1999).
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-301(4) (a) (I) (2002).
84. In many cases, parties have been enticed to give up a percentage of their rights
in order to settle a dispute with their opponents, largely out of fear of the costs of
litigation. Interview with Richard Stenzel, [then] Div. Eng'r, Water Div. No. 1, in
Greeley, Colo. (Oct. 15, 1999); Interview with Eric Wilkinson, supra note 76; Interview
with James R. 'Jay" Montgomery, Esq., Moses, Wittenyer, Harrison & Woodruff, P.C.,
in Boulder, Colo. (Oct. 25, 1999).
85. City & County of Denver v. Consolidated Ditch Co., 807 P.2d 23, 34 (Colo.
1991).
86. This issue has yet to be litigated, although it seems inevitable that it will be.
David C. Hallford, [former] Gen. Counsel, Colo. River Water Conservancy Dist.,
Address at the Colorado Water Congress Summer Convcntion (Aug. 27, 1999).
87. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-103(5),-302(1)(a).
88. Interview with Eric Wilkinson, supra note 76.
83.

89.

NICHOLSETAL., supra note 2, at 145.
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irrigation water, the associated water rights can supply it without court
approval since there is no change in place or type of use.9"
B. THE POLITICS OF TRANS-BASIN DIVERSIONS

The intrastate politics of trans-basin diversions create another
source of costly delays in obtaining water. Urban growth along
Colorado's Front Range historically prompted large water diversions
from the West Slope. Many factors suggest that the Front Range will
continue to look across the mountains for additional water through
trans-basin diversions. These factors include existing under-utilized
trans-basin water rights and facilities, 91 the current availability of
unused water on the West Slope, 92 political opposition to conversion of
eastern plains agricultural-to-urban water,9" Denver basin groundwater
mining, and potentially, water quality95 and endangered species96
problems along the Front Range. An additional benefit of imported
water to the Front Range is its legal status. Foreign water can generally
be used to extinction, and changes in use are often possible without
costly court proceedings.
Trans-basin diversions have often been a battlefield between the
populous Front Range and the rest of Colorado, largely due to real
and potential negative impacts borne by the basins of origin.9 The
most obvious basin of origin impacts of trans-basin diversions are
associated with reduced stream flows.99 Since any return flows occur in
the basin of use rather than the basin of origin, exported water is a
complete loss to the basin of origin.'9 9 Depending on the use of water
rights involved, depletions may be either year-round or seasonal.'9 '
The result is a variety of impacts: economic, environmental, and
cultural.' 2
Sorme policies seek to mitigate these negative impacts to the basin
of origin.'"
Historically, "compensatory storage" has been the
centerpiece of mitigation strategies. 10 4 This term describes a practice
in which East Slope interests, in "compensation" for trans-basin
diversions, develop water projects designed to store spring runoff for

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 114.
Interview with Robert E. Brogden, supranote 25.
NiCHOLSrET AL., supra note 2, at 80.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 56.
NICHOLS ET AL., supra note 2, at 39.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id.
Id.
NICHOLS ETAL., supra note 2, at 40.
Id.
Id.
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105

This principle was
use on the West Slope, typically for irrigation.
incorporated into C-BT in 1937,'06 and became a statutory requirement
in 1943 for all new projects undertaken by conservancy districts.107 The
requirement does not extend to other trans-basin diverters, notably
Denver Water, or to intra-basin transfers,"' 8 such as within the
Arkansas basin. "This is a significant limitation."'09
Other protections for the basin of origin are present in water law
regimes and operational policies that minimize depletions during the
irrigation season."" "Trans-basin rights are typically junior during the
irrigation season but are relatively senior at other times.""' Forjunior
water rights, depletions may only occur in average or wet years when it
is possible to divert water in priority and/or store it during spring runoff for later trans-basin delivery." Although the West Slope often
blames trans-basin diversions for low flows, trans-basin appropriators
usually are not diverting when stream flows are the lowest. ' Rather, it
is West Slope ski areas and resort communities that are diverting water
during winter low flows. " '
Trans-basin diversions remain highly controversial and unpopular
outside the urban Front Range." 5 Part of the reason that modern
targets of trans-basin diversions view proposals with such hostility is the
105. Id.
106. The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District ("Northern") is one of the
major trans-basin diverters in the state through the C-BT project. Northern's policy
towards compensation of basins-of-origin has not changed in the forty years since the
When the C-BT project was built, the Front Range
project was completed.
compensated the West Slope with compensatory storage at Green Mountain, and paid
for additional compensatory storage when Windy Gap was built. Northern does not
perceive that it has any further compensatory responsibility. Interview with Lee
Rozaklis, P.E., Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, Inc., in Boulder, Colo. (July 20, 1999).
107. NicHoLs ET AL., supra note 2, at 40; Act of Feb. 25, 1943, ch. 191, 1943 Colo.
Laws 633 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-45-118(1) (b) (II) (2002)).
108. NICHOLSETAL., supra note 2, at 40.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Interview with Rod Kuharich, [former] Government Affairs Manager, Colo.
Springs Utilities, in Colo. Springs, Colo. (June 30, 1999). Exceptions are C-BT, and
Denver Water's Moffat and Dillon systems, which divert year round. Although these
diversions rely on releases from replacement storage, they can contribute to locally
significant low flows.
114. NICHOLSETAL., supra note 2, at 40.
The growth of the West Slope recreation economy complicates the
relationship with the East Slope on water matters. For example, proponents
of West Slope recreational-based economies need to protect local supplies for
resorts and environmental amenities, but also recognize that East Slope
economic growth is key to a healthy customer base. Additionally, many transbasin diversion facilities located on the West Slope, such as Dillon Reservoir,
are themselves highly valuable recreational destinations.
Id. at n.174.
115. Id. at 40-41. "Residents of the San Luis Valley and the Gunnison River Basin, for
example, attacked... proposed trans-diversions as threatening local lifestyles,
economies, and environmental quality." Id. at 41 n.175.
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legacy of bitterness and distrust arising from past trans-basin diversions
that remind many Western Coloradoans of California's Owens
Valley. 116 Given the growing imbalance in political and economic
power, West Slope interests increasingly see themselves as being at a
strategic disadvantage in these intrastate water wars. " ' Rather than
participating in conceiving and designing trans-basin diversions,
parties in the basin-of-origin have typically fought projects in water
court, the primary forum in Colorado for the determination of water
rights, including the determination of the amount and priority of
absolute and conditional rights, approval of changes in water rights,
and plans for augmentation.'
Recent examples include Homestake
II, AWDI, and Union Park."9 Periodic legislative attempts to require
consent to trans-basin diversions have faced insurmountable political
odds in the state legislature.'
However, there is increasing
recognition that mitigation of basin of origin impacts is an essential
prerequisite for additional water development to meet the state's
growth.'
1. Leveling the Water Table
In recent decades, opponents of trans-basin diversions have
become remarkably adept at delaying new projects, sometimes
effectively killing them. Since Windy Gap came on line in 1985, no
other significant trans-basin diversions have come to fruition, despite
the efforts of water appropriators holding senior water rights. 22 The
primary venue to thwart additional diversions is water court.
Arapahoe County has been the principal proponent of the Union
Park Project to divert water from the Gunnison basin for municipal
use on the East Slope.'
This project proposed to capture surplus
water high in the Gunnison basin for ultimate diversion under the
Continental Divide to the South Platte basin. 2 1 Stalled by Gunnison

116.
117.

MARc REiSNER, CADILLAC DESERT 59-96 (1993).

This may be one impetus behind the formation of "Colorado 58," a coalition of

58 Colorado counties outside the Denver metro area proposing "win-win" solutions to
preserve the vitality of rural Colorado while meeting urban water needs. No Drought of
Ideas, THE DENVER POST, Dec. 1, 2002, at E6.
118. FWS Land & Cattle Co. v. State Div. of Wildlife, 795 P.2d 837, 841 (Colo. 1990);
NICHOLS ET AL., supra note 2, at 41.
119. NICHOLSETAL., supra note 2, at 41-42.

120. Id. at 41. "In 2001, for example, Senator Gigi Dennis offered an amendment to
S.B. 148 that would have required county approval to move water from agriculture to
urban uses outside of the county. The proposed amendment lost 27 to 8." Id. at n.177.

121. Interview with Greg Walcher, supra note 56. The legislature authorized water
courts to impose transitional property tax mitigation and bonded indebtedness
payments on the removal of water that results in the transfer of more than 1000 acrefeet of annual consumptive use more than twenty miles. S.B. 155, 64th Gen. Assem.,

1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003).
122. NICHOLSETAL., supra note 2, at 41.
123. Id.
124. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Arapahoe County v. Crystal Creek Homeowner's
Ass'n, 14 P.3d 325, 329-30 (Colo. 2000).
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basin interests since 1986, the Colorado Supreme Court recently
rejected the water right for the second time.12
Because of this
litigation, Union Park is infinitely farther from reality than it was
sixteen years ago, although the general concept still has powerful
proponents.
Over time, several organizations have pursued large-scale
development of groundwater in the San Luis Valley for export.
American Water Development, Inc. led the most infamous of these
efforts, which proposed to tap and export 200,000 acre-feet of
groundwater underlying land held by AWDI. 126 A storm of political
opposition and litigation derailed this proposal and lead to a court
judgment rejecting AWDI's claim that the water involved was actually
non-tributary, and thus, not governed by normal rules of
appropriation and transfer.27

Recently, former AWDI opponent and San Luis entrepreneur Gary
Boyce, backed by California investors, pursued an only slightly less8
ambitious plan to export 100,000 acre-feet to Front Range cities.1
The conversion of the Great Sand Dunes National Monument into a
National Park may end these proposals. 29 The Nature Conservancy's
purchase of the Baca Ranch - the source of recent trans-basin
diversion proposals - seemingly settles the controversy. Part of the
ranch will join the new park, and the remainder will join the Rio
Grande National Forest and Baca National Wildlife Refuge.1 ° This
expansion will protect the park's watershed, and effectively limit
withdrawal of the valley's groundwater for trans-basin diversions. 131
While it may be an overstatement to conclude that there are no
foreseeable new trans-basin diversions of any significance that can
overcome basin of origin opposition, both the Union Park and San
Luis Valley export projects illustrate the truism that water projects
seldom die. Reincarnations
and reincarnators abound; there are few
32
wooden stakes.

125. See generally id.
126. Am. Water Dev., Inc. v. City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352, 358 (Colo. 1994).
127. See generally id.
128. Gary Gerhardt, Written in Sand Adjacent to Big Dunes and Astride Aquifer, Baca
Ranch Faces Conflict, Uncertainty,ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 15, 2000, at 16A.
129. Great Sand Dunes National Park & Preserve Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-530,
114 Stat. 2527 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 410hhh through 410hhh-9 (2000)).
130. 16 U.S.C. § 410hhh-6(c).
131. Id. § 410hhh-7(e).

132. Threats of legislation to prohibit trans-basin diversions extend back decades,
perhaps longer. The latest incarnation, a proposal by Rep. Carl Miller (D-Leadville),
would have prohibited water courts from decreeing a new trans-mountain water right
to an applicant who has the right to develop any Denver basin aquifers, essentially the

entire urban Front Range, unless the applicant demonstrates that it is putting to
beneficial use its maximum entitlement to that groundwater. H.B. 03-1090, 64th Gen.

Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003). Another 2003 proposal, by Rep. Lola Spradley (R
- Southern Colo.) would have given water courts authority to impose terms and
conditions on trans-basin diversions to protect downstream water rights from

significant changes in the quality of water available to meet the needs for which such
water right has normally been used. H.B. 1146, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo.
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2. Union Park Redux?
Officials from El Paso County, Colorado Springs, Douglas County,
Arapahoe County, Aurora, Adams County, Northglenn, Elbert County,
and Lafayette recently joined to form the Colorado Water Partnership
("Partnership").'" Members represent growing urban areas along the
Front Range that generally need additional water supplies to meet the
demands of increasing population. In the 2000 Legislative Session, the
Partnership sponsored an unsuccessful bill to require the Colorado
Water Conservation Board ("CWCB") to solicit proposals and
recommend development of a new water supply project to deliver a
minimum of 120,000 acre-feet annually from the West Slope to the
East Slope.'34 Since many proponents of Union Park supported the
legislation, some concluded that the bill was a veiled attempt to
promote that project.' s A Partnership-promoted letter to Secretary of
Interior Norton reinforced this perception by asking the Bureau of
Reclamation "to look at opportunities to use... for the benefit of the
entire state" the 240,000 acre-feet in the marketable pool of the
Aspinall Unit noted in the Colorado
36 Supreme Court's opinion which
proposal.
Park
Union
the
rejected
First introduced in the 2002 Special Session, the group again
sponsored legislation to authorize $10 billion in debt for new water
storage projects and to tap unused water from the Colorado River
basin in 2003."' The important point is that these efforts reflect an
unwillingness to accept the status quo, and an attempt to forge a new
path to realize trans-basin diversion projects. As such, this legislation
exemplifies the increasing frustration of some local elected officials
with Colorado's system of water courts and permitting, and a
willingness to override settled processes in an effort to secure
additional water
supplies to meet the demands of water users on the
38
Front Range.
C. ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITTING

One of the greatest sources of delay, frustration, and expense for
water providers is environmental law. These requirements are typically
2003).
133. Colo. Water Partnership, http://www.bestchamber.com/cwpsite.
134. S.B. 215, 62nd Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2000).
135. Telephone interview with Richard D. MacRavey, Exec. Dir., Colo. Water
Congress (June 28, 2000).
136. Letter from Reps. Joel Hefley, Bob Schaffer, & Thomas G. Tancredo, to Hon.
Gale Norton, Sec'y of the Interior (July 18, 2001). See also letter from John A.
Brackney, Arapahoe County Water & Wastewater Auth., to Brent Uilenberg, Bureau of
Reclamation (July 19, 2001).
137. Greg Avery, Coalition Again Asks for Water Projects: Communities Seek Authorization
of $10 Billion in Debt for Reservoirs, DAILY CAMERA, Dec. 20, 2002, at lB. The legislature
referred a measure to the electorate to authorize $2 billion in revenue bonds for water
infrastructure improvements. S.B. 236, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003).
138. Interview with Sara Duncan, Esq., Manager of Intergovernmental Affairs,
Denver Bd. of Water Comm'rs, in Denver, Colo. (June 16, 2000).
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federal in origin. The federal government owns approximately onethird of the land in Colorado.139 Similar to other federal landholdings
in the West, many of these acres are in the high mountains that collect40
Colorado's winter snows, the state's major source of precipitation.1
All of Colorado's great rivers arise on federal land, and flow through
federal land as they journey out of state. Thus, it is not surprising that
federal laws influence many facets of Colorado water law and policy.
These include the Wilderness Act of 1964, "' the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969,4 the Clean Water Act of 1972 and
of particular importance, the Endangered Species Act of 1973.14
1. Two Forks
In the 1940s, Denver Water started planning to meet the water
demands of the anticipated population growth that will occur in the
twenty-first century. The initial plan entailed building a dam and
reservoir that would supply adequate water to the Denver-metropolitan
area through the year 2020.14 Two Forks Reservoir was to be a major
water storage project located below the confluence of the South Platte
River and its North Fork. The project "was designed to deliver 98,000
acre-feet of water per year on a firm yield (sometimes called drought
yield) basis to the Denver metropolitan area to meet future residential,
commercial, and industrial demands.' 46 While Two Forks promised to
provide sufficient water for anticipated population increases, the price
of the project was considerable, and the potential environmental costs
were, ultimately, prohibitive.
The public greatly opposed the project. However, the inability to
secure a federal environmental permit finally killed the project.4 7 The
1986 draft Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") prepared by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") foreshadowed the scope of
negative environmental impacts, as did the final EIS released in March
of 1988.48 Despite these circumstances, the Corps decided to issue the
necessary Section 404 permit required under the Clean Water Act 4 9
139. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, FEDERAL LANDS: INFORMATION ON LAND OWNED
AND ON ACREAGE WITH CONSERVATION RESTRICTIONS, PUB. No. RCED-95-73FS 26 (1995),

at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/multidb.cgi.
140. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, National Water & Climate Center, Foreword, Water

Supply

Outlook

Reports,

at

http://www.wcc.nrcs.usda.gov/water/quantity/foreword.html.
141. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2000).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
143. 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
144. 16 U.S.C. § 1531.
145. The Denver Water Board held water rights in the dam and reservoir area since
1902 and in 1931 obtained a dam construction right-of-way. Luecke, supra note 50, at
24.
146. Id. at 25.
147. LEO EISEL &J. DAVID AIKEN, PLAITE RIVER BASIN STUDY 43 (1997) (report to the
Western Water Policy Review Advisory Comm'n).
148. Luecke, supranote 50, at 27.
149. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 6

for dredge-and-fill activities in rivers. The Corps justified the permit
issuance with the potential to mitigate the negative impacts."" The
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), which had long been
critical of the proposed project, did not share the Corps' confidence.
The EPA has the statutory authority to veto 404 permits; 5 ' a power the
agency exercised over Two Forks on November 23, 1990. The EPA
veto of Two Forks not only halted an undertaking backed by an
impressive political coalition of municipal water providers and $40
million in preliminary studies, but signaled a new era in serving Front
Range growth.
2. The Endangered Species Act
In recent years, endangered species issues have increased in
importance, from being a deciding factor between alternative uses or
projects, to being a central consideration in almost all uses and all
projects. 5" Endangered species issues are ubiquitous, touching every
river basin, as well as reaching upstream and downstream from critical
stream segments. The purpose of the Endangered Species Act
("ESA") is to "provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved,
[and] to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered
species."' Sections 7 and 9 are the heart of the Act, described by one
Section 9
observer as "the pit bull of environmental policy."'5 4
prohibits the "taking" of a federally listed species.'55 "'Take' means to
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect, or attempt to engage in any such conduct."' 6 Habitat
destruction may also be considered a taking. 57 This prohibition finds
expression in Section 7 of the Act, which requires federal agencies "in
consultation with the ... Secretary [of Interior to] utilize their
for the
authorities in furtherance of the purposes of [the ESA] ...
s58

conservation of endangered species and threatened species.'
Implementation of the ESA raises a host of jurisdictional issues,
between federal and state government, and between federal and
private interests. Of particular concern to the western states is the
judicial finding that federal agencies can withhold permits and
approvals necessary for the exercise of water rights pursuant to state
law if necessary to prevent a "take" of a federally listed endangered
150.
151.

Luecke, supra note 50, at 27.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(c).

152. Telephone interview with Bennett W. Raley, Esq., [former] Gen. Counsel, N.
Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. (Aug. 10, 1999).

153.

16U.S.C.§1531(b).

154.

WILLIAM PERRY PENDLEY, WAR ON THE WEST: GOVERNMENT TYRANNY ON AMERICA'S

GREAT FRONTIER 86 (1995).

155. 16U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1).
156. Id. § 1532(19).
157. Id. §§ 1538(a)(1), 1532(19); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities
for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 696-98 (1995).
158. 16U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1).
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species. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals directly addressed this
issue in Riverside IrrigationDistrict v. Andrews,'9 involving the U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers, the Riverside Irrigation District, and endangered
whooping cranes threatened by the proposed Wildcat Reservoir in
northern Colorado.'60
While one might suspect that, but for the ESA, Colorado would
have developed much more water in the' past twenty-five years, there is
little evidence this is the case.' 6' Other factors, such as the Clean Water
Act and state-delegated county 1041 permitting authority, are much
In fact, the ESA's most visible impact in Colorado
more significant.
appears to be the formation of multi-party programs to recover and
delist species. 6 3

This is not to say, however, that the ESA has not

Reduced yields from
affected water development decisions--it has.
"re-operation" of existing water projects to meet ESA-driven goals are
another real impact. 6
One can again find in the active C-BT market another example of
the effect of transaction costs. The purchase of C-BT shares of water is
159. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
160. The Corps' denial of a permit was challenged as a violation of the "Wallop
Amendment" of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g), which prohibits federal
actions that impair the rights of states to allocate water within its jurisdiction. In
Riverside IrrigationDist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985), the court found that
while the "Wallop Amendment" indicates "that Congress did not want to interfere any
more than necessary with state water management," Id. at 513 (citing Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1982), Congress intended an
accommodation where both the state's interest in allocating water and the federal
government's interest in protecting the environment are present. Id. However, the
Riverside Court then trumped state law when it held that the "Corps did not exceed its
authority in denying a nationwide permit based on its determination that the
depletion ... of water would adversely affect the critical habitat of the whooping
crane." Id. Also worthy of review with regard to this issue is United States v. GlennColusa IrrigationDistrict, 788 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
161. For example, Section 7 consultations approved additional depletions of
135,276 acre-feet per year on the Colorado River from 1/1988 through 9/30/2002, a
thirteen percent increase over historic depletions. Memorandum from Water Consult,
Engineering and Planning Consultants, to Executive Committee, Colo. Water
Congress Colo. River Project, at tbl.1 (Dec. 19, 2002).
162. See CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 24-65.1-101 to -502 (2002); NICHOLS ETAL., supranote 2,
at 65-78.
163. NICHOLSETAL., supra note 2, at 55.
164. Id. at 63.
165. The Bureau of Reclamation is required to release up to 21,650 acre-feet from
Ruedi Reservoir to augment natural flows to meet the needs of endangered fish in
western Colorado. Water users are committed to providing 10,825 acre-feet from
existing or new storage facilities, which will reduce the Bureau's obligation by a
corresponding amount. An additional 20,000 acre-feet is sought to enhance spring
peak flows. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION'S

OPERATIONS AND DEPLETIONS,

OTHER DEPLETIONS,

AND

FUNDING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOVERY PROGRAM ACTIONS IN THE UPPER COLORADO
RIVER ABOVE THE GUNNISON RIVER 8-9, 11 (1999). This water will be delivered to the

fifteen-mile reach from existing or new storage facilities above the Grand Valley, such
as the existing Wolford Mountain Reservoir or a new Wolcott Reservoir. BROWN ETAL.,
PHASE 1 COORDINATED FACILITIES WATER AVAILABILITY STUDY FOR THE ENDANGERED

FISHES OF THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER,

Water Conservation Bd.).

at ES-1 to ES-3 (2000) (prepared for the Colo.
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a private transaction; endangered species issues are the responsibility
of the C-BT contracting agency, the Northern District, and not the
buyer, a substantial advantage for the purchaser.
3. County 1041 Land Use Authority
Federal laws are not the only environmental permitting hurdles
that water projects face in Colorado. Pursuant to 1041 Regulations, 6
and the Local Government Land Use Control Enabling Act, 167 Grand
and Eagle Counties adopted regulations entitled Guidelines and
Regulations for Areas and Activities of State Interest.6 1 Colorado courts
' 69
have upheld county regulatory
authority over water development
statutes.
these
on
based
In 1967, Colorado Springs and Aurora developed the Homestake
Project to supply their municipal needs with West Slope water from
the Colorado River. 70 The first phase of the project went on line with
the Homestake Reservoir on the West Slope.' Water collected in the
reservoir eventually flows into the Arkansas River basin on the East
Slope through a trans-Continental Divide tunnel. 17 After flowing
down the Arkansas River, some of this water is diverted and pumped
via the Otero Pump Station across South Park to the South Platte River
basin, where Aurora stores the water in Spinney Mountain Reservoir
until needed. 173 The rest remains in the Arkansas174basin, and is routed
to Colorado Springs through a different pipeline.
Colorado Springs and Aurora planned a second phase of the
Homestake Project, a major trans-basin diversion. 75 Eagle County
rejected the cities' permit application for additional diversion and
storage facilities near Vail in the early 1990s. 17' The court of appeals
upheld
Eagle County's denial of a local 1041 permit for Homestake
177
Ii.

Following the EPA's veto of Two Forks, Homestake II emphasized
the essential importance of environmental permitting. For example,
since the failure of Homestake II, Aurora has abandoned all of its large
trans-basin projects in favor of smaller, presumably more certain

166. COLO.REv. STAT. §§ 24-65.1-101 to-502 (2002).
167. Id. §§ 29-20-101 to -205.
168. City & County of Denver v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Grand County, 760 P.2d
656, 659 (Colo. 1988).
169. See, e.g., id. at 765-66; City of Colo. Springs v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Eagle
County, 895 P.2d 1105, 1113, 1116 (Colo. App. 1994).
170. CORBRIDGE & RIcE, supra note 82, at 525.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. City of Colo. Springs v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Eagle County, 895 P.2d 1105,
1109 (Colo. App. 1994).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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projects.' Few now doubt that a core value of the New West is a desire
to protect and restore environmental resources.179
IV. CHOOSING A BETTER LINE
While transaction costs gained preeminent influence in the past
decade, they lack any intrinsic characteristic that dictates the state's
water future. Colorado can choose to address the challenges of
drought and growth through a variety of strategies. These alternatives
serve broader socioeconomic goals than answers driven solely by
transaction costs, and may offer more attractive solutions if the state
considers all costs.
A. THREE-PRONGED STRATEGY

The principal urban supply options continue to lie in three
traditional categories: (1) water reallocation, (2) conservation and
efficiency, and (3) new development. The best mix of these strategies
to meet Colorado's needs is admittedly subject to opinion, but it is
all these
apparent that a better future rests on a pragmatic mix of
opons180 Focusing on one strategy is unrealistic; focusing on just one
project or reform is even more tenuous. The paths Colorado's
decision-makers choose to serve their customers will also shape the
state's future agricultural economy and the Western Slope.'8 ' Without
statesmanship on both sides of the Continental Divide to bury the
unilateral, parochial, and competitive past and to seek new solutions
that also address basin-of-origin and environmental concerns, Front
divert water from irrigated agriculture, forever
Range growth will
9
182
changing the historic character and economy of the state.
B. REALLOCATION

One of the easiest and most effective strategies for augmenting
municipal water supplies is the reallocation, or transfer, of water from
one user to another. While these transfers take on several forms, in
the vast majority of examples transfer activities move water from the
agricultural to the municipal sector."3 Several factors encourage these
water transfers. Most important is the rapid growth of municipal water
demands at a time when traditional regional economies based on

178. Interview with Douglas Kemper, Manager of Water Res., City of Aurora, Colo.,
in Aurora, Colo. (June 23, 1999). Aurora's South Park conjunctive use project has

not, however, proven to be any more successful than some proposed trans-basin
diversions.
179. SARAH F.

BATES ET AL., SEARCHING OUT THE HEADWATERS:
REDISCOVERY IN WESTERN WATER Poucy42-47 (1993).

CHANGE

AND

180. Interview with Greg Walcher, supra note 56.
181. Id.
182. Tom Kenworthy, West's Dry Areas Get Creative With Water Use; Residents Seek LongTerm Solutions to Fight Drought, USA TODAY, Dec. 19, 2002, 2002 WL 4739591.
183. NICHOLSETAL., supra note 2, atfig.13a.
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agriculture, livestock, and mining are flat or declining"" These
traditional western enterprises use most of the water-over 90 percent
of consumption in the western states-and control the most senior
water rights.'85 It is frequently argued that a reallocation of just ten
percent of agricultural water to municipal uses could augment
municipal supplies by fifty percent."' Other factors encouraging water
transfers include the higher economic, political and environmental
costs of other options, especially new dam and reservoir projects. 87
Under Colorado law, a holder of a decreed water right can sell,
lease, exchange, or change it. The designated use can change, as well
as the place of use, but only up to the amount of historic use.'"" Water
transfers can take several forms, be permanent or temporary, and be
based upon various types of contingency arrangements. This variety of
tools brings great flexibility to the transfer option, further stimulating
water reallocations.
Transfers of foreign water offer a distinct
advantage; as such, transfers often do not injure other 89rights holders
and thus avoid the necessity of water court proceedings.
Despite legal, political, and economic costs associated with water
transfers and, specifically, the need to have changes of use approved in
water court, reallocation of water is still usually more cost-effective
than other water supply augmentation options.' 90 For the next decade
at least, reallocation of water from agricultural to municipal use will be
a core element of strategies to accommodate municipal growthperhaps the core element.
Transfers can cause negative economic, social, and environmental
impacts for the area losing water.' These impacts are normally borne
by "third parties," a term used to describe any potentially affected92
interest to a water transfer other than the buyer or the seller.'
Perhaps more than basins-of-origin affected by trans-basin diversions,
agricultural communities suffer socioeconomic
losses when
municipalities purchase and transfer agricultural water to meet urban
needs.'
The classic examples are communities whose economies
depend on agricultural activity, including services to farmers and
ranchers." 4 While an irrigator receives a sizable check from selling her
water rights, and perhaps retires far away with the proceeds, the

184. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 66, at 23-25.
185. SOLLEYETAL., supra note 22, at 11.
186. Hon. Bruce Babbitt, [then] Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Interior, Address at the
Natural Resources Law Center Water Conference on Strategies in Western Water Law
and Policy: Courts, Coercion and Collaboration (June 8, 1999).
187. NAT'LREsEARcH COUNCIL, supra note 66, at 24-25.
188. Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1223-24 (Colo. 1988).
189. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 66 (Colo. 1996).
190. TERESA A. RICE & LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL, AGRICULTURAL TO URBAN WATER
TRANSFERS IN COLORADO: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ISSUES AND OPTIONS 1 (1993).
191. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 66, at 45-52.

192.
193.
194.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 47-49.
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community's economic base contracts permanently.'95 Some believe
that protecting these interests is an essential responsibility of policymakers, and there have been periodic legislative proposals to regulate
such transfers.
For example, in 2003, Representative Salazar
sponsored a bill to require water judges to impose terms and
conditions on water transfers that address the direct economic effects
of a trans-basin water diversion on the basin of origin.'9 6 When a
similar bill passed the Senate in 2002, it died amid claims that it would
lower the value of water rights to the sellers. 9 7 This illustrates the
schizophrenic attitudes towards trans-basin diversions in basins of
origin, which explains in part why such legislation does not pass.
Temporary transfers are a theoretically promising alternative to
permanent reallocation. Often, municipalities have adequate water
rights for average to wet years-even with growth-but lack reliable
supplies in dry years or for periods of extended drought, as 2002
demonstrated. This results from the fact that municipal water rights
are often relatively junior and subject to call in dry years.9
Thus, a
mechanism to assure an adequate supply for dry years is sometimes all
a municipality needs.'99 In other cases, a municipality may simply need
an interim water source to act as a bridge until a permanent supply
comes on line. Several alternatives to the outright purchase of
additional water rights allow municipalities to meet their temporary
water needs, although none is in widespread use in Colorado.
1. Leases
A water lease is an agreement between a rights holder and a new
user providing for a temporary water transfer of a pre-determined
quantity and duration. Parties leasing water are often those with
excess supplies, at least in the short term, in need of a beneficial place
to "park" them. Lessees may be parties needing interim supplies while
seeking a permanent source of water, or may be responding to a
drought crisis.0 0 For example, Aurora leases 5000 acre-feet per year
195.

See, e.g.,

MAcDONNELL,

supra note 33, at 56-59.

196. H.B. 1113, 64thGen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003).
197. Deb Frazier &Jerd Smith, Water Wrangles on Tap: LegislatureFacinga Flood of Bills
on Drought; Many Agree Compromise is Key, RocKY MOUNTAIN NEws, Jan. 7, 2003,
www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/state/article/0.1299,DRMN_21_1656167,00.htm

1.
198. The hallmark of the prior appropriations system is the concept of "first-in-time,
first-in-right." This notion allows for the establishment of a priority system to
determine the proper allocation of water amongst users on a stream when supplies are
insufficient to satisfy all demands. Priority is based on seniority, meaning that "senior"
rights holders are those who first established a pattern of water use-as recognized in
a permit or decree-as compared to more 'junior" users. Seniority is important since
in a water short year senior water right holders will receive all of their water before any
junior water right holders. In order to obtain the water to which it is entitled, a senior
water right holder may place a "call on the river," which requires upstream junior
rights holders to cease diversions until more senior users receive their full

entitlements.
199. See MAcDONNELL, supra note 33, at 262.
200. The "great and growing cities doctrine" allows municipalities to acquire water
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from Pueblo for a term of fifteen years, with a ten-year option. 20 '
Other communities, such as Commerce City, have declined lease offers
from Pueblo, due to a strong bias for permanent supplies.2 2 This
reluctance is evidence of a general municipal apprehension about less
than full control over their water supplies. The enormous potential
for future problems of supplying permanent development with
temporary water supplies is the basis for this fear.0 5 The drought has
changed this attitude. Aurora reportedly drafted legislation to
facilitate leasing other's senior rights to cities.
2. Subordination Agreements
A subordination agreement is one way for a municipality to
increase the reliability of its water supply.2 5 It enters into a contract

with senior rights holders where the senior pledges not to call out the
junior municipality. 206 The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation recently freed
60,000 acre-feet of water for new uses in the Upper Gunnison River
basin when it signed an agreement covering the Aspinall
Unit,
2
demonstrating the significance of subordination agreements. 11
In probably the ultimate subordination in Colorado, Denver Water
and Xcel Energy0 8 entered into an agreement for the Shoshone Power
Plant, a senior water right that controls the mainstem of the Colorado
River during the winter.2
The agreement allows Denver Water to
divert Colorado River water out-of-priority upstream of the Shoshone
Power Plant when the plant has placed a call on the river, primarily
during the winter months.t0 In return, Denver Water agreed to

for future needs. See generally City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836 (Colo.
1939).
201. Interview with Douglas Kemper, supra note 178. Interview with Roger L. "Bud"
O'Hara, supra note 29.
202. Interview with Roger L. "Bud" O'Hara, supra note 29.
203. E-mail from Carol Ellinghouse, supra note 69.
204. Theo Stein, Eco-Groups: Conservation, Not Dams, can Supply Water; THE DENVER
PosT, Jan. 15, 2003, at B1.
205. The crucial question raised by a subordination agreement is whether alijuniors
benefit when the Division Engineer administers the agreement. Orlyn Bell believed
that it was not practical to administer a subordination agreement selectively in favor of
a single water right. Telephone interview with OrlynJ. Bell, [then] Div. Eng'r, Water
Dist. No. 5, Colo. Div. of Water Res. (May 15, 2000). If a subordination agreement is
not selectively administered, all juniors will benefit from removing the call, notjust the
contracting party. As a practical consequence, this eliminates any benefit from a
subordination agreement if there are any significant upstream juniors who could first
benefit from and take the subordinated water.
206. Such agreements are common provisions in water rights settlements.
207. Office of State Eng'r, Colo. Div. of Water Res., Signing of the Aspinall
SubordinationAgreement, 14 COLO. STREAM LINES 1 (Nov. 2000).
208. Formerly Public Service of Colo.
209. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Colorado RiverMainstem Basin FactsJan.2000, at
2.
210. Letter from Bryant O'Donnell, Executive Vice President & Gen. Counsel,
Public Service Co. of Colo., to William H. Miller, Manager, Denver Bd. of Water
Comm'rs 1-2 (Apr. 14, 1986) (on file with author).
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reimburse the costs of replacing lost power generation." Conceived as
a replacement for Two Forks,1 2 the 2002 drought actually provided the
impetus for an arrangement between Denver Water and the Colorado
River District to implement the agreement for 2003. The recent deal
reduces the Shoshone call, allowing Denver to refill its droughtdepleted reservoirs, 2d4 while the West Slope receives ten percent of the
water made available by the reduction of the call. 5 Denver will pay
Xcel for power interference costs.2"

Although the Supreme Court

recently recognized selective subordination, 7 the current agreement
simply reduces the call, benefiting all junior rights.
3. Dry-Year Options

An additional strategy for increasing the reliability of a municipal
water supply is a dry-year option agreement, also known as an
interruptible supply contract. A dry-year option allows temporary
water transfers during specified hydrologic conditions. 2"s As the name
implies, dry-year options normally "allow the senior rights holders to
continue to use the water (in most cases for farming) in normal years
and give the option holder (often a municipal user) a cost-effective
In exchange
way to make its supply more reliable during dry years.
for the option arrangement, the municipality pays a fee to the irrigator
for entering into the agreement, plus additional amounts for
exercising the option and actually transferring the water.2 0
Dry-year options theoretically provide a win-win situation for both
the agricultural and municipal sectors. They allow farmers to retain
ownership of water rights, to augment their income through fees
collected when entering into the agreement, and to receive
compensation for production losses experienced when a municipality
exercises its option in dry yearsY. For the municipality, a dry-year
option provides a means of drought protection which could be much
the purchase of new water rights, and perhaps
more cost-effective than
222
......
more importantly, the construction or expansion of storage facilities,
although storage may still be required to implement a successful dry-

211.

Id.

212. Interview with Sara Duncan, Esq., supra note 138.
213. Agreement concerning Proposed Operation of the Shoshone Power Call
Between Colorado River Water Conservation District and City and County of Denver

(Mar. 21, 2003).
214. Id. 11 2 & 3.
215. Id.

8.

216. Id. 17.
217. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Arapahoe County v. Crystal Creek Homeowners
Ass'n, 14 P.3d 325, 341 (Colo. 2000).
218. Margie Wood, ColoradoEconomist Says FarmingAreas Should Consider Water Leases,
THE PUEBLO CHIEFrAN, Jan. 14, 2003, 2003 WL 10238106.
219. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 66, at 32.
220. Wood, supra note 218.
221. Wood, supra note 218, at 2.
222. See GEI CONSULTANTS, INC., supra note 6, at 8-46 to 8-47.
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year leasing program. There is substantial anecdotal evidence that
irrigators hold unrealistic expectations of the value of their rights, and
are unwilling to give up control of their water in a dry year.
Dry-year options are not common in Colorado, but well established
in California.2' Legal complications and uncertainties partly explain
the limited use of dry-year options in Colorado up to the present.
Most issues stemmed from the fact that exercising the option entailed
a "change of water right," which required judicial approval to permit
use for additional purposes, for example municipal use, to divert at a
different point, and to apply water at a different place than originally
decreed.'2 The legislature eliminated many of these obstacles in 2003,
granting the State Engineer authority to approve temporary changes
in the point of diversion, location of use, and type of use during and
immediately following a declared drought emergency. 221
To the extent that legal requirements prove to be expensive and
time-consuming, they discourage dry-year options and similar
temporary measures and encourage permanent transfers.2 6
Transaction costs also are likely to discourage dry-year options that
involve relatively small quantities of water, or that involve multiple
rights holders. Additionally, agricultural interests may resist dry-year
options that they perceive as impeding the outright future sale of their
water rights to another provider who needs an annual supply. To
succeed, an agreement must adequately address the interests of both
parties. The municipality needs assurance that the water will be
available when needed; the owner needs compensation for losses
caused by the exercise of the option, plus some incentive to enter into
the agreement.227 It will also probably be necessary to create a
schedule of compensation based on the date the municipality exercises
its option. 228 For example, if the option is exercised before planting,
the farmer will have avoided some costs and compensation should
correspond accordingly. 229 However, if exercised later, the farmer will
have unrecoverable costs that require greater compensation. 2'0 There
may also be concerns about calculating the value of lost productivity,
and possible third-party effects such as greater difficulty among other
ditch users in delivering their water.

223. The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, or example, recently

"initiated a [statewide] competitive [bidding] process to purchase options on up to
100,000 acre-feet of water for transfer into its service area during dry years and supply
interruption." Is the California Water Market Open for Business?, WESTERN WATER,
Mar./Apr. 2001, at 5.

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

GEI CONSULTANTS, INC., supra note 6, at 8-49.
H.B. 1334, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003).
Interview with Eric Wilkinson, supra note 76.
Interview with [retired] Sen. Fred Anderson, in Loveland, Colo. (July 19, 1999).
Id.

229. Id.
230. Id.
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4. Lease-Back Arrangements
Leaseback arrangements are the mirror image of dry-year option
agreements. In a leaseback arrangement, the municipality acquires
ownership of the water right, makes the appropriate changes in water
court, and then leases the rights back to the seller.23' There are two
principal variations of this scenario.
The first is most analogous to a dry-year option agreement and
occurs when a provider only needs the water rights in case of
drought.23 In average or wet years, the municipality meets its needs
with other water rights and leases the water back to the original
seller.23 ' This leaseback approach allows for the possibility of retaining
long-term agricultural use.2 ' Examples abound in the Northern
District where municipalities have purchased some water rights solely
for use during drought. 35 In average or wet years, they rent the water
back to farmers through annual agreements.216 This essentially is a
form of water
23 7 banking nested within the context of a leaseback
arrangement.
The second situation may be more typical in Colorado. Here, a
municipality acquires the agricultural water rights it needs to meet
future growth.
It then leases the water back to the seller for
continued agricultural use until the growth materializes. 239 Pueblo, for
example, annually leases excess water to irrigators.240 In 1999, the city
2
leased 13,000 acre-feet for three to seven dollars per acre-foot.
These leasebacks defer the impacts of agricultural transfers until
municipal growth creates the need for water.
The potential for leaseback arrangements is high, given the efforts
of municipal water providers to drought-proof their water systems.
Many municipalities plan to meet a thirty- to fifty-year drought without
cutbacks, while trying to stay twenty to fifty years ahead of projected
population demands. 42 This means that in average or wet years, most
municipalities have excess supplies they can make available to
231.
232.
233.
234.
single

Wood, supra note 218.
Id.
Id.
These agreements are analogous to a common plan of augmentation wherein a
entity creates dry-year options using water rights it owns. For example, Boulder

uses some of its water rights to maintain agricultural land in normal or wet years, but
these rights are also decreed for municipal purposes to meet the city's needs in dry

years. Interview with James R. 'Jay" Montgomery, Esq., supranote 84.
235. Interview with Bennett W. Raley, [former] Gen. Counsel, N. Colo. Water
Conservancy Dist., in Denver, Colo. (Oct 14, 1999).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238.

Interview with Roger L. "Bud" O'Hara, supra note 29.

239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Transactions, in WATER STRATEGIST: ANALYSIS OF WATER MARKETING, FINANCE,
LEGISLATION AND LTIGATION 8 (Rodney T. Smith & Roger Vaughan eds.,June 1999).
242. Interview with Eric Kuhn, Manager, Colo. River Water Conservancy Dist., in
Glenwood Springs, Colo. (July 1, 1999).
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agricultural or other uses. Unfortunately, some agricultural lands do
not respond well to periodic cycles or irrigation and fallow. For
example, it is impossible to return the lands irrigated by the Rocky
Ford Ditch that were purchased by Aurora to productivity within a
single irrigation season following several years of being dry.
5. Water Banking
Water banks are analogous to water markets, with the exception
that water banks seek to coordinate temporary, rather than
permanent, water transfers. "A water bank is a formal mechanism for
pooling surplus water rights for rental to other water users." 44 The
Colorado Legislature enacted a pilot water-banking program for the
Arkansas River basin in 2001 .24' The purpose of the legislation is to test
the concept of a water bank to "simplify and improve the approval of
water leases, loans, and exchanges, including interruptible supply
"
agreements, ... [and to] reduce the costs [of] such transactions. ,l
The statute requires the State Engineer to report on the effectiveness
of the pilot program by November 1, 2005.247 It is too early to tell how
well the bank will function, but there is not much activity. 48 This may
be due to unrealistic expectations of profits by Arkansas Valley
irrigators. The South Platte and Rio Grande basins need water
banking as well,249 and the General Assembly enacted legislation
requiring the state engineer to promulgate the necessary rules to
establish250 water banks upon the request of a water conservancy
district.

The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District's water
allocation system has both a marketing and banking component, as
transfers can be either permanent or temporary.
Temporary
exchanges, such as annual rentals, are a highly flexible means for
water providers to adjust to annual fluctuations in demand.
C.

CONSERVATION AND EFFICIENCY

Municipal providers can stretch existing water supplies to serve
growing populations through a variety of management strategies.
While water conservation practices cannot satisfy future water supply
needs alone,2 2 they are an important part of the solution.
243. Interview with Douglas Kemper, supra note 178.
244. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 66, at 31.
245.
1060
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Arkansas River Pilot Water Banking Act of 2001, ch. 284, 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws
(codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-80.5-101 to -107 (2002)).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80.5-102 (2002).
Id. § 37-80.5-106.
Interview with Greg Walcher, supra note 56.
Id.
H.B. 1318, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003).
Interview with Bennett W. Raley, supra note 235.
MONTGOMERY WATSON, COLORADO WATER DEVELOPMENT STUDY 1999 UPDATE 3

(1999) (prepared for the Colo. Farm Bureau).
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The current drought demonstrates the potential for demand
management among Front Range cities. The authors' investigation of
nine Front Range municipalities suggests that mandatory (droughtinspired) water restrictions in the summer of 2002 generally reduced
water consumption by more than fifteen percent when compared to
water use in the 2000-2001 period, a time of slightly smaller
In only July and
populations and significantly wetter weather.
August of 2002, Denver Water saved over 10,000 acre-feet, mainly by
restricting lawn watering to every third day254 -a practice that is
already permanent in some cities, such as Castle Rock.2' 5 The potential
for additional savings may be limited, however. There is some
evidence that demand has "hardened" over the past couple of decades
Denver Water, for
from a general emphasis on conservation.
example, only realized eighteen percent annual savings from drought
restrictions in 2002, substantially less than expected.2 5' Before the
enactment of restrictions, water consumption in many Front Range
cities was on a record high pace, a potentially devastating trend given
already depleted storage reservoirs.158 Given that water demands
normally soar in hot, dry times, the effectiveness of mandatory
restrictions, focused mainly on limiting lawn watering, is more
impressive.
1. Demand Management
The number of Colorado municipal water providers not pursuing
some sort of water conservation likely fell to zero in 2002. The success
of municipal water restrictions in the summer of 2002 may indicate
opportunities for further, permanent reductions in per capita water
use.2 59 The feasibility of sustaining or deepening reductions is open to
debate, but the statistics on water use suggest that there is still
considerable room for improvement. Per capita water use in the
United States is three times that of the average European country, and
astronomically more than most developing nations.260 According to
the United States Geological Survey, per capita water use in the United
253. DOUGLAS S.
WATER

KENNEY & ROBERTA KLEIN, USE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MUNICIPAL
(2003),
at
COLORADO
12
DROUGHT
IN
DURING
RESTRICTIONS

http://sciencepolicy.Colorado.edu/homepages/roger-pielke/hp-roger/pdf/2003.16
.pdf.
254. Id. at 11.
255. Town of Castle Rock Homepage, Utilities Dep't, Water Conservation, at
http://www.ci.castlerock.co.us/Town-services/pub-works/utilities/water-cons.asp
(last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
256. Interview with David Little, Manager of Water Res. Planning, Denver Water
(December 30, 2002).
257. Id.
258. Water Used at Record Pace, DENVER POST, June 25, 2000, 2000 WL 4465761.
259. The authors' review of summer 2002 water use suggests that even modest
restrictions, for example limiting lawn watering to every third day, had significant
benefits.
260. William Graves, When the Well's Dry, We Know the Worth of Water, NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC SPECIAL EDITION, Nov. 1993, at 1.
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States, as of 1995, for "public supply" 26' purposes averages 179 gallons
per day nationally. Colorado's rate of 208 gallons per day is fifteen
percent above the national average.26 2 Approximately sixty-three
percent of water used within Denver is for landscaping.2"3 This high
use of water for landscaping is not surprising, given Coloradoans' love
for lush lawns in apparent denial of the state's semi-arid climate.
Denver Water estimated that conservation could save twenty-seven
percent, approximately 72,000 acre-feet, of current system use,
particularly through the adoption of xeriscaping programs. 261
Reducing water consumption associated with lawn-watering is a
difficult challenge given the prevalence and cultural acceptance of
lush lawns, and given rules such as the Highlands Ranch covenant that
not only requires a minimum size lawn, but also requires it be kept
green. The homeowner's association may fine a homeowner for
allowing their grass to "brown up" during summer months.2 65 Not
surprisingly,
legislation adopted in 2003 prohibits such covenants in
the future .2'
2. Pricing Mechanisms
Economists describe the degree to which demand for a good or
service is responsive to price changes using the term "elasticity. 267
Elasticity can be reduced by several factors, including the degree to
which the good or service is essential, and cannot be replaced with
substitute products, and the overall price of the good.268 In part due to
the low cost of water, a recent study of water conservation in the West
suggests that price is only a modestly effective tool for managing
demand:
Water price has a significant and negative impact on water use, but
water demand is very price inelastic, more so than has been suggested
in most other studies. The highest elasticity estimate was for summer
use (approximately -0.20).
At this degree of consumer
responsiveness, water utilities could double their water rates and
expect, at a maximum, only a 20 percent decrease in water use during
the peak season. More likely, utilities should expect a water elasticity
of -0.10 on an annual basis; a hefty 50 percent increase in rates will
reduce use by 5 percent.269

261. The public supply category includes domestic, commercial and industrial
purposes, including thermoelectric power production. SOLLEY, supra note 22, at 20
262. Id. at 23.
263. PETER W. MEYER ET AL., RESIDENTIAL END USES OF WATER 114 (1999).
264. DENVER BD. OF WATER COMM'RS, supra note 6, at 45.
265. RIEBSAME ETAL., supra note 29, at 56.
266. H.B. 1001, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., § 4 (Colo. 2003).
267. EDWIN G. DOLAN & DAVID E. LINDSEY, MICROECONOMICS 130-31 (5th ed. 1988).
268. Id. at 136-37.
269. ARi M. MICHELSEN ET AL., EFFECTIVENESS OF RESIDENTIAL WATER CONSERVATION
PRICE AND NONPRICE PROGRAMS,

at xxii (1998).
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Raising residential water rates to encourage conservation is
politically difficult. Since water service is a basic human need, equity
and public health considerations provide a compelling rationale for
making water available at the lowest possible cost.
3. Wastewater Reuse
Municipalities across the West are increasingly looking to
7
Solving two problems at once is
wastewater as a water supply source.Y
part of the appeal of water "recycling" because "it reduces the need to
develop new sources to meet growing demands and it helps reduce the
level of effluent discharges into surface water and groundwater." ''
Reuse also often provides a highly competitive and cost-effective means
of supply augmentation.2
The most common examples of direct reuse are for non-potable
purposes, which pose considerably smaller public relations challenge
than potable reuse. Non-potable reuse is also cheaper since it does not
require treating water to drinking water standards, and it is well suited
for agricultural, industrial, and municipal landscape irrigation
purposes. 3 For example, Colorado Springs supplies approximately
2,500 acre-feet per year of non-potable water from a wastewater
treatment plant and Monument Creek to irrigate golf courses,
cemeteries, city and county properties, and sports facilities. 4
Colorado Springs' system is expected to grow in proportion to the
city's overall water demand, expanding to serve the irrigation needs of
Woodmen Valley and the
2 5 Broadmoor Hotel at a cost of between $500
and $850 per acre-foot.
Non-potable reuse requires construction of distribution systems
isolated from potable water systems. This is an important cost
consideration, and militates for the use of reclaimed water in places
with concentrated non-potable demands.
Another potential problem involves increased consumptive use,
which reduces downstream flows that could injure junior water rights.
Thus, reuse may only be feasible with foreign water, and even then
may raise endangered species issues downstream, at least on the South
Platte.
Direct potable reuse is an intriguing, albeit controversial, idea.
One form of potable reuse occurs from the presence of municipal
wastewater in the raw water taken into a municipal water system. This

270. Reclaimed Western Water, in WATER STRATEGIST: ANALYSIS OF WATER MARKETING,
FINANCE, LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION 8 (Rodney T. Smith & Roger Vaughan eds.,
Summer 1997).
271. Id.

272. Id.
273. Steve Trivett, Recycled Water Equals Green Links Amid Drought, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, May 23, 2002, at 24C.
274. BLACK & VEATCH, WATER

VI-8 (1996).
275.

Id. at VII-7, IX-4.

RESOURCE PLAN FOR COLORADO SPRINGS UTILITIES, at
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can occur by piping effluent directly into a drinking water system
where it is treated and distributed-a rare but technically feasible
activity.7 6 This can also occur by mixing treated wastewater into a
municipality's raw water supply. Because of geography and gravity, this
latter situation is ubiquitous, occurring anywhere a wastewater
discharge is upstream of a drinking water diversion point. For
example, Thornton's drinking water contains treated effluent from the
upstream Bi-cities Wastewater Plant. There are several other examples
of Colorado cities' drinking
water supplies composed of five to forty77
five percent effluent.
4. Reuse in Denver
The 1955 Blue River decree 7 8 suggests that Denver has a legal
obligation to reuse its trans-mountain diversions in order to minimize
the need for, and size of, such diversions.279 The amount of reuse
required is not specified; rather, the decree calls only for due diligence
in reusing trans-basin water and for reuse to be pursued within legal
and economic limits. How the city is to meet its obligation is quite
ambiguous, and has not been litigated-yet. 20 The Western Slope
continues to pressure Denver to increase reuse as part of any plan that
involves additional trans-basin diversions. 81
Denver Water presently lacks a water reuse plant, although it
reuses water by exchange.
However, the agency described, in its
Integrated Resource Plan, three cost-effective
effluent reuse
opportunities. 2"
The first opportunity, a two-phase non-potable
proram, may yield 17,000 acre-feet per year for public and private
use.
Phase I of the Denver Water Recycling Program is currently

276. For example, during a 1956 drought in the small town of Chanute, Kansas,
wastewater was recycled through its "rapid-sand-filtration plant directly into the intake
point of its drinking water system with no ill effects." Reclaimed Western Water, supranote
270, at 7.
277. Interview with Eric Kuhn, Manager, Colo. River Water Conservancy Dist., in
Glenwood Springs, Colo. (Dec. 26, 2002).
278. See generally the consolidated cases of 2782, 5016 and 5017, United States v. N.
Colo. Water Conservation Dist. (D. Colo. filed Oct. 12 1955) (ruling on the Blue River
Final Decree).
279. Interviews with Michael D. "Sandy" White, Esq., in Denver, Colo. (July 12,
1999); Interview with Charles B. "Barney" White, Esq., in Denver, Colo. (Oct. 7, 1999).
280. Interview with Charles B. "Barney" White, supra note 279; David Hallford, supra
note 86.
281. Interview with Eric Kuhn, supra note 277.
282. An exchange occurs when water is taken at a time and place when it would
otherwise be out of priority, but other water rights that would be injured are satisfied
with replacement water from another source. In short, water is added to the stream at
a downstream point to enable diversion of an equal amount of water at an upstream
location. Exchanges are often an efficient way for a trans-basin diverter to maximize
use of imported foreign water.
283. DENVERBD. OF WATER COMM'RS, supranote 6, at 34.
284. Telephone interview with Myron Nealey, Hydraulic Eng'r, Denver Bd. of Water
Comm'rs (June 6, 2001).
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underway for completion in late 2003 or early 2004.25 Up to 8,300
acre-feet per year will supply the Park Hill Golf Course, Xcel Energy's
Cherokee Power Station, city parks, and other potential industrial
customers at a capital cost of almost $64 million,2 6 Phase II, 8,700
acre-feet, will serve Stapleton and Lowry Redevelopment areas,
Gateway area, and Denver International Airport after 2008 at a capital
cost of $75 million. 87
The total potential yield from two potable reuse opportunities
could ultimately exceed 35,000 acre-feet per year, if potable reuse
proves economically and publicly acceptable.
Coupled with the nonpotable program, Denver Water could reuse over 50,000 acre-feet per
year at city build out.2

1

Thus, reuse could provide a substantial

290
portion of Denver Water's total annual use of 265,000 acre-feet.

5. Re-operation of Storage Facilities
"Re-operating" reservoirs, in a manner that allows for greater water
storage, provides one strategy for increasing yields from existing
systems.
The Southeast Colorado Water Conservation District's
("SECWCD") winter water program presents an early example of
creative reservoir management to increase the basin-wide yield of
water. 29 '

Envisioned as an integral part of the Fryingpan-Arkansas

("Fry-Ark") Project, the program allows users to temporarily store
water in reservoirs during the winter months and to call for the stored
water at times when the user needs the water. 2
Recently, the Bureau of Reclamation and the City of Colorado
Springs explored the potential of further re-operations of the Fry-Ark
Project to suit municipal needs. 293

This research suggested that the

project had an unused storage capacity of at least 70,000 acre-feet that
could, through reservoir re-operations, store non-project water. 294 In
2000, the SECWCD decided, in principle, to allow municipal providers
to store as much as 49,000 acre-feet of water they own in unused FryArk space. 295 Such re-operation could meet Colorado Springs' need
for 45,000 acre-feet of additional storage capacity.29 6

However, the

proposal requires the consent of the Bureau, which once concluded
that federal law2 97 prohibits the storage of non-project municipal water
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id.
Id.
Id.

291.

GEI CONSULTANTS,

DENVER BD. OF WATER COMM'RS, supra note 6, at 34.

Id.
Id. at 13.

INC., supra note 6, at 4-8 through 4-14.
Id.
Id. at 7-12 to 7-17.
Id. at 7-15 to 7-17.
Colo. Water Congress, SECWCD Moves Forwardon Enlargement of Pueblo Reservoir,
WATER INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Oct. 20, 2000, at 2.
296. See GEI CONSULTANTS, INC., supra note 6, at 7-12 to 7-14.
297. 43 U.S.C. § 523 (2000).

292.
293.
294.
295.
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in project facilities.28 However, the Bureau is reviewing its authority,
and recently concluded that it could issue a long-term contract to the
City of Aurora for the use of Frying Pan-Arkansas Project Facilities. 9I
Coordinated reservoir operations also emerged as a useful tool for
environmental purposes. On the Colorado River, 63,000 acre-feet of
water from coordinated reservoir operations supported flows in the
fifteen-mile reach for four endangered fish species in 1999.30
6. Regional Coordination
Integrated operations of otherwise separate water systems are
another strategy for increasing yields and efficiency. The Southern
Water Supply Project provides a good example in which the Project
conveys trans-basin water to a dozen entities within the Northern
District."' The pipeline was first discussed to provide an alternate
water supply for Broomfield in 1991, the same year a regional study
forecast increased water demands in Boulder and Weld counties.
Working together, the project addressed Broomfield's needs and
allowed other entities to meet their needs at a cost that was far less
than if each had acted independently."'
The Metropolitan Water Supply Investigation ("MWS!") identified
coordination among urban Front Range water providers as one of the
304
Front Range's most promising future water management options.
Unfortunately, competition, suspicion, and controversy among the
largest water providers characterize Colorado water history.
Additionally, many past efforts at cooperative water development failed
spectacularly, as evidenced by Two Forks, Homestake II, and Union
Park. This legacy leaves many water providers leery of big cooperative
05
projects."
Any meaningful progress regarding coordinated system operations
requires the cooperation of a few key players. In the Denver Metro
area, Denver Water must necessarily be at the center of any significant
cooperative arrangements, simply because it maintains the region's
most extensive infrastructure.30 6- Denver Water has adopted a policy
298. Letter from A. Jack Garner, Area Manager, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't
of Interior, to Steve Arveschoug, [then] Gen. Manager, SECWCD 2 (Nov. 3, 1998).
299. Letter from John W. Keyes, III, Comm'r, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of
Interior, to James Broderick, Project Manager, SECWCD (Apr. 3, 2003).
300. Tom Pitts, P.E., comments at the Colorado Water Congress Summer
Convention (Aug. 23, 2001).
301. Beneficiaries include Fort Morgan, Fort Lupton, Broomfield, Hudson,
Berthoud, Longmont, Erie, Louisville, Morgan County Quality Water Dist., Little
Thompson Water Dist., Cent. Conservancy Water Dist., and Superior Metropolitan
Dist. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., Southern Water Supply Project (2003), at
http://www.ncwcd.org/

project&features/swsp-main.asp
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. HYDROSPHERE REs. CONSULTANTS, INC. ET AL., supranote 6, at 129.
305. Interview with Douglas Kemper, supra note 178.
306. Interview with Charles B. "Barney" White, supra note 279.
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that invites cooperative proposals from other entities! °7 Likely
partners would include Aurora, Arapahoe County, Douglas County,
and Thornton.
An early coordination success involves Denver Water and the City
of Boulder. The two municipalities recently completed negotiations
that will allow Boulder to use storage space in Denver Water's Gross
Reservoir when Denver does not need the space for its municipal
demands.0 8
The MWSI process has stimulated other conversations regarding
improved system coordination and operations. Already, two promising
progeny resulted from MWI-the Southern Cooperative Action Proposal
and the Northwest Cooperative Investigation."" These initiatives are
promising, largely because they are voluntary undertakings that involve
the principal players on all sides of the issues, although it is too early to
tell if they will yield any real improvements in water efficiency in the
Denver Metro area.
D. NEW DEVELOPMENT

Before Two Forks and Homestake II, the development of new
water supplies was the traditional response to growth. However,
construction of major new on-stream dam and reservoir projects is
essentially impossible in the modern era due to environmental and
area-of-origin considerations.
In addition, areas of the state with
remaining developable water are increasingly distant, and thus,
economically costly and challenging to Front Range demands. Despite
these challenges, some new water development is still occurring and
providers currently contemplate much more in Colorado. Currently
viable alternatives to big dams and trans-mountain diversions tend to
involve an expanded use of small and unconventional reservoirs, such
as gravel pits, and Front Range projects that provide water benefits to
the basins-of-origin.3 ' With few exceptions, waters from the Upper
Colorado, Gunnison, and South Platte systems are the targets of
307. Denver Bd. of Water Comm'rs, Cooperative Actions With Metropolitan Water
Suppliers Outside the Board's Service Area (Oct. 15, 1996).
308. Respect for the Land Translates Into Protection of Natural Environment for Carol

Ellinghouse, INSTREAM COLORADO, July 2001, at 3. Boulder will use the water to
maintain minimum stream flows in South Boulder Creek.
309. The evolution of the South Metro Water Supply Board, formerly the so-called

Tri-Party Alliance, is discussed in WATER AND GROWnH IN COLORADO, NICHOLS ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 107-09. Providers in the northwest Denver Metro area are generally
short on storage needed in a critical drought. Changes in operations and/or
modification of arrangements between Denver Water and the providers could address
much of this shortfall, and is the subject of the Northwest Cooperative Investigation.
See generally HYDROSPHERE

RES. CONSULTANTS, INC., NORTHWEST COOPERATIVE
FINAL REPORTS FOR TASK 1: MUTUAL EDUCATION, TASK 2: FUTURE
BASELINE REPRESENTATION, TASK 3: ESTIMATE OF FUTURE UNUSED SUPPLY (1999).
INVESTIGATION,

310. Radio show: NPR Morning Addition, Controversial Efforts to Pump Water and
Sell it in Texas, hosted by Bob Edwards and reported by John Burnett (October 15,
2002).

311. SeeNICHOLS ETAL., supra note 2, at 96, 98.
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additional development; other basins in the state are already at or near
their development capacity, or too remote to be economically
attractive.312

For a trans-basin project to succeed today, it must feature a degree
of Front Range/Western Slope cooperation lacking in historic
diversions because legal tools now exist to block new projects. 313' The
Western Slope is increasingly demanding that trans-basin projects
contain inherent incentives to minimize diversions, such as
pumping,1 4 while addressing unmet Western Slope needs for
additional water. 35 These needs include additional water supplies for
the Fraser and Snake Rivers, Ten Mile Creek, and more recreational
water held in Dillon Reservoir. 316' The Upper Colorado River Study
("UPCO Study") is an effort by the Northwest Colorado Council of
Governments' Water Quality & Quantity Committee to quantify the
Western Slope's needs.
A draft report is due for release in 2003.38
Legislation to mitigate basin-of-origin impacts would facilitate future
trans-basin diversions. 9
1. Cooperative Precedents
Post Two Forks, a number of Front Range providers participated in
new joint use trans-basin projects that develop new water supplies for
both the Front Range and source watersheds. In this manner, urban
Front Range providers can develop their trans-basin water rights to
meet growth needs, and West Slope interests realize additional
supplies to meet the needs of growing headwater resort communities
and ski areas. 320
Perhaps the best example of Front Range-West Slope cooperation
is Wolford Mountain Reservoir, which solved a problem facing Denver
Water and allowed the Colorado River Water Conservation District
("River District") to complete a storage project to serve West Slope
needs.3 2' Before the demise of Two Forks, Denver entered into a
twenty-five-year lease for water from a reservoir the River District
planned to construct on Muddy Creek, with the leased water to tide
Denver over until Two Forks came on-line.2 However, with EPA's veto
of Two Forks, that premise went out the window. Concurrently, the
312. MONTGOMERYWATSON, supranote 6.
313. Interview with Eric Kuhn, supra note 277.

314. Interview with David C. Hallford, Esq. [then] Gen. Counsel, Colo. River Water
Conservancy Dist., in Glenwood Springs, Colo. (July 1, 1999).
315. Interview with Eric Kuhn, supranote 277.

316. Id.
317. Telephone interview with Robert Weaver, Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, Inc.
(Dec. 27, 2002).

318. Id.
319. Interview with Greg Walcher, supra note 56.
320. Interview with Eric Kuhn, supra note 277.
321. E-mail from Hamlet J. "Chips" Barry, III, Manager, Denver Bd. of Water

Comm'rs, to authors (May 12, 2003).
322. Id.
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River District realized it could not build the reservoir it wanted with
the $10 million compensatory storage payment made by the Municipal
Subdistrict for the Windy Gap Project and Denver's lease fees.323 In a
lengthy telephone call, Chips Barry, Manager of Denver Water, and
Rollie Fischer, then Secretary-Engineer of the River District, struck a
deal."' Denver Water agreed to help finance the reservoir.
In
exchange, the River District agreed to give Denver an ownership
interest rather than a leasehold interest in the yield of the reservoir.
After further negotiations and adding some details involving supplies
for the Upper Fraser River basin, Denver obtained forty percent of the
reservoir's yield, and the River District was able to construct Wolford
Mountain Reservoir.3"7 While not strictly a trans-basin diversion
project-the water is used by exchange-many consider Wolford to be
328
a model for future trans-basin diversions.
The Clinton Gulch Reservoir Project on Fremont Pass provides
another example of intrastate cooperation.3 29 The Clinton Gulch deal
lets Denver Water obtain permanent storage capacity in Wolford
Reservoir. 30 The project provides headwaters communities with a little
needed water, 3 ' and buys the region more time to deal with larger
332
trans-basin diversion issues.
Most interesting, the project uses an
ingenious exchange that allows ski areas to use out-of-priority
diversions for snowmaking. By agreement, the ski areas-Keystone,
Breckenridge, and Copper Mountain-take water from nearby streams
that would otherwiseS• flow
into Denver Water's Dillon Reservoir, and
333
use it for snowmaking. In the spring, the snow melts and flows to the
reservoir, as it would have six months earlier. 3 4 The agreement
assumes twenty percent evaporation losses from snowmaking, and the
ski areas repay Denver from the water stored in Clinton Gulch
Reservoir. 5 Thus, snowmaking is serving the same purpose as a
traditional reservoir.

323. Id. "Compensatory storage" describes a practice in which Eastern Slope
interests, in "compensation" for trans-basin diversions, provide water projects designed
to store spring runoff for use on the Western Slope, typically for irrigation. This
principle was incorporated into the Colorado-Big Thompson (C-BT) Project in 1937.

324. Id.
325. Id.
326. E-mail from HamletJ. "Chips" Barry, supra note 321.
327. Id.

328. E-mail from Richard D. MacRavey, Exec. Dir., Colo. Water Congress, to authors
(July 30, 2001).
329.

Interview with Glenn E. Porzak, Esq., Porzak, Browning, & Bushong, P.C., in

Boulder, Colo. (Aug. 30, 1999).
330. E-mail from Ed Pokorney, Dir. of Planning, Denver Bd. of Water Comm'rs, to
authors (Aug. 20, 2001).

331. The arrangement provides approximately 1,200 acre-feet to Summit and Grand
County communities and ski areas.
332. Interview with Lee Rozaklis, supra note 106.

333. Interview with Glenn E. Porzak, supra note 329.
334. Id.
335. Id.
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2. Conjunctive Use
Groundwater is particularly useful for serving low-densit y
residential development, a type of growth that has been on the rise.
Nowhere is this more evident than in Douglas County, which has little
in the way of surface water supplies but features over a dozen
groundwater-dependent
municipal water supply systems and
thousands of individual domestic wells that draw upon Denver Basin
aquifers, a vast but fundamentally non-renewable resource.337 The
long-term reliability of this water supply is a growing concern as
demands escalate.
One option for utilizing the resource more efficiently may entail
the conjunctive use of groundwater with surface water. A conceptual
study done as part of the MWSI found that up to 60,000 acre-feet of
surface water supply could be developed through a regional
conjunctive use project, s' although this figure did not reflect
constraints water rights and environmental concerns might impose.3 3 9
The concept called for using excess surface water to recharge East
340
Slope aquifers, or offset pumping, in wet years.
Denver Water, the Douglas County Water Authority ("Water
Authority"), and the Colorado River Water Conservation District have
co-sponsored the South Metro Water Supply Study to determine the
feasibility of such a regional conjunctive use project.31 A draft report
is due in 2003.342 It will likely propose new appropriations of South
Platte and Blue River water in wet years.3 43 This water would meet
some of the Water Authority's needs and provide water to recharge the
aquifers in wet and average years.3 " In dry years, the Authority and
Denver Water would draw on the aquifers to meet their demands.343
Return flows from pumped groundwater and from new trans-basin
appropriations would be reusable to extinction, and the project would
feature additional water reuse and conservation components. 34 In this
manner, the long-term aquifer depletions would be reduced, perhaps
prolonging the aquifer life indefinitely.3 47 The project would use
existing Denver Water facilities to store, deliver, and treat surface

336. E-mail from Lee Rozaklis, Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, Inc., to authors (Jan.
13, 2003).
337. Id.
338.

HYDROSPHERE RES. CONSULTANTS, INC. ET AL., supra note 4, at 55.

339. E-mail from Rozaklis, supra note 336.
340.

HYDROSPHERE RES. CONSULTANTS, INC. ETAL., supra note 6, at 55.

341.

Douglas County Water Res. Auth., Res. No. R-998-02 (Sept. 1998); Colo. River

Water Conservation Dist./Denver Bd. of Water Comm'rs, Joint Resolution (Nov. 17,
1998).
342. E-mail from Lee Rozaklis, supra note 336.

343. Id.
344. Pat Mulhern, Dist. Manager, Inverness Water & Sanitation Dist., Presentation to
Denver Water Planning Meeting (Oct. 4, 2002).
345. Id.

346. Id.
347. E-mail from Lee Rozaklis, supra note 336.
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water to the South Metro area for distribution through existing and
new pipelines.3 48

Even at complete Denver Water build out, not

expected before 2050, the project would yield over 25,000 acre-feet of
new surface water which, when coupled with continued groundwater
pumping, additional water conservation, and water reuse, could
represent a sustainable water supply for Douglas County and a drought
year supply for Denver and the West Slope. 49 Like other trans-basin
projects, West Slope support will depend on simultaneously addressing
West Slope needs and concerns.
3. Statewide Water Supply Initiative
In November 2002, the CWCB embarked on a project to identify
feasible water projects and "get going."3 5' The Statewide Water Supply
Initiative proposes to "[b]uild a consensus among all parties... as to
which [water development] alternatives and strategies should be
pursued for implementation."3 5 2 In short, the CWCB is proposing an

process to develop water projects that
innovative two-year statewide
"can be built immediately."35 3 The project proposes to break recent
impasses over trans-basin diversions and the environment through an
35
extensive public information and involvement process. '

To be

successful, the study team will have to overcome not only decades of
competition, mistrust, and unilateral action by the principle water
providers of the Front Range and the West Slope, but their equal
suspicion of any substantive state decision-making role in water
development.3 55 Precedents like Wolford Mountain and Clinton Gulch
offer reasons for optimism.
4. Colorado 64
Club 20 sparked an effort, the so-called Colorado 64 principles, to
develop consensus on some basic precepts for future Colorado water
development.3 56 The theme is that thirsty municipalities should use
and reuse existing and local sources before seeking to import water
Fifty-eight of Colorado's sixty-four counties
from other basins.15

348. Mulhern, supranote 344.
349. E-mail from Lee Rozaklis, supranote 336.
350. Interview with Eric Kuhn, supra note 277.
351. Interview with Greg Walcher, supra note 56.
352. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Scope of Work for a Statewide Water Supply
Initiative, Nov. 7, 2002.
353. Interview with Rod Kuharich, Exec. Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd., in
Denver, Colo. (Dec. 20, 2002).
354. See Colo. Water Conservation Bd., supra note 352, at 4.
355. See generally COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-60-106(1) (1), -119, -121 (2002) (describing
the CWCB's role in water development through annual appropriations of its
construction fund).
356. Press Release, Club 20, Club 20 Spearheads Development of Statewide Water
Principles (Oct. 4, 2002) (on file with authors).
357. Id.
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united in the appeal,"' and Metro Denver counties joined the
endeavor in January.35 9 The Colorado General Assembly immediately
endorsed the principles to begin "earnest efforts to find water supply
answers that benefit all Coloradoans, for this and future
generations.'3' 0 The principles represent a common sense approach
that is difficult to disagree with, and perhaps offer further support for
a new working relationship between the urban Front Range and the
rest of the state.
V. CONCLUSION
The next decades figure to be highly challenging for Colorado
water interests as Front Range municipal water providers continue to
aggressively explore a highly varied and complex set of strategies for
acquiring and managing additional water supplies. The pace of legal
and technological innovation is accelerating, yet in some casesnamely the South Denver Metro region-may only be sufficient to
keep pace with demand due to the cushion provided by groundwater
reserves. The challenge faced by headwater communities is, arguably,
even greater than that faced by Front Range cities in some cases.
Rapidly growing Summit and Grand Counties, for example, have a
physical abundance of water, but most is unavailable for local use due
to senior or conditional rights held by urban Front Range providers.
The challenge for agricultural advocates, meanwhile, primarily entails
trying to retain water for irrigation in the face of more economically
attractive uses. Statewide, agricultural-to-urban water transfers have
not had a huge impact on agriculture yet, but in some locations, such
as the lower Arkansas Valley, serious economic disruption is already
evident. More widespread are environmental impacts associated with
past water developments. Environmental advocates will undoubtedly
be challenged to win remedies for historic effects of water diversions.
Colorado's deepening water crisis is not simply a matter of
population increases and drought, but is also about changes in
lifestyles, land-uses, politics, economics, and values. Ultimately, it is
about raised expectations-especially where our water systems are
concerned. For water managers to satisfy the increasingly diverse
demands that confront them, innovation must continue. Managing
water in a period of sustained growth and climatic uncertainty will
likely require finding mechanisms for exploiting advances in
engineering and management, recognizing the true economics of
water development and use, adapting historic laws and policies that
may unnecessarily limit progress, and perhaps reconsidering how we,
as Coloradoans, value and use our limited water resources.
Fortunately, recent years have produced several innovative
management strategies to build upon.
358. No Drought of Ideas, supra note 117.
359. Water Factions Reach "Treaty" Sides to Cooperate but Work Remains, THE DENvER
PosT, Jan. 25, 2003.
360. H.J.R. 1019, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003).
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I. GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY
The Costilla Creek watershed is located in the southeastern
portion of the San Luis Valley in southern Colorado and northern
New Mexico. The headwaters of Costilla Creek originate high in the
Culebra Range of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains in southern
Colorado at an elevation of 11,770 feet above sea level. The east and
west forks of Costilla Creek flow approximately two miles in a southern
direction before they converge near the Colorado/New Mexico state
line. The creek then meanders thirty-three miles in a generally
western semi-circle before turning north to Colorado in the San Luis
Valley near the community of Garcia, Colorado. Continuing on its
western path for another thirteen miles, Costilla Creek crosses the
Colorado/New Mexico border for the third and final time before
reaching the Rio Grande River in Taos County, New Mexico. Over its
course of approximately fifty-one miles, the environment of Costilla
Creek changes dramatically from an alpine forest of spruce and aspen,
to vibrant agrarian lands in the valley, and eventually, to desert lands at
its confluence with the Rio Grande River after a decline in elevation of
4400 feet.
Spanish military expeditions traversed the San Luis Valley in the
eighteenth century, but the opening of the Santa Fe Trail in 1821
provided the impetus for migration into the area by "trappers, hunters,
'mountain men,' traders, and merchants.... ."' One of the early
t
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settlers in the region was a French Canadian named Charles Beaubien
who arrived in Taos in 1823 and subsequently became a prominent
merchant, [trader], landholder, and politician."2 In 1841, Beaubien
and Guadalupe Miranda petitioned the governor of the northern
Mexican province for a grant of land east of Taos. The practice of
granting large tracts of land by Spain and Mexico in the midnineteenth century was intended to promote settlement and to
provide protection from raiding Apache, Navajo, Comanche, Ute, and
other indigenous tribes in the northern provinces of Mexico at that
time.
"[T]he Beaubien-Miranda Grant, subsequently known as the
Maxwell Land Grant, was approved in 1841."3 Beaubien became
anxious to expand his landholding, but was legally precluded from
applying for a second land grant. However, the provincial law did not
preclude ownership by another family member, so on December 27,
1843, Beaubien's twelve-year-old son Narciso and a young American
named Stephen Louis Lee who Charles Beaubien employed submitted
a petition for an adjacent land grant to the north to the Mexican
government.4 Fifteen days later, on January 12, 1844, Governor
Manuel Armijo approved the Sangre de Cristo Grant that
encompassed over a million acres of land within the Trinchera and
Costilla Creek watersheds in present day Costilla County in southern
Colorado and Taos County, in northern New Mexico.' The elder
Beaubien immediately began to administer the vast estate and
prompted settlement by small groups along Costilla Creek that were
quickly abandoned due to the constant threat of Indian attack.
Tragedy befell the Beaubien family early in the morning ofJanuary
19, 1847 when young Narciso, Stephen Lee, and others were killed in
the governor's home in the Taos Rebellion." Since Narciso was
unmarried, Charles Beaubien inherited his share of the grant and
purchased Lee's half-interest for one hundred dollars and became the
sole owner of the grant on May 4, 1848. 7 Coincident with settlement
activities on the Sangre de Cristo Grant, war broke out between the
Mexican Republic and the United States in May 1846. Wishing to "put
an end to the calamities of war" that existed, representatives of the two
Knox received his B.S. from Colorado State University in chemical engineering and his
Masters degree in Civil Engineering. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate at Colorado
State University in the engineering department with emphasis in Water Resources
Planning and Management and is a registered professional engineer in Colorado.
This article reflects the sole opinion of the author, not the Colorado Division of Water
Resources.
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Republics constructed an accord of peace known as the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo on May 30, 1848.8 Article VIII of the Treaty
provided for formal recognition and full protection of the private
rights and titles of land grants ceded by Mexico to owners in the
United States.9 Seeking confirmation of his interests by the new
government, Charles Beaubien filed a petition to the Surveyor General
of New Mexico. On June 21, 1860, Congress accepted the Surveyor
General's recommendation and confirmed ownership of the Sangre
de Cristo grant to Beaubien.'1
Promotion of settlement in the Sangre de Cristo Grant continued,
and a small group of settlers on Costilla Creek in New Mexico
established the first successful colony on the land grant in 1848." It
was located approximately one-half mile south of the Colorado-New
Mexico state line near the present-day community of Garcia, Colorado.
Settlement expansion soon spread to the northern portion of the
grant. The San Luis colony, a product of this settlement, was
established in 1851 on the Culebra River, located approximately
sixteen miles to the north. It retains the distinction of being the oldest
continuously inhabited town in Colorado. 2 Although development
was slowly progressing in the Sangre de Cristo land grant, its
ownership soon appeared to become a significant financial liability to
Charles Beaubien because there was minimal discernable income from
the land and the United States made overtures to impose a tax
assessment on land grants. 3 Seeking to limit his exposure and
capitalize upon his holdings, Beaubien segmented the grant into onesixth interests and conveyed three of those interests to three of his
associates in 1853. ' Upon learning that William Gilpin, the first
Territorial Governor of Colorado, had purchased one of the one-sixth
land interests in 1862, Beaubien quickly arranged to meet him and
offered to sell his remaining one-half interest in the land grant. By
September 1864, Gilpin completed the purchase of five-sixths of the
land Fgrant for a total of $41,000, or approximately four cents per
acre.
Gilpin shared the same fear of a potential land tax burden and was
determined to sell his interests for a handsome profit. On January 10,
1865 Gilpin conveyed a "[9/24ths] interest in the land grant for
$162,000" to an easterner who had recently settled in the Southwest
named Morton Coates Fisher. 6 Four months later Fisher bought

8. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, May 30, 1848, U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat. 922.
9. Id. art. VII.
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another 5/24ths interest for $90,000.'7 In June 1868, Fisher and his
associates incorporated the Colorado Freehold Land Association and
published a pamphlet designed to attract foreign investment. 18
To assist them in their promotion of the Sangre de Cristo land
grant, one of Fisher's associates enlisted the expertise of an English
solicitor, capitalist, and speculator named William Blackmore. Late in
1868, Blackmore befriended the noted explorer and government
geologist Dr. Ferdinand V. Hayden and arranged for Hayden to
accompany him in an investigation of the Sangre de Cristo grant in
order to conduct a geological survey of its lands and resources."
Hayden was recognized in Europe and America for the quality and
integrity of his surveys in the West and Blackmore realized the valuable
contribution a positive assessment by Hayden would have in
promotion of the grant. Upon investigation and survey of the land
and its waters, on December 5, 1868 Professor Hayden reported:
The land embraced in the Sangre de Cristo Grant forms the eastern
and southern portions of [the San Luis] valley, and is by far the finest
agricultural district I have seen west of the Missouri River.
The water is very fine, and quite equally distributed over the
surface of the grant, so that it might all be divided into arable and
pastoral land.2

After his exploratory investigation of the grant, Blackmore advised
the principals of the Colorado Freehold Land Association it was
necessary to offer high dividends in a capitalized land company
promoting land emigration and stock raising in order to attract
foreign investments to the American frontier.
The owners of the
land grant agreed with Blackmore and subsequently partitioned the
grant into two land areas that corresponded to the natural watershed
and formed a separate land company for each under Colorado
territorial law. 2 The northern portion became the Trinchera Estate
and the southern wa's called the Costilla Estate.23 Foreign bankers
remained hesitant to invest in the land company due to a concern that
a federal act by Congress might nullify Colorado territorial law. 4 To
alleviate the concerns of foreign investors, principals of the land
companies successfully lobbied Congress to pass an act incorporating
the United States Freehold Land and Emigration Company ("U.S.

17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
1 BRAYER, supra note 1, at 76.
Id. at 72-73.
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Freehold") on July 8, 1870.5 Six days later, on July 14, the owners
deeded Costilla Estate from Colorado Freehold Land Association to
the U.S. Freehold.26 Soon thereafter, the tenuous negotiations with
foreign investors bore success and the Dutch investment banking
house of Wertheim and Gompertz of Amsterdam purchased the
Costilla Estate for $1,000,000 in company bonds for $500,000, with
company stock divided among those assisting in the promotion.
Secure with the safe deposit of Dutch investment money,
Blackmore and Fisher turned their attention toward organizing
settlement and development of the Costilla Estate.2 8 However, local
residents dissented and vocally opposed the development plans for the
Costilla Estate by Gilpin, Fisher, and the other shareholders of U.S.
Freehold. In the intervening years between settlement of the original
colonies and consummation of foreign investments, a considerable
number of migrants settled on the best agricultural lands adjacent to
Costilla Creek." The local residents constructed ditches to convey
precious water supplies and used the bounty of forest and other
natural resources with no interference from Gilpin or other U.S.
Freehold investors.3 ' After two decades of almost undisputed use of
the Sangre de Cristo Grant, the settlers claimed ownership of the land
and water supplies based upon a promise by Charles Beaubien to deed
them the small tracts of land they had settled. The foremost obstacle
facing the land grant residents was an inability to legally prove their
ownership or dispute the land company's title, which had a chain of
title dating to the 1860 congressional confirmation act.33
Led by a fellow settler named Ferdinand Meyer, residents of the
Costilla Creek Valley challenged U.S. Freehold's development plans. 4
Despite operating under a perceived fear of ejection from the land as
illegal squatters, the united opposition of Meyer and the other settlers
achieved a measure of success by dampening the attractiveness for
investment by new settlers in the land development and colonization
program. 5 As a conciliatory compromise, Blackmore and Gilpin met
with the local citizens' committee on October 4, 1871 and offered to
give quit claims to the small home tracts of the original settlers, but
refused to recognize the right of the settlers to cut wood or allow their

25. Act ofJuly 8, 1870, ch. 224, 16 Stat. 192 (incorporating U.S. Freehold Land &
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livestock to graze on the grant. 6 An impasse ensued for a number of
years until U.S. Freehold took a different tact to remove the
troublesome settlers by seeking judicial relief through the courts to dry
up their irrigation water supplies. 7
On June 10, 1890, U.S. Freehold filed a bill of complaint against
Ferdinand Meyer seeking to enjoin him and others from diverting
water from Costilla Creek in the Acequia Madre Ditch for irrigation of
farmlands.38 In their petition to the court, U.S. Freehold argued "that
said defendant and his confederates are not entitled to any water from
said stream for said purposes."39 The Circuit Court for the District of
Colorado heard the complaint in May 1897."0 It found in favor of
defendant Meyer and sustained the demurrer to the bill of complaint
in addition to dismissing the bill at the plaintiffs cost.4 U.S. Freehold
immediately appealed to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit in St. Louis, Missouri." The court of appeals
reversed the finding of the lower court, and enjoined Meyer from
diverting any portion of Costilla Creek through the Acequia Madre
Ditch or any other means for irrigation in the State of Colorado. 3
However, the court victory for U.S. Freehold was hollow and shortlived due to the impending twin pillars of economic collapse to the
company: negligible revenue and increasing tax delinquency."
Unable to meet its property tax burdens, U.S. Freehold sold its
interests in 1902 to the Costilla Land and Investment Company. 5
Approximately six years later in 1908, the Costilla Estate Development
Company ("Development Company") bought the 500,000 acre Costilla
Estate, who transferred its water rights to the San Luis Power and
Water Company ("Water Company") in 1909.46 Franklin E. Brooks was
president of both the Development Company and the Water Company
in 1908, and orchestrated a plan to promote colonization through the
sale of land from the Development Company and contract for water
from the Water Company.47
36. Id. at 109-10.
37. See Plaintiff Complaint at 1, 6, U.S. Freehold Land & Emigration Co. v. Meyer
(C.C.D. Colo. filed in 1890).
38. Id. The Acequia Madre Ditch is recognized as the first water conveyance
structure built in the Costilla Creek watershed.
In the original water court
adjudication for Costilla Creek in Colorado on June 14, 1889, the Acequia Madre was
granted 22.5 cubic feet per second to irrigate 900 acres of land in Colorado and
retains an April 1, 1853 appropriation date.
39. Id. at 6.
40. U.S. Freehold Land & Emigration Co. v. Meyer, No. 2551 (C.C.D. Colo. 1897).
41. Id.
42. See Stipulation, U.S. Freehold Land & Emigration Co. v. Meyer, No. 2551,
(C.C.D. Colo. 1899) (referring case to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth
District in St. Louis, MO.).
43. See U.S. Freehold Land & Emigration Co. v. Meyer, No. 2547, at 1-2 (C.C.D.
Col. June 9, 1899).
44. 1 BRAYER, supra note 1, at 123.
45. Id.
46. DUANE D. HELTON, GARCaA WATER PROBLEMS 5 (1974).
47. Id. at 5.
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In contrast to the land developers' frustrations, independent
settlement and farming activities continued to progress in the
southeastern portion of the San Luis Valley. In addition to the
Acequia Madre Ditch, Manzanares, Acequiacita, Madrilles, Chalifu,
Trujillo, and Garcia Ditches were constructed to divert and apply
Costilla Creek water for irrigation of lands in Colorado and New
Mexico from 1854 through 1873.48 A short distance to the north,
similar irrigation development occurred as evidenced by the 1852
construction of the San Luis Peoples Ditch that diverted water from
the Culebra River.49
Mormon pioneers were the first to initiate reservoir construction in
the area beginning in 1890.'o They constructed Eastdale Reservoir No.
1 in the valley floor approximately seven miles northwest of presentday Garcia, Colorado and Eastdale Reservoir No. 2 a few miles
upgradient on the same ephemeral draw." The Mormons built the
reservoirs with the intent to capture the temporal abundance of spring
runoff for subsequent irrigation of farmlands later in the summer
months. The source of water supply to both off-channel reservoirs was
streamflow conveyed from either the Culebra River or Costilla Creek
through filler ditches." Discouraged by the short water supply, the
Mormon pioneers moved east to Manassa, Colorado and sold their
interest in the Eastdale Reservoir system."
Coincident with the acquisition of the water rights from the
Development Company in 1909, the Water Company also acquired the
Eastdale Reservoir system, the Sanchez Reservoir project located on
the Culebra River, and the Acequia Madre, Manzanares, and Madriles
Ditch direct flow water rights. ' The owners of the Development
Company and Water Company could now promote development of
their land holdings and also sell irrigation water from both the
Culebra and Costilla watersheds to their anticipated clients.55
In approximately 1914, land reclamation in the Jaroso area in
southern Colorado began to expand and the market for water supply
contracts increased. Unfortunately, the limited amount of water
available in the Water Company's direct flow water rights portfolio,
48. Id. at attachment 2. Notice the original direct flows decrees in the Costilla
Garcia Area as adjudicated in Colorado on June 14, 1889, and New Mexico on
December 2, 1911. Id.
49. See COLO. WATER Div. III, WATER RIGHTS REPORT 130 (2002).
50. Andrew Jenson, The Founding of Mormon Settlements in the San Luis Valley,
Colorado, 17 THE COLO. MAG. 174, 179 (1940).
51. See COLO. WATER DIV. III, supra note 49, at 61.
Through subsequent
enlargements in 1908 and supplemental decreed priorities of February 11, 1935,
Eastdale Reservoir No. 1 had an aggregate storage of 3468 acre-feet and Eastdale
Reservoir No. 2 had 3041 acre-feet of capacity. Id. An acre-foot of water is equal to the
volume of water covering one acre, or 43,560 square feet, to a depth of one foot.
52. Id.; R.J. TIPTON, COSTILLA RESERVOIR INVESTIGATION 2 (1941) (unpublished
report prepared for the Colorado Water Conservation Board, on file with author).
53. HELTON, supra note 46, at 5.

54.
55.

Id.
Id.
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and the excessive conveyance losses to water delivered through the
Eastdale Reservoir system, created a supply deficit that could not satisfy
the promising new demands. To supplement their water supplies, the
Water Company sought to construct a new storage vessel high in the
mountains on Costilla Creek. 6 On August 29, 1911, the Water
Company filed an application with the New Mexico Territory Engineer
to build Costilla Reservoir approximately ten miles above the
community of Costilla. 7 The Territory Engineer of New Mexico
approved the permit on April 8, 1912 with the following language:
This is to certify that I have examined the within application for a
permit to appropriate the public waters of the Territory of New
Mexico, and hereby approve the same. This application is approved
subject to all prior valid rights to the use of water of this steam system

including those acquired by beneficial use on the Costilla and
tributaries as set forth in decisions of the courts; also, provided the
total amount that can be appropriated through this permit shall not

be in excess of 20,750 acre-feet per annum, applicant, however, may
appropriate in addition not to exceed 10,000 acre-feet per annum of
water, which may be conserved by a proper distribution and
beneficial use of the quantity being
diverted by those specified in the
58

court decrees above mentioned.

Costilla Reservoir is located high in a canyon approximately
sixteen miles southeast of the community of Costilla at an elevation of
9300 feet above mean sea level in Taos County, New Mexico.5 The
Water Company completed construction of the reservoir in 1920 and
the structure stored 15,000 acre-feet from a drainage basin of 54.6
square miles.60 The new storage vessel provided the means to capture
temporal snowmelt in the spring months and also afforded a
mechanism to control releases from the reservoir into Costilla Creek.
As a result, the principals of the Water Company turned their
attention to building a conveyance structure to deliver water to the
increasing irrigation demand in the Jaroso area in Colorado.
On
January 30, 1920, the Water Company filed an application with the
State Engineer of New Mexico for permission to construct a water
conveyance structure referred to as the Cerro Ditch.
The New

56.

See TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO, APPLICATION FOR PERMIT, No. 599 (1911)

[hereinafter APPLICATION NO. 599]; TIPTON, supra note 52, at 2.
57. APPLICATION No. 599, supra note 56.
58. Id. at 2. The application claimed the project would have an estimated cost of
$280,000 and provided domestic and irrigation water to 27,430 acres. Id. at 1.
59.
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2000, at 71 (2000) [hereinafter USGS].
60. Id.; See TIPTON, supranote 52, at 2.
61.

APPLICATION FOR PERMIT TO APPROPRIATE THE PUBLIC WATERS OF THE STATE OF

NEW MEXICO, No. 1360 (1920).

62. Id. New Mexico subsequently consolidated permit nos. 599 and 1360 and
referred to them as the Costilla Reservoir Project with intent to provide adequate
water supplies to irrigate 24,335 acres of land. The terms Cerro Ditch and Cerro
Canal are interchangeable and refer to the same water conveyance structure.
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Mexico State Engineer approved the permit on January 19, 1921 and it
contained the standard caveat protecting the rights of prior
appropriations, but also included the restrictive proviso that said:
[W]aters herein above approved for the use of irrigation of the land
under this project shall be used only on lands situated within the
boundaries of the State of New Mexico as per the filing map attached
to application for Permit No. 1360 and on file in this office, and shall
include the waters covered by Permit No. 6599, and Permit and this
application being considered jointly herein. 3
The Water Company completed the Cerro Ditch in 1922, with the
headgate located on Costilla Creek less than one mile upstream of the
community of Costilla. It flows in a general northwesterly direction to
deliver irrigation water to the Association Ditch and others that serve
lands in New Mexico, and to the Jaroso area in Colorado. Subsequent
to completion of Costilla Reservoir and Cerro Ditch, the Water
Company employed the practice of ascribing the initial storage of
water in Costilla Reservoir under the senior priorities of the Eastdale
Reservoirs, and holding that water high in the system until the
irrigation demand prompted a controlled release from Costilla
Reservoir.
The reservoir releases flowed downstream and were
diverted at the Cerro Ditch for delivery to the Eastdale Reservoirs.
This continued practice made effective use of the proximity and
additional storage capacity of Costilla Reservoir while using the
Eastdale Reservoirs as regulating structures to prudently conserve and
manage available Costilla Creek water supplies.
The diversion and application of Costilla Creek waters that began
in the spring of 1853 continued until the limited and fleeting waters
had been fully appropriated by 1873.64 Seeking to confirm their water
rights, water users in Colorado received court adjudications for a total
of 70.50 cubic feet per second in seven ditches to irrigate 2767 acres.65
Similarly, New Mexico courts awarded 28.475 cubic feet per second in
nine ditches to irrigate 2278 acres. 6 The combined direct flow
decreed amount for the Costilla Creek system under the early decrees
was 98.975 cubic feet per second to irrigate 5045 acres below the
mouth of Costilla Canyon.67
63. Lindsey v. McClure, 136 F.2d 65, 67 (10th Cir. 1943). The Cerro Ditch capacity
requested in the application for Permit No. 1360 was for 277.9 cubic feet per second.
According to Steven E. Vandiver, Division III Engineer, the current sustainable
operating capacity is approximately 120 cubic feet per second.
64. J.H. Buss & T.G. SPANNAGEL, INVESTIGATIONS OF COSTILLA RIVER INCLUDING IN
APPENDIX EARLY IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT OF COSTILLA RIVER AND ITS EFFECT ON THE

COSTILLA RESERVOIR PROJECT 1 (1941) (unpublished report prepared for the State of
New Mexico, on file with author).
65. Id.
66. Id.

67. Id. at 11.

The Colorado ditches include: Acequia Madre, Manzanares,

Acequiacita, Madrilles, Chalifu, Trujillo, and Garcia Ditches. HELTON, supra note 46,
at attachment 2. The New Mexico Ditches include: Acequia Madre, Cerrito,
Manzanares, Plaza de Arriba, Plaza del Medio, A.J. Arellano & Sons, M.E. Trujillo,
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Settlement activities and associated agricultural development
.continued to progress in the Costilla Creek watershed, particularly in
the Jaroso community in Colorado. By the advent of World War II,
approximately 5126 acres were being irrigated in Colorado and
another 4978 acres in New Mexico for a total of 10,104 acres by direct
streamflow decrees and reservoir storage."8 According to a statement
made by receiver Malcolm Lindsey for the Water Company, in the two
decades after construction of Costilla Creek Reservoir, the Water
Company had expanded its service area and was providing water under
contract to 135 of the 4978 acres of irrigated land in New Mexico." In
Colorado, the Water Company exercised its full range of water delivery
options and provided irrigation water under contract to 440 acres
through its direct flow decrees, 1032 acres under the Eastdale
Reservoir system, and another 2654 acres in the Jaroso community.0
II. GENESIS OF THE COSTILLA CREEK COMPACT
With intent to continue expanding its water service contracts and
revenue, the Water Company made periodic applications to the New
Mexico State Engineer seeking extensions of time to fully develop its
allocation under Permits 599 and 1360 for the Costilla Reservoir
Project. 71
Beginning in 1924, statements and affidavits from
representatives of the Water Company were included with these
applications that proposed the temporary use of water from the
Costilla Reservoir Project on lands other than those specified in the
original Permits 599 and 1360.7 On April 27, 1937, New Mexico State
Engineer Thomas McClure expressed concern in a letter to the Water
Company that the permits only authorized use of Costilla Reservoir
Project water upon New Mexico lands only, and New Mexico
considered use of the water in Colorado only temporary. 3 In the
period from 1918 to 1935, the New Mexico State Engineer's Office
imposed no restrictive conditions on the approved extensions of time
to limit water deliveries to New Mexico lands.
Penasquito, andJ.M. Alires Ditches. Id. The Acequia Madre and Manzanares Ditches
divert water from Costilla Creek in New Mexico, but serve irrigated lands in both states
and were awarded decrees in both states. Id.
68. TiI'TON, supra note 52, at 2. In 1941, Costilla Creek Reservoir had 15,000 acrefeet of storage capacity and Eastdale Reservoir No. 1 had a usable capacity of 2000
acre-feet. Eastdale Reservoir No. 2 leaked and was considered inoperable because it
was unable to retain water within the storage vessel.
69. Buss & SPANNAGEL, supranote 64, at 11.
70. Id. at 9.
71.

Lindsey v. McClure, 136 F.2d 65, 68, n.2 (10th Cir. 1943).

Requests for

extensions of time for Permit No. 599 to the New Mexico State Engineer were dated:
January 16, 1918, March 12, 1919, January 25, 1924, March 19, 1926, January 28, 1929,
April 7, 1931, April 20, 1933, April 6, 1935, May 6, 1937, July 7, 1938, November 13,
1940; and under Permit No. 1360 were dated: January 25, 1924,January 28, 1929, April

7, 1931, April 20, 1933, April 6, 1935, May 6, 1937, July 7, 1938, and November 13,
1940.
72. Id. at 68.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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The Water Company filed applications for extensions to the
permits on May 6, 1937, however the engineer's office did not act
promgtly acted upon then and the Water Company refiled on July 7,
1938. For the first time, the New Mexico State Engineer conditioned
his approval of the 1938 applications to use water from Costilla Creek
on New Mexico lands only.76 On August 31, 1940, he issued the
following order:
That the San Luis Water and Power Company cease storing in the
Costilla Reservoir in the state of New Mexico all Eastdale Reservoir
No. 1 and Eastdale Reservoir No. 2 water, storage for which is in the
State of Colorado.

That water for the Eastdale Reservoir No. I and the Eastdale
Reservoir No. 2 shall not be diverted through any canals with
headgates in New Mexico.
That stored water in the Costilla Reservoir released shall be used only
on lands in the State of New Mexico, and under no conditions shall
be delivered to lands in the State of Colorado.
On behalf of the Water Company, Malcolm Lindsey filed an action
with the Federal District Court in New Mexico seeking 7to enjoin the
State Engineer of New Mexico from enforcing his order. The Federal
District Court of New Mexico sustained State Engineer McClure in his
motion to dismiss the suit. Lindsey agpealed the case to the United
States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Impressed by the complexity
of the issues in the case, the court suggested the parties attempt to
negotiate a compact to resolve the matter. Representatives for the
State of Colorado, State of New Mexico, and the Water Company were
receptive to counsel offered by the court, and the court granted a
petition for a stay in the proceedings to give time to construct an
interstate compact to allocate and administer the waters of Costilla
Creek.8
The States held the first meeting of the Costilla Creek Compact
82
Committee was held in September 1941 in Santa Fe, New Mexico
with intent to construct an interstate compact to equitably allocate and
administer the limited water supplies of Costilla Creek.83
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81. N.M. OFFICE OF THE STATE ENG'R, COSTILLA CREEK COMPACT, ROUGH DRAFT
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82. Id.
83. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; Felix Frankfurter &James M. Landis,
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Representatives for Colorado included: Judge Clifford H. Stone,
Director of the Colorado Water Conservation Board; Royce J. Tipton,
Consulting Engineer; and L.H. Larwill and T.C. McPherson, Attorney
and Manager respectively for the Water Company. New Mexico was
represented by: State Engineer, Thomas M. McClure; Attorney, A. T.
Hannet; and staff engineers for the New Mexico State Engineer's
Office, John H. Bliss and T. G. Spannagel. 8 Mr. Tipton and Mr. Bliss,
as designated Engineer Advisers for their respective states, provided a
general briefing of the water rights, reservoir storage, and irrigation
practices in existence at that time." Tipton provided a statement of
five conditions he regarded to be a fair basis to construct the compact
upon:
1. Recognize direct flow rights on a parity basis.
2. Consider the balance of the system as a unit without regard to
states.
3. Recognize present irrigation development in Colorado and New
Mexico.
4. Consider an additional acreage in New Mexico (which he found
to be about 2000 acres based upon the available water supply) as
subject to receiving a firm water supply from Costilla Reservoir.
5. Consider an additional 2000 to 3000 acres as irrigable in years of
high flows after all above lands had been supplied with water.87
After further discussion, members of the committee determined
that additional studies were warranted to determine the probable
acreage that could be irrigated in New Mexico under Permit Numbers
599 and 1360 after fully meeting the demands of all prior water rights
on Costilla Creek in both states.
84. Minutes, Record of the First Meeting of Costilla Creek Compact Commission,
Santa Fe, N.M. 1 (Sept. 22-23, 1941).
85. Id. Clifford Stone and Thomas McClure were designated as Compact
Commissioners for Colorado and New Mexico, respectively.
86. Id
87. Id. at 3. In the water right adjudications in Colorado, the court based the flow
amount on a duty of water of one cubic feet per second to irrigate forty acres, except
for ditches serving small acreages that were granted a minimum of one cubic feet per
second to provide adequate flow/hydraulic energy for reasonably efficient irrigation.
The New Mexico courts based their adjudication on a duty of water of one cubic feet
per second to irrigate eighty acres of land. The Costilla Creek Compact Committee
adjusted the Colorado water rights to the one cubic feet per second per eighty acres
standard (except for those small ditches that retained their minimum one cubic feet
per second allocation) for an equitable allocation of water to all lands in the Costilla
Creek watershed.
88. Id at 3-4. The Commission directed the Engineer Advisers to base the studies
assuming:
that storage of water in the Eastdale reservoir to supply the Eastdale lands be
limited to 3468 acre-feet; (2) that of this 3468 acre-feet of available storage
1000 acre-feet be assumed as being supplied from Culebra through the
Culebra-Eastdale canal; (3) that the remaining 2468 acre-feet of storage in
Eastdale reservoir be supplied from Costilla Creek, if and when available; (4)
that the direct flow rights on the Costilla Creek be operated as decreed; (5)
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Coincident with the compact negotiations, the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals heard Lindsey v. McClure, and on May 24, 1943, rendered its
decision on the appeal brought by the Water Company. 9 The court
premised its opinion upon two legal interpretations. First, it reiterated
that a "water right is a property right and inherent therein is the right
to change the place of diversion, storage, or use of the water if' the
interests of other water right owners are not injured. 9° Second, the
water statutes of Colorado and New Mexico carry no extraterritorial
effect or jurisdiction over the other in terms of judicial or
administrative authority." In its decision, the court recognized that
Colorado adjudicated Eastdale Reservoir water rights, but also that the
Water Company had indeed changed the points of diversion, storage,
and use of water to Costilla Reservoir in order to better apply the water
available under those priorities to beneficial use. 92 The court found it
permissible to divert the water from Costilla Creek and convey it to
irrigate lands through the Cerro Ditch, so long as the diversion did not
adversely impact the rights of other water users.93 In support of its
finding, the court acknowledged that both Colorado and New Mexico
apply the doctrine of prior appropriation as a basic premise of water
law to administer and distribute tributary water supplies.94 As to the
administration of water right priorities in different states that share the
same stream, the court "upheld the cardinal rule of the doctrine - that
the priority of appropriation, [not location,] gives superiority of
right."99 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Water
Company was entitled to change the place of diversion and storage
regarding water rights adjudicated to the Eastdale Reservoirs to points
within New Mexico, so long as the change would not be injurious to
the rights of other water users in the Costilla Creek system.96 Thus, the
case was remanded back to the lower court for a new trial.97
Subsequent Costilla Creek Compact Committee meetings and
progressive hydrologic investigations by the Engineer Advisers
continued until the fifth and final meeting in Santa Fe on February 7,
1944.9'
The Chairman of the meeting, Judge Fred E. Wilson,
commenced the meeting with a summary of the events and litany of
actions that preceded the pending lawsuit by the Water Company,
that the irrigation season be considered as extending from May 15th to

September 30th of each year; [and] (6) that theJaroso area be omitted in the
determination of the total acreage irrigable under the above permits.

Id. at 4.
89. Lindsey v. McClure, 136 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1943).

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 70.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 71.

94.

Lindsey, 136 F.2d at 69.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 70.

97. Id. at 65.
98. Minutes, Record of the Fifth Meeting of the Costilla Creek Compact
Commission, Santa Fe, N.M. 1 (Feb. 7-8, 1944).
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which sought to enjoin the order by the New Mexico State Engineer.9
Judge Wilson provided incentive to the gathering by reminding those
in attendance that the case on remand to the New Mexico Federal
District Court was set for hearing the next day, February 8th, unless
the Costilla Creek Compact Commission could demonstrate definite
progress toward agreement. 100

Judge Wilson then called upon Royce Tipton to review the
engineering features and substantial points of agreement reached to
that point by the Commissioners contained within a proposed compact
draft.' O' The meeting then focused on a set of seven different
conditions or assumed methods of operation that were prepared by
the Engineer Advisers that were to form the basis for operating the
compact.'0 2 After prolonged and lively debate, Engineer Adviser
Tipton explained "Condition F" required all lands under the Costilla
Reservoir system to be operated on a parity basis, which provided the
best and most economical alternative.
Commissioners and
representatives from both states consulted with their respective
constituents and adopted the recommendation of the Engineer
Advisers, and as a result, Condition F became the operational basis for
the compact. Upon adjournment of the meeting, representative
attorneys were instructed to draft a petition to the court asking the
case on remand be held in abeyance until a compact could be
completed and approved by the legislative bodies of both states and
the United States and to draft a compact that was based upon the
studies and terms agreed upon by the compact committee.' 0 Seven
months and several draft iterations later, Commissioners Stone and
McClure signed the Costilla Creek Compact on September 30, 1944 in
Santa Fe, New Mexico. °0 Both states subsequently ratified the compact
and Congress approved it in 1946.'06

Courts have often prompted adjacent states in dispute over a
shared river to pursue a mutually acceptable resolution that would
equitably allocate and administer the precious water resources
through a negotiated compact, as opposed to contentious litigation
that concludes in ajudicial decision by an individual who typically has
99. Id. at 2.
100.

Id.

101. Id. at 1.
102. Id. at 7.
103.

Minutes, Record of the Fifth Meeting, supra note 98, at 11. The basic data on

Costilla Reservoir Operations in 1943 for Conditions A-G was: Costilla Reservoir
permanent capacity 11,000 acre-feet; 2600 acres of Jaroso colony lands in Colorado;
5000 acres Costilla Reservoir lands in New Mexico. Condition F operations are: 37
second feet (cubic feet per second) remaining private direct-flow rights operating in
order of priority; 1000 acre-feet to Eastdale Reservoir; 27 second feet company-owned
rights in Colorado and New Mexico in order of their priority turned back to the
stream for use on Costilla Reservoir lands. All Costilla Reservoir System lands and
Jaroso lands operated on a parity basis.
104. Id. at 18.
105.

Costilla Creek Compact, Pub. L. No. 408, 60 Stat. 246 (June 11, 1946).

106. Id.
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little personal familiarity with the river or its use. The Costilla Creek
Compact serves as a unique genesis of an administrative action by a
state government official and a privately held water development
company.
III. WATER ALLOCATION SYSTEM
The foundation for administering water rights under the Costilla

Creek Compact was application of the doctrine of prior appropriation.
In designing an instrument to equitably distribute water supplies from
an interstate river, the negotiating parties to the compact were fully
aware of the guidance provided by the United States Supreme Court's
0 7 In that landmark case, the
seminal decision in Wyoming v. Colorado.'
Court held that when neighboring states share an interstate river, and

both employ the prior appropriation doctrine within their respective
boundaries to administer water rights, the principle
8
applicable to interstate streams and controversies.10
Pursuant to Article IV of the Compact:

is no less

[t] he apportionment and allocation of the use of Costilla Creek water
shall be as follows:
(a) There is allocated for diversion from the natural flow of Costilla
Creek and its tributaries sufficient water for beneficial use on
meadow and pasture lands above Costilla Reservoir in New Mexico to
the extent and in the manner now prevailing in that area.
(b) There is allocated for diversion from the natural flow of Costilla
Creek and its tributaries thirteen and forty-two hundredths (13.42)
cubic feet of water per second of time for beneficial use on lands in
the Amalia Area in New Mexico.
(c) In addition to allocations made in subsections (e), (f) and (g) of
this Article, there is allocated for diversion from the natural flow of
Costilla Creek fifty and sixty-two hundredths (50.62) cubic feet of
water per second of time for Colorado and eighty-nine and eight
hundredths (89.08) cubic feet of water per second of time for New
Mexico, subject to adjustment as provided in Article V (e), and such
water shall be delivered for beneficial use in the two states in
accordance with the schedules and under the conditions set forth in
Article V.
(d) There is allocated for diversion from the natural flow of Costilla
Creek sufficient water to provide each year one thousand (1,000)
acre-feet of stored water in Eastdale Reservoir No. 1, such water to be
delivered as provided in Article V.
(e) There is allocated for diversion to Colorado thirty-six and fivetenths per cent (36.5%) and to New Mexico sixty-three and fivetenths per cent (63.5%) of the water stored by Costilla Reservoir for
107. 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
108. Id. at 465.
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release therefrom for irrigation purposes each year, subject to
adjustment as provided in Article V (e) and such water shall be
delivered for beneficial use in the two states on a parity basis in
accordance with the provisions of Article V. By "parity basis" is meant
that neither state shall enjoy a priority of right of use.
(f) There is allocated for beneficial use in each of the states of
Colorado and New Mexico one-half of the surplus water, as defined
in Article II (p), to be delivered as provided in Article V.
(g) There is allocated for beneficial use in each of the states of
Colorado and New Mexico one-half of any water made available and
usable g additional storage facilities which may be constructed in the
future.

Article V of the Compact entails "the operation of the facilities of
Costilla Creek and [water delivery] for the irrigation of land in
Colorado and New Mexico" in accord with the preceding Article IV.'"
Contained within the Article is a tabulation entitled Deliveries of Direct
Flow Water to Colorado DuringIrrigationSeason that provides a definitive
allocation of the amount of Costilla Creek streamflow measured at the
canyon mouth that shall be delivered by New Mexico to Colorado."'
Subsequent narrative in the Article provides additional instruction for
water delivery, with particular emphasis on the amount delivered and
the schedule for storage releases within the Costilla Reservoir System."'
Article VIII of the Amended Costilla Creek Compact vested the two
State Engineers with the authority for administration of the waters in
Costilla Creek." 3 To properly distribute the natural streamflows and
releases from reservoir storage to water users in accord with the
priority system, it was necessary to have an accurate daily measurement
of water throughout the Costilla Creek watershed. Cognizant of that
need, the authors of the Compact included within Article VIII the
provision for the United States Geological Survey ("USGS") to
collaborate
with
the Costilla Creek Compact Commission
("Commission") to conduct streamflow measurements, provide daily
flow information at eight locations in the Costilla Creek Basin, and
publish annual water reports necessary for the proper administration

109. Amended Costilla Creek Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. IV, § 37-68-101 (2002),
Act of Dec. 12, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-198, 77 Stat. 350. The amended Costilla Creek
Compact reflected a transfer of 5.08 cubic feet per second of water from the Colorado
allocation of the Acequia Madre Ditch to the Cerro Canal by resolution of the Costilla
Creek Compact Commission on May 2, 1962. Commissioner J.E. Whitten for
Colorado and Commissioner S.E. Reynolds for New Mexico signed the Amended
Costilla Creek Compact in Santa Fe, New Mexico on February 7, 1963.
110. Id. art. V, 77Stat. at354.
111. Id.
112. Id. art. V(b), 77 Stat. at 354-55.
113. Id. art. VIII, 77 Stat. at 358. The officials from Colorado and New Mexico who
are charged with the duty of administering the public water supplies are designated as
"Commissioners" for their respective states. Together, they constitute the Costilla
Creek Compact Commission.
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of the Compact."' In addition to securing assistance with streamflow
measurement and recording, the Commission retained the ability to
employ engineering and other administrative assistance necessary to
properly administer the Compact." 5
At the Second Annual Meeting of the Costilla Creek Compact
Commission, the Commissioners agreed that during the ensuing year,
New Mexico officials would administer water rights in the Costilla
Creek watershed below the canyon mouth to assure proper delivery of
water in accordance with the Compact.1 6 Through a cooperative
agreement subsequent to that directive by the Commission, the State
of New Mexico and the USGS employed Max Contreras as the first
Watermaster to provide daily water administration and oversight in the
Costilla Creek system from April 15, 1947 through September 30,
1947.1 7 Henceforth, Colorado and New Mexico have recognized the
value and importance of daily water administration, and continue the
seasonal employment of a Costilla Creek Watermaster to date. Both
states share equal supervision authority for the Costilla Creek
Watermaster and the Watermaster's appointed assistant, as well as
funding responsibility for their salaries and operating costs.
In recognition that administration and distribution of Costilla
Creek water in accordance with the complex system prescribed by the
Amended Costilla Creek Compact is difficult, the Commissioners
adopted a resolution that directed the Engineer Advisers to develop a
users.
written set of operational standards that would serve all water
Adhering to the direction of the Commission, the Engineer Advisers
conducted formal inspections of all pertinent facilities and water
conveyance structures in the Costilla Creek system with the
Watermaster, and submitted a draft Operations Manual to the
Commission, local water users, and citizen groups for review and
comment.
At the Fifty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Costilla Creek Compact
Commission, the Commissioners adopted the Costilla Creek
Operations Manual with five basic principles: (1) to efficiently and

114. Amended Costilla Creek Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. VIII, § 37-68-101, 77
Stat. 350, 358. In collaboration with the USGS, the Commission maintains streamflow

gauging stations and equipment at the following locations: on Costilla Creek
immediately below Costilla Reservoir; on Costilla Creek near the canyon mouth above
the headgate of the Cerro Canal and below the Amalia Area; on Costilla Creek at the
Colorado-New Mexico state line; on the Cerro Canal immediately below its headgate;
on the Cerro Canal at the Colorado-New Mexico state line; on the intake from the
Costilla Creek to Eastdale Reservoir No. 1; on the Acequia Madre immediately below
its headgate; and on the Acequia Madre at the Colorado-New Mexico state line.
115. Id.
116. Minutes, Record of the Second Annual Meeting of the Costilla Creek Compact
Commission, Santa Fe, N.M. 4 (Feb. 24 & 26, 1947).
117. Minutes, Record of the Third Meeting of the Costilla Creek Compact
Commission, El Paso, Tex. 3 (Feb. 24 & 25, 1948).
118. Resolution of the Costilla Creek Compact Commission, Direction of the Colorado
and New Mexico Engineer Advisers to Take Specific Actions to aid in the Administration of the
Amended Costilla Creek Compact (May 8, 1998).
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effectively serve the direct streamflow water users in strict accordance
with the 1963 Amended Compact and allocation table; (2) to
efficiently distribute Costilla Reservoir water as allocated between the
two states; (3) to properly account for the different water types
(streamflow, reservoir storage) and uses of water in the system; (4) to
provide information to water users and state water officials in Colorado
and New Mexico through a daily report during the irrigation season
and an annual report; and (5) to diligently work with the owners of
diversion structures within the Costilla Creek system to ensure reliable
control and accurate measurement of water."'
IV. COMPACT ADMINISTRATION ISSUES
A. WATER ADMINISTRATION AND WATER USERS
The preponderance of irrigated lands served by Costilla Creek is in
the southeastern portion of the San Luis Valley, which is a highaltitude desert climate that receives a paltry seven inches of
precipitation per year on average. Succinctly, demand for water far
exceeds available supply, as evidenced by the early construction of
irrigation ditches in the region, which had fully appropriated Costilla
Creek waters by 1873. Within the Costilla Creek watershed, the Amalia
Area is the irrigated area in New Mexico above the Canyon Mouth and
below the Costilla Reservoir. Direct flow water rights serve the Amalia
Area. 2' Several smaller direct flow decrees serve the Costilla-Garcia
Area, which is downstream and extends from the Canyon Mouth in
New Mexico to a point in Colorado about four miles downstream from
the state line.'
The Costilla-Garcia Area is a compact body of
irrigated land on either
side of Costilla Creek, served by decreed direct
22
flow water rights. 1
Lands of the former Jaroso Colony are located entirely within
Colorado and served by a consortium of direct flow rights carried in
the Cerro Canal and reservoir storage in Eastdale Reservoir No. 1.
Within the context of an arid region with limited and temporary water
supplies, water users compete-sometimes violently-for water. In late

119. Minutes, Record of the Fifty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the Costilla Creek
Compact Commission, Santa Fe, N.M. 13 (May 10, 2001); COSTILLA CREEK COMPACT
COMM'N, THE COSTILLA CREEK OPERATIONS MANUAL 3

(2001). The Operations Manual

also cites seven specific functions and duties of the Watermaster:
distribute direct flow water ... ; administer Costilla Reservoir storage
water... ; administer Amalia Area water rights ... ; account for the different
types of water (through measurement and calculations] ... ; communicate
with water users and state officials ... ; exercise [sound] judgment [to assure
the] ... proper and safe delivery of water; [and] oversee [construction and
operation] of headgates and measuring devices.
Id.
120. Amended Costilla Creek Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. art. 11(c), § 37-68-101
(2002), 77 Stat. 350, 351.
121. 1I art. II(d), 77 Stat. at 351.
122.

Id.
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August 1950, a lack of summer rains threatened irrigated crops in the
Jaroso area. Colorado State Engineer Michael Hinderlider and New
Mexico State Engineer John Bliss collaboratively agreed to an atypical
release of two hundred acre-feet of water from Costilla Reservoir above
the amount due to Colorado for the irrigation season to provide relief
to the Jaroso farmers."' 3 In an ominous and foretelling statement, Mr.
Bliss recognized such a nonconforming release would deplete the
However, he concurred
reservoir to a potentially disastrous level.'
with Hinderlider's petition for the storage release by stating, "this is a
,,121
chance which the Commissioners can and should take in this case.
Unfortunately, Bliss' prescient caution was warranted. In a notice
to Costilla Creek water users dated April 2, 1951, the Commission
advised the water users there would be no water to satisfy direct flow
water rights beyond the first two priorities on the stream, and only
9000 acre-feet of storage water from Costilla Reservoir was available. 2 6
Because of this dire set of hydrologic circumstances, irrigators in the
Amalia Area began to take administration of Costilla Creek waters into
their own hands. In acts of defiance, the irrigators destroyed or
bypassed headgates and control structures in the area.2 7 For the first
and only time, New Mexico was unable to provide any diversion
records for the Amalia Area in 1951.128 To assist the Costilla Creek
Watermaster, the New Mexico State Engineer petitioned the New
Mexico Attorney General to file a suit seeking a permanent injunction
as a means of
against the contentious ditch owners in the
129Amalia Area
Compact.
the
of
regulations
the
enforcing
Tension between water users grew proportionally with the severity
and duration of the drought experienced in the Costilla Creek Basin
during the early 1950s. The animosity and dangerousness alarmed the
Watermaster and local water users throughout the area. During the
two-year period between 1951 and 1953, violence extended beyond
destruction of headgates and ditches, to acts of intimidation, death
threats, and shootings at the Watermaster and representatives of the
Due to the dismal water supply forecasts and
Water Company.'
escalating threats of violence, Colorado Governor, Dan Thornton,
collaborated with New Mexico Governor, Edwin Mechem, to resolve
the troubles along Costilla Creek in northern New Mexico. 3 ' The New
123. Letter from John H. Bliss, Comm'r for New Mexico, to M.C. Hinderlider,

Comm'r for Colorado (Aug. 29, 1950).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Notice from John H. Bliss, Comm'r for New Mexico, to Costilla Creek Water
Users (Apr. 2, 1951).
127. Letter from John H. Bliss, Comm'r for New Mexico, to M.C. Hinderlider,
Comm'r for Colorado (Sept. 21, 1951).
128. Id.
129. Letter from John R. Erickson, Interstate Stream Eng'r, New Mexico, to M.C.
Hinderlider, Comm'r for Colorado (July 2, 1951).
130. Letter from M.C. Hinderlider, Comm'r for Colorado, to Dan Thornton,
Governor of Colorado (Mar. 17, 1953).
131. Letter from Dan Thornton, Governor of Colorado, to Edwin L. Mechem,
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Mexico Chief of Police restored law and order to the Amalia Area by
assigning a state patrolman to provide visible assistance to the
Watermaster, and to conduct random patrols in the Amalia Area,
which continued for the next several years.
It is important to recognize the efforts of Colorado and New
Mexico state water officials to work collaboratively to defend the
prescribed and equitable water allocation system provided for in the
Costilla Creek Compact against anarchy, even to the extent of securing
law enforcement. Due to the lack of water, poor land development
sales, threats of violence, or perhaps a combination of all three, the
Water Company completely divested its interests by 1956. The Rio
Costilla Cooperative Livestock Association took possession of the New
Mexico direct flow and storage water rights1 33 based in the Amalia

Area, and successors to the Jaroso Colony obtained the Water
Company's interests in Colorado. 4
B. EASTDALE RESERVOIR No. 1 OPERATIONS
As previously indicated, Costilla Reservoir captures water through
impoundment of a dam on Costilla Creek high in the mountains at its
headwaters, and Eastdale Reservoir No. 1 is an off-channel structure
situated on the valley floor at the other end of the system. Codified
within the Compact are specific terms that describe the amount,
timing, and priority of storage in Eastdale Reservoir No. 1. In practical
terms and sequence, Eastdale Reservoir No. I is entitled to store 1000
acre-feet from the natural flow yielded by Costilla Creek as early in the
irrigation season as possible.' 5 Direct flow water rights in both states
are then administered in priority. If surplus water is available that is in
excess of the aggregate demand of direct flow water rights or cannot

Governor of New Mexico (Mar. 25, 1953).
132. Letter from John H. Bliss, Comm'r for New Mexico, to M.C. Hinderlider,
Comm'r for Colorado (June 4, 1953).
133. Minutes, Record of the Sixth (Fifth Annual) Meeting of the Costilla Creek
Compact Commission, Santa Fe, N.M. 2. (Apr. 7, 1950). The Rio Costilla Livestock
Association was issued the tax deed to "Costilla Dam and Irrigation Works," per H.B.
Sellers, Chief of the New Mexico Tax Commission to the New Mexico State Engineer.
134. Minutes, Record of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Costilla Creek Compact
Commission, Santa Fe, N.M. 6 (May 10, 1955). The Jaroso water users formed the
Jaroso Mutual Ditch Company and took over the Cerro Canal and Eastdale systems in
1955.
135. Amended Costilla Creek Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. IV(d) & V(d), § 37-68101 (2002), 77 Stat. 350, 354, 356. The point of measurement for the 1000 acre-feet
quantity is storage within the reservoir, not the measured diversion at the reservoir
intake. Early storage is encouraged to coordinate the timing of spring runoff with
diversion of direct flow rights to maximize the beneficial use of water. The initial
portion of spring runoff is typically too early in the season for irrigation in the higher
elevations of Costilla Creek and this water may be effectively captured and released for
late-season irrigation without conflict to direct flow water rights. In the event that
Eastdale Reservoir No. 1 does not receive its 1000 acre-feet allocation and natural flow
was stored in Costilla Reservoir, Eastdale No. 1 is entitled to that amount stored in
Costilla Reservoir during the same irrigation season to fill its 1000 acre-feet
entitlement.
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be stored in operating reservoirs, each state is entitled to one-half of
the surplus.' 36 Review of historical compact accounting and reservoir
records indicate Eastdale Reservoir No. I stored in excess of 1000 acrefeet many times and released these waters to beneficially irrigate lands
below the reservoir.17 According to former New Mexico State
Engineer Reynolds, the practice of permitting Eastdale to store surplus
waters that could not be stored in other reservoirs and was in excess of
the requirements of direct flow ri hts, satisfied the purposes of the
compact and made common sense.
However, storage of surplus waters in Eastdale Reservoir No. 1
continues to be a contentious issue.
Offering a contrary and
ambiguous interpretation of the compact, the local Amalia
organization Rio Costilla Cooperative Livestock Association
("RCCLA") repeatedly challenged the Commission's position to allow
the storage of surplus water in Eastdale Reservoir No. 1 and to pass the
surplus water through the reservoir to beneficially irrigate crops.139
The RCCLA protests this sound water management practice and
attempts to preclude storage of surplus water in Eastdale that can be
applied to beneficial use even though they are located several40 miles
upstream and have no physical ability to use these same waters.
C. THE ENVIRONMENT

Competition for these scarce water supplies includes
encroachment by natural factors or phenomena. As an example,
creation of ditch and lateral systems for land irrigation allowed for a
greatly expanded network of "artificial streams" that conveniently
provided habitat for beavers that did not exist in the pre-development
natural environment of Costilla Creek. The persistence and ingenuity
of beavers to construct impoundments within Costilla Creek and its
irrigation ditches has been a source of consternation to farmers and
water administration officials for decades. As a testament to their
prolific activity, reference to their activities was a constant theme in the
annual Watermaster reports that described the construction of beaver

136. Id. art. V(c), 77 Stat. at 356.
137. COSTILLA CREEK WATERMASTER, COSTILLA CREEK WATERMASTER'S REPORT FOR
1970 IRRirATION SEASON5 (1970). As an example of storage in excess of 1000 acre-feet

in Eastdale Reservoir No. 1, Watermaster Charles Miller stated the delivery to Eastdale
Reservoir No. 1 started March 1, 1970 and completion of the 1000 acre-feet delivery

was accomplished by April 24, 1970. After which, "water was made available to the
direct flow users in accordance with the schedule of priorities .... The direct flow
users did not use all of the water available" so the Watermaster delivered 2070 acre-feet
of excess water to Eastdale Reservoir No. 1 by May 15th "and an additional 1680 acrefeet were delivered during the irrigation season." Id.
138. Memorandum from S.E. Reynolds, State Eng'r, New Mexico, to file 4 (Apr. 30,
1964) (on file with New Mexico State Engineer Office).
139. Letter from David Arguello, President, Rio Costilla Cooperative Livestock
Assoc., to Norman Gaume, New Mexico Interstate Stream Eng'r 3 (Jan. 24, 2000).

140. Id.
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dams in the Acequia Madre and other irrigation ditches, causing
failure of the ditch, erosion of lands, and wasted water."'
As is the case with many other rivers and creeks in the western
United States, local environmental coalitions are seeking to revert
Costilla Creek back to its pre-development conditions through
imposition of a minimum bypass through Costilla Reservoir. 42 As
previously mentioned, Costilla Reservoir is located high in the basin
with a limited drainage basin that effectively serves its intended
purpose and captures ephemeral snowmelt for deferred release to
irrigated farmlands later in the summer months.' Representatives for
the environmental coalitions have petitioned the Commission for
imposition of 3.6 to 7.25 cubic feet per second continual release
through Costilla Reservoir and to forego storage of this amount during
the winter months.144 Unfortunately, the environmental coalition fails
to recognize the total inflow to the reservoir during the winter months
is an estimated two to four cubic feet per second and the water rights
are owned by farmers and ranchers dependent upon capture of these
waters for irrigation and their livelihood.
Nevertheless, the
willingness of the environmental constituents and their representative
legal counsel to meet with local farmers and water administration
officials in pursuit of mutual understanding and collaboration is a
positive action toward maintaining the vibrancy of the Costilla Creek
watershed.
D. OPERATIONS, MEASUREMENT, AND COST
Maintaining diversion structures, dams, and ditches in a
mountainous climate is always a difficult endeavor. Sediment carried
by rushing spring snowmelt settles in the calmer flow of downstream
ditches and must be removed on a perpetual basis to retain the
ditches' carrying capacity. 4 ' Sluicing operations that temporarily flush
the sediment from the Acequia Madre, Cerro, and other ditches often

141.

JOHN H. YAPLE, WATERMASTER, REPORT BY WATERMASTER OF COSTILLA RESERVOIR

SYSTEM FOR 1962 IRRIGATION SEASON 10 (1962). WatermasterJohn Yaple described the
repeated construction of beaver dams in the Acequia Madre and other irrigation
ditches. The dams preclude division of water among different ditches and caused the
waste of water through overflow that evaporated or percolated into the ground
without returning to the stream. Although the dams were repeatedly removed from
the ditches, the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish did not respond to the
request to remove the beaver. Id.
142. Minutes, Record of the Fifty-Second Meeting of the Costilla Creek Compact
Commission, Santa Fe, N.M. 10 (May 8-9, 1988).
143. USGS, supra note 59, at 71.
144. Letter from Ernest Atencio, Projects Director, Amigos Bravos, to Costilla Creek
Compact Comm'n (May 8, 1998) (on file with the Costilla Creek Compact
Commission).
145. Interview with Steven E. Vandiver, Colo. Div. III Eng'r, Alamosa, Colo. (Feb. 21,

2003). USGS streamflow records are not available for the winter months at these high
elevation stations. Id.
146. COSTILLA CREEK WATERMASTER, WATERMASTER REPORT 4 (1980).
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must occur on a weekly basis throughout the season to minimize
sediment deposition."'
Control and measurement of water through adequate structures is
critical to accurate water administration and compliance with the
Costilla Creek Compact. In an attempt to quantify the amount of
diversions, the New Mexico State Engineer issued a formal order to
install adequate headgates and measuring devices in the Amalia Area
in 1948. '48 Unfortunately, four years later the New Mexico State
Engineer had to reissue the orders to replace headgates damaged or
destroyed by the acts of defiance in 1951.'14
Although acts of
vandalism to streamflow gauging stations and unauthorized
adjustments to diversion headgates continue today, the water officials
from both states mutually recognize the value and need for adequate
water control and measuring devices.150 Each year a few additional
structures are rehabilitated or installed in the Costilla Creek system
and help the Watermaster in administering water in accord with the
compact.
Consistent with other forms of public service, the demand for
accurate and responsive water administration by state officials
continues to escalate. Unfortunately, water administration funding
has remained essentially stagnant while the cost of "doing business"
has risen dramatically.
The increasing costs for Costilla Creek
Compact administration are especially acute. After hiring the first
Watermaster and setting the initial budget in 1947, Colorado and New
Mexico were each assessed $2,000 for administrative and operating
costs.' 5 ' The assessments have steadily
increased for each state to
52
$45,384 in the current 2003 budget.
The Commission simultaneously pursued two parallel paths to
reduce expenses in order to maintain a high quality water
administration and pay the bills. First, the Watermaster was instructed
to operate, service, maintain, and develop water flow records at several
locations that were formerly under contract to the USGS.13 Second,
the Commission seized upon the use of advanced technology by
installing remote-access equipment on several streamflow gauging
147. Id. In 2001, the New Mexico State Legislature appropriated $50,000 for use in
removing sediment and beaver dams in the lower Amalia area and below the Cerro
Diversion Dam.
148. Minutes, Record of the Third Annual Meeting, supra note 117, at 3-4.
149. Minutes of the Tenth (Seventh Annual) Meeting of the Costilla Creek Compact
Commission, Santa Fe, N.M. (Apr. 4,1952).
150. Minutes, Record of the Seventeenth Annual (Twenty-Second) Meeting of the
Costilla Creek Compact Commission, Santa Fe, N.M. 3 (May 2, 1962); Minutes of the
Forty-Fifth Annual (Fiftieth) Costilla Creek Compact Commission 5 (May 9, 1991).
151. Minutes, Record of the Second Annual Meeting, supra note 116.
152. COSTILLA CREEK COMPACT COMM'N TREAsuRER's REP. JULY 1, 2001 TO JUNE 30,
2002. The expenditures represent the administrative costs for personnel salaries and
benefits, office supplies and communication expenses, vehicle operating expenses,
and joint funding with the USGS for streamflow gage operations.
153. Minutes, Record of the Forty-Fourth Annual (Forty-Ninth) Meeting of the
Costilla Creek Compact Commission, San Luis, Colo. 7 (May 4, 1990).
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stations that provide near-instantaneous flow reports without the need
for the Watermaster to incur the daily cost of driving to the stations.'54
The Commission has been applauded for its initiative. However, with
inadequate funding, the effort to provide high quality service in the
Costilla Creek basin will continue to be a struggle.
V. CONCLUSION
The pristine waters of Costilla Creek are laced with history,
controversy, and fulfillment. Early explorers and settlers recognized
the potential of the land, but also knew they must harness the water
and apply it to beneficial use before they could realize any measure of
success or permanence. In contrast, a litany of promoters, investment
bankers, and land developers who actively sought to exploit the
natural resources that were once so evident in the Sangre de Cristo
Grant came and went - some garnered wealth, others lost vast
fortunes. Only those individuals and communities that worked with
the creek to marshal its limited and temporal waters persevered and
passed their inheritance to successive generations.
Administration of an interstate, river compact is often difficult and
always complex. Administration of the Costilla Creek Compact has
also proven to be fraught with peril. To retain order and distribute
water in strict accord with the prescribed terms of the compact
requires a vigilant presence. 5 The compact provides for an equitable
apportionment of water, but it is the Watermaster that must provide
daily oversight to assure the direct flow rights and recipients of
reservoir water receive the water to which they are entitled, in time
and amount. Although streamflow gauging stations equipped with
remote access instrumentation and the Operating Manual with an
electronic accounting spreadsheet are available to assist in daily water
administration, the communication and collaboration efforts among
the water users and state administration officials are the keys to
successful water allocation.
0 The Compact Commissioners are vested with the responsibility and
authority to assure the intent of the compact authors is achieved - the
equitable division and apportionment of water, to promote interstate
comity, resolve current and future controversies, and to assure the
most efficient utilization of Costilla Creek waters through integrated
operation of existing and future irrigation facilities."" The application
of a fundamental priority system across state lines requires both State
154. Minutes, Record of the Forty-Ninth Annual (Fifty-fourth) Meeting of the
Costilla Creek Compact Commission, Santa Fe, N.M. 3 (May 12, 1995). Colorado State
Engineer Hal D. Simpson implored the use of technology to administer the compact
more efficiently. Id. The administrative cost of $9.50 per irrigated acre for the Costilla
Creek Compact far exceeds the administrative cost per acre of other compacts by a
factor of two or three. Id. Interview with Steven E. Vandiver, Colo. Div. III Eng'r,
supra note 145.
155. Interview with Steven E. Vandiver, Colo. Div. III Eng'r, supra note 145.
156. Amended Costilla Creek Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. I, § 37-68-101 (2002),
77 Stat. 350, 350-351.
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Engineers to consider the rights and interests of out-of-state water
users. Such a system also calls upon State Engineers to enforce the
provisions of the compact to the detriment of water users in their own
respective state. As a testament to the present and former State
Engineers, the Costilla Creek Compact has not yet been subject to
interstate litigation since its inception almost sixty years ago. The
water users will only continue to receive their equitable apportionment
of the elusive Costilla Creek waters in a very challenging environment
through mutual respect and adherence to the provisions contained
within the Costilla Creek Compact.
VI. APPENDIX
COSTILLA CREEK COMPACT
The general assembly hereby ratifies the amended compact
between the state of Colorado and the state of New Mexico, designated
as the "Amended Costilla Creek Compact", signed inthe city of Santa
Fe, state of New Mexico, on the seventh day of February, A. D. 1963, by
J. E. Whitten, commissioner for the state of Colorado, and S. E.
Reynolds, commissioner for the state of New Mexico, which said
amended compact is as follows:
Amended Costilla Creek Compact
The state of Colorado and the state of New Mexico, parties
signatory to this compact (hereinafter referred to as "Colorado" and
"New Mexico," respectively, or individually as a "state," or collectively
as the "states"), having on September 30, 1944 concluded, through
their duly authorized commissioners, to- wit: Clifford H. Stone for
Colorado and Thomas M. McClure for New Mexico, a compact with
respect to the water of Costilla Creek, an interstate stream, which
compact was ratified by the states in 1945 and was approved by the
congress of the United States in 1946; and
The states, having resolved to conclude an amended compact with
respect to the waters of Costilla Creek, have designated, pursuant to
the acts of their respective legislatures and through their appropriate
executive agencies, as their commissioners:
J. E. Whitten, for Colorado
S. E. Reynolds, for New Mexico
Who, after negotiations, have agreed upon these articles:
ARTICLE I
The major purposes of this compact are to provide for the
equitable division and apportionment of the use of the waters of
Costilla Creek; to promote interstate comity; to remove causes of
present and future interstate controversies; to assure the most efficient
utilization of the waters of Costilla Creek; to provide for the integrated
operation of existing and prospective irrigation facilities on the stream
in the two states; to adjust the conflicting jurisdictions of the two states
over irrigation works and facilities diverting and storing waters in one
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state for use in both states; to equalize the benefits of water from
Costilla Creek, used for the irrigation of contiguous lands lying on
either side of the Boundary, between the citizens and water users of
one state and those of the other; and to place the beneficial
application of water diverted from Costilla Creek for irrigation by the
water users of the two states on a common basis.
The physical and other conditions peculiar to the Costilla Creek
and its basin, and the nature and location of the irrigation
development and the facilities in connection therewith, constitute the
basis for this compact; and neither of the States hereby, nor the
Congress of the United States by its consent, concedes that this
compact establishes any general principle or precedent with respect to
any other interstate stream.
ARTICLE II
As used in this compact, the following names, terms and
expressions are described, defined, applied and taken to mean as in
this article set forth:
(a) "Costilla Creek" is a tributary of the Rio Grande which rises on
the west slope of the Sangre de Cristo range in the extreme
southeastern corner of Costilla County in Colorado and flows in a
general westerly direction crossing the boundary three times above its
confluence with the Rio Grande in New Mexico.
(b) The "Canyon Mouth" is that point on Costilla Creek in New
Mexico where the stream leaves the mountains and emerges into the
San Luis Valley.
(c) The "Amalia Area" is that irrigated area in New Mexico above
the Canyon Mouth and below the Costilla Reservoir which is served by
decreed direct flow water rights.
(d) The "Costilla-Garcia Area" is that area extending from the
Canyon Mouth in New Mexico to a point in Colorado about four miles
downstream from the boundary, being a compact body of irrigated
land on either side of Costilla Creek served by decreed direct flow
water rights.
(e) The "Eastdale Reservoir No. 1" is that off-channel reservoir
located in Colorado in sections 7, 8 and 18, township 1 north, range 73
west, and sections 12 and 13, township 1 north, range 74 west, of the
Costilla Estates survey, with a nominal capacity of three thousand four
hundred sixty-eight (3,468) acre-feet and a present usable capacity of
two thousand (2,000) acre-feet.
(f) The "Eastdale Reservoir No. 2" is that off-channel reservoir
located in Colorado in sections 3, 4, 9 and 10, township 1 north, range
73 west, of the Costilla Estates survey, with nominal capacity of three
thousand forty-one (3,041) acre-feet.
(g) The "Costilla Reservoir" is that channel reservoir, having a
nominal capacity of fifteen thousand seven hundred (15,700) acrefeet, located in New Mexico near the headwaters of Costilla Creek.
The present usable capacity of the reservoir is eleven thousand
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(11,000) acre-feet, subject to future adjustment by the state engineer
of New Mexico. The condition of Costilla Dam may be such that the
state engineer of New Mexico will not permit storage above a
determined stage except for short periods of time.
(h) The "Cerro Canal" is that irrigation canal which diverts water
from the left bank of Costilla Creek in New Mexico near the southwest
corner of section 12, township 1 south, range 73 west, of the Costilla
Estates survey, and runs in a northwesterly direction to the boundary
near Boundary Monument No. 140.
(i) The "boundary" is the term used herein to describe the
common boundary line between Colorado and New Mexico.
(j) The term "Costilla Reservoir System" means and includes the
Costilla Reservoir and the Cerro Canal, the permits for the storage of
water in Costilla Reservoir, the twenty-four and fifty-two hundredths
(24.52) cubic feet per second of time of direct flow water rights
transferred to the Cerro Canal, and the permits for the diversion of
direct flow water by the Cerro Canal as adjusted herein to seventy-five
and forty-eight hundredths (75.48) cubic feet per second of time.
(k) The term "Costilla Reservoir System Safe Yield" means that
quantity of usable water made available each year by the Costilla
Reservoir System. The safe yield represents the most beneficial
operation of the Costilla Reservoir System through the use, first, of the
total usable portion of the yield of the twenty-four and fifty-two
hundredths (24.52) cubic feet per second of time of direct flow rights
transferred to the Cerro Canal, second, of the total usable portion of
the yield of the direct flow Cerro Canal permits, and third, of that
portion of the water stored in Costilla Reservoir required to complete
such safe yield.
(1) The term "usable capacity" is defined and means that capacity
of Costilla Reservoir at the stage above which the state engineer of New
Mexico will not permit storage except for short periods of time.
(in) The term "temporary storage" is defined and means the water
permitted by the state engineer of New Mexico to be stored in Costilla
Reservoir for short periods of time above the usable capacity of that
reservoir.
(n) The term "additional storage facilities" is defined and means
storage capacity which may be provided in either state to impound
waters of Costilla Creek and its tributaries in addition to the nominal
capacity of Costilla Reservoir and the Costilla Creek complement of
the Eastdale Reservoir No. 1 capacity.
(o) The term "duty of water" is defined as the rate in cubic feet per
second of time at which water may be diverted at the headgate to
irrigate a specified acreage of land during the period of maximum
requirement.
(p) The term "surplus water" is defined and means water which
cannot be stored in operating reservoirs during the storage season or
water during the irrigation season which cannot be stored in operating
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reservoirs and which is in excess of the aggregate direct flow rights and
permits recognized by this compact.
(q) The term "irrigation season" is defined and means that period
of each calendar year from May 16 to September 30, inclusive.
(r) The term "storage season" is defined and means that period of
time extending from October 1 of one year to May 15 of the
succeeding year, inclusive.
(s) The term "points of interstate delivery" means and includes (1)
the Acequia Madre where it crosses the boundary; (2) the Costilla
Creek where it crosses the boundary; (3) the Cerro Canal where it
reaches the boundary; and (4) any other interstate canals which might
be constructed with the approval of the commission at the point or
points where they cross the boundary.
(t) The term "water company" means The San Luis Power and
Water Company, a Colorado corporation, or its successor.
(u) The word "commission" means the Costilla Creek Compact
commission created by Article VIII of this compact for the
administration thereof.
ARTICLE III
1. To accomplish the purposes of this compact, as set forth in
Article I, the following adjustments in the operation of irrigation
facilities on Costilla Creek, and in the use of water diverted, stored and
regulated thereby, are made:
(a) The quantity of water delivered for use in the two states by
direct flow ditches in the Costilla-Garcia Area and by the Cerro Canal
is based on a duty of water of one cubic foot per second of time for
each eighty (80) acres, to be applied in the order of priority; provided,
however, that this adjustment in each instance is based on the acreage
as determined by the court in decreeing the water rights for the
Costilla-Garcia Area, and in the case of the Cerro Canal such basis shall
apply to eight thousand (8,000) acres of land. In order to better
maintain a usable head for the diversion of water for beneficial
consumptive use the adjusted maximum diversion rate under the
water right of each of the ditches supplying water for the CostillaGarcia Area in Colorado is not less than one cubic foot per second of
time.
(b) There is transferred from certain ditches in the Costilla-Garcia
Area twenty-four and fifty-two hundredths (24.52) cubic feet per
second of time of direct flow water rights, which rights of use are held
by the water company or its successors in title, to the headgate of the
Cerro Canal. The twenty-four and fifty-two hundredths (24.52) cubic
feet of water per second of time hereby transferred represents an
evaluation of these rights after adjustment in the duty of water,
pursuant to subsection (a) of this Article, and includes a reduction
thereof to compensate for increased use of direct flow water which
otherwise would have been possible under these rights by this transfer.
(c) Except for the rights to store water from Costilla Creek in
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Eastdale Reservoir No. I as hereinafter provided, all diversion and
storage rights from Costilla Creek for Eastdale Reservoirs No. I and
No. 2 are relinquished and the water decreed thereunder is returned
to the creek for use in accordance with the plan of integrated
operation effectuated by this compact.
(d) The Cerro Canal direct flow permit shall be seventy-five and
forty-eight hundredths (75.48) cubic feet per second of time.
(e) There is transferred to and made available for the irrigation of
lands in Colorado a portion of the Costilla Reservoir complement of
the Costilla Reservoir System Safe Yield in order that the storage of
water in that reservoir may be made for the benefit of water users in
both Colorado and New Mexico under the provisions of this compact
for the allocations of water and the operation of facilities.
2. Each state grants for the benefit of the other and its water users
the rights to change the points of diversion of water from Costilla
Creek, to divert water from the stream in one state for use in the other
and to store water in one state for the irrigation of lands in the other,
insofar as the exercise of such rights may be necessary to effectuate the
provisions of this Article and to comply with the terms of this compact.
3. The water company has consented to and approved the
adjustments contained in this Article; and such consent and approval
shall be evidenced in writing and filed with the commission.
ARTICLE IV
The apportionment and allocation of the use of Costilla Creek
water shall be as follows:
(a) There is allocated for diversion from the natural flow of
Costilla Creek and its tributaries sufficient water for beneficial use on
meadow and pasture lands above Costilla Reservoir in New Mexico to
the extent and in the manner now prevailing in that area.
(b) There is allocated for diversion from the natural flow of
Costilla Creek and its tributaries thirteen and forty-two hundredths
(13.42) cubic feet of water per second of time for beneficial use on
lands in the Amalia Area in New Mexico.
(c) In addition to allocations made in subsections (e), (f) and (g)
of this Article, there is allocated for diversion from the natural flow of
Costilla Creek fifty and sixty-two hundredths (50.62) cubic feet of
water per second of time for Colorado and eighty-nine and eight
hundredths (89.08) cubic feet of water per second of time for New
Mexico, subject to adjustment as provided in Article V(e), and such
water shall be delivered for beneficial use in the two states in
accordance with the schedules and under the conditions set forth in
Article V.
(d) There is allocated for diversion from the natural flow of
Costilla Creek sufficient water to provide each year one thousand
(1,000) acre-feet of stored water in Eastdale Reservoir No. 1, such
water to be delivered as provided in Article V.
(e) There is allocated for diversion to Colorado thirty-six and five-
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tenths per cent (36.5%) and to New Mexico sixty-three and five-tenths
per cent (63.5%) of the water stored by Costilla Reservoir for release
therefrom for irrigation purposes each year, subject to adjustment as
provided in Article V(e) and such water shall be delivered for
beneficial use in the two states on a parity basis in accordance with the
provisions of Article V. By "parity basis" is meant that neither state
shall enjoy a priority of right of use.
(f) There is allocated for beneficial use in each of the states of
Colorado and New Mexico one-half of the surplus water, as defined in
Article II(p), to be delivered as provided in Article V.
(g) There is allocated for beneficial use in each of the states of
Colorado and New Mexico one-half of any water made available and
usable by additional storage facilities which may be constructed in the
future.
ARTICLE V
The operation of the facilities of Costilla Creek and the delivery of
water for the irrigation of land in Colorado and New Mexico, in
accordance with the allocations made in Article IV, shall be as follows:
(a) Diversions of water for use on lands in the Amalia Area shall be
made as set forth in Article IV(b) in the order of decreed priorities in
New Mexico and of relative priority dates in the two states, subject to
the right of New Mexico to change the points of diversion and places
of use of any of such water to other points of diversion and places of
use; provided, however, that the rights so transferred shall be limited
in each instance to the quantity of water actually consumed on the
lands from which the right is transferred.
(b) Deliveries to Colorado of direct flow water below the Canyon
Mouth shall be made by New Mexico in accordance with the following
schedule:
Deliveries of Direct Flow Water to Colorado During Irrigation
Season
Useable
Discharge

Incremental
Allocations to

Point of
Interstate

Cumulative
Allocations to

of Creek

Colorado

Delivery

Colorado

at Canyon

(C.F.S.)

Remarks

(C.F.S.)

Mouth
Gauging
Station
(C.F.S.)

(1)

(2A)

25.00

1.05

(2B)

(3)
Acequia
Madre

(4)

(5)
Incremental allocation is
4.2% of the usable
discharge when usable
discharge is less than
25.00 C.F.S.

Issue 2

THE COSTILLA CREEK COMPACT

Useable
Discharge
of Creek

Incremental
Allocations to
Colorado

at Canyon

(C.F.S.)

Point of
Interstate
Delivery

Cumulative
Allocations to
Colorado

Remarks

(C.F.S.)

Mouth
Gauging
Station
(C.F.S.)
2.53

Incremental allocation is

Cerro Canal

10.13% of the usable
discharge when usable
discharge is less than
4.70

Cerro Canal

8.28

25.00 C.F.S.
This 4.70 C.F.S. is not a
part of the Colorado
allocation of the direct
flow water of the Costilla
Reservoir System and is
not subject to adjustment
in the event of a change
in the usable capacity of
Costilla Reservoir.
Incremental allocation is
18.8% of the usable
discharge when usable
discharge is less than
25.00 C.F.S. This 4.70
C.F.S. allocated to
Colorado for delivery
through the Cerro Canal
is 5.50 C.F.S. of the
original 6.55 C.F.S.
allocated to Colorado for
delivery through the
Acequia Madre less 0.8
C.F.S. correction for
losses.
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Useable

Incremental

Point of

Cumulative

Discharge

Allocations to

Interstate

Allocations to

of Creek

Colorado

Delivery

Colorado

at Canyon

(C.F.S.)

Remarks

(C.F.S.)

Mouth
Gauging
Station
(C.F.S.)
36.88

.38

This 0.38 C.F.S. is not a
part of the Colorado

Cerro Canal

allocation of the direct
flow water of the Costilla
Reservoir System and is
not subject to adjustment
in the event of a change
in the usable capacity of
Costilla Reservoir.
Incremental allocation is
3.26% of the usable
discharge in excess of
25.38 C.F.S. and less than
36.88 C.F.S.
4.04

Cerro Canal

12.70

Incremental allocation is
35.11% of the usable
discharge in excess of

38.62

1.00

Creek

13.70

25.38 C.F.S. and less than
36.88 C.F.S.
Incremental allocation is
100% of the usable
discharge in excess of
37.62 C.F.S. and less than
38.62 C.F.S.

44.76

2.24

Cerro Canal

15.94

Incremental allocation is
36.5% of the usable
discharge in excess of
38.62 C.F.S. and less than
44.76 C.F.S.

50.91

6.00

Creek

21.94

Incremental allocation is
100% of the usable
discharge in excess of
44.91 C.F.S. and less than
50.91 C.F.S.

56.48

.13

Cerro Canal

22.07

Incremental allocation is
11.18% of the usable
discharge in excess of
55.35 C.F.S. and less than
56.48 C.F.S.
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Useable

Incremental

Point of

Cumulative

Discharge

Allocations to

Interstate

Allocations to

of Creek
at Canyon

Colorado
(C.F.S.)

Delivery

Colorado
(C.F.S.)

Remarks

Mouth
Gauging
Station
(C.F.S.)
1.00

61.48

Creek

23.07

Incremental allocation is
100% of the usable
discharge in excess of
60.48 C.F.S. and less than
61.48 C.F.S.
At usable creek discharge

64.22

of 64.22 C.F.S. the Cerro
Canal direct flow permit
becomes operative after
1,000 acre-feet has been
stored in Eastdale
Reservoir No. 1.
139.70

27.55

Cerro Canal

50.62

Incremental allocation is
36.5% of the usable
discharge in excess of
64.22 C.F.S. and less than
139.70 C.F.S.

The actual discharges of Costilla Creek at the Canyon Mouth
Gauging Station at which the various blocks of direct flow water
become effective shall equal the flows set forth in column (1)
increased by the transmission losses necessary to deliver those flows to
the headgates of the respective direct flow ditches diverting in New
Mexico.
The delivery of ditch water at the boundary shall equal the
allocation set forth in columns (2a) and (2b) reduced by the
transmission losses between the headgate of the ditch and the point
where the ditch crosses the boundary. The allocations to be delivered
to Colorado through the Cerro Canal represent, except as otherwise
indicated in column (5) of the table above, 36.5 percent of those
blocks of direct flow water of the Costilla Reservoir System which are
subject to adjustment as provided in subsection (e) of this article.
The provisions of article III(1) (a) shall not be applicable to the
Colorado allocation of 5.08 C.F.S. which is transferred from the
Acequia Madre to the Cerro Canal by this amendment to the Costilla
Creek compact and shall not be applicable to the 0.8 C.F.S. which is
transferred from Colorado to New Mexico by this amendment to the
Costilla Creek compact.
The above table is compiled on the basis of the delivery to
Colorado at the boundary of thirty-six and five-tenths percent (36.5%)
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of all direct flow water of the Costilla Reservoir System diverted by the
Cerro Canal and the delivery at the boundary of all other direct flow
water allocated to Colorado, in the order of priority, all such deliveries
to be adjusted for transmission losses. In the event of change in the
usable capacity of the Costilla Reservoir, Colorado's share of all direct
flow water of the Costilla Reservoir System diverted by the Cerro Canal,
to be delivered at the boundary and adjusted for transmission losses,
shall be determined by the percentages set forth in column (4) of the
table which appears in subsection (e) of this article.
(c) During the storage season, no water shall be diverted under
direct flow rights unless there is water in excess of the demand of all
operating reservoirs for water from Costilla Creek for storage.
(d) In order to assure the most efficient utilization of the available
water supply, the filling of Eastdale Reservoir No. 1 from Costilla Creek
shall be commenced as early in the spring as possible and shall be
completed as soon thereafter as possible. The Cerro Canal or any
other ditch which may be provided for that purpose shall be used,
insofar as practicable, to convey the water from the Canyon Mouth to
Eastdale Reservoir No. 1. During any season when the commission
determines that there will be no surplus water, any diversions, waste or
spill from any canal or canals supplying Eastdale Reservoir No. I will
be charged to the quantity of water diverted for delivery to said
reservoir.
(e) The commission shall estimate each year the safe yield of
Costilla Reservoir System and its component parts as far in advance of
the irrigation season as possible, and shall review and revise such
estimates from time to time as may be necessary.
In the event the usable capacity of the Costilla Reservoir changes,
the average safe yield and the equitable division thereof between the
states shall be determined in accordance with the following table:
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Useable Capacity of

Annual Average Safe

Costilla Reservoir

Yield (acre-feet)

Division of Safe Yield
Colorado
Acre-

Percent

feet

New Mexico
Acre-

Percent

feet

0

1800

1510

83.9

290

16.1

1000

3400

2000

58.8

1400

41.2

2000

4900

2450

50.0

2450

50.0

3000

6400

2910

45.5

3490

54.5

4000
5000

7900
9300

3370
3800

42.7
40.9

4530
5500

57.3
59.1

6000

10700

4220

39.4

6480

60.6

7000

12000

4650

38.5

7380

61.5

8000

13200

4990

37.8

8210

62.2

9000

14300

5320

37.2

8980

62.8

10000

15200

5600

36.8

9600

63.2

11000

16000

5840

36.5

10160

63.5

12000

16600

6020

36.3

10580

63.7

13000

17000

6140

36.1

10860

63.9

14000

17400

6270

36.0

11130

64.0

15000

17700

6360

35.9

11340

64.1

15700

17900

6420

35.9

11480

64.1

Intermediate quantities shall be computed by proportionate parts.
In the event of change in the usable capacity of the Costilla
Reservoir, the Costilla Reservoir complement of the Costilla Reservoir
System Safe Yield shall be divided between Colorado and New Mexico
in accordance with the percentages given in columns 4 and 6,
respectively, of the above table.
Each state may draw from the reservoir in accordance with the
allocations made herein, up to its proportion of the Costilla Reservoir
complement of the Costilla Reservoir System Safe Yield and its
proportion of temporary storage and no more. Colorado may call for
the delivery of its share thereof at any of the specified points of
interstate delivery.
Deliveries of water from Costilla Reservoir to the Canyon Mouth
shall be adjusted for transmission losses, if any, between the two points.
Deliveries to Colorado at the boundary shall be further adjusted for
transmission losses from the Canyon Mouth to the respective points of
interstate delivery.
Water stored in Costilla Reservoir and not released during the
current season shall not be held over to the credit of either state but
shall be apportioned when the safe yield is subsequently determined.
(f) The Colorado apportionment of surplus water, as allocated in
Article IV(f), shall be delivered by New Mexico at such points of
interstate delivery and in the respective quantities, subject to
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transmission losses, requested by the Colorado member of the
commission.
(g) In the event that additional water becomes usable by the
construction of additional storage facilities, such water shall be made
available to each state in accordance with rules and regulations to be
prescribed by the commission.
(h) When it appears to the commission that any part of the water
allocated to one state for use in a particular year will not be used by
that state, the commission may permit its use by the other state during
that year, provided that a permanent right to the use of such water
shall not thereby be established.
ARTICLE VI
The desirability of consolidating various of the direct flow ditches
serving the Costilla-Garcia Area, which are now or which would
become interstate in character by consolidation, and diverting the
water available to such ditches through a common headgate is
recognized.
Should the owners of any of such ditches, or a
combination of them, desire to effectuate a consolidation and provide
for a common headgate diversion, application therefore shall be made
to the commission which, after review of the plans submitted, may
grant permission to make such consolidation.
ARTICLE VII
The commission shall cause to be maintained and operated a
streamgaging-station, equipped with an automatic water-stage
recorder, at each of the following points, to-wit:
(a) On Costilla Creek immediately below Costilla Reservoir.
(b) On Costilla Creek at or near the Canyon Mouth above the
headgate of Cerro Canal and below the Amalia Area.
(c) On Costilla Creek at or near the boundary.
(d) On the Cerro Canal immediately below its headgate.
(e) On the Cerro Canal at or near the boundary.
(f) On the intake from Costilla Creek to the Eastdale Reservoir
No. 1, immediately above the point where the intake discharges into
the reservoir.
(g) On the Acequia Madre immediately below its headgate.
(h) On the Acequia Madre at the boundary.
(i) Similar gauging stations shall be maintained and operated at
such other points as may be necessary in the discretion of the
commission for the securing of records required for the carrying out
of the provisions of the compact.
Such gauging stations shall be equipped, maintained, and
operated by the commission directly or in cooperation with an
appropriate federal or state agency, and the equipment, method, and
frequency of measurement at such stations shall be such as to produce
reliable records at all times.
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ARTICLE VIII
The two states shall administer this compact through the official in
each state who is now or may hereafter be charged with the duty of
administering the public water supplies, and such officials shall
constitute the Costilla Creek Compact Commission. In addition to the
powers and duties hereinbefore specifically conferred upon such
commission, the commission shall collect and correlate factual data
and maintain records having a bearing upon the administration of this
compact. In connection therewith, the commission may employ such
engineering and other assistance as may be reasonably necessary
within the limits of funds provided for that purpose by the states. The
commission may, by unanimous action, adopt rules and regulations
consistent with the provisions of this compact to govern its
proceedings. The salaries and expenses of the members of the
commission shall be paid by their respective states. Other expenses
incident to the administration of the compact, including the
employment of engineering or other assistance and the establishment
and maintenance of compact gaging stations, not borne by the United
States shall be assumed equally by the two states and paid directly to
the commission upon vouchers submitted for that purpose.
The United States geological survey, or whatever federal agency
may succeed to the functions and duties of that agency, shall
collaborate with the commission in the correlation and publication of
water facts necessary for the proper administration of this compact.
ARTICLE IX
This amended compact shall become operative when ratified by
the legislatures of the signatory states and consented to by the
Congress of the United States; provided, that, except as changed
herein, the provisions, terms, conditions and obligations of the Costilla
Creek Compact executed on September 30, 1944, continue in full
force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the commissioners have signed this
compact in triplicate original, one copy of which shall be deposited in
the archives of the department of state of the United States of
America, and one copy of which shall be forwarded to the governor of
each of the signatory states.
Done in the city of Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the 7th day of
February, in the year of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and
sixty-three.
(Signed) J. E. Whitten,
Commissioner for Colorado.
(Signed) S. E. Reynolds,
Commissioner for New Mexico.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Like many western states, California has looked to water marketing
as a tool for stretching this scarce resource in an era when the building
of new dams meets considerable financial and environmental
obstacles.' Unlike many of its neighbors, however, California does not
have a comprehensive legal code governing water resources. The
State's "modern" water code, established in 1914, applies mainly to
surface water. Groundwater, which constitutes about one-third of the
water used in "normal" rainfall years and more in dry years,' remains

t

Ellen Hanak is an economist and research fellow with the Public Policy

Institute of California. Caitlin Dyckman is a doctoral candidate in the City and
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1. For discussions of water marketing policy in western states, see generally NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1992); WESTERN WATER POLICY ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN THE WEST:
THE
CHALLENGE
FOR
THE
NEXT
CENTURY,
FINAL
REPORT
(1998),

http://www.den.doi.gov/wwprac/reports/final.htm.
2.

CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE BULLETIN 160-98, at

ES3-5 (1998).
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largely unregulated at the State level. This distinction has direct
implications for the functioning of the water market. State laws
governing water transfers provide explicit "no injury" protections for
other legal surface water users as well as fish and wildlife.3 But because
the State does not have jurisdiction over most groundwater-related
transfers,4 these third-party protections do not fully extend to
groundwater users. 5 Under such conditions, the introduction of a
market brings with it the inherent risk of harm to groundwater users in
the source regions, if pumping for sale affects the availability or quality
of the resource locally.
The rapid growth of the market in the early 1990s, prompted in
part by a state-run drought water bank, generated local concerns over
the lack of third-party protections. Bolstered by an appellate court
ruling in 1994 that upheld counties' right to exercise police powers
over groundwater, 7 twenty-two of the California's fifty-eight countiesall located in the inland rural regions - have adopted ordinances with
a section regulating the "export" of groundwater.'
Following an
overview of the genesis of this rural movement to assert control over
the water market, this article examines the movement's implications
from the legal, economic and institutional perspectives. The manifest
3. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1725, 1735-1737 (Deering 2003); George A. Gould, Water
Rights Transfers and Third-PartyEffects, 23 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 13,19 (1988).
4. The State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB") oversees all transfers
involving a change in purpose or place of use of surface water held in post-1914 right.
See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 102, 174. The California Department of Water Resources
("CDWR") needs to approve any transfers of surface or groundwater by parties using
its conveyance facilities, such as the California Aqueduct. Id. § 123. Transfers of
groundwater and of surface water held in pre-1914 rights that do not require the use
of a state-owned conveyance facility are not subject to state review.
5. Legally, groundwater users are not protected by the no-injury provisions of the
water transfer code because of the lack of state jurisdiction over this resource. The
fact that the state does not actually get to review many such transfers makes it difficult
for these two agencies to protect groundwater users under the spirit of the law as well.
Interview with Andrew Sawyer, Gen. Counsel's Office, SWRCB, in Sacramento, Cal.
(Sept. 27, 2002); Interview with Jerry Johns, Chief of the Water Transfers' Office,
CDWR, in Sacramento, Cal. (Dec. 2, 2002).
6. See Harold 0. Carter & Henry J. Vaux, Jr., Third-Party Effects: The Research
Challenge, in SHARING SCARCITY: GAINERS AND LOSERS IN WATER MARKETING 54-55, 97
(Harold 0. Carter et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter SHARING SCARcITY].
7. Baldwin v. County of Tehama, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 889 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
8. Counties with export clauses include: BUTTE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 33-1 (1999);
CALAVERAS COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 17.85.050 (2002); COLUSA COUNTY,CAL., CODE § 43l(p) (1998); FRESNO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 14.03(o) (2002); GLENN COUNTY, CAL.,
CODE § 20.04.410 (2002); IMPERIAL COUNTY, CAL., CODE §§ 92203.00 to .05 (2003);
INYO COUNTY, CAL., CODE §§ 18.77.000(I) to (J) (2000); KERN COUNTY, CAL., CODE
§ 19.118 (2002); LAKE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 28-1 (2001); LASSEN COUNTY, CAL., CODE
§ 17.01 (1999); MADERA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 13.100 (2001); MODOC COUNTY, CAL.,
CODE § 20.04 (2001); MONO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 20.01 (2002); SACRAMENTO COUNTY,
CAL., WATER AGENCY CODE § 3.40.090 (2002); SAN BENITO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 7C
(2002); SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 5-8100(m) (2000); SHASTA COUNTY, CAL.,
CODE § 18.08.010(I) (1998); SIERRA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 8.17.050 (2000); SIsKIYOu
COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 3-13.101(i) (2001); TEHAMA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 9.40 (1994);
TUOLUMNE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 13.20.040 (2001); YOLO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 107.101(j) (2001) [collectively hereinafter Counties with Export Clauses].
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issue is whether or not this local control mechanism appropriately fills
the pre-existing legal void, given an incomplete set of state-level
protections for water users from market-related injury. But the
ordinance movement also raises larger questions about the
appropriate forms of groundwater management within the State: What
levels of jurisdiction are most suited to managing the resource, and
with what kinds of regulatory controls?
H. THE RISE OF THE MARKET AND THE MOBILIZATION OF
RURAL COUNTIES
California's foray into active promotion of water marketing began
during a year of severe drought, 1977. Two reports commissioned at
that time, one by the Governor and one by the Legislature," strongly
endorsed water marketing as a component of the State's future water
policy. The governor's commission also advocated a number of
changes in the water code to facilitate transfers, notably provisions to
ensure the security of water rights for transferring parties and their
access to the use of conveyance facilities." Although many of the
commission's recommendations were accomplished in the years that
followed, the 1980s saw little uptake in market activity. Annual trades
hovered in the range of 100,000 to 200,000 acre-feet, less than half of
one percent of the State's combined municipal, industrial and
agricultural uses."
It was the next significant drought, beginning in 1988 and lasting
for six of the following seven years, which occasioned the market's
veritable jumpstart. ' 4 From the outset, the State's Department of
Water Resources ("CDWR") began making dry-year purchases from a
handful of Sacramento Valley water districts, for the purpose of
supplying certain contractors and wildlife refuges. In 1991, when the
dry-year market was opened up to any willing buyers and sellers,
CDWR purchased 820,000 acre-feet of water for resale, bringing the
overall market volume to over 1.1 million acre-feet. Water banks and
other dry-year purchases were also operated in 1992 and 1994, with
state as well as federal involvement. On average, the 1988-1994
drought saw annual trades at over 600,000 acre-feet.
9.

GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA'S WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL

REPORT 63-64 (1978) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
10. CHARLES PHELPS ET AL., EFFICIENT WATER USE IN CALIFORNIA: WATER RIGHTS,
WATER DISTRICTS AND WATER TRANSFERS 49 (1978).
11. FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 62-69.

12. Notably, the legislature adopted a flurry of the recommended code sections in
1980, with a few subsequently amended or renumbered. The recommended code
sections included, among others, CAL. WATER CODE §§ 100.5, 109, 1011, 1244, 17251731 (Deering 2003).
13.

ELLEN HANAK, CALIFORNIA'S WATER MARKET, BY THE NUMBERS

7 fig.7 (2002)

[hereinafter BY THE NUMBERS]. This study reports original data on the water market,
developed by the author from multiple sources. Transfer data reported here include
both short and long-term leasing of water use rights.
14. Id. at 7.

15. Id. at 7-8.

COUNTIES WRESTING CONTROL

Issue 2

Both state and federal policy changes continued to facilitate
market development in the wake of the drought. This included
modifications in the operating rules of the federally run Central Valley
Project ("CVP") and the State Water Project ("SWP") to enhance
contractors' ability to trade amongst one another. 6 Perhaps more
significantly, it also included the introduction of explicit
environmental restoration goals that would have direct and indirect
consequences for the market. In 1992, federal legislation mandated a
reduction in project deliveries to CVP contractors in favor of
endangered wildlife and introduced an environmental water purchase
A joint federal and State effort, known as CALFED,
program.
augmented direct purchases for the environment in 2000.18 Water for
the environment has been a major factor in sustaining market
development since 1995; by the end of the decade, environmental
water has accounted for one-quarter to one-third of total purchases in
a market that regularly attained or exceeded the million acre-feet
mark. The other major source of market growth has been increased
purchases from San Joaquin Valley farmers whose supplies were
curtailed by the new environmental restrictions. "S
Given the distribution of surface water rights within the State,
which heavily favors many of the inland agricultural regions,"
economists analyzing the potential for a water market have assumed
that agriculture would be the principal supplier.21 The economic
reasoning behind this proposition is that farmers whose operations
generate a relatively low profit per incremental unit of water used will
stand to gain by selling some of their water to those willing to pay
more-cities, other farmers with junior rights and higher value crops,
and the public stewards of environmental programs. The patterns of
sales have reflected this assumption, with agricultural districts in the
Central Valley and the desert valleys to the south (Imperial and
eastern Riverside Counties) consistently providing over ninety percent
of market supplies.22
Economists have also recognized that water market transactions
can generate costs to others, even though both buyer and seller

16. For the CVP, see Central Valley Project Improvement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 34063411 (1992). For the SWP, the modifications were introduced as part of the
"Monterey Agreement." Planning & Conservation League v. Dep't of Water Res., 100
Cal. Rptr. 2d 173, 178-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
17. 43 U.S.C. §§ 3406-3407.
18. ELIZABETH G. HILL, ENVIRONMENTAL WATER AccouNT: NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE
DEFINITION AND OVERSIGHT 3-5

19.
20.

BYTHENUMBERS,

(2001).

supra note 13, at 11-12.

See, e.g., STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPAcT REPORT
FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1995 BAY/DELTA WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLAN, at 1117 to

11126 (1998).
21. PHELPS ET AL., supra note 10, at 45-46; see also HenryJ. Vaux, Jr. & Richard E.
Howitt, Managing Water Scarcity: An Evaluation of Interregional Transfers, 20 WATER
RESOURCES RES. 785, 788 (1984).
22. BYTHE NUMBERS, supra note 13, at 13-15.
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benefit from the trade. 3 These "third-party" impacts are of two
distinct types. 4 When sellers make water available for the market by
reducing their agricultural activity, this may negatively impact the local
economy if employment and revenues are reduced as a consequence.
Such impacts are sometimes referred to as "pecuniary externalities."
By contrast, a "non-pecuniary" or "technical" externality occurs if the
water sale materially affects the quantity or quality of the physical
resource available to other users.
The advent of the water market generated concerns on both fronts
in rural California. The State's water bank was a major source of
controversy, given both the volume of purchases and the fact that the
primary means of water acquisition-land fallowing and additional
pumping of native groundwater to free up surface water supplies (a
process known as "groundwater exchange")-were prone to generating
third-party impacts. The fallowing controversy came to a head over
the operations of 1991 water bank, for which over half the water was
acquired through this method. Officials in Yolo County, where
fallowing activity was fairly high (thirteen percent of total farm
acreage), requested the State to reimburse the increased costs of
social welfare programs that it attributed to unemployment created by
the water sales.28 Challenging both the legality of the claim and the
facts on which it was premised, the State declined the county's request,
but it also cut the fallowing program short.29 During the 1992 and
1994 water banks, the State purchased water entirely from
groundwater exchange and from the handful of suppliers in a position
to sell excess water held in surface reservoirs. 0
There was also a well-publicized grievance over the bank's
groundwater exchange purchases in 1994 in Butte County, where the
water sales were linked to neighboring wells going dry.3' But the

23. Bonnie Colby, Regulation, Imperfect Markets, and Transaction Costs: The Elusive
Questfor Efficiency in Water Allocation, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONoMICS 475,
475-76 (Daniel Bromley ed., 1995) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]; see also Charles W. Howe,

Protecting Public Values in a Water Market Setting: Improving Water Markets to Increase
Economic Efficiency and Equity, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 357, 364 (2000); NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 38-69.

24. For a detailed discussion, see Richard E. Howitt, Effects of Water Marketing on the
supra note 6, at 100; see also ELLEN HANAK, WHO
THIRD PARTY ISSUES AND THE WATER
MARKET 80 (forthcomingJuly 2003) [hereinafter THIRD PARTY ISSUES].
Farm Economy, in SHARING SCARCI',

SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SELL WATER IN CALIFORNIA?

25. Howitt, supra note 24, at 100.
26. See generally Brian E. Gray, The Role of Laws and Institutions in California's 1991
Water Bank, in SHARING

SCARCITY,

supra note 6, at 178 (in-depth discussion of the

controversies generated by the state's water bank).
27. Calculation by the authors based on data presented in Carter & Vaux,Jr., supra
note 6, at 41, 44-51.
28. Gray, supra note 26, at 133, 174-77.
29. Id. at 174 n.116.
30.

THIRD PARTY ISSUES, supra note 24, at 71-72.

31.

Gregory Thomas provides a detailed case study of this incident.

GREGORY

THOMAS, DESIGNING SUCCESSFUL GROUNDWATER BANKING PROGRAMS IN THE CENTRAL

VALLEY: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE 28-38 (2001).
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State's foray into groundwater purchases generated a much wider
controversy in rural California, even where no evidence of harm
appeared or where no sales actually took place. Local concerns over
groundwater-based transfers were longstanding in California's
northern and mountain counties, as reflected in legislation adopted in
the early 1980s to restrict direct groundwater exports out of the
watershed." In effect, under the largely unregulated conditions of
access to groundwater, many Californians feared that a water market
could lead to groundwater being "mined," with potentially dire
consequences for local water users.
The large-scale export of
groundwater from the Owens Valley to Los Angeles that began in the
1920s set a notorious precedent, shutting down the local agricultural
economy and effecting significant environmental damage. 3
Given the clear signal from the state and federal agencies that the
water market was open for business, the question that arose in the
rural source regions was how to protect third parties from harm. At
the state level, the only clear third-party protections were for other
surface water users, under the "no injury" provisions of the water
code.3 4 The failure of the State code to protect those harmed by land
fallowing-a pecuniary impact-is not an omission; there is no clear
legal tradition for protecting individuals from the economic impacts of
business decisions in California or elsewhere in the country. Selling
water instead of using it to farm crops does not take that water away
from other legal users.
However, the lack of protection for
groundwater users could be seen as an omission of the "no injury"
code, occurring precisely because the State's regulatory reach does not
extend to groundwater. This very omission provided rural counties
with the justification for putting in place their own restrictions on
transfers, by invoking police powers to protect the public health, safety
and welfare in an area not fully occupied by the state.
The antecedents of the movement to restrict water transfers
through county-level ordinances relate to the 1977 drought, the point
when the State first began promoting water marketing as a policy goal.
In that year, three northern counties (Glenn, Butte, Sierra) adopted5
urgency ordinances prohibiting the "mining" of groundwater.
32.

CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1215-1222 (Deering 2003).

33.

See NORRIS H.

HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER, A

HISTORY 144-66, 347-60 (2001). As one analyst of the state's water market has noted,
"when water people get to talking, the very name Owens Valley stands by itself as a
complete sentence." BRENT M. HADDAD, RrvERS OF GOLD: DESIGNING MARKETS TO
ALLOCATE WATER IN CALIFORNIA, at XV (2000).
34. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1725, 1735.
35. The urgency ordinances prohibited water "mining," "in order to use it or sell it
outside the area in which said pumping affects the natural available water supply
without first obtaining a permit." Butte County, Cal., Ordinance 1859 § 31-4 (Aug. 23,
1977); see also Glenn County, Cal., Ordinance 672 § 20.04.400 (Sept. 6, 1977); Sierra
County, Cal., Ordinance 516 § 8.17.020 (Dec. 20, 1977). Weber asserts that Imperial
had the original groundwater export ordinance adopted in 1972 and amended in
1978. Gregory S. Weber, Twenty Years of Local Groundwater Export Legislation in
California: Lessons from a Patchwork Quilt, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 657, 703 (1994)
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Modoc County followed in early 1978 with an ordinance restricting
transfers outside the groundwater basin." In the following years, one
Sacramento Valley county (Sacramento) and two mountain counties
(Inyo, Nevada) introduced regular ordinances with explicit restrictions
on "exports. 3 7 Both Inyo's and Nevada's ordinances underwent legal
challenges and the trial courts invalidated the ordinances, on the
grounds that the State preempted the field." Neither county chose to
appeal the ruling. In Inyo County's case, where the ordinance related
to a broader set of grievances between the county and the City of Los
Angeles, plaintiff, over the consequences of Los Angeles' pumping of
the Owens Valley aquifer, the county chose instead to pursue a
Nevada County simply rescinded its
negotiated settlement. s9
ordinance following the trial court's ruling and did not pursue the
matter through any other channels."
Given the successful legal challenges to county authority over
groundwater transfers, it should not come as a surprise that other
counties were slow to use this tool when the market really got
underway during the 1988-94 drought. Apart from one mountain
county, Mono, which introduced an urgency ordinance restricting
groundwater exports in 1988,"' and one of the "precursor" counties,
Glenn, which adopted a regular ordinance in 1990," Tehama was the
only county to take action during the drought years.
The Tehama County supervisors adopted an ordinance in 1992
requiring county review of groundwater exports in response to the
plans of two private farmers to send groundwater south via the
[hereinafter Local GroundwaterExport Legislation]. However, Imperial's ordinance can
be distinguished from the mining ordinances because it governs "appropriated"
groundwater pumped from a well that is used or sold outside of the area of influence,
effectively imposing a conditional use permitting process for the county wells.
Imperial County, Cal., Ordinance 432 (Nov. 21, 1972); Imperial County, Cal.,
Ordinance 669 (Nov. 21, 1978).
36. Modoc County, Cal., Ordinance 255 § 3 (Mar. 6, 1978).
37. Sacramento County, Cal., Ordinance 410 § 2 (1980); Inyo County, Cal., Owens
Valley Groundwater Management Referendum Measure A (1980); Nevada County,
Cal., Ordinance 1370 § L-X6.3 (Jan. 27, 1986).
38. Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings, City
of Los Angeles v. County of Inyo, No. 12908, slip op. at 4 (Super. Ct. Inyo County, Cal.,
July 13, 1983); Rulings on Motions for SummaryJudgment, Truckee-Donner Pub. Util.
Dist. v. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 35920 (Super. Ct. Nevada County, Cal., filed June 21,
1989), cited in Gregory S. Weber, Forginga More Coherent GroundwaterPolicy in California:
State and Federal ConstitutionalLaw Challenges to Local GroundwaterExport Restrictions, 34
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 373, 387-88 n.73, 74 (1994) [hereinafter Challenges to Local
GroundwaterExport Restrictions].
39. See generally AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COUNTY OF INYO AND THE CITY OF Los
ANGELES AND ITS DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND POWER ON A LONG TERM GROUNDWATER
COUNTY
(1989),
VALLEY
AND
INYO
PLAN
FOR
OWENS
MANAGEMENT

http://www.inyowater.org/waterResources/water_agreement/default.html;
Telephone interview with GregJames, Dir., Inyo County Water Dep't (Aug. 22, 2002).
40. Interview with Antonio Rossmann, Special Counsel, Imperial County, in San
Francisco, Cal. (Oct. 22, 2002); Telephone interview with Nelson Buck, Tehama
County, Cal. Counsel (Sept. 6, 2002).
41. Mono County, Cal., Ordinance 88-530 (May 17, 1988).
42. Glenn County, Cal., Ordinance 971 (Aug. 21, 1990).
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Tehama-Colusa canal to properties in Colusa County. 43
The
landowners, Baldwin and Myers, took the county to court and won at
the trial court stage, with a ruling similar to that of the Inyo and
Nevada cases." However, Tehama County appealed the decision, and
won an appellate court victory in late December 1994, upholding its
authority to regulate groundwater.45
Several months later, the
California Supreme Court refused to hear the plaintiff's challenge to
this appeal, and the appellate holding has governed this issue since.46
The Baldwin decision, widely publicized in water law and county
government circles, opened the proverbial floodgates for county
regulation of groundwater exports. From 1995 to 2002, nineteen
counties introduced or regularized ordinances restricting exports,
bringing the total number of counties to twenty-two. 48 Geographically,
the group is concentrated in the mountain counties to the north and
east, the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys in the center of the
State, and Imperial County to the south. By and large, these counties
are traditionally considered as "source" regions for the State's water
supply, or counties that have relied heavily on groundwater for
agriculture.4 9 With the exception of the mountain counties where
43. Tehama County, Cal., Ordinance 1553 (Feb. 18, 1992). Telephone interview
with Lee Mercer, Tehama County Dep't of Envtl Health (Sept. 6, 2002). See also Local
GroundwaterExport Legislation, supra note 35, at 662-63.
44. Myers v. County of Tehama, Nos. 34147 & 34446 (Super. Ct. Tehama County,
Cal., filed Aug. 11, 1993), cited in Challenges to Local GroundwaterExport Restrictions, supra
note 35, at 373, n.82.
45. See Baldwin v. County of Tehama, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 889 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994).
46. Baldwin v. County of Tehama, No. S044774, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 2006 (Cal. Mar.
17, 1995) (denying certiorari).
47. SeeJanet K. Goldsmith, Counties, Cities may Regulate Groundwater,Appellate Court
Rules, 5 CAL. WATER LAW & POL'Y 42 (1995); Janet K. Goldsmith, It's Official-Counties
can Regulate Groundwater,5 CAL. WATER LAW & POL'Y 163 (1995); Thomas S. Bunn III,
CountiesHave a Stake in Managing Groundwater,CAL. COUNTYJuly-Aug. 1997, at 10.
48. Counties introducing ordinances for the first time include: Calaveras County,
Cal., Ordinance 2681 (Jan. 22, 2002); Colusa County, Cal., Ordinance 615 (1998);
Fresno County, Cal., Code § 14.03 (2000); Kern County, Cal., Ordinance G-6502 § 2
(part) (1998); Lake County, Cal., Ordinance 2457 § 1 (Feb. 9, 1999); Lassen County,
Cal., Ordinance 539 § 1 (part) (Mar. 1999); Madera County, Cal., Ordinance 573
(Mar. 23, 1999); San Benito County, Cal., Ordinance 664 § 1 (Aug. 1, 1995); San
Joaquin County, Cal., Ordinance 3879 § 4 (part) (1996); Shasta County, Cal.,
Ordinance 97-6 (1997); Siskiyou County, Cal., Ordinance 98-15 (July 14, 1998);
Tuolumne County, Cal., Ordinance 2429 (Nov. 20, 2001); Yolo County, Cal.,
Ordinance 1195 § 1 (Dec. 26, 1996). Counties regularizing urgency ordinances
include Butte County, Cal., Ordinance 3303-A (Dec. 10, 1996); Sierra County, Cal.,
Ordinance 865 (Mar. 17, 1998); Modoc County, Cal., Ordinance 322 (part) (2000);
Mono County, Cal., Ordinance 98-02 § 1 (part) (1998). Inyo County, whose 1980
ordinance had been invalidated by the trial court ruling, re-introduced an ordinance
in 1998. See INYO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 18.77 (1998). Imperial County, which had
been operating with an ordinance requiring conditional use permits for certain
within-county uses since the 1970s, see supra note 35, introduced an ordinance with
explicit out-of-county export restrictions in 1996. See Imperial County, Cal., Ordinance
1172 (Aug. 6, 1996).
49. Recognition of many of these counties as "source" regions has led to the
enactment of the various areas of origin protections in the California Water Code. See
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there is little agricultural activity, these regions have been the major
source of water for the market.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE EXPORT ORDINANCES
A basic export ordinance consists of findings, definitions, language
restricting groundwater transfer, legal justification to do so through
police power, and description of the permitting process as well as
entities or circumstances automatically or conditionally exempted. "'
Although the specific language of the ordinances varies, the common
thread is their focus on the regulation of "exports," as distinct from onsite groundwater uses. In most ordinances, exports are defined as
shipments of water beyond the county's administrative boundaries.
Although several counties apply instead an "out-of-basin" definition of
exports, 3 or "off-parcel" definition,54 a review of the actual permitting
behavior suggests that these non-administrative boundaries reflect an
intent to protect the ordinance against potential legal challenges,
rather than to regulate groundwater use within the county. 5 Only
three counties within the group-San Benito, Sierra and
Imperial-have
56
enforced a permitting process for within-county uses.

HUNDLEY, supra note 33, at 171, 195, 245-46, 313, 531-33.
50. ByTHE NUMBERS, supra note 13, at 13-15.
51. Unless otherwise specified, the discussion of the content of the ordinances
refers to the most recent revision. See Counties with Export Clauses, supra note 8.
52. Id.
53. The most recently revised versions of ordinances apply an "out-of-basin"
definition in the following counties: Inyo, Kern, Mono, and Siskiyou. INYO COUNT',
CAL., CODE §§ 18.77.010; KERN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 19.118.030 (2002); MONO
COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 20.01.030 (2002); SisKiYou COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 3-13.301
(2001)
54. See SAN BENITO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 7C-1.30 (2002); SIERRA COUNTY, CAL.,
CODE § 8.17.030(c) (2000); TEHAMA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 9.40.030 (2001). See also
IMPERIAL COUNTY, CAL., CODE §§ 92203.01 to 92203.02 (2003).
55. From August through December 2002, we interviewed county officials and
water users in thirty-nine counties.
The sample included all counties with
groundwater protection ordinances (including those with on-parcel use restrictions, to
be discussed in Section VI below) except Siskiyou and Monterey. Questions focused
on the record on permitting and other information relating to ordinance adoption
and implementation.
56. Sierra County granted one permit for a within-county transfer between
different private property owners for the transfer of treated wastewater from an
industrial property to adjacent property in agricultural use. Telephone interview with
Julie Griffith, Sierra County Planning Dep't (Dec. 3, 2002). In San Benito County,
there were five applications for minor subdivisions (four units or less), of which three
were approved and two withdrawn. Telephone interview, San Benito County Planning
Dep't (Aug. 14, 2002). Imperial County granted nineteen conditional use permits
since 1994 under its well-permitting process instituted in 1972. Imperial County's
export ordinance adopted in 1996 has never been employed. Telephone interview
with Joanne Yeager, Assistant County Counsel, Imperial County Counsel's Office (Feb.
18, 2003). The only permit application treated in Tehama County was for an export of
water beyond county boundaries, for use on an orchard owned by the proposed
exporter. Telephone interview with Lee Mercer, supra note 43.
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All twenty-two ordinances restrict the direct export of
groundwater." All but two of the nineteen counties that introduced or
regularized ordinances following the Baldwin decision also implicitly
restrict exports of surface water, by regulating the extraction of
groundwater used to replace
exported surface supplies. 8
Sacramento's ordinance explicitly restricts surface water exports of any
kind.59 A handful of counties, mainly within the San Joaquin Valley,
have introduced specific restrictions on the use of county groundwater
basins as storage sites for groundwater banking projects. 60 In San
Joaquin County, officials have incorporated restrictions on the
location of above-ground storage as well.
The restricted activities generally require a county permit, which
invokes a review under the California Environmental Quality Act
("CEQA"). 6 Permit applicants are expected to conduct from one to
several studies; applications go through a multi-layered review by
county departments and commissions, with the final decision most
often in the hands of a political body (the Board of Supervisors itself
or a body appointed by the Board).G If approved, permit duration is
generally from one to three years. 5 However, some jurisdictions may
57. See Counties with Export Clauses, supranote 8.
58. There are two exceptions in which the ordinances only restrict direct
groundwater transfers. MONO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 20.01.050; SAN BENrTO COUNTY,
CAL., CODE § 7C-1.40.
59. SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CAL., WATER AGENCY CODE § 3.40.090 (2002).
60. FRESNO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 14.03.05 (2002); KERN COUNTY, CAL., CODE
§ 19.118.020 (2002); IMPERIAL COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 92202.00 (2003); MADERA
COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 13.100.050 (2001).

61. The supervisors passed an interim measure requiring a county permit for large
surface storage projects in November 2001 and approved a permanent ordinance in
May of the following year (SANJOAQUIN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 9-115.582 (2002).
62. California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177
(Deering 2003).
63. On average, five distinct entities must review a permit prior to approval, with a
range from one to nine. SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CAL., WATER AGENCY CODE § 3.40.090;
MADERA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 13.100.060.
64. The exception is Fresno County, where the Director of the Planning
Department makes the decision. FRESNO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 14.03.08; telephone
interview with Phil Desitov, Fresno County Planning & Res. Mgmt. Dep't (Sept. 10,
2002).
65. The Imperial, Inyo and Kern ordinances provide for a case-by-case
determination of permit duration. IMPERIAL COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 92202.03; INYO
COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 18.77.050; KERN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 19.118.070. Mono and
Sacramento's ordinances do not specify duration. MONO COUNTY, CAL., CODE
§ 20.01.040 (2002); SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CAL., WATER AGENCY CODE § 3.40.090.
Counties granting one year permits with an annual review include Tehama, Sierra, San
Benito and Glenn. GLENN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 20.04.450 (2002); SAN BENITO
COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 7C-2.10 (2002); SIERRA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 8.17.090 (2000);
TEHAMA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 9.40.080 (1994). Permits not to exceed three-years
were envisaged in Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, Lassen, Modoc, San Joaquin, Shasta,
Siskiyou, Tuolumne and Yolo. BUTTE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 33-14 (1999); CALAVERAS
COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 17.85.120 (2002); COLUSA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 43-14 (1998);
LASSEN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 17.01.037 (1999); MODOC COUNTY, CAL., CODE
§ 20.04.030(1) (2001); SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 5-8380; SHASTA COUNTY,
CAL., CODE § 18.08.130 (1998); SIsKiyou COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 3-13.308 (2001);
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grant permits for a longer period.66
Most ordinances provide certain categorical and conditional
exemptions to the permitting process. Fresno, the county with the
longest permit duration of ten years, is the only one to explicitly
exempt short-term transfers and exchanges.6 7 Water districts or
landowners with service areas or land holdings overlying adjacent
counties typically do not need permits for water use on those lands, as
long as quantities remain within historical use levels." Many counties
provide blanket exemptions to permitting for historical use levels
more generally. 6 Although, it is likely that a change of use patterns
involving exports of water historicallyz used within the county would
not qualify for such an exemption.
A number of the mountain
counties exempt bottlers of spring water, as long as the bottling is
done within the county.7 ' Finally, various counties exempt specific
types of local entities from permitting altogether, such as incorporated
cities or water districts, because either the counties have assurances
that the entity in question is already engaging in sound groundwater
management practices, or there are questions of regulatory authority
and an interest in avoiding jurisdictional conflicts."

These blanket

TUOLUMNE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 13.20.130 (2001); YOLO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 10-

7.309 (2001)
66. Lake and Madera provide for five-year permits, and Fresno for ten years.
FRESNO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 14.03.12; LAKE COUNTY, CAL., CODE
MADERA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 13.100.060(0) (2001).
67. FRESNO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 14.03.05.

§

28-11 (2001);

68. Inter-jurisdictional exemptions apply in Butte, Colusa, Fresno, Lake, Lassen,
Modoc, Sacramento, San Joaquin, Siskiyou, and Yolo counties. See BuTrE COUNTY,
CAL., CODE § 33-5; COLUSA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 43-4; FRESNO COUNTY, CAL., CODE
§ 14.03.05; LAKE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 28-3.1(3); LASSEN COUNTY, CAL., CODE
§ 17.01.030(3); MODOC COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 20.04.030(3); SACRAMENTO COUNTY,
CAL., WATER AGENCY CODE § 3.40.090; SANJOAQUIN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 5-8380(3);
SisK1you COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 3-13.301 (1); YOLO COUNTY, CAL. CODE § 10-7.301 (3).

69. Counties without exemptions for inter-jurisdictional entities, but with historical
use exemptions, include Calaveras, Imperial, Inyo, Kern, Mono, Shasta, and
Tuolumne. See CALAVERAS COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 17.85.050(b); IMPERIAL COUNTY, CAL.,
CODE § 92202.01; INYO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 18.77.010(B); KERN COUNTY, CAL., CODE
§ 19.118.030; MONO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 20.01.050; SHASTA COUNTY, CAL., CODE
§ 18.08.040; TUOLUMNE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 13.20.060 (2001).

70. This
responsible
Brian Moss,
71. This

is, for instance, the interpretation of the Calaveras County official
for oversight of ordinance implementation. Telephone interview with
Calaveras County Dep't of Envt'l Health (Aug. 8, 2002).
includes Calaveras, Inyo, Kern, Siskiyou, and Tuolumne. CALAVERAS

COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 17.85.050(b) (2); INYO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 18.77.010(B) (3);
KERN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 19.118.030(C); SIsmuvOU COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 313.301(3); TUOLUMNE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 13.20.060.

72. Calaveras, Imperial, Inyo, Madera, Mono, San Benito, Sierra, and Tehama
County Codes provide blanket exemptions for some or all local entities, such as water
agencies
COUNTY,
COUNTY,
COUNTY,
COUNTY,

and cities. See CALAVERAS COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 17.85.050(b) (3); IMPERIAL
CAL., CODE § 92202.01; INTO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 18.77.010(B); MADERA
CAL., CODE § 13.100.050; MONO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 20.01.050; SAN BENITO
CAL., CODE § 7C-1.30; SIERRA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 8.17.050; TEHAMA
CAL., CODE § 9.40.030. Interviews with county officials and water users

revealed both types of motives for the exemptions. Madera County provides an
example of the exemption based on responsible groundwater management, where
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exemptions apply to entire geographic regions in two counties.
IV. LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE ORDINANCES
A. STATE PREEMPTION OF GROUNDWATER AUTHORITY

To date, ordinance challengers have questioned the counties'
The county
jurisdictional authority to regulate groundwater.
through the
justified
been
have
groundwater protection ordinances
that the
a
field
in
welfare
municipal police power to protect the public
7 4 In
"occupied.
State has not explicitly or impliedly and substantively
all three lawsuits challenging the groundwater ordinances, plaintiffs
asserted that the State had preempted the field, despite its lack of a
comprehensive legal code governing groundwater."' As noted, trial
court rulings in each case sustained this argument, although the
appeals court in Baldwin v. County of Tehama overturned the trial court
and held in favor of the county.
Without belaboring the specifics of each trial, it is instructive to
examine some of the main arguments made regarding state oversight
of groundwater, as they may have bearing on future legal challenges to
the ordinances. In all three cases, the preemption argument hinged
on a combination of general constitutional and water code provisions
applying to groundwater, as well as case law or specific legislation,
specific water agencies that have long-established conjunctive use practices are
exempted. MADERA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 13.100.050(B); Telephone interview with
Denis Prosperi, Chair of the County Water Comm'n (Sept. 8, 2002). Calaveras and
Imperial Counties provide examples of counties where the exemptions were intended
to avoid jurisdictional conflict. Telephone interview with Jim Cornelius, Calaveras
County Water Dist. (Aug. 12, 2002); Telephone interview with Brian Moss, supra note
70; Telephone interview with Joanne Yeager, Imperial County Assistant Counsel (Aug.
19, 2002). For a discussion of the process of ordinance drafting in Fresno, which
involved over two dozen iterations and which resulted in the introduction of many
exemptions, see Christopher L. Campbell, Address to the Association of California
Water Agencies Lawyers Meeting, County Groundwater Regulation: A Case Study of
Fresno and Madera Counties 4-5 (Oct. 2000) (on file with author).
73. Kern's ordinance applies only to the southeast portion of the county within the
Lahontan hydrologic region, and excludes the San Joaquin Valley portion of the
county. See KERN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 19.118.020. Conversely, Madera's ordinance
applies only to the San Joaquin Valley portion of the county but not to the Sierra
foothills. See MADERACOUNTY, CAL., CODE § 13.100.040.

74. All the counties except Tehama and Sacramento explicitly cite the use of police
powers among the justifications for ordinance adoption. See generally Counties with
Export Clauses, supra note 8. According to interpretations of In re Maas, 27 P.2d 373,
374 (Cal. 1933), counties have the police power to regulate groundwater extraction.
See Challenges to Local GroundwaterExport Restrictions, supra note 35, at 408-11 (citing
Antonio Rossmann & Michael J. Steel, Forgingthe New Water Law: Public Regulation of
"Proprietary"GroundwaterRights, 33 HAsTINGs L.J. 903, 933-35 (1982)).
75. Baldwin v. County of Tehama, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994);
Rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment, Truckee-Donner Pub. Util. Dist. v. Bd. of
Supervisors, No. 35920 (Super. Ct. Nevada County, Cal., filed June 21, 1989); Ruling
on Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings, City of Los
Angeles v. County of Inyo, No. 12908, slip op. at 4 (Super. Ct. Inyo County, Cal., July
13, 1983).
76. 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 897.
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which coalesced in a comprehensive scheme to regulate the resource."
Adopted in 1928, Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution
reaches groundwater through the mandate that "the water resources
of the state be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they
are capable."78 The general provisions in the California Water Code
are found in an introductory chapter on general state policy, which
echoes the notion of beneficial use for both surface and groundwater
and provides general policy authority to the State for conducting
statewide water planning." Plaintiffs in all three cases made reference
to these code sections.
In addition to the comprehensive scheme, the City of Los Angeles,
in County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, used a novel preemption
argument based on case law. Citing a recent holding from Nat'l
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court,80 the plaintiff invoked the public trust
doctrine as an additional argument in favor of State preemption, to
enable water to move to the places with greatest need.' The plaintiffs
in Baldwin provided the most comprehensive set of references to
specific legislation relating to groundwater, citing: (i) the enabling
legislation for specially enacted groundwater management districts; "
(ii) the 1984 California Water Code sections 1215 through 1222, and
particularly section 1220, restricting the direct export of groundwater
out of the combined Sacramento and Delta-Central Sierra Basins; and
(iii) a set of recently enacted provisions authorizing existing water
agencies to adopt groundwater management plans.83
Prior to Baldwin, it could be argued that the courts' decisions to
hold in favor of preemption were based on a philosophy of avoiding
"balkanization" of water policy rather than a demonstration that the
State had actually occupied the field through specific actions.8 4 Legal
77. See Challenges to Local GroundwaterExport Restrictions, supra note 35, at 387-90.
78. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
79. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 104-105 (Deering 2003). Specifically, these sections give
the state the authority to "determine what water... surface and underground, can be
converted to public use or controlled for public protection" Id. § 104. "[I]n what way
the water... should be developed for the greatest public benefit." Id. § 105.
80. 658 P.2d 708 (Cal. 1983).
81. Ironically, the plaintiffs supported their argument for taking more water from
the Owens Valley basin to service the City of Los Angeles by citing a holding that
provided the justification for reducing some of Los Angeles' water exports from that
basin in order to restore water levels to Mono Lake. See Ruling on Motion for
Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings, City of Los Angeles v. County of
Inyo, No. 12908, slip op. at 4 (Super. Ct. Inyo County, Cal.,July 13, 1983).
82. This includes special water districts with authority to regulate groundwater and
special groundwater management districts, the first of which was authorized in 1978.
See Cal. Dep't of Water Res., GroundwaterManagement Districts or Agencies in California,
WATER FAcTs, Jan. 1996 [hereinafter 1996 WATER FAcrs]. See generally Ella FoleyGannon, Institutional Arrangements for Conjunctive Water Management in California and
Analysis of Legal Reform Alternatives, 6 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 273 (2000)
for a thorough discussion of the legislative empowerment in these entities.
83. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10750-10753.9 (Deering 2003).
84. Weber uses the term "balkanization" in arguing that the courts did not want
smaller sections of the state to control the state's water. See Challenges to Local
GroundwaterExport Restrictions, supra note 35, at 389-90.
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scholars who have argued on either side of the preemption issue have
agreed that the intent of California Water Code sections 104 through
105 is to express a broad policy for public, not proprietary, control of
water resources, rather than to exercise specific control over
groundwater.8 5 Indeed, the holding in the Inyo case patently reflects
the popular views of the time that water resources should be allocated
according to the demands of the economy and the population
(located in Southern California and not rural Inyo County). The
court provides no further justification of preemption beyond the view
that "the needs of the state as a whole are paramount. '
Baldwin occurred at a point when the State had taken additional
steps to regulate groundwater, both through the restrictions on
exports of groundwater from the northern California basins adopted
in 1984 and the legislation enabling local districts to engage in
groundwater management adopted in 1992. Accordingly, the trial
court's holding of preemption went beyond generalities, stating that
the State had provided a clear path for local entities to follow in
Significantly, the appellate court's
groundwater management."
reversal of this holding expressly reversed this interpretation of the
new statutes. The court stated instead that the statutes giving local
agencies the power to adopt groundwater management plans
"manifest a purpose to induce local water agencies to address
groundwater management. " " Further, "there is a common thread in
these statutes which suggests that problems of groundwater
management should be addressed on the local level."89 The fact that
the State itself filed an amicus curiae brief siding with the county9 lends
further credence to this view of local management prerogatives for
groundwater.
As noted, there have been no subsequent legal challenges to the
ordinance in the wake of the Baldwin appellate decision. In light of
that court's holdings, a new preemption challenge with respect to
groundwater is unlikely without a significant change in the direction of
State actions on groundwater regulation. Nothing in the eight years
since the Baldwin decision suggests such a change. Subsequent
legislation has focused on shoring up the requirements for local
groundwater management and groundwater use planning.91 These
85. See Rossmann & Steel, supra note 74, at 940. Rossman filed an amicus brief for
the county in the Baldwin case, and Weber for the plaintiffs and respondents. See
Baldwin v. County of Tehama, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 888-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). For a
more comprehensive discussion of the evolution of the case law interpreting these
code sections, see Challenges to Local GroundwaterExport Restrictions, supra note 35, at
391-96.
86. Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment andJudgment on the Pleadings, City
of Los Angeles v. County of Inyo, No. 12908, slip op. at 4 (Super. Ct. Inyo County, Cal.,

July 13, 1983).
87. See Challenges to Local GroundwaterExport Restrictions, supra note 35, at 390.
88. See Baldwin, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895.
89. Id. at 895-96.

90. Id. at 889.
91.

Notably,

the

legislature adopted various

changes

in the

groundwater
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new laws essentially provide additional guidance (and financial
incentives) to local level managers, but do not assume substantive State
management obligations. To be sure, the debate on the role of the
State on groundwater management continues. Notably, the State
Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB") recently commissioned a
report on the incorporation of groundwater classified as subterranean
streams into its permitting jurisdiction, based on the hydrologic
connections between surface and groundwater.9" The report met with
such resounding opposition from local water management entities
during the public hearing phase9 3 that the SWRCB chairman
announced soon afterwards that the Board would not adopt its
recommendations. 4
B.

STATE PREEMPTION OF SURFACE WATER AUTHORITY

Even if the preemption issue is closed for the time being with
respect to groundwater, many of the ordinances may be subject to
legal challenge on another preemption issue, which the courts have
yet to address. We refer to the provisions of the Water Code governing
surface water transfers, an area where it would be difficult to argue
that the State has not occupied the field. Sacramento's ordinance,
which openly restricts any surface water exports, would suffer under
such a legal challenge. A more subtle form of the same control, the
common ordinance provision to restrict the practice of additional
groundwater pumping to sell surface water, may also conflict with the
State's authority in this area.
As noted earlier, most counties' ordinances now contain these
indirect restrictions, although none of the three cases examined in
court did so. In their favor, counties could argue that the restrictions
are merely extending no injury protections to groundwater users, since
groundwater exchange transfers could generate as much harm to
other users as direct exports of groundwater. The State's own actions
as a participant of the water market suggest that it would agree with
such a position. In recent announcements of intent to purchase water,
CDWR stressed the importance of local parties' putting in place
"strategies to monitor developing conditions and actions to prevent

management plan statutes through A.B. 3030 in 1992 and S.B. 1938 in 2002. CAL.
It also modified the urban water management
planning act to incorporate groundwater through S.B. 610 in 2001. Id. § 10610.
92. See generally JOSEPH L. SAX, REVIEW OF THE LAWS ESTABLISHING THE SWRCB's
PERMrING AUTHORITY OVER APPROPRIATIONS OF GROUNDWATER CLASSIFIED AS
WATER CODE § 10750 (Deering 2003).

SUBTERRANEAN STREAMS AND THE SWRCB's IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE LAWS No. 0-076-

300-0 (2002).
93. See, e.g., STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., PUBLIC WORKSHOP REGARDINGJOSEPH
SAX'S REPORT ON THE LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF GROUNDWATER (Apr. 10-11, 2002).
94. Chairman Baggett announced that the SWRBC would not adopt the
recommendations at the meeting of the Association of California Water Agencies in
early May 2002. See Stuart Leavenworth, State's GroundwaterDebate Unquenched: A State
Panel Rejects Regulations, but the Issue Remains hot, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 12, 2002, at Al.
The Board has yet to make an official announcement regarding its decision.
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injury to water users."95 Officials at both state agencies involved in
overseeing water transfers have argued that the State takes steps to
protect groundwater users in the spirit of the no injury laws whenever
possible, despite their lack of coverage under the letter of the law.96
Nevertheless, some have viewed this as an issue inviting litigation. 97
To some extent, this relates to the perception that in some counties
the ordinances are intended not only to protect local groundwater
users from harm, but also to give preferential treatment to locals in the
market for surface water. For instance, in Fresno County, several small
irrigation districts in an area suffering from drainage problems have
attempted to sell their surface water contracts to out-of-county buyers.
County opposition to past sales proposals prevented one permanent
sale altogether and led to accommodations involving some water
staying in the county in another case.9 The most recent proposal for a
permanent out-of-county transfer of surface water has already
In such situations, the costs of
generated county opposition.
litigation-in time, money, and political ill will-may be more important
considerations than the strict legality of the case. As the manager of
the agency intending to purchase the water announced, "legally, we
could probably make this deal work without Fresno County, but
practically, we do need Fresno County to support this.... We're
prepared to make this work." 100 Options being examined to
accommodate the county's concerns include taking less water out of
the county and keeping at least some of the land in production.
C. HOARDING WATER AND EXCEDENCE OF POLICE POWERS

Another area of potential legal challenge relates to the question of
whether counties are over-protecting the groundwater resource
through the ordinances. There are two distinct legal issues, although
both rest on whether or not the ordinances exceed their legal reach.
The first is whether the ordinances conform to the "beneficial use"
95.

Press Release, Cal. Dep't of Water Res., DWR Announces 2003 Dry Year Water

96.

Interview with Andrew Sawyer, supra note 5; interview with Jerry Johns, supra

Purchase Program (Nov. 15, 2002).
note 5.

97. Campbell, supra note 72, at 7.

98. The sale of the surface water allocation of the Widren Water District to a
municipal agency in San Joaquin County was effectively blocked, and the water
continues to be used within Fresno County by other agricultural districts. The
permanent sale of the surface water allocation from Mercy Springs Water District to
users in Santa Clara and Monterey Counties has been arranged to permit the
continued use of a part of the entitlement by farmers in Fresno County. See Campbell,
supra note 72, at 4-5; Telephone interview with Buddy Smith, Tracy Area Office, U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation (Sept. 17, 2002); THIRD PARTY ISSUES, supra note 24, at 54-55.

99. Mark Grossi, $25 Million Water Deal in Works: Watsonville Farmers Want Permanent
TransferFrom Valley, FRESNO BEE, Feb. 7, 2003, at Al. The proposed transaction is a sale
of the Broadview Water District to the Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency,
located in Monterey County.
100. Id. The article quotes Charles McNiesh, General Manager of the Pajaro Valley
Water Management Agency, and concerns the proposed purchase of the Broadview

Water District.
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requirements of Article X, Section 2 in California's Constitution.
Counties may unconstitutionally "hoard water" if they are preventing
outsiders from using in-county groundwater, despite a lack of
immediate local need. Second, and by the same token, an overly
protective position may exceed the police power, which relates to
current threats to public health, safety and welfare."'
As we have seen, all three legal challenges to the ordinances cited
Article X, Section 2 as part of the preemption argument. While each
trial court accepted this article as an element of potential preemption,
only one-the court ruling in the Nevada County case-found the
ordinance to be in direct contradiction with the constitutional
requirement to use water beneficially. 02 The Baldwin court chose not
to address the constitutional issue of water hoarding, although it noted
in a footnote that the issue was "not so simple as [the] plaintiffs'
cursory argument supposes.' 0 3 Given the lack of definitive rulings on
this issue, one can consider 01that
counties are still potentially open to
4
this constitutional challenge.

The extent of the ordinances' susceptibility to charges of either
water hoarding or exceeding police powers relates to the nature of the
groundwater problem. In counties where it is possible to demonstrate
an already significant problem of groundwater overdraft, both issues
are arguably moot. In such a situation, it would be difficult to make
the case for water hoarding. Moreover, imposing export restrictions is
a classic use of police power, as it protects residents' ability to exercise
their property rights. Few of the counties are in a position to provide
this justification, however. Only a third declare current overdraft as a
motivation for the ordinance, including several for which there is no
official determination of such a problem at the state level. '
Most counties rely instead on ajustification based on protection of
water resources for their residents' future needs.'00 While such
101. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7. Telephone interview with Christopher Campbell,
Attorney, Baker, Manock &Jensen Law Offices (Jan. 28, 2003).

102. See Challenges to Local GroundwaterExport Restrictions, supra note 35, at 388.
103. Baldwin v. County of Tehama, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 896 n.14 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994).
104. This conclusion is shared by a recent workgroup of water attorneys and other
water experts.
See WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, WATER TRANSFER ISSUES IN
CALIFORNIA, FINAL REPORT 36 n.67 (2002).
105. Counties declaring overdraft as a motive for the ordinance include Colusa,
Fresno, Lake, Madera, San Joaquin, Siskiyou, and Yolo. See COLUsA COUNTY, CAL.,
CODE § 43-1 (1998); FRESNO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 14.03.01 (2002); LAKE COUNTY,
CAL., CODE § 28-1(1.3) (2001); MADERA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 13.100.010 (2001); SAN
JOAQUIN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 5-8100(c) (2000); SIsKuYOu COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 313.101(c) (2001); YOLO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 10-7.101(c) (2001). Of these, only
Madera and San Joaquin have groundwater basins designated by the state to be in
critical overdraft or having special problems. CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., GROUND
WATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA, BULLETIN 118-80, at 1-5 (1980). This was the last time the
state made official designations of overdraft. Interview with Carl Hauge, Chief
Hydrologist, CDWR, in Sacramento, Cal. (July 2, 2002).
106. All the counties except Tehama list future water needs as a motivation for the
ordinance. See Counties With Export Clauses, supra note 8.
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foresight may seem eminently sensible from a planning perspective, it
leaves the counties open to charges of water hoarding, since applying
such restrictions could bar present (beneficial) use somewhere in the
state to preserve future use in the areas of origin. It may exceed the
police power as well, since the protection is against an anticipated
future threat, rather than a current nuisance. Such a challenge could
be bolstered by the ordinances' widespread exemptions for historical
use levels, which arguably acknowledge that there is no immediate
threat to public health, welfare and safety from the current patterns of
groundwater use.
While a constitutional challenge would hinge on a ruling that the
beneficial use doctrine has been violated, a charge of exceeding police
powers would involve the demonstration of a taking. Over-regulation
or regulation without a nexus has long been an issue in the field of
land use law, particularly through zoning.' 7 If the analogy between
land use and groundwater regulation can be made, it may be argued
that the counties are protecting their residents against a threat of
overdraft that they do not yet face, and are effectively reaching only
certain landowners, particularly in the counties where there are
exemptions for historic use levels. The situation is analogous to the
Lucas case, and the ordinances could be subject to a takings challenge.
As Eric Garner has argued, however, it may be difficult to assert a
takings suit with water in general-not just groundwater, -because
"water rights have traditionally less protections than most other
property rights," given their usufructuary nature and the deference
given to the public domain (public trust doctrine, etc.), as well as the
fact that the definition of reasonable and best use is especially
malleable. 0 8 The definition is so malleable in fact, that "[w]hen uses
107.

Lucas, Dolan and Nollan are seminal takings cases in which the United States

Supreme Court found that local governments had over-regulated a property and
affected a taking. In Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), the Court
instituted the nexus requirement, holding that if there is a physical taking, there must
be a nexus between the governmental condition and the impact the condition is trying

to ameliorate. Id. at 831-37. The Court also held that ownership of property includes
the right to exclude others from private property, and when that is "taken," the owner
must be compensated. Id. at 838-92. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992), followed Nollan five years later. The South Carolina Beachfront Management
Act restricted building on sensitive areas, but every other owner in the protected area

had constructed structures before the enactment, so the effect of the regulation
reached only a single property owner. The Court held that disproportionate impacts
on certain landowners constitute a taking when the owner is left with no economic
value. Id. at 1014-19. In Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), the Court found
that there was a legitimate state interest for the City's ordinance and that the
condition did not deny all economically viable use, Id. at 386-88, but the Agins
regulations were legislative and affected the whole community. See Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). Here, the condition was parcel-specific, with a

quasi-adjudicatory effect. The court again affirmed the fact that the right to exclude is
an inherent element of ownership and established a "rough proportionality" test, in
which directness is needed ir.
the nexus between the regulation imposed and the
impacts it tries to address. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388-91.

108. Eric L. Garner, How States in the United States Have Handled the Transitionfrom
Common Law to Permitting,in ISSUES INWATER LAW REFORM 149 (1999).
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cease to be seen as beneficial and reasonable, however longstanding,
they have often been repudiated in favor of modern conceptions of
beneficiality and reasonableness."' 09 His review of case law illustrates
that "the regulation of water rights has often changed the way in which
they can be exercised, yet rarely if ever, has it been considered a
taking.... Furthermore, California has radically redefined rights of
water use without ever receiving a successful takings challenge .", 0 By
this reasoning, the greater potential challenge to the ordinances lies in
the courts' current conception of beneficial and reasonable use as
required by the California Constitution.
Arguably, the State's
increasing emphasis on encouraging local entities to engage in longterm water resource planning could be interpreted as a firm sign that
reserving water for future needs is a beneficial use."'
D. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE VIOLATIONS

In a different vein, there is some debate over whether the
ordinances could be subject to a Federal Commerce Clause
challenge."' As noted above, the language in most of the ordinances is
jurisdictionally based, restricting exports beyond the administrative
boundaries of counties, rather than hydrologic basins or some other
distinction that reflects the physical links between groundwater
extraction and harm to adjacent users." 3 This raises the potential for a
challenge of discrimination based on arbitrary distinctions. The case
law precedent is Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,14 in which the
United States Supreme Court held groundwater is an article of
commerce, and accordingly discriminatory groundwater export
109. Id.
110. Id.at 150.
111. This includes increasing legislative requirements for long-term water planning
through the Urban Water Management Planning Act. CAL. WATER CODE § 10610
(Deering 2003) (introduced in 1983 and amended numerous times since 1990,
notably with changes in 2001 making state funding contingent on submission of a
complete plan). Since the early 1990s, the legislature has also passed several bills to
encourage the linkage of water supply and land-use planning. In 1991, the legislature
amended CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65352(1) (b) to require planning agencies to refer
proposed general plan amendments to water suppliers. Senate Bill 901, enacted in

1995, required cities and counties to reference urban water management plans in
their general plans and to discuss and evaluate water supply and demand information.
Act of Oct. 13, 1995, ch. 881, 1995 Cal. Laws 90 (codified as amended at CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 65302; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21104). In 2001, Senate Bills 610 and 221 added
further requirements for local agencies to assure water supplies for future
development. Act of Oct. 9, 2001, ch. 642, 2001 Cal. Laws 88; Act of Oct. 9, 2001, ch.

643, 2001 Cal. Laws 94.

For a review of the various pieces of legislation, see

A USER'S GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA
STATUTES INCLUDING SB221 & SB610 (2002).
In addition to these legislative
requirements, in 2002 the Governor's Office of Policy Research introduced revised
McCORMICK ET AL., WATER SUPPLY AND DEVELOPMENT:

draft guidelines for general planning including an optional water element. BRIAN
GRAT'IDGE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT: STATE OF CALIFORNIA GENERAL PLAN GUIDELINES 99-103

(2002), http://www.opr.ca.gov/planning/PDFs/GPG_2002.pdf.
112. WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, supra note 104, at 36 n.67.
113. Id. at36.
114. 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982).
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regulation interferes with interstate commerce. ' 15 A direct application
to the interstate commerce issue could potentially affect counties that
border neighboring states,"16 although more broadly such a challenge
could reach any restriction of inter-county commerce within California
as well. Although this issue has not been raised in any of the court
challenges to date, it has been of some concern for ordinance drafters
in several counties, as reflected in the move to an "out-of-basin" or "offparcel" permitting system.117
E. IMPORTED BANKED GROUNDWATER
The ordinances generally do not distinguish between native
groundwater and imported surface water banked underground,
providing a final legal concern. As a result, even ordinances that do
not directly address groundwater-banking projects do so implicitly by
introducing ambiguity in the extent to which the county might restrict
the re-export of water brought into the county for temporary storage.
This raises questions of overlapping and potentially conflicting
jurisdictions, since the State, through the SWRCB, possesses
permitting authority over surface water brought into the county for
underground banking, while counties may seek to govern its reexport."' In at least one case, a county used the permitting process to
block the re-export of imported banked water." 9 The legal ambiguities

on this issue are compounded by the fact that there is little or no
hydrologic process that would distinguish the banked surface water
from native groundwater. A county's defense of pumping restrictions
might be strongest for overdrafted basins, on grounds of immediate

harm.

Such basins are

typically the most suitable places for

groundwater banking projects, precisely because there is surplus

underground storage space.

115. DAVID H. GETcHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 416 (3d ed. 1997) (citing
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982)).
116. Of the border counties with export restrictions, Modoc and Lassen use county
boundaries, while Siskiyou, Inyo and Mono require permits for use outside of the
basin and Sierra off-parcel. LASSEN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 17.01.030 (1999); MODOC
COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 20.04.030(A) (2001); INYO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 18.77.010(3)
(2000); MONO COUNTY, CAL., CODE

§

20.01.030 (2002); SisKiyou COUNTY, CAL., CODE

§ 3-13.301 (2001).
117. Counties that moved from a county to a basin restriction include Inyo, Mono,
and Siskiyou. INYO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 18.77.010(3); MONO COUNTY, CAL.. CODE
§ 20.01.030; SISKuvOU COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 3-13.301. Discussions with officials in Inyo

and Mono revealed that compliance with the Commerce Clause was a factor in this
decision. Telephone interview with Greg James, supra note 39. Telephone interview
with Scott Burns, Mono County Planning Dep't (Aug. 16, 2002). Kern County drafted
its ordinance with basin restrictions for similar reasons, following discussions with Inyo
County officials. Telephone interviews with Bruce Divelbiss, Kern County Counsel
(Aug. 6, 2002 & Sept. 26, 2002). Constitutionality issues were also a factor in the
drafting of the Tehama County ordinance, which restricts use off-parcel rather than
out-of-county. Interview with Antonio Rossmann, supra note 40.
118. WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, supra note 104, at 33-37.
119. This occurred in San Joaquin County, where the County denied a re-export
permit to East-Bay Municipal Utilities District. SeeTHOMAS, supra note 31, at 49-55.
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To facilitate conditions for groundwater banking in the State, the
Water Transfer Workgroup, convened by the SWRCB in 2000,
underscored the need to "develop principles and guidelines for
resolving the critical legal uncertainties .... as either a precursor to,
or a substitute for, clarifying legislation or judicial rulings." 12 The
Workgroup recommended constraining the ordinance authority,
limiting local ability to restrict recovery, and re-export of "foreign"
water imported into local groundwater basins, except as necessary to
prevent injury to other legal users of the basin.'
V. ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF LOCAL
EXPORT RESTRICTIONS
In fundamental ways, the legal considerations regarding the
appropriateness of county export restrictions reflect the underlying
economic problem of groundwater management in California.
Groundwater is by nature a collective, or "common pool" resource,
with many parties typically sharing an aquifer. Collective resources are
inherently prone to overexploitation under conditions of unregulated
access, since individual users do not bear the full costs of resource
depletion. Instead individual users share the costs with their
neighbors. 2 For groundwater, the negative physical externalities of an
unmanaged basin might result in increased pumping costs associated
with a lower water table, increased risk of shortages in low rainfall
years, reduced water quality, and elevated infrastructure replacement
costs in the event of land subsidence. 22 Of course, overdraft and
related problems may result strictly from extracting too much water for
local uses. 24 However, the introduction of a water market raises the
potential for generating negative externalities, because it expands the
pool of potential water users. An economically efficient outcome,
ensuring sustainable use of the aquifer, requires the imposition of
management rules that eliminate these externalities by5 forcing water
users to take into account the full costs of their actions.

120. WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, supra note 104, at 41.
121. Id.
122. See generally Gardner M. Brown, Renewable Natural Resource Management and use
Without Markets, 38J. ECON. LITERATuRE 875 (2000) (reviewing the economic literature
on this issue).
123. See generally Bill Provencher & Oscar Burt, The Externalities Associated with the
Common Property Exploitation of Groundwater,24J. ENVrL. ECON. & MGMT. 139 (1993)
(discussing pumping and risk externalities);CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA'S
GROUND WATER, BULLETIN 118, at 118-19 (1975) (reviewing subsidence); THOMAS,
supra note 31, at 67 (discussing the water quality issues).
124. Indeed, most basins in the San Joaquin Valley were considered in a state of
critical overdraft in 1980, well before the onset of the water market. CAL. DEP'T OF
WATERRES. BULLETIN 118-80, supra note 105, at 1-5.

125. This is the standard economic policy prescription for the resolution of market
failures due to externalities. As it applies to groundwater management, see generallyBill
Provencher, Issues in the Conjunctive Use of Surface Water and Groundwater,in HANDBOOK,
supra note 23, at 514-17.
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Given the open access rules for groundwater that prevailed in rural
California and the lack of state protections, the local movement to
restrict exports through the exercise of county police powers may be
viewed as a rational economic response to the threat of uncontrolled
mining of the aquifers.' In effect, the county police powers substitute
for the lack of coverage by the State's no injury laws, as a means of
protecting local groundwater users from harm. From an economic
standpoint, such protections are necessary in order to prevent
unsustainable levels of pumping, whether for direct exports of
groundwater or for substitution with exported surface supplies.
An economic perspective also provides insights into the legal
questions regarding the extent to which the ordinances may be overregulating, by extending protections beyond the necessary levels. If
long-term sustainability of the aquifer's yield is retained as the guiding
principle for basin management,' it is straightforward to justify
regulation in order to protect the aquifer from overexploitation not
only in the present, but also into the future. However, the ordinances
may effectively become barriers to trade, interfering with efficiency, if
the limits imposed on exploitation of the resource exceed the
sustainability criterion.
Such protectionism is the economic
counterpart to the legal notion of hoarding water.
Drawing such a conclusion about either the intent or the outcome
of county behavior is not straightforward, even for the many counties
that do not claim current overdraft problems as a reason for adopting
the export restrictions. When there is uncertainty about the basic
characteristics of the groundwater basin-size and depth of the
aquifer, recharge rates, direction of flows, etc.-restricting exports
could be a reasonable precautionary measure. In many parts of the
state, the level of knowledge of these basic characteristics is
rudimentary, including the speed with which exports might generate
problems for local users.2
Even if a defensive strategy restricting exports might be a sensible
first step in groundwater protection, it is sub-optimal from the
126. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see generally THIRD PARTY ISSUES, supra
note 24, at 97-115.
127. Note that this long-term concept allows for annual fluctuations in the level of
the water table, to take advantage of the substitutability of surface and groundwater. It
can, for instance, be optimal to draw down the aquifer in dry years and recharge in
wetter years when surface supplies are more abundant. See Provencher, supra note
125, at 514-17.
128. This view is shared by CDWR's Chief Hydrologist, Carl Hauge and the Head of
the Groundwater Analysis Unit of CDWR's Northern Area Office. Interviews with Carl
Hauge, Chief Hydrologist, CDWR, in Sacramento, Cal. (Sept. 27 & Dec. 2, 2002);
Interview with Toccoy Dudley, Head of the Groundwater Analysis Unit, CDWR
Northern Area Office, in Willows, Cal. (Aug. 27, 2002). Telephone interview with
Toccoy Dudley, Head of the Groundwater Analysis Unit, CDWR Northern Area Office
(Feb. 13, 2003). As an illustration, prior to the late 1990s, there were only three
regional investigations of the aquifer systems in the Sacramento Valley in the past
eighty years, and none since the mid-1970s. See Allan Fulton et al., Seeking an
Understandingof the GroundwaterAquifer Systems in the Northern Sacramento Valley, UNIV. OF
CAL. DEP'T OF AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES NEWSLEMrER, Feb. 2003, at 1.
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standpoint of local as well as statewide groundwater management
interests. A policy limited to exports does little to stabilize the aquifer
in places already subject to overdraft because of local use patterns. It
also makes it difficult, if not impossible, to make economic use of the
underground storage space, through groundwater exchange transfers
and imported surface water banking.2 Attaining these goals requires
a more offensive, comprehensive strategy of groundwater management
that protects local users while providing opportunities to address
supply and quality problems and allowing those with well-designed
water transfer and banking projects to participate in the market.'30
VI. FROM GROUNDWATER PROTECTION TO GROUNDWATER
MANAGEMENT
What models exist for efficient groundwater management that
might be applicable to rural California?
Although there is no
statewide system of oversight,' a number of local institutions have
evolved in some regions, which regulate the use of groundwater
32
supplies through a combination of pricing and quantity controls. 133
Institutional forms include basins with a single managing authority,
and basins where individual property rights have been attributed
through a court-ordered adjudication.
Such systems can manage
groundwater basins efficiently because they internalize the full costs of
extraction. In a basin that is entirely owned or managed by one entity,
that entity will have the incentive to set pumping charges to the level
consistent with the full costs of replenishment. In a groundwater basin
where withdrawal rights are fully attributed through adjudication, the
full cost of the resource is also taken into account in the determination
of maximum sustainable yield.3 5 The only collective problem in such
basins is to ensure adequate monitoring and enforcement of the rules
on withdrawal.
129. These are two examples of programs that expand the availability of water
resources through the conjunctive use of surface and groundwater. For a description
of the various types of conjunctive use programs suitable for California conditions, see
DAVID R. PURKEY ET AL., FEASIBILITY STUDY OF A MAXIMAL PROGRAM OF GROUNDWATER

BANKING9-10 (1998), at 129.These are two examples of programs that expand the
availability of water resources through the conjunctive use of surface and groundwater.
For a description of the various types of conjunctive use programs suitable for
California conditions, see DAVID R. PURKEY ET AL., FEASIBILITY STUDY OF A MAXIMAL
PROGRAM

OF

GROUNDWATER

BANKING

9-10

(1998),

at

http://www.n-h-

i.org/Publications/Pubs_.pdf/Conj-use.pdf.
130. See, e.g., THOMAS, supra note 31, at 12-16; WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, supra
note 104, at 39-41, 56.

131.
132.

1996 WATER FAcrS, supra note 82, at 1.
Id. at 3.

133.

Notably, this list includes certain special water districts with groundwater

authority, such as the Orange County Water District and the Santa Clara Valley Water
District, and eleven special groundwater management districts established by
legislative acts. See 1996 WATER FACTS, supra note 82, at 1-3.
134. See Cal. Dep't of Water Res., Adjudicated Basins in California,WATER FAcqS, Jan.

2001, at 1 [hereinafter 2001 WATER FACTS].
135.

Id. at l, 4.
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The movement to develop fully regulated local management
systems began in densely populated regions of coastal southern
California in the 1940s and 1950s.136 This movement has continued
through to the present, with the result that many coastal and all
Southern California counties now have such systems in place.'
Interestingly, several counties in this group have employed the tool of
county groundwater protection ordinances as a substitute for 138 or
complement

to

3

1

special groundwater

management

districts

or

adjudication. In contrast to the set of ordinances restricting exports
discussed above, these ordinances regulate on-site use of groundwater,
with a clear aim to manage the resource locally. 4 In most cases, the
permitting process involves incorporation of a groundwater review or
overlay in a regular ministerial process, rather than application for a
discretionary permit with CEQA review. 4'
Southern California's local groundwater management systems have
been so successful that they have been singled out as models in the
literature on collective management of common pool resources.' 41 Yet
136. The Raymond Basin in Los Angeles County was the first adjudicated basin in
the state, dating back to 1944. Id. at 2. The first special district to receive full
authority over groundwater regulation is the Orange County Water District, which was
authorized by the state legislature to begin charging a pump tax and to monitor
groundwater extractions in 1956. See Orange County Water Dist., Orange County Water
District History, http://www.ocwd.com/-html/history.htm.
137. Southern California and coastal counties with one or more local regulatory
schemes for groundwater involving price and/or quantity controls for on-site use
include: San Diego, Orange, Los Angeles, Ventura, Riverside, San Bernardino,
Monterey, Santa Clara, Napa, and Mendocino. Coastal counties without such systems
include Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, and all counties north of Santa Clara, with
the exception of Mendocino. See generally THIRD PARTY ISSUES, supra note 24, at 26-29,
139-44.
138. Groundwater protection ordinances in lieu of other measures have been
introduced in San Diego and Napa. SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 67.702 (2002);
NAPA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 13.15 (2002). Officials in Napa argued that the ordinance
provided an alternative to a more costly adjudication process. Interview with Don
Ridenhower, Dir., Napa County Public Works & John Stuart, Former Dir., Napa
County Public Works, in Napa, Cal. (Sept. 10, 2002).
139. Groundwater protection ordinances that complement other local institutions
include that of Mendocino, Monterey, and San Bernardino. MENDOCINO COUNTY,
CAL., CODE § 20.744 (2002); Monterey County, Cal., Ordinance 3717 (Oct. 5, 1993);
Monterey County, Cal., Ordinance 3790 (Nov. 8, 1994); Monterey County, Cal.,
Ordinance 3851 (Dec. 5, 1995); San Bernardino County, Cal., Ordinance 3872 (Oct.
29, 2002). The Mendocino ordinance applies only to the Town of Mendocino, where
a special district has groundwater authority. The San Bernardino ordinance applies to
desert regions of the county not already under a local management system (notably
excluding the Mojave Basin, which is adjudicated). The Monterey ordinances apply to
several different zones within the county not already covered by the Monterey
Peninsula Water Management District, a special district with groundwater authority.
See 1996 WATER FACrS, supra note 82, at 3. The county supervisors adopted the
ordinances in their capacity as board of supervisors of the Monterey County Water
Resources Agency.
140. See, e.g., SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 67.702; MENDOCINO
CODE§ 20.744.005; NAPA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 13.15.020.

141.

COUNTY, CAL.,

Conversely, San Bernardino County's permitting process resembles that of

counties with export restrictions.

142.

See ELUNOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
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the extension of this type of model into the state's rural hinterland is
virtually non-existent."3 Although part of the reason may lie with
cultural factors (notably the profound mistrust of regulatory
intervention that pervades California's rural regions), the central
explanatory factor is probably economic. There is some evidence to
suggest that the strictly local benefits of improved management in
agricultural areas may be inadequate to spur users to put in place an
oversight system. 4 ' These benefits can increase substantially once one
considers the opportunity for active conjunctive use of groundwater
and surface water, with transfers and banking. 45 For this reason, the
advent of the water market creates not only new risks for California's
rural water users, but also new incentives for groundwater
management.
In general, the risks and the incentives are not evenly distributed
among the rural population. Certain water users stand to gain more
from the water market, by virtue of their location (e.g., proximity to a
conveyance facility, availability of land with good potential for
recharge operations, etc.) and their access to senior surface water
rights that can be used conjunctively with groundwater. Conversely,
the downside risks are greatest for those without such opportunities,
since the market merely increases their likelihood of facing higher
pumping costs and dry wells. Ordinances that restrict exports are
simple management options that respond to the downside risks of
non-sellers.' 6 The incentives for moving to a more comprehensive
103-42 (1990); see generally WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING THE
WATERS: GOVERNING GROUNDWATER IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (1992).
143. Some ostensible exceptions include five special groundwater management
districts established over the past two decades in the mountain counties bordering the
State of Nevada. See 1996 WATER FAcTs, supranote 82, at 1-3. However, all but one of
these, the Sierra Valley Groundwater Management District, was set up with the primary
purpose of controlling exports, rather than for local use management. Telephone
interviews with Bob Sorvaag, Dir., Lassen County Dep't of Cmty. Dev. (Aug. 29, 2002),
and Dan Lyster, Dir., Mono County Dep't of Econ. Dev. (Aug. 8, 2002). Despite the
initial intent, there have been no controls imposed on local users in this one district
since its inception. Telephone interview with Judy Dylan, Manager, Sierra Valley
Groundwater Mgmt. Dist. (Dec. 19, 2002). Another exception is the adjudicated basin
(Scott River Stream System) in Siskiyou County, near the Oregon border. See 2001
WATER FACTS, supra note 134, at 2. Finally, several of the counties with export
restrictions (Imperial, San Benito, and Sierra) appear to be operating hybrid
systems-requiring permitting for some within-county uses as well as for exports. See
supra text accompanying note 56.
144. Modeling exercises show that the annual increases in farmers' pumping costsa function of declining groundwater levels-in an open access system are typically not
very large if groundwater use is limited to the overlying users, ranging from .3 to 10
percent. SeeProvencher, supra note 125, at 515.
145. See Keith Knapp et al., Water Transfers, Agriculture, and GroundwaterManagement:
A Dynamic Economic Analysis, J. ENVTL. MGMT. (forthcoming 2003, manuscript on file
with author).
146. Not surprisingly, these parties frequently supported the introduction of the
ordinances. For a discussion of the Butte County ordinance introduction, see THOMAS,
supra note 31, at 28-38. THIRD PARTY ISSUES, supra note 24, at 37-58, provides a detailed
discussion of the dynamics of ordinance adoption in many of the counties, drawing on
material collected in interviews with county officials and water users.
FOR COLLECTIVE ACrION
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management system that does not discriminate against exports lie with
those who stand to gain the most-the potential sellers.
In several counties, alternative management models have begun to
emerge that reflect this line of reasoning. In Kern County, where
there are particularly good conditions for groundwater banking,
parties in a position to develop these projects played a leadership role
in setting up a monitoring and oversight system with neighboring
parties whose groundwater access could potentially be affected.4 7 The
project operating rules provide for the possibility of mitigation in the
event of harm to these third parties, including the cessation of
groundwater pumping for export. Recently, in response to public
concerns over some proposed new groundwater banking projects, the
county's wholesale water agency launched 14a countywide consultation
process on groundwater management issues. 1
In Yuba County, members of agricultural water districts have an
agreement with the countywide wholesale water agency to engage in
mitigation in the event of any third-party groundwater impacts related
to groundwater exchange transfers.1 4 9 Active monitoring of the
groundwater basin is an integral component of water transfer
programs in Yuba. 5 0
In both Yuba and Kern, this system of safeguards for third parties
has forestalled the need to impose export restrictions backed by the
authority of county police power."' A third county, Glenn, has
introduced a new management process, effectively supplanting the
original export restriction system adopted in 1990. In 2000, the
county supervisors adopted a new ordinance that lays out a set of rules
for comprehensive management of the resource.'
A citizen's group
representing water users from throughout the county drafted the
ordinance, the outcome of an eight-year process of consultations.'
147. See the case studies of the Semitropic Water Storage District banking project
and the Kern Water Bank in THOMAS, supra note 31, at 71-78, 88-98.
148. Telephone interview with Gary Bucher, Water Supply Manager, Kern County
Water Agency (Dec. 12, 2002).
149. Interview with Curt Aikens, Gen. Manager, Yuba County Water Agency (Dec. 2,
2002); see also THIRD PARTY ISSUES, supra note 24, at 95-115.
150.

Id. at 144.

151.

Recall that Kern's ordinance applies only to the southeastern portion of the

county, overlying the Lahontan hydrologic formation. KERN COUNTY, CAL., CODE
§ 19.118.020 (2002). The code expressly excluded the San Joaquin Valley portion of
the county because a water resource management process was already underway there.
Telephone interviews with Bruce Divelbiss, Kern County Counsel (Aug. 6 & Sept. 26,
2002).
152. GLENN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 20.03 (2002). This is a separate section in the
county code from the export restriction ordinance adopted in 1990. Id. § 20.04.
Although it does not officially replace the old ordinance, the county is operating as
though it has done so. Interview with Judy Brown, Chair of Water Advisory Comm., in
Willows, Cal. (Aug. 27, 2002); Interview with Keith Hansen, Glenn County Supervisor,
in Willows, Cal. (Aug. 28, 2002); Interview with Denny Bungarz, Glenn County
Supervisor, in Willows, Cal. (Aug. 26, 2002).
153.

JUDY BROWN ET AL., LOcALLY GOVERNED GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT IN GLENN

COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 1 (2001); Interview with Sandy Denn, Member, Bd. of Dirs.,
Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., in Chico, Cal. (Aug. 28, 2002). Interview with Van
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The county's largest irrigation district initiated the process. This
district's members stood to gain the most from being able to engage in
water transfers and recognized the need to accommodate the concerns
of neighboring groundwater users who stood to lose from an
uncontrolled export scheme. 54 Under the new system, local users have
committed to monitoring the health of the aquifer and have
established a set of target levels, called basin management objectives,
as reference points for determining critical declines in the water
table.' 55 The system dispenses with the need to acquire a permit for
water transfers; instead, it stipulates that exports can be stopped if they
lead to critical declines in the water table.'56 It can also require
cessation of pumping for local agricultural uses if critical levels are
exceeded. 5' Although the ordinance does not provide for other forms
of mitigation, water districts that have begun to engage in transfer
activity since the Rassage of the new ordinance have established funds
for this purpose.
Elsewhere within rural California, the 1990s have seen some
movement toward local oversight systems for groundwater, notably
through the establishment of groundwater management plans,
commonly referred to as Assembly Bill 3030 plans, under the authority
of the legislation adopted in 1992 and noted earlier. 59 As a group,
these systems provide a framework for active, largely voluntary
management of the groundwater basin.
The focus is on the
development of monitoring systems and the organization of basin
replenishment activities."'
Taken together, these various models suggest that although the
days of open access to rural groundwater basins are over, the systems
may evolve to a somewhat different set of management rules than
those operating in coastal and southern California. Instead of moving
toward quantified property rights through adjudication or a
Tenney, Gen. Manager, Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., in Willows, Cal. (Aug. 27, 2002);
Telephone interview with Van Tenney, Gen. Manager, Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist.
(Dec. 9, 2002).
154. BROWN ETAL., supra note 153, at 1.
155. Id. at 3.
156. Id. at 9.
157. GLENN COUN'Y, CAL., CODE §20.03.130 (2002).
158. Interview with Van Tenney, supra note 153; Telephone interview with Van
Tenney, supra note 153.
159. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10750 to 10750.10 (Deering 2003). CDWR records show
that there may be as many as 100 such plans, of which involve multiple parties,
although officials do not know how many of these are active. It is widely recognized
that many plans were adopted on paper, with little real management content. Some
local agencies did so as a defensive strategy, to keep the state from expanding its own
authority over groundwater. Interview with Carl Hauge, Chief Hydrologist, CDWR,
and Rob Swartz, Senior Hydrologist, CDWR, in Sacramento, Cal. (Sept. 27, 2002).
160. For an early assessment of these plans, see CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES.,
GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT IN CALIFORNIA, A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE PURSUANT
TO 1997 SENATE BILL 1245, at IX (1999).
Further discussion of the plans will be

forthcoming in the CDWR Bulletin 118-2003, to be published before the end of 2003.
Interview with Carl Hauge and Rob Swartz, supra note 159.

Issue 2

COUNTIES WRESTING CONTROL

comprehensive scheme for water pricing under a single management
authority, rural users are seeking forms that combine consensual rules
Clearly,
and only limited restrictions on individual behavior.
development of information on the characteristics of the aquifer is a
necessary component of any form of active management. There is an
open question as to whether these systems will be able to function
effectively on a strictly voluntary basis, without a mechanism to impose
price or quantity sanctions on pumping in the event of serious water
table depletion. " In this respect the Glenn County system stands out
as the only one backed by police power. By contrast, agencies with
Assembly Bill 3030 plans have only limited powers to introduce either
quantity controls or pricing mechanisms for limiting access to the
162
resource.
A second and related question is whether a groundwater
management plan can be effective without establishing target levels for
the water table. Such levels are the essence of the "basin management
objectives" approach. This approach allows for adjusting target levels
as information on the aquifer improves and determining critical
conditions when pumping restrictions are warranted. 63 Legislation
passed in 2002 provides local agencies with a strong incentive to adopt
such target levels; without them, a groundwater management plan will
by CDWR for
no longer be eligible to receive state funds administered
16
1
projects.
construction
or
quality
groundwater
The third question on the horizon concerns the appropriate level
of jurisdiction for a local groundwater management system. The
systems now in place span a wide range of options, from a single water
district to multi-party, multi-county arrangements. Many of the multiparty groundwater management plans are configured to correspond to
the underlying groundwater basin.'65 This is generally not the case for
programs adopted by individual water districts. By making state
funding contingent on the presentation of plans to involve other
agencies overlying a basin, the legislature in 2002 sent 6a6 signal to local
agencies to follow a basin approach whenever possible.

161. According to the manager of an agency that federates numerous water districts
within the SanJoaquin Valley on water policy issues, the common position of member
districts is that a voluntary method ought to suffice. Telephone interview with Dave
Orth, Gen. Manager, Kings River Conservation Dist. (Oct. 21, 2002).
162. For instance, a local agency with an Assembly Bill 3030 plan cannot "limit or
suspend extractions unless [it] ... has determined through study and investigation
that groundwater replenishment programs or other alternative sources of water supply
have proved insufficient or infeasible to lessen the demand for groundwater." CAL.
WATER CODE § 10753.9(c). Fees can only be collected for groundwater management
after an election within the affected area. Id. § 10754.3.
163. See Toccoy Dudley, Basin Management Objective (BMO) Method of Groundwater
Basin Management, in BASIN MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVE (BMO) FOR GROUNDWATER
SURFACE ELEVATIONS IN GLENN COUNTY, CAL., atAl-A9 (2001).
164. CAL. WATER CODE § 10753.7(a) (Deering 2003).
165. Two examples are the Merced Area Groundwater Pool Interests and the Tulare
Lake Bed coordinated Groundwater Management Plan.
166. CAL. WATER CODE § 10753.7.
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From a basin management perspective, one can make strong
arguments in favor of systems uniting agencies overlying a common
basin; this is, after all, the level at which the negative externalities of
groundwater mismanagement are registered and the benefits of sound
management are shared.
A basin approach nevertheless raises
questions concerning the future role for counties, whose
administrative boundaries rarely coincide with the contours of aquifers
(or the local management plans adopted by water agencies). Counties
have already shown their ability to play a defensive policing role. As
the experiences in Glenn, Yuba, and Kern show, the county can also
serve as a useful level of organization for more offensive management
initiatives. Counties provide a readily available structure for convening
water users, and their police powers can be used proactively as a
safeguard in groundwater management. For water users in the many
California counties with export restrictions in place, the challenge
ahead will be to negotiate the move from a purely defensive role of
groundwater protection to one facilitating active groundwater
management.
VII. CONCLUSION
The adoption of county ordinances restricting groundwater
exports was a rational initial response to the threat of uncontrolled
mining of the aquifers under a statewide water market. In effect, the
county police powers are a substitute for the lack of protection of
groundwater users under the State's no injury laws.
From an
economic perspective, these protections should apply both for direct
transfers of groundwater (an area the courts have determined to be
within county jurisdiction) and for indirect transfers through the use
of additional groundwater in exchange for transferred surface water.
Although county jurisdiction in this latter area remains ambiguous
from a legal perspective, it is consistent with the spirit of the State's no
injury protections. There are, however, both economic and legal bases
for concern that the ordinances may over-protect the resource,
thereby imposing a barrier to its reasonable and beneficial use within
the state. A more offensive strategy of groundwater management is
needed to achieve the goals of stabilizing overdrafted aquifers and
making economic use of underground storage space through transfer
and banking operations.
Water users in rural counties have so far eschewed the
comprehensive management systems adopted in coastal and southern
California, including adjudicated basins and pump taxes. In some
rural counties, however, the advent of the market has led to
experimentation with new forms of management, key components of
which are the establishment of monitoring and mitigation systems.
These experiences suggest the potential for this rural movement to go
beyond its initial role of protecting local water users from the negative
effects of the market to one of advancing groundwater management at
the local level.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Drought is the proverbial elephant being described by blind men'except in the case of drought the elephant is walking and the blind
men are trying to keep up. It is human nature to focus on the pieces
of the whole, such as the elephant's leg or tail because the whole
animal is too big to quickly comprehend. In the context of drought,
the pieces of the whole include, in no particular order, quantity of
precipitation by season, resultant soil moisture storage, if any, ground
water use, reservoir storage levels, and spring runoff quantities and
Water resources professionals and climatologists
characteristics.'
examination of these individual elements was responsible in part for
statewide confusion regarding the severity of the current drought
during the summer of 2002. For example, the Governor declared a
drought emergency, implementing the Colorado Drought Mitigation
Response Plan in April, based on forecast conditions for the eastern
t Sarah Klahn, Esq. is a member of the firm White &Jankowski, LLP. She can be
reached at sarahk@whitejankowski.com.

Thanks to Doug Clements, P.E., Spronk

Water Engineers for his helpful suggestions.
author's.

Any errors in engineering are the

1. John Godfrey Saxe, Parable of the Blind Men and the Elephant, available at

http://www.wvu.edu/-lawfac/jelkins/lp-2001/saxe.html.
2. See generally THOMAS B. MCKEE ET AL., HISTORICAL
A TECHNICAL REPORT (1999) [hereinafter

COLORADO: PART
PERIODS].

DRY AND WET PERIODS IN
HISTORICAL DRY AND WET
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plains early in the growing season.'
By contrast, although the
snowpack literally evaporated in much of the state durin April and
May, resulting in little runoff and almost no reservoir fill, only a few
communities adopted watering restrictions relatively early in the
summer, including Louisville, Silt and Parachute.5 Other cities, such
as Denver and Golden, did not formally act to impose water
restrictions until middle to late-summer, although both cities adopted
voluntary restrictions earlier in the year.
As the character of the 2002-2003 drought became clearer, the
reaction to the drought by policy-makers grew in volume, although
initially it was largely of the one-note variety-increase supplies
Colorado water law is tailor-made for this type of response: the state
constitution guarantees the right to divert," protects water rights as
property rights,9 and with a few exceptions, provides little leeway for
the legislature or executive agencies to exert "command and control"
remedies to drought situations. However, while increasing supply is
the most obvious means of responding to drought, no one seriously
thinks these plans are an effective response to this drought. And,
although Colorado law precludes "command and control" actions by
the state executive branch to address drought, it does provide for a
variety of measures that can be taken by water users.
This article begins by considering the perceptual nature of
drought, perhaps the only natural disaster we experience without
initially realizing it, as well as reviewing some of the climatological
measures used to estimate the elephant. Part II also briefly examines
other states' responses to drought, as well as Colorado's response
through its Drought Plan. Next, the article focuses on the reported
stream flow and water rights call conditions in various basins during
the 2002 water year to get a big picture of the Colorado elephant.
Finally, Part III examines the ability of Colorado's prior appropriation
3. See Letter from Bill Owens, Colorado Governor, to Brad Lundahl, Chair, Colo.

Water

Availability

Task

Force

(Apr.

22,

2002),

available

www.cwcb.state.co.us/owc/Drought_- Planning/Drought_PlanActivation.pdf.

at

4. See generally Office of the State Eng'r, Colo. Div. of Water Res., Colorado Water
Supply Conditions Update May -June 2002 [hereinafter Supply Conditions Update "Month

Year'].
5.

LAND & WATER FUND OF THE ROCKIES, WATER USE EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS: A

SOLUTION TO COLORADO'S URBAN WATER SUPPLY PROBLEMS 1 (2002) (for Silt and

Parachute); see City of Louisville, Colorado Homepage, http://www.ci.louisville.co.us
(Louisville Mayor'sJune 2002 Executive order imposing watering restrictions).
6. The DenverChannel.com, Denver Passes Mandatory Water Restrictions, June 25,
2002, availableat www.TheDenverChannel.com; see generally Theo Stein, IrrigationWell
Owners Notified of Pumping ban, DENVER POST, Mar. 14, 2003, at Bi; Marcos MocineMcQueen, Boulder Leads the way in Water Conservation,DENVER POST, Mar. 11, 2003, at
Al.

7. See discussion infra Part III on the "Big Straw" and various funding mechanisms
being discussed for local community bonding efforts to enlarge reservoirs or build new
reservoirs.
8. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 (stating "the right to divert.., shall not be
denied.")
9. Id.§5.
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system to deal with drought. As of the first part of January, the
legislature introduced more than eighty bills addressing the drought.
With so many fish in the barrel, this article focuses on two high-profile
pieces of legislation that were proposed during the 2003 legislative
session and, more importantly, several ways that water users and others
were able to mitigate the effects of drought under current state law.
H. DEFINING DROUGHT: ONE MAN'S DROUGHT IS ANOTHER
MAN'S SUNNY DAY'0
A. PERCEPTIONS ARE EVERYTHING
We have no good definition of drought. We may say truthfully that
we scarcely know a drought when we see one. We welcome the first
clear day after a rainy spell. Rainless days continue for a time and we
are pleased to have a long spell of such fine weather. It keeps on and
we are a little worried. A few days more and we are really in trouble.
The first rainless day in a spell of fine weather contributes as much to
it will be until the
a drought as the last, but no one knows how serious
last dry day is gone and the rains have come again .... i
There is little question about natural disaster when property has
been hit by a hurricane, flood, or tornado; however, one person may
experience a drought that his neighbor, under the same physical
conditions, does not experience. Consider for example, three farmers
in the same neighborhood in the Lower South Platte basin. The
location of this example is significant because water supplies on the
Lower South Platte are dependent upon both mountain snowpack and
plains precipitation. The first farmer is a dryland farmer on uplands,
with neither ditch nor ground water rights. The second farms alfalfa
using senior surface diversions. The third also farms alfalfa but has
junior surface rights, insufficient in quantity, and an undecreedjunior
well. The dryland farmer relies on properly timed precipitation falling
on his land. Thus, even in a year when the Lower South Platte receives
average precipitation, if the timing is off, he experiences a "drought"
because his supply does not meet his demand. As a dryland wheat
farmer, he has few, if any, options to replace natural precipitation.
The second farmer growing alfalfa under one of the senior ditch
systems in the Lower South Platte will rely on ditch deliveries for his
crop. His water right, if sufficiently senior, can supply necessary
irrigation water with little regard to hydrological or climatic
conditions. As dryland farmers and owners of more junior water rights
feel the pinch of drought, he prospers because of higher crop yields

10. THOMAS B. McKEE ET AL., WATER IN THE BALANCE: A HISTORY OF DROUGHT IN
COLORADO: LESSONS LEARNED AND WHAT LIES AHEAD 5 (2000) [hereinafter WATER IN
THE BALANCE].

11. 1 DROUGHT A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT 6 (Donald A. Wilhite ed., 2000) (quoting I.R.
TANNEHILL, DROUGHT: ITS CAUSES AND EFFECTS (1947)).
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and favorable market conditions. This farmer would have a wholly
different definition of drought than his dryland neighbor.
The third farmer, growing alfalfa with a combination of junior
surface diversions and an unaugmented well, is in a more complicated
position. His water supply depends on a host of factors. He is at the
mercy of winter mountain snowpack, spring and summer rains, the
timing of runoff and basinwide reservoir levels. His irrigation water
first comes from the river under his junior water rights. This water will
only be available at times of plenty, occurring when snowpack and
rainfall are high or when the runoff pattern creates a peak in river flow
allowing his water right to come into priority. If rainfall and river
diversions do not suffice, he is forced to rely on his well. His wells, like
many others in the area, were drilled in response to earlier drought,
such as that occurring in the first half of the 1950s. 2 These wells have
ample physical water supply, but dubious legal supply. 3 This farmer
has created a particularly Hobbsian choice for himself: (1) if he
operates lawfully, he may experience drought even under average
precipitation and snowpack conditions, because his water rights are
not senior enough; or (2) if he operates unlawfully, he risks being shut
down by the water court or the State Engineer's Office ("SEO").
Water users' differing perceptions of drought extend beyond
irrigated agricultural users. Although agriculture uses more than
ninety-five percent of Colorado's surface and groundwater; the second
most important use by quantity is municipal use, accounting for nearly
all of the remaining five percent. Municipal users come in two
varieties: (1) water planners and engineers that develop and supply
raw water for public or private agencies; and (2) individual treated
water consumers. Drought is perceived differently by these two
categories of municipal water users. Water resources engineers and
planners anticipate multiple droughts every decade, as they track
snowpack and snowmelt patterns, precipitation patterns, and reservoir
levels. In the last twenty to thirty years, short-term drought conditions,
particularly related to reservoir supplies, have never materialized in
ways that impacted water users because well-timed and unexpected
precipitation breached the looming gap in supplies. This is the goal of
water resources engineering, and the water resources engineer who
has done a reliable job of developing raw water supplies effectively
insulating end-users from short-term drought effects. However, water
engineering attempts to predict the future by looking backward at the
last worst-case scenario. Engineers' ability to do this effectively has
insulated most of the state's treated water customers from drought for
the last thirty years. The summer of 2002 set a new water supply worstcase scenario and was so intense that the entire state, including treated
water customers, felt the effects of the drought.
12. ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS 181-82 (1983).
13. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(5) (2002); Kelly Ranch v. S.E. Colo. Water
Conservancy Dist., 550 P.2d 297, 302, 305 (Colo. 1976); Bijou Irrigation Co. v.
Simpson, No. 02 CW 108, slip op. at 13 (Colo. Dist. Water Div. 1 Dec. 23, 2002).
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These examples reflect the complex nature of drought, where both
perception and impact define the condition. Drought impacts are
proportional to a region's vulnerability-a term drought policy-makers
define to include social factors, such as institutional and decisionmaking environments, policy issues, economics, and technology. 4 For
example, in a community without water metering, the expectation that
water will be available on demand at the tap without regard to cost,
increases the community's vulnerability to drought. If expectations
translate to behavior, drought can be exacerbated or even "caused"
when a more conservation-minded community might not have felt the
effects of the dry spell.
The institutional and decisional environment also impacts a
community's vulnerability. Existing water law and the level of integrity
that water users accord this legal and administrative system can either
increase or decrease vulnerability. Some states, such as New Mexico,
have a fairly fluid (no pun intended) concept of prior appropriation
law. 5 New Mexico is a permit state and theoretically river basin
adjudications should precede permit issuance. As a practical matter,
most rivers and streams in the state have never been adjudicated;
meaning the amounts of water to which users are entitled has never
been established. '6 The Office of State Engineer has only sporadic
records regarding stream diversions. These institutional elements may
make New Mexico more vulnerable to drought, because it is
impossible to predict how much wet-water will be available, assuming
lawful operations.
In Colorado, by contrast, the constitutional and statutory
requirements for obtaining and maintaining a water right mean that
water rights holders may have greater awareness of the amount and
timing of diversions that may be available during drought.'7 Historical
water diversion records are maintained at the State or Division
Engineers Offices. Local water officials, responsible for determining
which rights have priority and shutting down unlawful operations, can
also be an accurate source of information regarding the nature of a
water right during drought. On the Front Range, most municipal
surface water rights are changed agricultural water rights, and part of
the evidentiary showing in a change case includes engineering analyses
of water availability during drought conditions. ' Thus, in Colorado,
the institutional impact on drought vulnerability is neutral. The

14. 1 DROUGHT: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 11, at 8; Olga V. Wilhelmi &
Donald A. Wilhite, Assessing Vulnerability to Agricultural Drought: A Nebraska Case Study,
25 NAT. HAZARDS 37 (2002).
15. See generally G. EMLEN HALL, HIGH AND DRY: THE TExAS-NEW MEXICO STRUGGLE
FOR THE PECOS RIVER (2002).
16. ALLETrA BELIN ET AL., TAKING CHARGE OF OUR WATER DESTINY: A WATER
MANAGEMENT POLICY GUIDE FOR NEW MEXICO IN THE 21ST CENTURY 15 (2002).
17. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-80-102(7), 37-84-113; Georges v. Vahldick, 421 P.2d 471,

472 (Colo. 1966).
18. See Deposition of Mark Koleber, City & County of Denver v. Thornton, No. 96
CW 145 (Colo. Dist. Water Div. 1 Aug. 31, 1999) (on file with the author).
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Colorado water rights system, when complied with, provides
predictability; water rights susceptible to shortages during drought can
be determined through engineering analyses, as can those rights
reliably delivering water during drought.
Finally, economic and technological factors that influence drought
vulnerability include resources available to water users. In a drought
such as that of 2002, long-time growers with little operational
flexibility, such as the dryland wheat fanner or the junior surface
diverter discussed above, likely assessed conditions and decided it was
not reasonable to assume they could grow a high dollar crop requiring
substantial irrigation. This would likely minimize drought impacts to
their operations; but not the economic impact from growing a less
valuable crop or no crop. If their operations were economically viable,
these same users might have decided early in the year to attempt to
purchase augmentation water to improve their chances of growing a
crop by pumping ground water out-of-priority.
B. OVERCOMING PERCEPTION: MEASURING DROUGHT
In an attempt to deal with the perceptual nature of drought,
climatologists have constructed various types of drought indices and
measurements, some objective and some consensus-based, that
attempt to define the point at which conditions warrant the label
"drought." 9 Objective methods are useful if different types of data are
properly incorporated for a quantitative analysis directed at a
particular water use, such as agricultural use on the Great Plains.
Consensus-based methods incorporate analyses of different types of
data, as well as the professional judgment of numerous climatologists,
water engineers, meteorologists and so on, interpreting the data. In
addition to incorporating perception into the analysis, by either
focusing on one particular water use, or by involving multiple
disciplines in the analysis, consensus-based methods must
appropriately measure the time scale being considered. Drought
impacts may occur from drought conditions that arise in a few days,
such as "flash droughts" climatologists have identified that rapidly
materialize on the Great Plains. Flash droughts occur from a
combination of depletion of moisture in plant root zones and already
dry sub-soil.2 ' By contrast, drought impacts that arise only after months
or years of dry conditions require measurement methods spanning a
longer time period. 2
19. See Kelly Redmond's article on the various institutional shortcomings
surrounding drought indices' development, peer review and refinement. Kelly
Redmond, The Depiction of Drought: A Commentary, 83 BuLL. OF THE AM.
METEOROLOGICAL SOC'Y 1143, 1144-46 (2002).
20. Mark Svodoba et al., The Drought Monitor,83 BULL. OF THE AM. METEOROLOGICAL
Soc'y 1181, 1187-88 (2002).
21. Redmond, supra note 19, at 1146.
22. Climatologists speak of "intrinsic timescales" in drought indices, which make
different measures more or less reliable depending on the time step examined. Id. at
1145; see also HISTORICAL DRY AND WET PERIODS, supra note 2.
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In the 1960's, farmers and ranchers on the Great Plains developed
one of the most widely known "objective" indices, the Palmer Index. 3
Its internal timestep 4 of nine to twelve months is important in its
usefulness to agricultural water users. In the most simplistic terms, the
Palmer Index involves developing a water balance involving
precipitation, various types of sub-soil moisture, evapotranspiration
rates, and judgment calls regarding drought severity. 3
The
Standardized Precipitation Index ("SPI") ,26 another drought measure
developed specifically for Colorado, evaluates drought intensity,
magnitude, duration, and the probability of emerging from an existing
drought based on historic data.
In the late 1990's, the Drought Mitigation Center at the University
of Nebraska and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association
("NOAA") began work on a consensus based drought identification
tool that has evolved into the Drought Monitor. 8 On a weekly basis,
water resources experts and climatologists engage in an on-line
information gathering and discussion exercise, incorporating different
types of data from across the United States to determine the status of
drought conditions nationwide.n
The Drought Monitor identifies drought based on the interest
group impacted: agricultural drought, hydrological drought, or firedanger drought."
These categories are expansive.
Hydrologic
drought could refer to a drought impacting only municipal reservoir
storage, or it could reflect such insufficient supply resulting in a
"social" drought causing treated water customers and visitors
to an
area to feel the impacts of water restrictions.3
Time frame is
important in the context of drought consensus tools, just as in
determining the character and reliability of drought indices. The
Drought Monitor could identify a hydrologic drought in April, but
continued drought conditions through August may be required before
individual treated water customers would feel the effects.
23. Redmond, supra note 19, at 1145. The August 2002 issue of the Bulletin of the
American Meteorological Society previously referred to is devoted to the topic of drought.
See also Richard R. Heim. Jr., A Review of Twentieth-Century Drought Indices Used in the
United States, 83 BuLL. OF THE AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC'Y 1149, 1150-56 (2002); John
Keyantash & John A. Dracup, The Quantification of Drought: An Evaluation of Drought
Indices 83 BULL. OF THE AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC'Y 1167 (2002); Svoboda et al., supra
note 20.

24. Redmond, supra note 19, at 1145.
25. Heim, supra note 23, at 1155.
26. Thomas B. McKee, Nolan J. Doesken and John Kleist developed the SPI at
Colorado Climate Center at Colorado State University. See HISTORICAL DRY AND WET
PERIODS, supra note 2, at 12-14 (detailing the statistical and technical underpinnings of
this index).
27. See Heim, supranote 23, at 1160-61.
28. Svoboda et al., supra note 20, at 1181-90. Drought Monitor website, at
http://drought.unl.edu/dm.
29. Svoboda et al., supra note 20, at 1182-83.
30. Id. at 1186-87.
31.

Nat'l Drought Mitigation Cent., What is Drought? Understanding and Defining

Drought, at http://www.drought.unl.edu/whatis/concept.htm.
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In Colorado, the State and Division Engineers rely on a tool known
as the Surface Water Supply Index ("SWSI"). The SWSI incorporates
objective elements of drought indices with subjective evaluations of
conditions on the ground by local water officials." Like the SPI, the
SEO and Natural Resources Conservation Service developed the SWSI
The SWSI calculations include "snowpack,
for use in Colorado."
reservoir storage, and precipitation for the winter period (November
Except for the South Platte basin, "where reservoir
through April)
storage is given the most weight" during the winter, snowpack is the
dominant element of the winter SWSI calculation.3" During the
summer period (May through October), the SWSI is calculated mainly
from streamflows, except in the South Platte basin where reservoir
levels are again the most important element.36 These interbasin
Colorado does not
differences are important to acknowledge.
experience uniform wet and dry seasons.3 Each river basin can be
distinguished based on the times when it receives the majority of its
annual precipitation, and some basins experience intra-basin
For instance, the San
differences in the timing of precipitation.
Juan/Dolores basin relies mainly on late summer and fall monsoonal
storms39 from the Gulf of California. By contrast, the Upper South
Platte, including the Front Range, relies on late winter snows for water
supplies, while the Lower South Platte and eastern plains rely on midsummer precipitation.40 These and other items may be the subject of
further refinements to improve the SWSI as a tool."

32. Office of the State Eng'r, Colo. Div. of Water Res., Surface Water in Colorado, at
http://wwww.water.state.co.us/surfacewtaer/surface.asp; Keyantash & Dracup, supra
note 23, at 1175.
33. Supply Conditions Update March 200-3, supra note 4, at 1.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Supply Conditions UpdateJune 2002, supranote 4, at 1.
37. WATERIN THE BALANCE, supra note 10, at 10.
38.

39.
40.
41.

DRYAND WET PERIODS, supra note 2, at 5-6, 29, 47-49.
HISTORICAL DRYAND WET PERIODS, supra note 2, at 8, 48.
WATER IN THE BALANCE, supra note 10, at 10.
Supply Conditions Update November 2002, supra note 4, at 1, 4; Supply Conditions

Id.; see also HISTORICAL

Update September 2002, supra note 4, at 1, 4.

Issue 2

DESCRIBING DROUGHTIN COLORADO

527

SEASON OF MAXIMUM PRECIPITATION
COLORADO

*

A,

WINTE~SPRING

J O

WI

FALL

ASUMMER!

ER

A

SAA
/,y\

"

Mountains

Synoptic

LAMAR

AAALAN

DURANO
-..
-_--./_
--- -- -

WINTER

I

--

/.A

SPRING -

SUMMER

Front Range

Plain*

Southwest

Synoptic

ConvecUon

Southwest

-

FALL

Monsoon

(warmer)

I

Pause

FIGURE 142

Reliance on historical data for water supply planning and drought
mitigation purposes is only as good as the historical data are
representative. Reliable instrumental climatic data in the western
United States have only been collected over the past seventy to eighty
years;4 1 the time length of the stream flow records is even shorter in
42. HISTORICAL

DRY AND WET PERIODS, supra note 2, at 49.
43. Connie A. Woodhouse et al., Drought in the Western Plains, 1845-56, 83 BULL. OF
THE Am. METEOROLOGICAL SOC'Y 1485, 1488-89 (2002). Prior to statehood, the United
States Army, at its forts in the region west of the 100th Meridian, collected some
meteorological data of uneven quality. National Oceanic & Atmospheric
Administration,
Nineteenth Century
U.S.
Climate Data Set Project, at
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/onlinedata/forts/forts.html.
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many locations."
Broadly, paleoclimatologists rely on indirect
environmental measures such as the chemistry of glacial ice cores5 and
tree-ring analyses 46 to reconstruct, inter alia,the severity of drought and
the implications for water supplies.47
One of the most well-known tree-ring reconstructions, by Stockton
andJacoby, demonstrated that the seventeen years of data relied upon
by negotiators to the Colorado River Compact composed the wettest
period in 450 years of the Colorado basin."' Compact allocations were
thus based on anomalously high values. 49 Recently, climatologists at
NOAA in Boulder, Colorado, reconstructed Boulder Creek stream
flows from 1703 to 198750 and suggested several uses for such data in
Colorado water planning.5' Results from tree-ring investigations
suggest that lengthy and severe droughts are a standard feature of
Colorado Front Range climate. 2 NOAA suggested that municipal
water supply planning incorporate paleoclimatic data because such
data could provide perspective to the results obtained from using
historical flow data, involving at best seventy to eighty years of
instrument records.53 The scientists also suggested modeling with
paleoclimate data to simulate whether or not a given reservoir supply
will be sufficient during the magnitude of droughts suggested by
paleoclimatic records.54

44. Shaleen Jain et a]., Multdecadal Streamflow Regimes in the Interior Western United
States: Implications for the Vulnerability of Water Resources, 107 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 1
(2002).
45. David L. Naftz et al., Ice Core Evidence of Rapid air TemperatureIncreases Since 1960
in Alpine Areas of the Wind River Range, Wyoming, United States, 107J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 1,
at X-1 (2002).
46. This is also known as dendrochronology. SeeJain et al., supra note 44, at 1-2;
Woodhouse et al., supra note 43, at 1485-86; Ramzi Touchan & Malcolm Hughes, The
Role of Dendrochronology in Natural Resource Management, USDA FOREST PROCEEDINGS
RMRS-P-13, at 277 (2000).
47. SeeJain et al., supra note 44, at 1-2.
48. CHARLES W. STOCKTON & GORDON C. JACOBY, JR., LAKE POwELL RESEARCH
PROJECT BULLETIN: LONG-TERM SURFACE WATER SUPPLY AND STREAMFLOW TRENDS IN THE
UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN 38 (1976).

49. Id. Apart from the portions of the river the states to the Compact received, the
Stockton study establishes that the states were apportioned a total volume of water that
could be expected only a small fraction of the time. Water allocation, whether by
adjudication or equitable apportionment typically proceeds from average conditions,
rather than extreme conditions. The results of this over-allocation continue to be in
the news. See Dean E. Murphy, Failed Deal in California Cuts Water for Nevada, N.Y.
TIMES,Jan. 2, 2003, at Al0.
50. See STOCKTON &JACOBY, supra note 48, at 38;Jain et al., supra note 44, at 2; New
Mexico State Engineer Tom C. Turney, Comments before the Association of
Commerce and Industry (Mar. 22, 2002) (transcript available from the New Mexico
Office of State Engineer).
51. Jain et al., supranote 44, at6.
52. STOCKTON &JACOBY, supra note 48, at 38.
53. Id. at vii, 38.
54. Id. at vii, 41; See alsoJain et al., supra note 44, at 1-2 (discussing how analysis first
identifies certain periods of years in the paleoclimatic record as "flavors" of stream
flow, either wet, dry or very dry, then a given integrated reservoir storage level is
assumed against three or more demand scenarios to determine whether the reservoir
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Today, the City of Boulder is cautiously assessing paleoclimatic
data as a basis for water supply and city drought planning.55 Even if
water resources professionals determine that paleoclimatic data are
useful for planning, the use of such data by the water resources
community at large will likely depend on whether the methods and
conclusions survive the scrutiny of the Colorado water courts under
the rules of evidence.56 Water planning and water adjudication
typically work hand-in-hand in Colorado, and planning methods that
will not support water rights decrees are not likely to be adopted. 7
However, another possibility is that our water planning has proceeded
under unusually wet conditions, and the historic data relied upon to
determine an average stream flow condition is actually
unrepresentative. The New Mexico State Engineer suggested that the
current drought in the Rio Grande basin actually reflects "average
conditions" 9 instead of drought conditions. If that holds true regionwide, there will be no need to turn to paleoclimatic records, as each
year of the drought will provide new instrumental data with which to
reconfigure our previous assumptions about historical water flows.
III. PUTTING THE MEASUREMENT TOOLS TO WORK
A. DROUGHT PLANNING

If the availability of drought measurement techniques controlled
state planning in response to drought, it seems likely that all states
would have comprehensive drought plans. In fact, based on 1996
statistics, only about twenty-seven states have drought plans. Whether
to create a drought plan is a state decision 6' based on a complex mix of
social, economic, political and climatic variables.
State drought
planning takes many forms, and arises in part from the legal
framework (if any) regarding rights to use water.
For example,
storage will meet demands under a variety of climatic conditions. Jain et al., conclude:
"Indeed, this allows us to tie the multidecadal flow regimes and temporal changes in
the pdf to potential impacts on managed water resources infrastructure.").
55. 2 HYDROSPHERE RES. CONSULTANTS, CITY OF BOULDER, COLO. DROUGHT PLAN:
TECHNICAL INFORMATION ANDANALYSIS DRAr 18 (Feb. 5, 2003).

56. See, e.g., City of Golden v. City of Arvada, No. 98CW448, slip op. at 5-6 (Colo.
Dist. Water Div. 1 June 13, 2001). The court rejected the expert testimony offered in
support of the SEO's opposition to Golden's application.
57. See generally Park County Pres. Coalition v. Columbine Assoc., 993 P.2d 483

(Colo. 2000).
58. See Turney, supra note 50, at 2.
59.
60.

Id.
Donald A. Wilhite, State Actions to Mitigate Drought: Lessons Learned, 33 J. AM.

WATERREsOURCES Ass'N 961 (1997).

61. See Donald A. Wilhite, Drought Planning:A Processfor State Government, 27 WATER
In other countries, such as Australia, the federal
government takes the lead in drought planning.
RESOURCES BuLL. 29 (1991).
62.

Donald A. Wilhite & Steven L. Rhodes, State-Level Drought Planningin the United

States: FactorsInfluencingPlanDevelopment, 19 WATER INT'L 15, 16 (1994).
63.

Compare the drought plan case studies as described in Donald Wilhite's report.
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California's drought plan provides for state agency purchase of surplus
municipal or agricultural water for its banking program; 61 such an
approach would be questionable, at best, under Colorado law.65
Drought plans may incorporate assessment programs, drought indices
described previously, conservation programs, emergency response
programs, and water augmentation.
However, at least one
commentator concluded that state responses are too heavily weighted
towards reaction to drought emergency, rather than preparation to
avoid drought-related impacts.
Since 1981, Colorado has had a state drought plan in place that
has been described as "comprehensive. ''68 The current Colorado
Drought Mitigation & Response Plan incorporates Monitoring,
Assessment, Response and Mitigation. 69 Monitoring is an ongoing
activity incorporating data from the Palmer, SWSI, or SPI indices.
Drought severity triggers the next steps in the Drought Plan.7' In April
of 2002, the Governor announced a drought emergency, based on the
severity of drought conditions. 7' The Governor based the drought
emergency on the SWSI analysis conditioned by the DWR which
launched the state from "normal conditions" under the Drought Plan
to "Phase 3," meaning the SWSI index was between -2.0 and -3.9.73
B. OF LOW FLOWS AND LESS STORAGE

The Governor's early announcement proved to be correct. By May
of 2002, the SWSI index bottomed out in the San Juan/Dolores and
the Yampa/White River basins. The recorded values were -4.1 and -4.0
respectively. These were the lowest SWSI values reported since the
indices' inception in 1981; the lowest possible values SWSI algorithm is
-4.2. These water short measures were repeated statewide. By May
DONALD A. WILHITE, DROUGHT MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN THE UNITED STATES: WITH

FUTURE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 32-48 (1993).

64. Wilhite, supranote 60, at 966.
65. Colorado law provides for individuals, including state agencies, to hold water
rights for beneficial use. However the Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB")
is the only agency that may hold instream flows for the benefit of the people. State
agencies are not otherwise authorized to "hold" water to provide for emergency or
other uses. See COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (2002); but
seeThe Arkansas River Water Bank Pilot Program of 2001, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-80.5101 to -107; H.B. 1318, 64th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003). Governor Owens signed
H.B. 1318 on June 4, 2003 to extend the Arkansas Banking provisions statewide.
66. Wilhite, supra note 60, at 965 tbl.1.
67. Id. at 967.
68. See generally id.; WILHITE, supra note 63.
69. COLO. DEP'T OF LOCAL AFFAiRs, Div. OF LocAL GOV'T, THE COLORADO DROUGHT
MITIGATION
AND
RESPONSE
PLAN
3,
11
(2001),
at
http://www.dola.state.co.us/oem/Publications/publications.htm [hereinafter COLO.
DROUGHT PLAN].

70. See supratext accompanying notes 20-41.
71. See COLO. DROUGHT PLAN, supra note 69, at 22 fig.2.10.
72. Letter from Bill Owens to Brad Lundahl, supra note 3.
73. See COLO. DROUGHT PLAN, supra note 69, at 22 fig.2.10; Supply Conditions Update
April 2002, supranote 4, at 1-2.

Issue 2

DESCRIBING DROUGHT IN COLORADO

2001, the South Platte basin, which obtains much of its water supply
through snowmelt and depends on reservoir storage for reliable
supplies, had an average snow pack of only 23% and reservoirs were
between 82% and 93% capacity. Even more ominous at a time when
snowmelt runoff has typically begun, flows below the Denver Metro
area at the Kersey Gage were one-tenth of normal-235 cubic feet per
second ("cfs") versus 2,486 cfs.74
Other basins experienced conditions as severe as those in the
South Platte and the San Juan/Dolores Yampa/White basins. In the
Rio Grande, snowpack was six percent of normal, and unseasonably
warm and windy weather conditions in most basins effectively
evaporated what little runoff might have come down the rivers.
basins rely more
76
•• •
However, the Rio Grande and San Juan/Dolores
heavily on summer monsoonal precipitation, so these basins entered
the growing season with at least a possibility that summer rains would
be sufficient. That possibility did not materialize."
In a typical year, snowmelt runoff satisfies water users through the
first part of June in most basins in Colorado. By April of 2002, many
senior water rights holders were already placing calls for water; calls
that, in some cases, had not been made in over fifty years.•8 Many of
the calls were at the top of the watershed, complicating water rights
administration and impacting users throughout the basin. Two calls
came in the Gunnison basin; one for Gunnison Tunnel water, and
another to satisfy the rights of the Redlands Power Canal. These calls
were indicative of an extraordinary shortage of water at a time of year,
when even in a relatively dry year, water was usually plentiful. 79 The
repeated calls by8 ,senior users were detrimental to crops in the Upper
Gunnison basin.
The lack of stored water also impacted water rights holders. By
July, Lemon Reservoir was shut down, with only ten percent of its
capacity remaining." Vallecito Reservoir had only 18,000 acre-feet of
its 125,000 acre-feet capacity. On the Lower South Platte, where
irrigators rely heavily on stored water, major plains reservoir levels
were about sixty one percent of normal. The SEO predicted that the
plains reservoirs would be empty or very near empty by the end of
August. By August, the reservoir storage situation was worse than

74. Supply Conditions UpdateJune 2002, supra note 4, at 4.
75. Supply Conditions Update May 2002, supra note 4, at 5.
76. WATER IN THE BALANCE, supra note 10, at 9.
77. See Supply Conditions Update June-September 2002, supra note 4. However, by
September, the Durango area had received precipitation and one stream gage near
the Four Corners recorded a flow of 16,000 cubic feet per second. Supply Conditions
Update October 2002, supranote 4, at 9.
78. Supply Conditions Update May 2002, supra note 4, at 6.
79. Id.
80. Supply Conditions Update August 2002, supra note 4, at 8.
81. Supply Conditions UpdateJuly 2002, supra note 4, at 9.
82. Id. at 3.
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predicted.83 Not only were the major plains reservoirs empty except
for dead storage, the outlook for refilling the reservoirs was quite poor,
affecting the ability ofjunior ground water diverters to operate out-ofpriority. Without adequate reservoir storage available to augment
depletions (including winter precipitation to recharge water shortages
from winter depletions) the SEO predicted that the junior wells would
not be allowed to pump during the 2003 season. In the San Juan
basin, reservoir storage may have benefited from the region's
September monsoonal moisture and the few calls for irrigation water
to finish their crops.85
While the shortage of water was alarming and extreme, the
situation for water users was not as dire as it could have been. In fact,
the summer of 2002 was also remarkable for the generosity of certain
senior water users. In the Colorado basin, the Shoshone Power Plant
has two of the most senior calls on the river above Grandjunction; the
1902 senior call sweeps the river when it is in priority. By May of
2002, the Shoshone Plant's calls had been almost continuous since
August of 20018' and the plant voluntarily reduced its call to preserve
upstream storage. While this move was made out of the plant's selfinterest to ensure maintenance of hydro operations, it had a beneficial
effect on other water users whose calls could not come into priority
due to the size and seniority of the Shoshone call. In July, the
Redlands Power Canal negotiated an agreement with the United States
Bureau of Reclamation, United States Fish and Wildlife Service,
Colorado River Conservation District and Redlands Power Authority to
reduce its demand in exchange for reimbursement of lost power
revenues. This agreement avoided simultaneous calls from the
Gunnison Tunnel and the Redlands Power Canal. 8
As of February 2003, the SWSI indices forecast continued drought
across the state. With Colorado facing another year of drought and no
water reserves left, the question remains: what can we do about it?
89
IV. "IN COLORADO, WATER RUNS TOWARDS MONEY"

By its terms, the prior appropriation system, if properly
administered, is designed to deal with drought. In its simplest
formulation, prior appropriation ensures that users who are entitled to
water receive water, based solely on their priority date. 0 Once a water
right is decreed, the water official must diligently administer it by the
83.
84.

Supply Conditions Update September 2002, supra note 4, at 1, 3'
Id.

85. Supply Conditions Update October 2002, supra note 4, at 9.
86.

Supply Conditions Update May 2002, supra note 4, at 7.

87. Id. The plant placed a call on the river consistently since August 2001, except
for a two week period in November and December of 2001, when the plant was down
for maintenance.
88.

Supply Conditions UpdateJuly 2002, supra note 4, at 6.

89. No Drought of Ideas, DENVER POST, Dec.1, 2002, at E6 (quoting GovernorJohn
Love).
90. COLO.REv. STAT. § 37-92-501 (2002).
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terms of its decree.9 Water officials lack authority to independently
assess which users should receive water during times of shortage.
Thus, even if a water official believes that municipal users would be
better served by water delivery than a downstream senior agricultural
user unable to finish a crop because of water shortage, he must deliver
the water to the downstream senior."
In the summer of 2002 there were few overt water disputes, 93 with
the notable exception of the South Platte basin where the State
Engineer's attempts to adopt rules regarding operation of
unaugmented wells started a huge water fight.'- However, the
magnitude of the shortage in Colorado in 2002 and lack of winter
snowfall during 2002-2003 led to the introduction of over eighty bills
addressing water issues at the beginning of the 2003 legislative session.
" Consistent with the peculiar physics of Colorado water law, several of
the bills involved water running literally uphill toward money.96
Several others proposed changes in the authority of state water officials
which would have created a parallel system of SEO quasi-adjudicated
water rights to the detriment of the entire system.97 At least one bill
involved conservation,9 8 two others involved "basin of origin"
protections,99 and another, sponsored by Speaker Lola Spradley, would
have given the water judge explicit authority to consider the effects of
water quality in a change case. 09 The following sections take a closer
91. Id.
92. See Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Extension Ditch Co., 94 P. 339, 341 (Colo.
1908).
93. In fact just the opposite, there was extraordinary cooperation. See supra text
accompanying notes 86-89.
94. See Bijou Irrigation Co. v. Simpson, No. 02CW108 (Colo. Dist. Water Div. 1 Dec.
23, 2002) affd in part and rev'd in part, 69 P.3d 50 (Colo. 2003).
95. See Colorado General Assembly website, at http://www.state.co.us/govdir/
stateleg.html.
96. See H.B. 1001, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003); S.B. 110, 64th
Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003). Both involve appropriations for water
projects, including the "Big Straw," which would move water from the Utah state line
to the Front Range.
97. See, e.g., H.B. 1001, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. § 2 (pre-amended) (Colo.
2003) (proposing to amend statutes to grant the SEO with approval power regarding
"replacement plans" to allow out-of-priority diversions without a water court decree
during a "drought."); S.B. 73, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (pre-amended) (Colo.
2003) (proposing to provide the SEO with authority to allow out-of-priority diversions
from junior wells without requiring a plan for augmentation approved by the water
court).
98. See S.B. 87, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003) This bill was the last
surviving water conservation measure the 2003 General Assembly considered; on April
23, 2003, it was postponed indefinitely. Despite the worst drought in the state's
history, all introduced conservation measures were either actually killed, or effectively
killed (such as the "indefinite postponement" of S.B. 87), including as Representative
Weissmann's H.B. 1120, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003), which after its
first hearing was sent to the Committee on Military Affairs, a sign of certain death for
natural resources bills.
99. H.B. 1233, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003); S.B. 115, 64th Gen.
Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003).
100. H.B. 1146, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003). This bill was
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look at two types of legislation considered this term in the Colorado
General Assembly: appropriations aimed at building water storage
facilities, and statutory changes proposed to "fix" perceived problems
with the prior appropriation system. Neither type of legislation proved
useful to address water shortages brought about by the 2002-2003
drought. We will also look at statutory solutions to drought impacts
that municipal diverters employed that had been adopted by the
General Assembly prior to its 2003 session.
A. LEGISLATION
As in past droughts, the legislature has determined that one
solution is to build more storage projects.' The legislature discussed
several storage and water supply-spending bills during the 2003
legislative session. Among them, the legislature adopted Senate Bill
236, which requested voter approval to float $2 billion in bonds for
0 2
reservoir construction as a part of a so-called "drought package.'
Another was the $500,000 feasibility study of the "Big Straw" contained
in Senate Bill 110, also approved by the legislature and signed by the
governor.' 3 The Big Straw would move Colorado's entitlement under
the Colorado River Compact upstream from the Utah state line to the
Front Range.' 4 Critics have suggested that the power needs for such a
project could not be Rrovided by conventional power plants, making
the project infeasible.
The Big Straw feasibility study was part of Senate Bill 110, a kind of
omnibus water appropriations bill that also provides three million
dollars for a Statewide Water Supply Initiative 01 6 allowing for an
investigation of water supply needs for the state over the next thirty
years.
Senate Bill 110 initially contained $190,000 for a study into
defeated. The exchange and augmentation plan statutes already explicitly require
such consideration. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-80-120(3), 37-92-305(5) (2002); see also
City of Thornton v. City & County of Denver, 44 P.3d 1019, 1024 (Colo. 2002).

101. Congress passed the 1902 Reclamation Act on the heels of a crippling drought
that covered most of the west between the 1880's and 1890's and the Colorado Big
Thompson Project in 1937 at the end of the 1930's drought. DUNBAR, supra note 12, at
48-51, 57.
102.

See S.B. 236. 64th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003). See also Press Release, Office

of the Governor, Governor Signs SB 236, Initiative to "Save Colorado's Water" (June 5,
2003), http://www.state.co.us/owenspress/06-05-03b.htm (describing the Governor's
views regarding this legislation and its companion bills, H.B. 1318, H.B. 1320, and
H.B. 1334).
103. SeeS.B. 110, 64th Gen. Assem., Ist Reg. Sess., § 15 (Colo. 2003).
104. Arthur Kane, Panel OK's Big Straw Study, DENVER PosT, Feb. 6, 2003, at A12,
Arthur Kane, $500,000 Reinserted Into Bill to Examine Big Straw Issue, DENVER POST, Mar.
4, 2003, at A6.

105. Telephone Interviews with Greg Hoskins, Member, Colo. Water Conservation
Bd., and Attorney, Hoskins, Farina, Aldrich & Kampf (Nov. 26, 2002 & Dec. 2, 2002);
$500,000 Reinserted Into Bill to Examine Big Straw Issue, supra note 104, at 1 (describing

operational costs to move water over the mountains at 186 million a year").
106. Statewide Water Supply Initiative "SWSI" not to be confused with the SWSI
index conducted by the Division of Water Resources.
107. See S.B. 110, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., § 14(1).
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stream flow yields from United States National Forest Service lands.' 8
This arose from discussions within the water community about two
studies that have been conducted in northern Colorado and southern
Wyoming on "selective clear-cutting" to maximize winter runoff.'"
These types of storage and supply bills may make sense and, except
for the dramatic nature of the Big Straw, appear to be an attempt to
fund local water supply planning. Yet, in effect, these bills are wholly
unresponsive to the current drought.
Even if the projects
contemplated by these appropriations are built, they will not be of any
assistance for at least ten years."0 On the other hand, because of the
legal requirements to decree storage rights, providing funding for
increased water storage projects should promote planning on the part
of water users,"' perhaps the best defense against drought. "
Another category of legislation proposed during the 2003
legislative session sought structural changes to Colorado's prior
appropriation system. The most prominent of these proposals was
offered as Senate Bill 73, in which the legislature drafted as a response
to the Division 1 Water Court decision invalidating the SEO's 2002
South Platte River Proposed Rules ("2002 Proposed Rules") governing
the operation of out-of-priority tributary wells.
The 2002 Proposed Rules would have continued the SEO's longstanding practice of approving "replacement plans" for junior wells
rather than refusing to administer junior wells out-of-priority until the
well-owner obtained a decreed augmentation plan. Over thirty parties,
including senior vested agricultural and municipal water rights from
all over the South Platte Basin, objected to the 2002 Proposed Rules
because the rules disregarded the statutory and constitutional
requirements of obtaining a water right to operate out-of-priority. 4
The Division 1 Water Court agreed, and used the language within the
Supreme Court's decision Empire Lodge v. Moyer' to invalidate the
rules."' In Empire Lodge, the Supreme Court ruled that only a decreed
plan for augmentation could create the right to divert water out-of108.

$500,000 Reinserted Into Bill to Examine Big Straw Issue, supra note 104.

109. Chuck Troendle, Address at the Colorado Drought Conference: Managing
Water Supply and Demand in Time of Drought (Dec. 4, 2002).

110. Melinda Kassen, Perspective, A Smart Response to the Drought, DENVER POST, Mar.
9, 2003, at El; Telephone Interview with Greg Hoskins, supra note 105.
111. To obtain a water rights decree, including a storage decree, applicants must
show the water court that there is need for the water, that the project will not injure
vested rights, that it is not speculative, and that it can and will be completed in a
reasonable time with diligence. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305 (2002).
112. Although a conservation-minded user-community doesn't hurt either. See

Mocine-McQueen, supra note 6.
113. See generally OFFICE OF STATE ENG'R, AMENDED RULES AND REGULATIONS
GOVERNING THE DIVERSION AND USE OF TRIBUTARY GROUND WATER IN THE SOUTH PLATTE
RIVER BASIN, COLORADO: ORDER OF THE STATE ENGINEER (2002) [hereinafter 2002
PROPOSED RULES].

114. Bijou Irrigation Co. v. Simpson, No. 02CW108, slip op. at 1-2 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
Water Div. 1, Dec. 23, 2002).

115. Empire Lodge Homeowners' Assn. v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1143 (Colo. 2002).
116.

BijouIrrigationCo., No. 02 CW 108, slip op. at9.
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priority. "' The Water Court found that the SEO had no authority,
through replacement plans or by any other means, to determine the
right to divert water out-of-priority."
Responding to the SEO's
request for an expedited appeal, the Supreme Court set an accelerated
schedule of briefing and oral argument and on April 30, 2003,
affirmed the Water Court's invalidation of the rules." 9
Senate Bill 73 as introduced in January of 2003 was designed to
validate the 2002 Proposed Rules.' As introduced, the bill would have
significantly changed Colorado water law by vesting for the first time in
the executive branch authority to carry out administrative adjudication
of tributary ground water for out-of-priority diversions through
"replacement plans."'
However, after intensive negotiations, the
adopted version of Senate Bill 73 dropped the change in SEO
authority, instead providing Division 1 tributary well-owners and others
who had operated under the SEO's "replacement plan" scheme an
additional three-year grace period to file for an augmentation plan
with the Water Court.' During the three-year grace period, these well
owners could continue to operate under administratively approved
"Substitute Water Supply Plans" ("SWSP"). 123 The statute recites
"intent" on the part of the General Assembly to limit to three years the
time for unaugmented well owners to file for an augmentation plan,
there is no effective means to prevent subsequent legislatures from
continuing the exemption.'
Colorado Revised Statute Section 37-92-308(3) imposes on SWSP
applicants who have not already filed for a plan for augmentation in
Water Court minimum statutory requirements regarding the SWSP
request. Section 308(3) applicants must provide detailed information
regarding the wells to be operated out of priority, the nature and
location of augmentation sources, historic use analyses when surface
augmentation rights are involved, consumptive-use calculations using
the Blaney-Criddle method, projected number of acres and crops to be
irrigated.2 5 The new statutory provision also imposes on the SEO the
task of making detailed findings of fact regarding the proposed SWSP,
including ensuring that stream depletions caused by out-of-priority
well pumping are replaced in time, location and amount, requiring
117. Empire Lodge Homeowners'Assn., 39 P.3d at 1143.

118. Id.
119. Simpson v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 69 P.3d 50, 55 (Colo. 2003). Ironically, the
Supreme Court announced its decision on April 30, the same day the Governor signed
a much negotiated and amended S.B. 73.
120. Compare S.B. 73, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003) (pre-amended)
with 2002 PROPOSED RULES, supra note 113. Much of the language is verbatim.
121. See S.B. 73, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess.
122.

S.B. 73, 64th Gen. Assem. 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003) (signed by Governor

Owens on April 30, 2003) (to be codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-308(3)).
123. Id. § 37-92-308(3)(a).
124. Id. ("The general assembly finds that this three-year period is a sufficient
amount of time to develop augmentation plan applications for these wells, and there

shall be no subsequent extensions of this deadline.").
125. Id. § 37-92-308(3)(b)(I).
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that the depletions to be replaced include out-of-priority well pumping
that began any time after January 1, 1974, and avoiding expansion of
use by imposing volumetric126 limitations where appropriate on directflow augmentation sources.
Because section 308(3) SWSPs are not filed contemporaneously
with a Water Court application, the provision also includes notice
provisions, requiring the SEO to maintain a mailing list of "interested
persons" for a nominal fee.12 7 Whether the notice is constitutionally
sufficient remains to be seen. 28 Senate Bill 73 also provided for a
contested case hearing on the merits of the SWSP proposal; review
29 of
the SEO's decision is made de novo to the Division 1 Water Court.1
Insofar as the adopted version of Senate Bill 73 avoided vesting in
the SEO authority to adjudicate water rights, the adopted version
avoided a crisis with regard to the Colorado prior appropriation
system. However, the seriousness with which SWSP applicants under
section 308(3) address themselves to developing plans to meet the
statutory requirements, as well as whether the SEO limits consideration
to those SWSPs that are facially valid under statutory standards, will
determine whether or not Senate Bill 73 achieves the compromise
intended by the parties to the negotiations.
The most troubling aspect of section 308(3) is that its adoption
disregards existing statutory provisions, specifically Colorado Revised
Statutes section 37-92-308(4) adopted in 2002, that accomplish much
the same ends but only require that the out-of-priority well operator
file for a plan for augmentation in the Water Court. Section 308(4)
relief was available to well owners during the 2002-2003 drought
calling into question the need for section 308(3) legislation at all. As
the examples in Part I of this paper suggest, junior water users are
disadvantaged by their place in the priority system; however, Colorado
law (unlike other western states)12 provides maximum flexibility to
water users to operate out-of-priority through plans for augmentation
and exchanges, thereby vesting some value to junior water rights if
they obtain a court-decreed augmentation plan.
Protecting the
operations of a group of junior well owners rather than ensuring outof-priority operations properly replace depletions owed to the river as
well as decreed senior water rights undercuts the integrity of the prior
appropriation system.

126.
127.

Id. § 37-92-308(3)(c).
S.B. 73, 64th Gen. Assem. 1st Reg. Sess., § 1 (to be codified at COLO. REV.

STAT.

§ 37-92-308(3) (b) (II)).
128.

Mailing list notification likely raises due process problems, as the notice

provided to vested water rights holders regarding application and decision-making
regarding SWSP's probably does not meet the standards required by Mullane v. Cent.
HanoverBank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-16 (1950).

129. S.B. 73, 64th Gen. Assem. 1st Reg. Sess., § 1 (to be codified at COLO. REV.

STAT.

§ 37-92-308(3) (b) (IV)).
130. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-106 (Michie 2001) (regarding the terms under
which exchanges may operate).
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B. EXAMPLES OF MUNICIPAL WATER USERS' MEANS OF MITIGATION
Municipal
water users are likely to be hit hard by continuing
d . 131
drought. Unlike agricultural water users who can change, reduce or
abandon crops, utilities have an obligation to provide water at the tap
for customers.
In the 2003 legislative session, there was little
legislation directly addressing the municipal shortfall. 32 Section
308(3) is a statutory amendment to an already flexible statutory
provision, section 37-92-308, designed to provide for temporary
operation under SWSPs during the pendency of an augmentation plan
case. 3 3 During 2002, numerous municipal users took advantage of the
operational flexibility offered by section 37-92-308, particularly
through sections 308(4) and 308(7).
Section 308(7) provides for "emergency" relief when water supply

conditions are likely to affect "public health or safety.' 3 4 During 2002,
cities were required to take official steps to demonstrate a water
emergency. For example, the SEO has determined that a city is under
the "emergency" provisions if it has imposed watering restrictions.'35
Emergency relief lasts ninety days, a provision which is designed to
avoid long-term injury to other water rights on the stream.
This

limitation arises because of a concern that injury to other water users
37
will result from the long-term operation of an "emergency" SWSP.1
When applicants file water rights applications with the water court,
they are published in a monthly "resume"'38 providing notice to all

other decreed water rights on the stream of the pending water rights
application and opportunity to challenge the application. 3 ' The basis
131. See Marsha Austin, Water Restrictions Expected to dry up Nursery Business, DENVER
POST, Feb. 12, 2003, at A9; see alsoJoey Bunch, Denver Water Eyes Crack Down Proposal,
DENVER POST, Feb. 11, 2003, at B1 (reporting that reservoir levels are likely to be fortyfive percent of normal by April of 2003).
132. Excepted is Senator Linkhart's conservation measure. S.B. 87, 64th Gen.
Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003).
133. H.B. 1414, 63rd Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2002) (codified at COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-92-308). Section 37-92-308, like Senate Bill 73, was itself a response to a
court decision, Empire Lodge Homeowners'Ass'n v. Moyer.
134. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-308(7). Senate Bill 73 extended the emergency
provisions to agricultural augmentation wells included in a SWSP request under
section 308(3) or 308(4).
135. See Office of the State Eng'r, Policy 2002-2, Implementation of HB 02-1414 (Section
37-92-308, C.R.S. (2002)) RegardingSubstitute Water Supply Plans (July 2, 2002); see also
Letter from Kenneth W. Knox, Chief Deputy State Eng'r, to Karen Wogsland, Water
Res. Administrator, City of Thornton (Jan. 17, 2003) (approving Emergency TSSP for
the City of Thornton); Telephone Interview with Karen Wogsland, Water Res.
Administrator, City of Thornton (Feb. 15, 2003).
136. It is possible that water rights may be injured in the interim, and the SEO is
supposed to examine the proposed emergency SWSP to determine qualitatively
whether such injury may occur; he may deny the emergency SWSP on this basis.
137. See COLo. REV. STAT. § 37-92-308(7).
138. Id. § 37-92-302(3) (a).
139. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Dist., 926 P.2d 1, 24 (Colo. 1996). Note,
however, that the burden of proof remains on the applicant, both to demonstrate that
the resume provided sufficient notice, Stonewall Estates v. CF&I Steel Corp., 592 P.2d
1318, 1320 (Colo. 1979), and that the application should be granted.
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of the emergency provision was that the water court adjudication
process can be lengthy and in the midst of an emergency, water users
By making "emergency"
needed a means to provide for shortages.'
relief truly temporary in nature, the injury to decree-holders and
possible takings issues may be mitigated.
Cities may also obtain SWSPs under section 308(4), provided they
first file with the water court. By contrast with emergency relief
provided under section 308(7), the relief awarded under section
308(4) is not available until an applicant files his water court
application and receives statements of opposition. Water rights
applicants can then make application for a SWSP to the SEO, who is
required by section 308(4) to give notice to all those who filed
Objectors to the water
statements of opposition in the water court.'
4
case have thirty days to file comments on the SWSP.1 ' Although not

required by statute, the SEO may hold an informal meeting with the
objectors and the applicant to attempt to resolve differences over the
SWSP operation.14 However, the statute provides that no presumption
attaches to the SEO's determination regarding injury or non-injury
from operation of the SWSP, and objectors are not limited or bound
by their comments filed with the SEO when it comes time to litigate
the water court case.'" Section 308(4) provides temporary relief
insofar as the water court decree following adjudication (and appeal, if
any) replaces the SWSP." 45 However, this type of SWSP alone would

not address the emergency needs of cities, so the corollary provision in
section 308(7) is helpful.'4 6
Interruptible supply contracts with agricultural users are another
useful means for municipalities to increase their water supplies. In
most cases, these types of arrangements will work only if the
municipality owns shares in a particular ditch company; 47 because
many metro area municipalities own shares in ditch companies, this is
When the arrangement is between ditch
not usually a hurdle. 4
company members, the agreement is often nothing more than a letter
agreement in which the agricultural user agrees to forego his
A municipal user to
diversions in exchange for consideration.14

140.

COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-308(1)(a).

141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. § (4) (a) (III).
Id.
Id. § (4) (a) (IV).
Id. § (4)(c).

145.

COLO. REv. STAT. § (4)(a).

146. Id. § 37-92-308(7).
147. Most ditch company operating rules do not allow water to be leased to those
who are not "under" the ditch or who do not own shares in the ditch. See, e.g., By-Laws
of the Colorado Agricultural Ditch Company, art. III (Amended Dec. 15, 1990) (on
file with the author).
148. Telephone Interview with Mark Koleber, Director of Water Resources, City of
Thornton (Feb. 4, 2003).
149. See, e.g., Interruptible Water Use Contract between Boulder Creek Farms Inc.
and the City of Boulder (Apr. 17, 1998) (on file with the author).

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 6

paying the ditch member's dues or assessments represents a common
form of consideration in 2002.'50
A more complicated type of contract may arise if the city wants to
put in place the right to "interrupt" the irrigation use of water to
obtain supplies during a drought.5 One contract used by the City of
Boulder in the 1990's provided for notice to the irrigator in November
of the likelihood that it would interrupt irrigation supplies; then, prior
to May 1, if Boulder determined it wanted to use the irrigation water, it
was required to pay the irrigator's assessments. 52 If it determined that
it needed the irrigation water after May 1, the contract required
Boulder to compensate the irrigator for any losses caused by being
unable to complete his crop. The contract also required Boulder to
obtain any decrees required to use the water in ways not contemplated
by the irrigators' decrees.'53
This amounts to a contract that provides for the right of temporary
eminent domain. In locations where water is available, this type of
municipal planning could be easily accomplished. However, last
summer along the Front Range, there was little water available for
decreed agricultural rights leaving little incentive to engage in these
types of arrangements.
V. CONCLUSION
Drought arises from patterns of both climate and water use. The
drought of 2002-2003 may be the most severe since Anglo settlement
of Colorado, although paleoclimatic records suggest it is neither severe
nor unusual. Colorado's current water rights laws provide a means to
address drought. Yet, implicit in the combination of "drought" and
"prior appropriation" is the possibility that not every water user will get
his or her water. Both agricultural and municipal water users have
ample flexibility under the current statutes to obtain water supplies,
including resort to emergency and temporary operations under
section 37-92-308 of the Colorado Revised Statutes.

150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. § 3.
Id. § 4.
Id.§ 4.3.
Id. § 4.5.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Thank you for that kind introduction. In my travels as a former
President I have found that my presence is often advertised as "a
former President will speak." Recently this has led to disappointed
expectations of folks who expected the forty-second President, or
perhaps even thirty-eighth or forty-first. But although forty-second is
ready to return, he is not available. And of the others - they are simply
not ready to deal with Colorado water politics. So you'll have to
content yourselves with the twenty-sixth.
I am allowed to visit as ex-President only once or twice a year, and
often travel incognito. So it is a pleasure to be welcomed back and
recognized as my old self.
Many speakers today have properly recognized their antecedents,
old friends, and contemporaries. I, of course, will do the same, but,
alas, I am able to name only Sam Maynes and Fred Kroeger as
contemporary community leaders during the time I served as
President.
I am pleased today to learn about Paleo-hydrology - a term not
known in my day. I assume they will begin excavations at Fred
Kroeger's house soon.
I must say, observing the political campaigns of late, they are not
t Theodore Roosevelt was a founder of the conservation movement and father of
the National Forest System. His views were shaped by his experience as a naturalist
and as a North Dakota Rancher. Of course, Teddy Roosevelt's perspective on twentyfirst century western water issues are not known. However the author Chips Barry,
Manager of Denver Water, has made a hobby of trying to find out. Speaking as Teddy
Roosevelt and largely using Roosevelt's own words, Barry recently addressed the.
annual convention of the Southwestern Water Conservancy District in Durango.
Barry's speech as Teddy Roosevelt is reprinted here. As such, it consists primarily of
language President Roosevelt actually used in speeches and in materials he authored.
Therefore, quotes have not been used to reflect that these words were actually spoken
or written by President Roosevelt or his close colleagues.
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much different than the campaign of 1900, when I was a candidate for
the vice presidency along with Mr. McKinley.
Things move
considerably faster now, but the substance is about the same.
Then, and now, there is a cry for clean campaigns without mud
slinging. During my campaign for a second term in 1904, a Democrat
came to me and suggested that the campaign be carried on without
any mud slinging. Splendid idea, I said. I'll tell you what I will do. If
you will refrain from telling lies about the Republican Party, I will
promise not to tell the truth about the Democrats.
And, of course, we will always have the Congress. If I could only be
Congress and President, for just one hour, so much could be
accomplished. I suppose it is poetic that Congress is representative of
our great people. A newly elected representative in his maiden speech
said "Now, as Daniel Webster makes clear in his dictionary" which was
followed by a voice of more experience who explained "Noah Webster
wrote the dictionary" and the response from the newly elected was, of
course, "He did not, Noah built the ark."
So it seems to me that the great questions of today are also the
great questions of yesterday. For 100 years I have observed these
questions, and find the answers now are no better than they were
before. How much money should be used from the national treasury
for the national defense? How should society redress the excesses of
our industrial and postindustrial economy? What is our obligation as a
society and a government to the poor, less educated, less fortunate in
our society? What can we do about the press, whose appetite for
scandal and tragedy is unremitted? About this, as I said then and I say
now, "the men with the muck rakes are often indispensable to the well
being of society; but only if they know when to stop raking the muck."
But Mr. Clinton certainly has known the truth of this statement, and
no doubt Mr. Bush will come to know it as well.
But I did not come here today to regale you with political stories
and punditry which you know all too well from your own experience. I
am here because I have watched water and land developments and
policies for the last 100 years. I am dismayed and concerned at the
extent to which the country has strayed from the fundamental
concepts I established 100 years ago. While I have not myself
experienced these things, I know we now have advertising everywhere,
television, fast food, traffic congestion, air pollution, gender equality,
numerous forms of electronic communication, and a consumption of
worldly goods that defies description. Surprisingly, none of these
trends affect the basic principles for the management of our vital water
and land resources, especially in the West. My purpose today is to
remind you of these fundamental beginnings, so as to guide you in
your daily decisions about water and land in the West. All of these
words, except a few obvious contemporary asides, are exactly as they
were written nine or ten decades ago.
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II. THE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT
The movement for the conservation of wildlife, and the larger
movement for the conservation of all our natural resources, are
essentially democratic in spirit, purpose, and method.1 Our position in
the world has been attained by the extent and thoroughness of the
control we have achieved over nature; but we are more, and not less,
dependent upon what she furnishes than at any previous time of
history.2 The conservation and management of our natural resources
is urgently necessary to insure future availability. These resources are
the final basis for national power and perpetuity.3 But conservation
means development as much as it does protection. I recognize the
right and duty of this generation to develop and use the natural
resources of our land; but I do not recognize the right to waste them,
or to rob, by wasteful use, the generations that come after us.4 Under
my administration the rights of the public to the natural resources
outweigh private rights, and must be given first consideration. Public
lands and natural resources belong to the public, and they do not exist
for the unrestricted use of private industry.5 I notice with some
satisfaction that Interior Secretary Gale Norton has taken great pains
to reflect these views as her own.
We must protect and conserve our bountiful natural resources not
only for the economic development and future prosperity, which they
promise. Our land itself is part of the nation's history and embodies
the national character and democratic ideals of the United States. On
my recent trip to the Grand Canyon I was again overwhelmed. I told
the Park Service that I hoped they would not have a building of any
kind, not a summer cottage, a hotel or anything else, to mar the
wonderful grandeur, sublimity, the great loneliness and beauty of the
canyon. This is one of the great sites, which every American, if he can
travel at all, should see.6 I note, of course, that these comments are
about the Grand Canyon - not about the Escalante Staircase.
Whatever that is, it isn't the Grand Canyon.
Birds should be saved because of utilitarian reasons; and moreover,
they should be saved because of reasons unconnected with any return
in dollars and cents. A grove of giant redwoods or sequoias should be
The
kept just as we keep a great and beautiful cathedral.

1. Daniel Filler, Theodore Roosevelt: Conservation as the Guardian of Democracy,

http://pantheon.cis.yale.edu/-thomast/essays/filler/filler.html (quoting President
Theodore Roosevelt).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Theodore Roosevelt, Address in Osawatomie, Kan., The New Nationalism
Speech

(Aug. 31,

1910), in The Program in Presidential Rhetoric, Dep't of

Texas
A&M
Communication,
http://www.tamu.edu/comm/pres/speeches/trnew.html.
5. Daniel Filler, supra note 1.
6. Id.

University,

at
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extermination of the passenger pigeon meant that mankind was just so
much poorer; exactly as in the case of the destruction of the cathedral
at Rheims. 7
There is no question that under my administration the
conservation movement took root and grew in popularity and acclaim.
Conservation principles were the heart of my administration. After
1908, conservation was a common element of political rhetoric, and it
caused my successor William Taft to complain, "whatever conservation
was, everyone was in favor of it."9

m.

FOREST RESERVES

The conservation movements are, of course, the overarching
principle behind my presidential actions concerning the forest
reserves. When I became President, the Bureau of Forestry was a small
but growing organization under Gifford Pinchot. It contained all the
trained foresters in the government service, but had charge of no
public timberland whatsoever. The government forest reserves of that
day were in the care of a division in the General Land Office, under
the management of clerks wholly without knowledge of forestry, few if
any of whom had ever seen a foot of the timberlands for which they
were responsible." The forest reserves in the West were wholly
inadequate in area to meet the purposes for which they were created.
The fundamental idea of forestry is the perpetuation of forest by
use. Forest protection is not an end in itself; it is a means to increase
and sustain the resources of our country and the industries, which
depend upon them. The practical usefulness of the national forest
reserves to the mining, grazing, irrigation, and other interests of the
regions in which the reserves lie has led to a wide-spread demand by
the people of the West for their protection and extension."
With Mr. Pinchot in charge, we soon established a series of
principles for the use of public resources and public lands. The
principles thus formulated and applied may be summed up in the
statement that the rights of the public to the natural resources
outweigh private rights, and must be given first consideration. Until
that time, in dealing with the National Forest and the public lands
generally, private rights had almost uniformly been allowed to overbalance public rights. The change we made was right, and was vitally
necessary; but, of course, it created bitter opposition from private
interests. 12
Secretary Pinchot's blue print for the operation of the Forest
Service remains to this day. Use is not contrary to conservation.
7.
8.

Id.
HAROLD K. STEEN, THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE: A HISTORY 96 (1976).

9. Id.
10.

THEODORE ROOSEvELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 414 (Da

(1913).
11. GIFFORD
12.

PINCHOT, BREAKINGNEW GROUND 190 (1947).
ROOSEVELT, supra note 10, at 417.

Capo Press, Inc. 1985)
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Decisions on use should consider needs of local industries first. When
in doubt, where conflicting interests must be reconciled, the question
should always be decided from the standpoint of the greatest good of
the greatest number in the long run."' In my day at least we did not
trouble ourselves with abstract and completely unworkable concepts
such as "Outstandingly Remarkable Values" or "Viewsheds".
I know that among the water managers and officials in the room,
there are many who are anxious to hear my words on the concepts of
water in the National Forest. I am getting to that point, and would like
to talk about my programs and policies for water use in the West and
in the Forest Reserves.
IV. WATER USE AND THE FOREST
While I lived in the West, I came to realize the vital need of
irrigation to the country, and I was both amused and irritated by the
attitude of Eastern men who obtained from Congress grants of
national money to develop harbors and yet fought the use of the
Nation's power to develop the irrigation work of the West. 4 Thus, in
my first message to Congress, I struck a tone which held throughout
my seven and one-half years as President. In that message I said that
the water supply itself depends upon the forest. In the arid region it is
water, not land, which measures production. The western half of the
United States would sustain a population greater than that of our
whole country today if the waters that now run to waste were saved and
used for irrigation. The forest and water problems are perhaps the
most vital internal questions of the United States. The forest alone
cannot, however, fully regulate and conserve the waters of the arid
region. Great storage works are necessary to equalize the flow of
streams and to save the flood waters. Their construction has been
conclusively shown to be an undertaking too vast for private effort.
Nor can it be best accomplished by the individual states acting alone. 5
In 1902 the Reclamation Act was passed and it set aside the
proceeds of the disposal of public lands for the purpose of reclaiming
the waste areas of the arid West by irrigating lands otherwise
worthless. 6 A great plan of reclamation was undertaken between 1902
and 1906, and by 1909 the work was an assured success."
Although the gross expenditure under the Reclamation Act is not
as large as that for the Panama Canal, the engineering obstacles to be
overcome have been almost as great and the political impediments
many times greater. The population which the Reclamation Act has
brought into the arid West, while comparatively small when compared
with that in the most closely inhabited East, has been a most effective

13. STEEN, supra note 8, at 75.
14. ROOSEVELT, supra note 10, at 408.
15. PINCHOT, supra note 11, at 190-91.
16. ROOSEvELT, supra note 10, at 411.

17. Id. at 412.
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contribution to the national life for it has gone far to transform the
social aspect of the West, making for the stability of the institutions
upon which the welfare of the whole country rests.
As you can see by the above recitation of the accomplishments of
my administration, we have devoted enormous effort to the
conservation of our resources, to the protection and development of
our forest, and to the reclamation of arid lands of the West. The
overriding principle, of course, has been the use of natural resources
for the benefit of all our people, and not a monopoly for the benefit of
the few. We know that there are many people who will go with us in
conserving the resources only if they are to be allowed to exploit them
for their benefit. Conservation is a great moral issue for it involves the
patriotic duty of insuring the safety and continuance of the nation.19
V. PROTECTION OF WATER: STATE AND FEDERAL ROLE
We now move to those important questions that vex the Forest
supervisors of this day. With all the above as prologue, the question is
how are we to protect the water resources in the National Forests, and
what is our role and moral duty? There are, of course, many who can
hire the vulpine legal cunning, which will assert that the executive has
no role in this regard. ° Of course, any such contention is pure bunk.
The idea that the executive is the steward of the public welfare was first
formulated and given practical effect in the Forest Service by its law
officer, George Woodruff. The laws were often insufficient, and it
became well nigh impossible to get them amended in the public
interest when once the representatives of privilege in Congress
grasped the fact that I would sign no amendment that contained
anything not in the public interest. ' Throughout my Presidency, with
respect to the National Forest, and the protection of water resources,
the men in charge were given to understand that they must get into
the water if they would learn to swim; and furthermore, they learned
to know that if they acted honestly, and boldly and fearlessly accepted
responsibility, I would stand by them to the limit. In this, as in every
other case, in the end the boldness of the action fullyjustified itself.
I know that it was said that during my presidency, and continuing
even until today, that the various state governments and state laws
would suffice to protect the water resources in the forest. The special
interests will say that the states can do it. I have heard all of this
before. Much of the opposition to the conservation movement came
from westerners angered by what they viewed as eastern-based
interference with their prerogatives. I see the rhetoric on this issue is
unchanged despite the passage of ten decades. Westerners charged
that easterners wanted to prevent use of western resources, which
18. Id. at 413.
19. Theodore Roosevelt, supra note 4.
20. Id.
21. ROOSEVELT, supra note 10, at 420.

22. Id. at 412.
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would cripple economic growth. 3 I believe that our government,
national and state, must be freed from the sinister influence or control
of special interests. Exactly as the special interest of cotton and slavery
threatened our political integrity before the Civil War, so now the
great special business interests so often control and corrupt the men
and methods of government for their own profit. The word "Enron"
did not exist in my day, but the problems of corruption and greed
certainly did. We must drive the special interests out of politics. 2 4 I
note with satisfaction the continued efforts in Congress to curb the
abuses of power attendant upon special interest campaign
contributions. Perhaps John McCain is the only member of Congress
who fully comprehends the social detriment of the special interests.
Thus, I have said by analogy and by direct experience that the
executive must take charge of this situation, and that the states cannot
do it because they are infected by the special interests. I am, of course,
completely aware of the fact that Mr. Pinchot and I disagree on this
one point. He believes that the creation of a National Forest has no
affect whatsoever on the laws which govern the appropriation of water,
and this is a matter governed entirely by State and Territorial laws.
We must always make room for dissenting views, even when they
are in error.
VI. BYPASS FLOWS
I now come to the difficult portion of my remarks today. I have
searched my records, my messages to Congress, my letters to
journalists, politicians, friends and conservationists throughout the
world, and I have reviewed all thirty-six of my books in a vain effort to
find any reference to bypass flows. There are no references in my
earlier writings to this difficult and troublesome issue. I searched my
practice and my philosophy for guidance. I turned, as always, to my
friend Mr. Pinchot, who constantly urges the adoption of only
practical measures. The key concepts for the use of our public lands
have been embodied in two words: practical and use.2 And so I
inquire, is there anything practical about a bypass flow requirement?
Does it guarantee flow in a stream in the reach of the river below the
original diversion point? Certainly, it does not. A bypass flow is not a
mandated flow throughout a reach. It is only a bypass. It can be
picked up and used by any other appropriator 100 feet or 100 yards
downstream.
Bypass flows cannot keep water in the stream, as they are not
capable of being administered in priority by state water rights
administration systems.

23.
24.
25.
26.
(1991).

STEEN, supra note 8, at 98.

Theodore Roosevelt, supra note 4.
GIFFORD PINCHOT, THE USE OF THE NATIONAL FORESTS 13 (1907).
ALFRED RuNrE, PUBLIC LANDS PUBLIC HERITAGE: THE NATIONAL FOREST IDEA 48
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Does a bypass flow put water in a stream at the time when it is most
needed, such as the late fall? No, it does not. Because the water must
be bypassed, it is not stored and released to mitigate the effects of the
normal hydrology that applies in this area of arid lands. In fact, a
bypass requirement will result in the waste of a valuable western
resource. The touchstone of our conservation philosophy is practical
use. A requirement that water simply be bypassed from a diversion
structure which would put it to good and practical irrigation use, only
to see it placed in a stream at a time when it could do no good, or put
in the stream where it can be appropriated by another user, seems of
no use to me. Asking the practical and useful question produces the
answer that bypass flows - like some Presidents - have no more
backbone than a chocolate 6clair.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
I have reviewed your agenda for your convention, and I see you are
dealing with water questions that have no easy answers. But the
Panama Canal, the Reclamation Acts of this country, the protection of
forest and water, the breaking of the Trusts, and the establishment of
labor protection laws are all tribute to my belief that action - and
particularly bold and forceful action - can overcome those obstacles so
easily labeled as being without answers. I urge you to remember that
the object of government is the welfare of the people. The material
progress and prosperity of a nation are desirable chiefly so far as they
lead to the moral and material welfare of all good citizens. No matter
how honest and decent we are in our private lives, if we do not have
the right kind of law and the right kind of administration of the law we
cannot go forward as a nation. The prime problem of our nation is to
get the right type of good citizenship, and to get it, we must have
progress and our public men must be genuinely progressive. As
citizens and water users in this great water conservation district, I urge
you to go forward, and be bold and progressive.
Thank you very much.
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I. OVERVIEW AND HISTORY
For more than thirty years, there have been approximately 4000
high capacity wells drilled before 1972, operated in the South Platte
River Basin under substitute water supply plans ("SWSP") and
authorized annually by the State Engineer. In December, 2001, the
Supreme Court decision in Empire Lodge Homeowner's Association v.
Moyr made it clear that the State Engineer did not have legal
authority to approve SWSPs under the statute, Colorado Revised
Statute section 37-80-120, that had historically been relied upon.
Therefore, changes from the historic practice were necessary.
During the 2002 session, the General Assembly responded by
enacting House Bill 02-1414. 2 This statute granted the State Engineer
specific authority to review and approve SWSPs under four
circumstances: (1) all previously approved SWSPs could be reapproved for 2002 only;' (2) augmentation plans filed with the Water
Court could be approved as SWSPs while Court adjudication was
t Mike Shimmin, Partner at Vranesh & Raisch, LLP., has been a full time lawyer
for the last twenty-five years, focusing his practice almost exclusively on water law.
Mike's interest in water issues began while growing up on an irrigated farm in
northeastern Colorado. He obtained his bachelor's degree from Colorado State
University in 1975 and his law degree from University of Colorado in 1978. His
professional career has included extensive practice before the Water Courts, the
Colorado Groundwater Commission, and the Colorado Supreme Court. He has also
worked on legislation involving water issues, and has been a member of the Colorado
Water Congress State Affairs Committee since 1985. Mike represents a broad range of
clients which include municipalities, special districts, ditch companies, ground water
management districts, and individual water users.
1. 39 P.2d 1139 (Colo. 2001)
2. H.B. 1414, 63rd Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2002) (codified at COLO.
REv. STAT. § 37-92-308 (2002)).
3. Id. § 37-92-308(3).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 6

pending;4 (3) short duration water uses (not exceeding five years)
could be approved as SWSPs without Water Court adjudication;5 and
(4) a water supply plan necessitated by a public health and safety
emergency could be approved as an SWSP without Water Court
adjudication for a period not to exceed ninety days.6 House Bill 021414 acknowledged the pre-existing rulemaking authority of the State
Engineer under section 37-92-501 of the Colorado Revised Statutes,
but it did not address the question of whether that rulemaking
authority was broad enough to include annual approval of out-ofpriority depletions without Water Court adjudication.
The key remaining question was whether the operation of the pre1972 wells had to be adjudicated by the Water Court under
augmentation plans, or whether operation of these wells could
continue under annual plans approved by the State Engineer, without
Water Court adjudication. The owners of many surface water rights
believed that Water Court adjudication was required. The State
Engineer and Ground Water Appropriators of the South Platte River
Basin, Inc. ("GASP") did not, and responded to the Empire Lodge
decision by proposing amended rules and regulations pursuant to
section 37-92-501 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, under which
annual State Engineer approval would have continued without Water
Court adjudication. 7
HI. THE PROPOSED RULES
During March and April 2002, the State Engineer's Office and the
owners of surface water rights in the South Platte Basin held a series of
meetings to see if compromise rules could be agreed upon. Surface
water users requested more detailed information concerning plans for
the operation of these wells to be disclosed through public notice of
each plan, broad public participation in the plan review and approval
process, and a requirement that all plans must go to Water Court for
adjudication within a defined period of time. The State Engineer
showed limited willingness to accommodate the concerns of the
surface water users, mostly sided with GASP, and refused to require
these plans to go to Water Court.

4. Id. § 37-92-308(4).
5. Id. § 37-92-308(5).
6. Id. § 37-92-308(7).
7. The State Engineer had previously promulgated a set of amended rules and
regulations for the Arkansas River Basin which provide for such annual approval of
replacement plans. SeeAmended Rules and Regulations Governing the Diversion and
Use of Tributary Ground Water in the Arkansas River Basin, Colorado (June 1996).
Those rules were supported by most of the water users in the Arkansas Basin and the
Water Court approved of such rules in a detailed decision entered in Case No.
95CW211, Water Division No. 2. Because of the broad-based support for the Arkansas
Basin rules, the question of the State Engineer's authority to approve annual
replacement plans was not actually litigated in that case.
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On May 31, 2002, the State Engineer filed the proposed rules with
the Water Court.' The proposed rules would have created a process
for the State Engineer to annually review and approve "replacement
plans," that would have authorized continuing out-of-priority
depletions by pre-1972 wells.
I. THE WATER COURT LITIGATION9
More than thirty water user individuals and entities opposed the
proposed rules. Only a handful supported them. The parties agreed
that there were threshold legal issues that could be briefed and
decided as questions of law, and that this should be done before any
trial was held. Accordingly, several motions were filed challenging the
State Engineer's authority to adopt the proposed rules, and arguing
that they could not take effect until after a full trial on the merits had
been completed (the State Engineer wanted the rules to become
automatically effective December 31, 2002, regardless of the status of
Water Court review). These issues were briefed in the fall of 2002.
In separate rulings, the Water Judge held that the rules could not
take effect until after review by the Water Court had been completed,
and that the rules must be dismissed in their entirety because the State
Engineer lacked statutory authority to review and approve annual
replacement plans outside the statutory framework of express
authorization granted by section 37-92-308 of the Colorado Revised
Statutes.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT APPEAL
The final dismissal by the WaterJudge was signed on December 30,
2002. 'o The State Engineer filed his appeal the next day, and
requested expedited review by the Supreme Court. The court granted
the request; the involved parties fully briefed the case in approximately
five weeks; and the court held oral argument on February 19, 2003.
There were three issues presented for the Colorado Supreme
Court to decide. First, did the State Engineer have authority for the
proposed rules under section 37-92-501 of the Colorado Revised
Statutes (the water rule power)? Second, did the State Engineer have
authority for the proposed rules under section 37-80-104 of the
Colorado Revised Statutes (the compact rule power)? Third, could
the proposed rules take effect before the Water Court had conducted
a full review?"
8. See generally OFFICE OF STATE ENG'R, AMENDED RULES AND REGULATIONS
GOVERNING THE DIVERSION AND USE OF TRIBUTARY GROUND WATER IN THE SOUTH PLATrE
RIVER BASIN, COLORADO: ORDER OFTHE STATE ENGINEER (2002).
9. When filed with the Water Court as required by Colorado Revised Statute
section 37-92-501, the proposed rules were assigned Case No. 2002CW108. Copies of
pleadings filed and orders of the Court in that case can be obtained from the Water
Court for Water Division No. 1 in Greeley. Bijou Irrigation Co. v. Simpson, No.
02CW108, slip op. (Colo. Dist. Ct. Water Div. 1, Dec. 23, 2002).
10. Simpson v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 69 P.3d 50, 57 (Colo. 2003).

11.

Id. at 55.
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The parties expected a rapid decision, however, the court did not
issue its decision until April 30, 2003. The Supreme Court reversed
the Water Judge's ruling on one issue (number 2, above), but
affirmed the ruling on the other two (numbers 1 & 3, above). 3 In so
doing, the. decision effectively nullified the proposed rules and
regulations.
The court devoted the majority of the decision to analysis of the
scope of State Engineer authority under the water rule power. After
detailed analysis of existing statutes and legislative history, the court
concluded that the replacement plans contemplated by the proposed
rules were the functional equivalent of augmentation plans, that the
State Engineer did not have legal authority to review and approve such
plans except for the authority expressly granted to him by the General
Assembly in section 37-92-308 of the Colorado Revised Statutes (and a
couple of other statutes not relevant here), and that review and
approval of augmentation plans is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Water Court." After reaching these conclusions, the court held
that the State Engineer does have authority to enact rules and
regulations to enforce the South Platte River Compact under the
compact rule power, but that such rules must also fall within the scope
of the water rule power.15 This holding leaves the door open for a
different set of rules in the future, if needed to enforce the South
Platte Compact, but effectively nullified this set of proposed rules.
Last, although the court found the issue to be moot for the purposes
of this case, it held for future rulemaking cases that proposed rules
cannot take effect until after Water Court review has been completed. 6
Interestingly, the actual impact of this decision in the South Platte
River Basin may not be great, because of the provisions of new
legislation adopted as Senate Bill 03-73, discussed below. Similarly,
there is virtually no impact in the Arkansas River Basin because of the
existing rules and the express statutory authorization for them also
contained in Senate Bill 03-73. The decision will govern the State's
five other river basins, and will mean that the State Engineer cannot
adopt rules and regulations using annual replacement plans in those
basins, absent express statutory authorization in the future.
V. THE LEGISLATIVE COMPROMISE
In January, 2003, the legislative session opened shortly after the
Water Judge had dismissed the proposed rules. Senator Dave Owen
and Representative Diane Hoppe, whose districts encompass a good
portion of the South Platte River Basin where these pre-1972 wells are
located, were interested in a legislative solution to the well regulation
12. Id. (holding that the South Platte River Compact is not self-executing and
administrable pursuant to its own terms.)
13. Id. at 55-56.
14. Id. at 63-67.
15. Bijou IrrigationCo., 69 P.3d at 71.
16. Id. at 73.
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problem. They co-sponsored Senate Bill 03-73.17 As introduced, the
bill would have granted express authority to the State Engineer to
approve replacement plans under the water rule power in section 3792-501 of the Colorado Revised Statutes. Many surface water users
viewed this bill as an attempt to continue the status quo, and thus were
adamantly opposed from the beginning.
In response to this opposition, legislators undertook efforts to
develop a compromise. Attorney General Ken Salazar, Representative
Hoppe, and Senator Owen appointed a special committee of water
users to see if a compromise could be reached. That committee met in
Greeley during the second half of January, and developed a
replacement draft for Senate Bill 73. They patterned the basic
structure of the bill after the SWSP process already contained in
section 37-92-308 of the Colorado Revised Statutes. It also would have
required all plans involving pre-1972 wells to be filed in Water Court
by the end of 2005. Because this committee was only allowed two
weeks to work on the bill, it did not solve all problems, but gained
support from fifteen out of the eighteen committee members. The
committee took the revised bill to the legislators, and it passed the
Senate Agriculture Committee on February 13, by a 4-3 vote. The
Senate Appropriations Committee also approved the bill, but then the
bill stalled on the Senate floor.
A sub-committee of the Colorado Water Congress undertook
another negotiating effort. The sub-committee worked with the same
basic structure that had passed the Senate committees, but it added
numerous additional amendments. After nine meetings between
February 17 and April 9, a compromise was reached. In the second
half of April, Senate Bill 73 sped through the Senate, the House, and
Governor Owens signed it into law on April 30.
Senate Bill 03-73 provides authority for the State Engineer to
approve substitute water supply plans for these pre-existing wells for
2003-2005, under the interim standards and procedures set forth in it.
Long and detailed negotiations took place between the interested
parties to strike the balance in this compromise. The two sides
focused on providing some operational flexibility for these wells
during the next three years, while providing enough process and
defined standards for the SWSPs to ensure that senior surface water
rights are protected; requiring that the State Engineer approval
process is transparent and fair to all; and ensuring that the actual
operation of these SWSPs is visible to other water users through public
accounting and reporting.
The key features of the compromise include the following:
a. Existing well rules in the Arkansas Basin (Water Division 2) are
ratified so that the State Engineer will continue to have the authority
he needs in that basin to deal with well regulation and Compact

17. S.B. 73, 64th Gen. Assem. 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003) (signed by Governor
Owens on April 30, 2003) (to be codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-308(3)).
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b. In the South Platte Basin (Water Division 1), the State Engineer
will have limited authority to approve SWSPs using the procedures and
standards in the Bill. Wells not in augmentation plans have only until
the end of 2005 to file those plans. If Water Court plans are not filed,
the wells are shut down. 9
c. Specifies
20 a detailed set of information to be provided with the
SWSP request.
d. Provides notice to the public
2 and a thirty-day opportunity to file
written comments for each SWSP.

1

e. Specifies a public hearing process to be held for contested
SWSPs.
f. Sets forth interim standards for the State Engineer to apply in
evaluating SWSPs, that are more protective of surface water rights than
the standards used in the past. They include higher consumptive use
factors (fifty percent for flood irrigation on metered wells) (BlaneyCriddle method using crops, acres, and crop consumptive use for
unmetered wells) .3
24

g. Specifies methodology to calculate stream depletions.
h. Requires replacement of all out-of-priority depletions after
October 31, 2002, and up to eighteen months after date of the SWSP
request, to make sure that out-of-priority, winter depletions are
addressed.25
i. Provides a mechanism to allow depletions from last winter to be
remedied by agreement
with injured parties, if noticed and approved
26
as part of an SWSP.

j. Requires the State Engineer to curtail diversions from wells, if
out-of-priority depletions are not replaced in accordance with the
SWSP.
k. Allows existing surface water rights to be used for replacement
water even if they are not changed by Water Court decree, under
terms and conditions
that prevent expanded use and injury to other
8
water rights.
1. Requires replacement water to be provided at the time and
location necessary to satisfy senior diverters.
18. Id. §§ 37-92-308(1)(c)(I) & (II).
19. Id. § 37-92-308(3) (a) (No other basins are affected by the Bill).
20. Id. § 37-92-308(3) (b) (I).
21. Id. §§ 37-92-308(3) (b) (II) &(III).
22. S.B. 73, 64th Gen. Assem. 1st Reg. Sess., § 1 (to be codified at COLO. RFv. STAT.
§ 37-92-308(3) (b) (IV)).
23. Id. § 37-92-308(3) (c) (I).
24. Id. § 37-92-308(3) (c) (II).
25. Id. § 37-92-308(3) (c) (III).
26. Id.
27. S.B. 73, 64th Gen. Assem. 1st Reg. Sess., § 1 (to be codified at COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 37-92-308(3) (c) (III)).
28. Id. § 37-92-308(3) (c)(IV).
29. Id. § 37-92-308(3) (c) (V).
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m.Defines augmentation wells 0 and specifies criteria for the use of
augmentation wells in SWSPs.3 '
n. Provides a process for SWSP amendments, including an
abbreviated notice and comment process to add flexibility for shortterm responses to changing conditions during the irrigation season. 32
o. Requires monthly accounting for SWSPs and an annual year-end
report of actual plan operations, all to be made available to the parties
that filed written comments concerning the plan.33
p. Requires the State Engineer to provide a detailed statement of
the basis and rationale for any decision approving or denying an
SWSP, including the consideration given to written comments.
q. Specifies the appeal process for the Water Judge to review a
State Engineer decision about an SWSP and sets filing fees for the
Water Court appeal."3
r. Allows applications to be filed before the effective date of the
Bill, so long as all process occurs and the Bill is in effect before the
approval date .36

s. Provides for a study by the State Engineer to investigate options
for compensation to injured users if an SWSP falls short.37
t. Allows augmentation wells to be approved by State Engineer
under emergency SWSPs, without notice and comment, so long as
those wells are included in a regular SWSP request."
u. Provides additional flexibility for Water Court augmentation
plans to use water leased for short terms.3 9
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1969, the General Assembly dramatically changed the law
governing tributary ground water in Colorado, by requiring that all
tributary wells be integrated into the prior appropriation system.
Exactly how to accomplish that goal has received a great deal of debate
and has caused turmoil for water users. For the past twenty five years,
ground water users in the South Platte Basin had some temporary
stability by operating under annual substitute water supply plans, but
surface water users were never satisfied that the temporary plans were
adequate to protect their senior water rights.

30. Id. §§ 37-90-103 (21)(a) & 37-92-103 (14)(a).
31. Id. § 37-92-308(3)(c)(VII).
32. S.B. 73, 64th Gen. Assem. 1st Reg. Sess., § 1 (to be codified at COLO. REV.

STAT.

§ 37-92-308 (3) (c) (VIII)).

33. Id. § 37-92-308(3)(c)(IX).
34.

Id. § 37-92-308 (3)(e).

35. Id.
36. Id. § 37-92-308 (3)(f).
37. S.B. 73, 64th Gen. Assem. 1st Reg. Sess., § 1 (to be codified at COLO.
§ 37-92-308 (3)(g)).
38. Id. § 37-92-308(7).
39. Id. § 37-92-305 (8).
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In the past year, we have written another chapter in the debate
about how to get this job done. We now know that it will not be done
through State Engineer rulemaking. Within the next few years,
augmentation plans adjudicated by the Division 1 Water Court should
finish the job of fully integrating these wells into the priority system
while protecting senior surface water rights.

LEGISLATION UPDATE
THE COLORADO WATER CONGRESS WORKSHOP
ON SENATE BILL 73
Denver, Colorado

May 22, 2003

REBEKAH S. KING t
Colorado is currently experiencing one of the worst droughts in its
recorded history. While the drought has affected all of Colorado, the
South Platte River basin has been the focus of a recent Colorado
Supreme Court case as well as various legislative efforts. Among the
legislation proposed this year was Senate Bill 73, which concerns the
State Engineer's authority to approve the use of water in the South
Platte River basin. Because of the far-reaching effects of Senate Bill 73,
the Colorado Water Congress, which took an active roll in the
development and ultimate composition of the bill, held a workshop to
clarify and discuss the bill as it was passed.
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
Attorney General Ken Salazar opened the discussion with an
overview of what Senate Bill 73 is meant to accomplish. He initially
noted that the bill was intended to address the situation on the South
Platte should the state lose the case that was currently on appeal with
the Colorado Supreme Court regarding the State Engineer's authority
to approve replacement plans on the South Platte. To that end, the
bill provides a legal framework for the future. However, the Attorney
General did note that Senate Bill 73, as enacted, is a compromise
among several parties, and as such, many are unhappy with the result,
and no one is completely satisfied.

t Ms. King was the Editor-in-Chief of the Water Law Review in 2001-02 and the
Business Editor in 2000-01. She graduated from the University of Denver School of
Law in 2002 and is currently practicing water law.
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SESSION ONE-BRIEFING ON SENATE BILL 03-073 AND THE SUPREME
COURT DECISION

A. Background and History
Mr. Dennis Montgomery of Hill & Robbins PC provided a
summary of the events that led up to the need for and ultimate
Mr. Montgomery began with the
adoption of Senate Bill 73.
organization known as GASP, which stands for Groundwater
GASP represents about 1200
Appropriators of the South Platte.
people who own and operate approximately 3000 wells. Senate Bill 73
Moreover, some GASP
will directly impact all GASP members.
due to increased costs
to
operate
unable
be
will
simply
members
it new engineering
with
carries
73,
which
Senate
Bill
associated with
and legal expenses.
Turning to a more general history of Colorado water law, Mr.
Montgomery provided a short history of the similar events that
occurred in the Arkansas River basin in the 1960s. In the spring of
1964, many wells were in the process of being drilled for the Farmers
Highline Canal in the Arkansas River floodplain. Soon after, the
legislature passed House Bill 1066, which met a number of objectives.
First, House Bill 1066 authorized the State Engineer to regulate wells
in the basin and adopt rules and regulations to facilitate this; the State
Engineer had never before been granted this type of authority. In
addition to this authority, House Bill 1066 also gave the State Engineer
the power to enjoin those diverting in violation of the law. And finally,
the bill created a rebuttable presumption that any then existing wells
were not causing material injury as defined by statute. This allowed
existing wells to continue operating.
House Bill 1066 led to the Colorado Supreme Court decision of
Fellhauerv. People.' In Fellhauer,the court held the Division Engineer's
actions unconstitutional and stated that any actions must meet three
criteria: (1) the adoption of rules and regulations; (2) minimization of
material injury; and (3) the imposition of conditions on existing wells
in order to allow for their continuing use. Pursuant to this decision,
the State Engineer adopted rules and regulations in the Arkansas River
basin that have been in effect since 1973.
Mr. Montgomery then related the experience in the Arkansas River
basin to that currently in existence in the South Platte River basin.
The main difference is that in the South Platte, the wells are operating
under Substitute Supply Plans ("SSP"), which, until recently, the State
Engineer approved on an annual basis without any public notice or
comment procedures. However, in December of 2001, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the State Engineer did not have the authority

1. Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1968).
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to approve wells pursuant to SSPs in the South Platte River basin, and
should promulgate rules like those in the Arkansas River basin.
Having provided a brief history of the events leading up to the
current situation in the South Platte River basin, Mr. Montgomery
turned the program over to the next speaker.
B. Rules and Regulations Litigation
Ms. Veronica Sperling provided a summary of the recent litigation
in the Colorado Supreme Court regarding the authority of the State
Engineer in the South Platte River basin. It used to be that calls on
the South Platte were only in reference to the mainstem, and calls did
not affect tributaries. About ten years ago this changed. Eventually,
water users on the tributaries began to get called out, and at the same
time GASP gained a more prominent position in the politics of the
South Platte. At that time, the State Engineer was approving SSPs for
GASP's wells on an annual basis.
There are two statutes under which the State Engineer found the
authority to approve these SSPs. The first power is referred to as the
Water Rule Power.' Pursuant to this power, the State Engineer can
promulgate rules and regulations to assist in administering water
rights. The second statute by which the State Engineer claimed
authority to approve SSPs is known as the Compact Rule Power.
Under the Compact Rule Power, the State Engineer is authorized to
enter into interstate compacts in order to ensure the delivery of an
adequate amount of water at the state line.6
The current procedure for the State Engineer to promulgate new
rules and regulations follows several steps. First, the State Engineer
drafts new rules, at this time, there is no obligation to confer with
water users or anyone else. the State Engineer then files those
proposed rules with the WaterJudge in the appropriate water division.
At this time, the proposed rules are published in the monthly water
2. Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139 (Colo. 2001).
3. It should be noted that this past winter and spring saw two independent yet
related efforts concerning regulation of the South Platte basin. The State Engineer

published proposed Rules and Regulations for the basin, which provided that office
with the authority to approve replacement plans on the South Platte wells. This effort
ultimately went to the Colorado Supreme Court. Alongside this effort was the creation

and adoption of Senate Bill 73, which was essentially a compromise among all parties
to the litigation, and, in effect, nullified the court's decision.
4. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-501 (2002).
5. Id. § 37-80-104.

6. Colorado is a party to nine interstate compacts: The Colorado River Compact,
COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-61-101 to -104; The Upper Colorado River Compact, COLO.
REv. STAT. §§ 37-61-101 to -106; The La Plata River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 3763-101 to -102; The Animas-La Plata Project Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-64-101;
The South Platte River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-65-101; The Rio Grande River
Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-66-101 to -102; The Republican River Compact,
COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-67-101 to -102; The Amended Costilla Creek Compact, COLO.
REv. STAT. §§ 37-68-101 to -102; and The Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 37-69-101 to -106.
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court resumes and anyone has the opportunity to file a Statement of
Opposition to protest the proposed rules. If there is opposition that
cannot be resolved through a stipulation or other out of court process,
the parties will go to the Water Court with their dispute. After the
Water Court's ruling, either party may appeal to the Colorado
Supreme Court.
This is essentially what has happened on the South Platte over the
past year.
In May, 2002, the State Engineer filed proposed
amendments to the original South Platte Rules, which were
promulgated in 1974. The State Engineer held some meetings with
interested parties and water users, although unsuccessful in reaching
compromises or consensuses. The proposed amendments that the
State Engineer did file were to establish standards and procedures for
approval of replacement plans. The State Engineer did this in
response to the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling that the State
Engineer could not approve SSPs in EmpireLodge. Those opposing the
proposed amendments argued that a replacement plan was essentially
the same as an SSP, and that the State Engineer was attempting to do
what Empire Lodge disallowed under a different name. Opposers
argued that the end result was the same. The State Engineer could
approve an out of priority diversion by a well user, a process that
should require approval by the Water Court. In addition, the
proposed amendments were to go into effect on December 31, 2002,
regardless of whether the Water Court had ruled on any opposition.
Opposers also objected to this clause in the proposed amendments.
Initially, the Water Court ruled that the proposed amendments
could not go into effect before the Water Court issued a ruling.
Regarding the State Engineer's authority to approve replacement
plans, the Water Court held that the State Engineer could not have
such authority except where provided by statute in limited situations.
The State appealed the ruling to the Colorado Supreme Court.
Interestingly, the Court issued its opinion on the same day that Senate
Bill 73 was signed into law.7 The court's decision was divided into
three parts. First, the Court addressed the State Engineer's authority
under section 501, the Water Rule Power. The court held that the
State Engineer does not have authority to approve out of priority
diversions requiring augmentation except pursuant to already enacted
legislation. 8 Next the court addressed the State Engineer's authority
under section 104, the Compact Rule Power. The court reversed part
of the Water Court's ruling, holding that the South Platte River
Compact is not in need of clarification; the State Engineer could adopt
rules and regulations to ensure compliance with the Compact, but had
no more authority than that granted under section 501, the Water
Rule Power. Finally, holding that the regulations could not go into
effect before a Water Court Ruling, the Colorado Supreme Court
7. Simpson v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 69 P.3d 50 (Colo. 2003).
8. These limited exceptions include, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-80-120(5), 37-90-

137(11)(b), 37-92-308(3), (4), (5), & (7).
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stated that water users need an opportunity to participate in such
decisions, and the venue for this is the Water Court.
Ms. Sperling concluded by noting that two petitions for rehearing
have been filed in this case, and then turned the presentation over to
the next topic.
C. Evolution of Senate Bill 73
Mr. Michael Shimmin presented an overview of all of the events
and proceedings leading up to the eventual form of and adoption of
Senate Bill 73. Mr. Shimmin broke his presentation down into two
parts, (1) how the bill reached its enacted form; and (2) what the plain
language of the bill means.'
D. Approval Process for Substitute Water Supply Plans
Mr. Steven Sims addressed the mechanics of applying for and
obtaining approval of a substitute water supply plan. Now that the new
rules are in place, a water user in the South Platte River basin has
essentially two courses of action to choose between. A water user can
follow either the procedures provided in last year's House Bill 1414, or
opt to follow the newly enacted Senate Bill 73 guidelines. Both of
these options include the same basic five steps: (1) application for an
Substitute Water Supply Plan ("SWSP"); (2) data supporting the SWSP;
(3) public input; (4) a final decision; and (5) the possibility of an
appeal.
The first step, the application process, is very different depending
on which option a well user uses. Under House Bill 1414, the
application process is very simple, just apply and ensure that the
application matches with a plan for augmentation applied for in the
Water Court. However, under Senate Bill 73, the application process is
much more detailed. Applications must include:
[T]he permit number and location; the projected use and volume of
pumping; for all wells using the modified Blaney-Criddle method to
determine consumptive use, the projected number of acres and crops
to be irrigated; the anticipated stream depletions that affect the river
after October 31, 2002, until eighteen months after the date of the
request in time, location, and amount, including a detailed
description of how such depletions were calculated, and shall list the
identity, priority, location, and amount of all replacement water
sources to be used to replace stream depletions, including both
accretions and depletions attributable to any augmentation wells.
Upon the request of any party who has subscribed to the substitute
water supply plan notification list for water division 1, the applicant
for a substitute water supply plan shall also provide the model used to

9. For a complete overview, see Mike Shimmin, Recent Developments ConcerningState
Engineer Rulemaking Authority for the South Platte River Basin, 6 U. DENy. L. REv. 549
(2003).
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calculate stream depletions and the assumptions, input data, and
output data used by the applicant in such model."°
Under House Bill 1414, the supporting data necessary is not set out
in detail, however, the State Engineer does review the supporting data
and requires detailed information. In addition, the State Engineer
issued Policy 2002-2, which provides guidelines to applicants as to
necessary supporting data." Policy 2002-2 also allows for comment on
any proposed plans. Senate Bill 73 sets forth a more detailed list of
what is required as supporting data. Some of these requirements are
listed in section 308(3) (b) (I), above. The bottom line is that both
application schemes require detailed supporting data. If the data
provided is not sufficient, the State Engineer will return the
application to the applicant with a list of what further data is required.
Both schemes provide for public involvement, however Senate Bill
73's public involvement process is more comprehensive. Senate Bill 73
recognizes that most people who provide comments have specialized
knowledge of their particular area of the South Platte River basin and
provides for a public hearing. The notification process is modeled
after that in House Bill 1414, but sending notice out to all who
subscribe to the notification list. However, Senate Bill 73 takes the
notification one step further and also provides for a hearing, where
parties can examine and cross-examine witnesses in front of the State
Engineer. This allows for asking questions of applicants directly when
not satisfied with the information provided in an application.
In both instances, the final decision is made by the State Engineer,
but House Bill 1414 does not provide provisions for obtaining a copy
of a final decision; Senate Bill 73 establishes procedures for this. The
State Engineer must send a copy of the final decision addressing all
individual concerns raised by anyone who protested or appeared at the
hearing to question the applicant, to all involved parties. In addition,
the final decision must contain terms and conditions to address
depletion calculations, credit for replacement water, and operating
instructions.
Finally, Senate Bill 73 has altered the appeals process. Under
House Bill 1414, an SWSP was joined with a plan for augmentation.
Under Senate Bill 73, an appeal can be separate and in an expedited
manner. The appeal can proceed as fast as the appellant wishes it to,
which ensures decisions are made in an appropriate time frame,
considering the irrigation and farming season in Colorado.

10.

COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-308(3) (b) (I) (2003).
11. See Office of the State Eng'r, Policy 2002-2, Implementation of HB 02-1414
(Section 37-92-308, C.R.S. (2002)) Regarding Substitute Water Supply Plans (July 2,
2002).
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SESSION TWO-ENGINEERING ASPECTS ON SENATE BILL 03-073
Mr. Jon Altenhofen of the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
District addressed the engineering aspects pertinent to Senate Bill 73.
Mr. Altenhofen stressed that recharge is the key element. Engineers
deal with causes and effects; the cause being what a user is doing at the
well, the effect being what happens to the river or stream. The goal of
the State Engineer is to administer the river so that replacement
supplies are greater than depletions, and in order to reach this goal, a
policy of openness and transparency is absolutely necessary.
The main question that the State Engineer looks at is how much
ground water that is pumped from a well is actually consumed; an
augmentation plan is designed to replace that amount. Since all wells
on the South Platte are junior wells, in order for the river to be
effectively managed, a certain percentage of water that is consumed
must be put back into the river.
For those irrigation wells where diversions are actually measured
using water meters or verified power conversion measurements, the
presumed amount of consumptive use from wells used for flood
irrigation shall not be lass than fifty percent of diversions, and the
presumed amount of consumptive use from wells used for sprinkler
irrigation shall not be less than seventy-five percent of diversions. For
those irrigation wells where diversions are not actually measured, the
state engineer shall determine the amount of stream depletions using
actual data for the crops grown, acres irrigated surface water
deliveries, and the modified Blaney-Criddle method. 2y
Once consumptive use is determined, the next critical piece of
information is the lag depletive effect on the river. Mr. Altenhofen
noted that the stream flow depletion factor method arose out of the
1969 Act. Since then maps have been developed and standards have
been established. Senate Bill 73 adopts the use of these maps and
standards.
The next engineering issue is accounting for replacement supplies.
Mr. Altenhofen identified two methods to accomplish this: (1) ditch
bypasses of senior rights; and (2) augmentation wells. Ditch bypasses
leave a senior surface right in the water, but do have a depletive effect
on the aquifer. Augmentation wells tap directly into an aquifer to
augment wells pumping out of priority. Although these tend to be
winter depletions, they still must be accounted for. Both of these
methods are contained in Senate Bill 73.
Mr. Altenhofen concluded that the ultimate key to a successful
SWSP is to get to the bottom line of what kind of augmentations are
necessary to ensure that an out-of-priority well does not injure senior
users. In order to ensure this goal is met, Mr. Altenhofen stressed
again, that absolute openness and transparency is necessary.
12.

COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-308(3) (c) (I) (2003) (emphasis added).
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SESSION THREE - SECTION 309 OF THE WATER QUALITY CONTROL ACT

Mr. Tom Pitts of Water Consult, Engineering and Planning
Consultants addressed issues regarding Section 309 of the Water
Quality Control Act. Mr. Pitts provided comments on the examination
of the need to revise Colorado's aquatic life classification system to
address Section 309. Initially, Mr. Pitts noted that those in the
regulatory community would be reluctant to accept changes in the
proposed classification and standards system without first
understanding the impacts of those changes on discharge permits and
other regulatory functions, such as total maximum daily loads. In
order to understand these implications, case studies on selected stream
segments displaying the existing classifications system and associated
standards, the rationale for the existing system, and the proposed
classifications and associated standards will need to be conducted. In
addition, Mr. Pitts noted that the concept of "effluent dominated" and
"effluent depended" should be expanded to include "return flow
dominated" and "return flow dependent."
Mr. Pitts then reviewed the specific sections under consideration,
and concluded by noting that at this time, it would not be productive
to spend a lot of time commenting on those sections.
More
fundamental information is needed first, such as:
What is the role and purpose of sub-classifications?
Are qualifiers still needed, and I, if so, what are the roles of
qualifiers?
How are qualifiers distinct from sub-classifications?
What appropriate definitions should be applied with respect to
ephemeral, intermittent, return flow dominated, and return
flow dependent streams or stream segments?
SESSION FOUR-LUNCH SPEAKER

The State Engineer, Mr. Hal Simpson, provided a summary of
where Colorado is right now regarding the drought and the levels of
selected reservoirs. Mr. Simpson noted that some reservoirs are nearly
full, others, however, such as Lake Dillon, still have a long way to go.
Mr. Simpson then addressed House Bill 1001, stating that the main
purpose of the bill is to modify § 308(4). The bill shortens the time
period for approving plans and states that a plan can operate on a
temporary basis.
SESSION FIVE-CURRENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTH
PLATTE

Dr. Robert Ward, director of the Colorado Resources Research
Institute moderated the discussion. First, Dr. Luis Garcia, Director of
the Integrated Decision Support Group and Associate Director of the
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Colorado Agricultural Experiment Station at Colorado State
University, addressed work on the South Platte MAP ("SPMAP").
SPMAP is a program involved in entering data and other information
into a comprehensive geographic information systems ("GIS")
database. Once complete, this program will allow engineers to better
determine the effects of wells in the South Platte River basin.
Second, Dr. Garey Fox, of the Department of Civil Engineering at
Colorado State University, provided a discussion of the water quality
impacts of recharge projects. Dr. Fox's work also used GIS and other
computer modeling tools such as MODFLOW to facilitate his research.
Continuing work in this area will allow engineers to address not only
quantity impacts, but also quality impacts to the operation of wells in
the South Platte River basin.
SESSION SIX-SOUTH PLATTE DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM (SPDSS)

Mr. Ray Alvarado, a Senior Water Resource Specialist with the
Colorado Water Conservation Board addressed the South Platte
Decision Support System ("DSS"). Mr. Alvarado first identified the
four main components to a DSS: (1) data; (2) tools to interpret the
data; (3) documentation; and (4) user involvement. Mr. Alvarado
explained that DSS is a set of tools and models to better determine
consumptive use, as well as causes and effects of wells in the South
Platte River basin. Ultimately, DSS will help to maximize use and
minimize depletions.
SESSION SEVEN - ENDANGERED SPECIES ISSUES ON THE SOUTH PLATrE

Mr. Alan Berryman, head of the Engineering Service Branch of the
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District and Mr. Don Ament,
Commissioner, State Department of Agriculture, spoke about issues
regarding endangered species in the South Platte River basin. Mr.
Berryman and Mr. Ament briefly noted that the Endangered Species
Act is here to stay and that it is a factor that water resource planners
must consistently account for. The speakers recounted recent
examples in neighboring states where endangered species needs
required a certain amount of water in a stream, and this took
precedence over any other rights. In addition, if neighboring states
need more water for endangered species needs, this could affect the
compacts to which Colorado is a party.

BOOK REVIEW
DANIEL TYLER, SILVER Fox OF THE ROCKIES: DELPHUS E. CARPENTER
AND WESTERN WATER COMPACTS, University of Oklahoma Press:

Norman (2003); 392pp.; $34.95; ISBN 0-8061-3515-8, hardcover.
REVIEWED BYJUSTICE GREGORYJ. HOBBS, JR.t
Professor Dan Tyler tells a remarkable story of a remarkable man,
Delph Carpenter, a small town water lawyer who became a national
statesman of rivers.
Architect of the "compact idea" for setting interstate water
allocation disputes, Carpenter was born to a nineteenth century
pioneering family in Horace Greeley's Union Colony, founded in
1870. Carpenter grew up working water with his father from the
irrigation ditches that tap the Poudre River, which flows east from its
source in what is now the Rocky Mountain National Park.
Carpenter's life mirrored the Great Divide he revered. He loved
the shining mountains and the Great Plains that take one inevitably to
them. He drew from their strength as a husband, father, lawyer,
legislator, and craftsman of treaties. When litigating for Colorado
against Wyoming in the United States Supreme Court, for example,'
he climbed to the source of the Laramie River to understand the lay of
the land and how the waters flow. He wanted to leave his name on the
mountains he had climbed with the district water commissioner:
Carpenter wanted precise information on the Laramie River's origins,
but he also enjoyed the adventure of planting the first American flag
on these unnamed peaks. Having deposited a record of their ascent
in a Prince Albert tobacco can at the summit, Carpenter later asked
the U.S. Geological Survey to recognize these mountains henceforth
as the Carpenter Peaks.
There are no Carpenter Peaks. But, Carpenter's work is indelible
in the day-to-day, year-in-year-out administration of four great rivers
from source to mouth-the Platte, the Arkansas, the Rio Grande, and
the Colorado. His signature and mark are upon the 1922 Colorado

t Greg Hobbs is a Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court. He is the author of
the Citizen's Guide to Colorado Water Law recently published by the Colorado
Foundation for Water Education.
1. Wyomingv. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
2. DANIEL TYLER, SILVER Fox OF THE RocKIEs: DELPHUS E. CARPENTER AND WESTERN
WATER COMPAcTS 163 (2003).

Issue 2

BOOK REVIEW

River Compact, the 1922 La Plata River Compact, and the 1923 South
Platte River Compact. His groundwork prepared the way for the 1938
Rio Grande River Compact, the 1942 Republican River Compact, the
1948 Arkansas River Compact, and the 1948 Upper Colorado River
Compact.
Carpenter was a local northern Colorado ditch company lawyer
and one-term state Senator who became the state's equitable
apportionment litigator in the United States Supreme Court. His
decade-long scorching struggle against Wyoming from 1911 to 1922
converted him from a state-of-origin win-at- all-costs litigator into a
patient-and-tireless negotiator of durable interstate agreements.
Ironically, Carpenter became a peacemaker because the reality of
water scarcity and necessity-upon which the prior appropriation
doctrine turns-applies with equal logic to interstate rivers, if litigation
in the United States Supreme Court is the only device for resolving
water disputes between states.
Colorado had won against downstream Kansas in their 1907
equitable apportionment case, on the basis of Colorado's settled equity
in continuing established water uses over prospective Kansas water
uses.3 When Wyoming brought the same argument to bear against
Colorado, Carpenter initially resorted to claiming sovereignty over
waters originating in the headwaters state. He knew the argument was
likely a loser, and-while the Supreme Court was busy taking evidence
and briefs, hearing oral argument, ordering further briefs, convening
re-argument, and then pondering its decision for years-Carpenter
was busy formulating the "compact idea."
With clarity, scholarship, and a profound understanding of
Carpenter's keen passion and intellect, Professor Tyler explains that
Carpenter's water compact brainstorm derived from his understanding
of "river culture":
The culture of rivers and streams is dictated by geographical location.
Upstream residents tend to manifest an attitude of superiority. Their
connection to reliable water is guaranteed, especially during periods
of drought. Their major concern comes from the fact that most
western states accept the principle of first in time, first in right.
Economic development downstream, where warmer temperatures
encourage agriculture and population growth, results in a prior use
of water and therefore a potential legal claim to that water in times of
scarcity. Downstream residents worry excessively about upstream
transfers of water out of the river basin and upstream consumption
that diminishes downstream flows at critical times.
Experience with interstate water litigation had taught Carpenter
three great lessons. When the United States Supreme Court exercises
its original jurisdiction to resolve an interstate water dispute: (1) the
3. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117-18 (1907); David W. Robbins & Dennis M.
Montgomery, The Arkansas River Compact, 5 U. DENV.WATERL. REv. 67 (2001).
4. TY.ER, supra note 2, at 8.
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doctrine of equitable apportionment governs; (2) what is an equitable
apportionment in one decade may not be so in another; and (3) the
upstream state can lose to a downstream state whose development
occurs first, if not now then later.
Carpenter had two primary fears, that California would preempt
Colorado by its capacity for early development and that the federal
government through the Bureau of Reclamation would command all
western rivers to the detriment of individual states.
Carpenter's fears were real. In Kansas v. Colorado, the Supreme
Court-citing section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act deferring to state
water law-rejected the Government's contention that Congress had
reserved all unappropriated western waters for use as the United States
saw fit.5 Yet, the Government proceeded to embargo Colorado from
getting federal right-of-way approvals necessary for additional water
development of Rio Grande River and Platte River water, in favor of
assuring water supply for the federal Elephant Butte Project in New
Mexico and the Pathfinder Project in Wyoming.6
California's demand for a mainstream Colorado River dam for
flood control, power production, and irrigation water was long, loud,
and compelling, and its Congressional delegation insistent.
In this maelstrom, Carpenter refined and forwarded his principle
of interstate comity based on the Constitution's Compact Clause7 and
federalism guarantees.'
To Carpenter, "comity" meant that states
sharing an interstate stream system would apportion the waters
between themselves in perpetuity, respecting each other's legitimate
present and future needs.
Of course, Carpenter knew that
Congressional assent was necessary to make the apportionments legally
effective and enduring.
By the time the Supreme Court recognized Wyoming's interstate
Laramie River priority, leaving only 15,500 acre-feet per year for
additional Colorado use, 9 Carpenter had convinced the powerful
League of the Southwest to endorse the "compact idea" for the
Colorado River, and Congress had enacted legislation for a seven-state
Colorado River Compact Commission, whose Chair became
Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover.

5. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 92-93.
6. TYLER, supra note 2, at 8, 119, 154, 169, 314 n.58; William A. Paddock, The Rio
Grande Compact of 1938, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 13 (2001).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; art. VI, cl. 2.
8. Carpenter was a "literal, strict constructionist" in his view that the Tenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
provided parameters for his recognition of limited state sovereignty and a
guarantee of states' rights against illegal federal usurpation....
Although an interstate compact would diminish state sovereignty to some
extent, it would supersede state laws and assure signatory states the comity
necessary to avoid conflict (war) in the Supreme Court.
TYLER, supra note 2, at 19-20.
9. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 496 (1922).
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Professor Tyler's story of Delph Carpenter is a marvelous
biography of national significance culminating with particular
resonance in the telling of Carpenter's key Colorado River Compact
role. Following Professor Donald Pisani's Foreword and Professor
Tyler's Introduction, this biography includes chapters devoted to:
(1) Lineage and Love Letters; (2) Education and the Beginnings of a
Career; (3) The Making of an Interstate Stream Commissioner;
(4) The Colorado River Compact: Phase I; (5) The Colorado River
compact: Phase II; (6) The Struggle for compact Ratification; (7) Last
Years as Interstate Streams Commissioner; (8) Vindication; and
(9) Carpenter and the Compact Legacy. Extensive notes and a
bibliography document Professor Tyler's ten-year successful effort to
bring Delph Carpenter to life.
Carpenter was sick at the time of his greatest achievement.
He suffered from
Advocacy and negotiation wore him down.
Parkinson's disease aggravated by stress.
Aided by the first-ever access to Carpenter's personal and
professional papers-made available by the Carpenter familyProfessor Tyler tells how a stern-minded adversary of the federal
government became a close personal friend of the future president
and former state opponents in reaching monumental agreements.
These agreements are essential to the needs of a growing and
diverse western United States. In the twenty-first century, rapid
western urbanization-and the need to protect all creatures who share
this harsh and magnificent environment we love and depend on-will
test the durability of the river compacts. Because the states and their
citizens have placed great reliance on the guarantee that their water
compact apportionments will be available to them for beneficial use
when needed, continued decision-making within the compact
framework appears to be a well-counseled choice.
Ultimately, Delph Carpenter learned that there is no substitute for
hard work and good will. His love for the land of the Great Divide and
his dear wife, Dot, welled up in these verses:
From the blackest clouds come the brightest rains
The tree that is most exposed to wind and storm is the strongest.
The best fish come from the purest waters.
Circumstances must be turned and are not anxious to turn
themselves.1°

10.

TvYFR, supra note 2, at 50 (quoting Delphus E. Carpenter).
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ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND
THE FATE OF AMERICA'S FRESH WATERS, Island Press, Washington,

D.C. (2002); 300pp; $25.00; ISBN 1-55963-223-2, hardcover.
This book explores the future crisis of water shortage due to the
overdrafting of groundwater throughout the United States. The
author is effective in bringing one's attention to the dangers of
exploiting aquifers, for these waters feed and sustain our rivers, lakes,
and wetlands, as well as provide more than half our drinking water.
Throughout the book, the author clearly and passionately describes
how much is at stake if we continue to squander water, especially
underground water, and he provides suggestions as to how to avoid the
further negative impact on the environment.
The book is divided into fifteen chapters. The first two provide an
introduction to the importance of aquifers. Glennon discusses the
culture of water use in the United States and explains our increased
reliance on groundwater. He then covers the history of a few key rivers
and aquifers from around the country, illustrating the science and
hydrology as well as the legal aspects of water use and conflicts.
In chapters three through thirteen, the author tells a series of
stories of how excessive pumping of our aquifers has created an
environmental catastrophe. After reading these tales, it is clear to the
reader that there is a causal connection between groundwater
pumping and environmental degradation. The stories describe how
water is being used around the country, from Tampa Bay to Down East
Maine; from Minnesota to California's Central Valley; from the
suburbs north of Boston to the Hopi Reservation in Arizona; and from
Grand Canyon National Park to coastal regions of Florida. The author
describes how water in such localities is being used to accommodate
population growth; to supply private homeowner wells; to irrigate
fields; to mine gold and coal; and to support tourism in national parks
and forests. Some of the stories are poignant; some are tragic - but all
lead to the conclusion that the overdrafting of groundwater is a serious
problem, which has the potential of causing catastrophic damage to
the environment.
In Chapter One, The Worth of Water in the United States, the author
sketches the development of water law in the United States. He
describes how the legislature and the courts changed the legal rules at
each step in history to promote economic development and create
private property rights in water. The author points out how such rules
encouraged waste and placed no importance on protecting the
environment.
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Chapter Two, Human Reliance on Groundwater,discusses the excess
reliance on groundwater in the United States. The author begins by
giving various reasons for this occurrence. One of them is the quality
of groundwater. Much surface water is highly saline, especially in the
West. High salinity in water causes problems for farmers, and it also
creates problems for domestic users - thus, the preference for
groundwater. Another reason for the overuse of groundwater is the
fact that legal rules fail to conform to the physical reality and the
science of hydrology.
The author opines that developments in technology making
pumping more efficient and economical, together with a permissive
legal doctrine, have made groundwater a critical source of water
throughout the nation. Glennon goes on to discuss how great
expansion of groundwater pumping since the 1940s has caused a
number of serious environmental problems - the most disturbing of
which is actually running out of water. He also discusses other
negative effects, such as land subsidence, and the devastating effects
on surface water, including lakes, ponds, rivers, creeks, streams,
springs, wetlands, and estuaries.
Chapter Three, How Does a River Go Dry?, is the first story in the
book. In this chapter, the author discusses the catastrophic effect that
groundwater pumping had on the Santa Cruz River in Tucson,
Arizona. The author traces the history of the Santa Cruz River and its
surroundings, explaining how the river provided the impetus for
original settlements in Tucson. For hundreds of years, the river
sustained farming communities.
Today, however, the river is
practically dry. The author provides the reader with pictures and a
clear explanation as to how water moves. His explanation makes it
easier to understand the grave effects of excessive underground water
pumping on our rivers.
Chapter Four, A River at Risk, discusses the prospect of harm to the
San Pedro River in Arizona as a result of an increase in population
growth groundwater pumping. In 1999, American Rivers, a national
environmental group, declared the San Pedro one of the ten most
endangered rivers in the United States. In this chapter, the author
points out how not everyone realizes the dangers of underground
water pumping - not even those with the power to make a change, like
politicians and wealthy land developers. On the contrary, such groups
are afraid that bringing attention to these environmental issues may
retard growth. The author notes that although there has been
congressional intent to protect the flows of the San Pedro, the river is
still in jeopardy.
The author explains how continued groundwater pumping will
affect the San Pedro. He also delineates a series of possible options,
which may actually save the river, such as retiring agricultural
irrigation, installing low-flow fixtures, and mandating water
conservation. However, he points out that even if all the above ideas
were implemented, they would not bring the present rate of overdraft
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to zero. Glennon insists that to prevent this river from suffering the
same fate as the Santa Cruz, dramatic changes must occur.
Chapter Five, Tampa Bay's Avarice, tells the story of how explosive
population growth in the Tampa Bay area has led to extensive
groundwater pumping. Florida is the fourth most populous state, and
it has the highest per capita consumption of water in the world. The
author describes the great impact groundwater pumping has had on
the region's wetlands. Florida's wetlands, once fifty-four percent of its
land surface, now cover only thirty percent of the state. The author
explains that the decline in wetlands is critical, because wetlands
perform valuable functions - they enhance water quality, store water,
and recharge water to the aquifer.
Glennon also discusses the efforts to reduce groundwater
pumping. The Tampa water authority came up with one alternative building the largest water desalinization plant in the western
hemisphere. Although the process of desalinization generates a
substantial amount of potable water, however, it also produces as water
product highly saline water, which is dumped back into the ocean.
Environmentalists fear the long-term impact this could have on
Florida's west coast. The population in the Tampa area will increase
another thirty-seven percent by 2010. The Tampa Bay water authority
has the pressure of seeking feasible water sources for the future.
The next story occurs in Texas. In Chapter Six, The Tourist's
Mirage, the author discusses San Antonio's River Walk, the Edwards
Aquifer, and endangered species. River Walk is a 2.5-mile section of
the San Antonio River, which flows through the heart of downtown.
River Walk is a major tourist attraction bringing in $3.5 billion a year.
The author notes that most tourists would be surprised to find out that
the river is not a naturally flowing one. Rather, the river's water comes
from groundwater pumped from the Edwards Aquifer. Astoundingly,
up to ten million gallons a day of groundwater are fed into the river
just to create the economically useful illusion of a real river.
Glennon then discusses the Edwards Aquifer, which plays a critical
economic role in the life of south-central Texas. San Antonio is the
eighth-largest city in the nation, and it relies on groundwater from the
Edwards Aquifer for over ninety-nine percent of its municipal supply
of water. This makes it the largest city in the country to rely so heavily
on groundwater. As a result of pumping the Edwards Aquifer, the
water level in two of the largest springs in Texas, which is home to five
endangered species, has declined. The author then discusses the
results of litigation initiated by the Sierra Club for violating ESA
provisions, which protect threatened and endangered species.
Glennon concludes by discussing alternatives for San Antonio's future
water supply.
In Chapter Seven, Suburban Development and Watershed Initiatives,
the author begins by explaining how the Ipswich River in
Massachusetts, which receives on average forty-five inches of rain per
year dried up in 1995, 1997, and 1999. This fact is surprising when
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compared to the San Pedro River in Arizona, which also dried up but
only receives twelve inches of rain per year.
The author describes the river and its surroundings before
explaining why it dried up. The author notes that one of the problems
facing the Ipswich River is the suburban sprawl. This growth has
fueled high summer water use. The author describes how residents
waste water by building large homes, which are usually accompanied
by Olympic-sized swimming pools and enormous lawns. Thousands of
gallons of water evaporate from a single swimming pool each summer.
Moreover, automatic in-ground sprinkler systems water those
sprawling lawns. Based on the author's research, it is estimated that
new developments consume fifty percent more water than the older
ones; and communities use two to three times as much water in the
summer as during the rest of the year. The author concludes by
warning that a critical part of any solution against the depletion of
water from our rivers is to stop treating water as a free resource.
In the next chapter, A Game of Inches for Endangered Chinook Salmon,
the author tells the story of how the Corps' flood control program in
California's Central Valley, together with farmers' groundwater
pumping and surface water diversions have left the Cosumnes River in
a precarious state. The author describes how the lower water levels in
the Cosumnes have endangered the Chinook salmon, where they
migrate to spawn. During September and October, when the Chinook
enter the river, they face their worst obstacle. As they swim upriver,
they come upon a section that is bone-dry. The severe decline in
numbers of the Chinook has forced the United States Fish and
Wildlife Services listing it as an endangered species. The author notes
that scientists, as well as environmental organizations and government
agencies have great interest in saving the Cosumnes for this is the last
undammed river, it has endangered Chinook, and it supports the
largest surviving valley oak forest. Glennon concludes this chapter by
examining the various efforts to restore flows in the Cosumnes.
In Chapter Nine, Wild Blueberries and Atlantic Salmon, Glennon
explains how the state of Maine, a large part of which consists of lakes,
ponds, rivers, streams, and wetlands, has water problems. The author
mentions various reasons why Maine has such water problems.
However, he dedicates the rest of the chapter to discuss the reasons for
the decline in the number of Atlantic salmon. He tells the story of the
conflict created by blueberry growers who are irrigating their fields
with water diverted from rivers with populations of endangered
Atlantic salmon. Unfortunately for the salmon, farmers need the
additional water exactly when the salmon are swimming into the rivers
from the ocean. Glennon examines the various options under
consideration to save the salmon, and notes that Maine's awareness of
the relationship between groundwater and surface water has made
possible a potentially viable solution.
Chapter Ten, Size Does Count, at Least for French Fries, tells an
interesting tale of how the demand by the fast-food industry for a
specific type of potato is negatively affecting Minnesota's Straight River
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Basin. The author describes the potato farming industry and the
extensive irrigation needed to grow what he calls industrial potatoes those with uniform length, appearance, and color. These potatoes are
mainly used for french fries, and are preferred over potatoes which are
not constantly irrigated because those are of odd shapes and have
knobs. These potatoes are not profitable. One of the problems is that
farmers who are growing the industrial potatoes are using
groundwater for irrigation. More water is needed for processing. The
author discusses the negative effects the overdrafting is having on the
Straight River, such as placing the trout population in danger,
changing the equilibrium of the aquifer, and lowering river flows. The
author concludes by suggesting that Americans accept french fries
which are of slightly different colors and that are of different sizes.
In Chapter Eleven, The Black Mesa Coal Slury Pipeline, the author
discusses how groundwater pumping by Peabody Energy Company is
affecting the Hopi tribe in Arizona. Peabody Energy Company is the
world's largest private-sector coal business. In 1968, Peabody began
strip-mining the Black Mesa, Arizona. As part of the mining operation,
Peabody pumps groundwater for the slurry pipeline. The problem is
that Peabody extracts ten times as much water per year as that used by
the entire Hopi tribe of 9,000 people. The pumping is affecting the
largest source of surface water in the Hopi reservation - the Moenkopi
Wash. At one time, the Moenkopi Wash contained sufficient water to
irrigate fields, water livestock, and provide swimming holes during hot
summers. Today, however, Moenkopi Wash only flows intermittently.
The author ends this chapter by providing suggestions for the
solution of this problem. The most obvious one is that other methods
for transporting the coal should be used. The Black Mesa is the only
coal slurry pipeline in the country. Other states have made it illegal to
use water for coal transportation. The author suggests that Peabody
transport coal like others do - on trucks or railroads. He concludes by
examining the viability of using other methods of coal transportation.
Chapter Twelve, Is Gold or Water More Precious?, discusses the effect
of groundwater withdrawals from the Humboldt River basin for gold
mining operations in Nevada. The author discusses the process known
as "dewatering," which is a part of mining. In open-pit mining, heavy
machines dig pits that are so deep that they hit the water table. It is
then when the bottom of the pit fills with water and the mine operator
has to wait until the water is removed. Although that water is highquality glacial water, it is of no use, and mine owners have to get rid of
it. The author explains the negative effects of dewatering, which are
astounding. He notes how it is apparent that the economic benefits of
gold mining are more important to the State of Nevada than the
industry's impact on the environment, including springs and rivers.
In Chapter Thirteen, All's Fair in Love and Water, the author
describes the problems that are occurring in Apalachicola Bay, which
is located at the southernmost point on Florida's panhandle. The bay
supports a diverse ecosystem that yields ninety percent of Florida's
commercial oyster harvest. Apalachicola Bay oysters depend on water
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from the Apalachicola River. The author discusses the problems that
are created and which affect the oysters when the Apalachicola estuary
receives smaller volumes of fresh water. Although the author tells us
that until recently the Bay has been healthy, he points out there have
been three major factors which have contributed to harming the bay:
(1) upstream diversions of water from the Chattahoochee for Atlanta's
rapidly growing population; (2) uncontrolled diversions from the Flint
together with groundwater pumping adjacent to the Flint for
agricultural irrigation by Georgia farmers; and (3) extensive dredging
of the Apalachicola River by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The
author goes on to discuss these in more detail and discusses the
struggles of the different parties to resolve this problem.
Chapter Fourteen, The Futureof Water, is the story of how increased
interest in touring the Grand Canyon and its surroundings has raised
the demand for water, surface and underground. At the same time,
not only is tourism increasing, there is also the threat of new
development which will create an increase in the building of houses,
restaurants, hotels, and other facilities and amenities. As the author
states, all of this development poses very serious questions about the
availability of water.
In this chapter, the author discusses the danger of increased
pumping to support new development. The Canyon has many seeps,
creeks, and even streams, which receive discharges from the aquifer.
One of the fears is that increased pumping will reduce flows to these
surface watercourses. One of the consequences would be that animals
that depend on this water would be placed at risk. In addition, the
author discusses other effects of increased groundwater pumping,
which includes the negative effect on the Havasupai tribe. This tribe's
reservation is located west of the South Rim. Their economy depends
on tourists enjoying Havasu Springs.
Continued and extensive
groundwater pumping would substantially diminish the flow of these
springs. Not only would the Havasupai tribe members suffer economic
damage, the springs are also of spiritual and cultural importance to
them.
After introducing the various issues resulting from
underground water pumping, the author goes on to examine and
evaluate a range of possible alternatives in connection with the
proposed development.
Finally, in Chapter Fifteen, The Tragedy of Law and the Commons, the
author concludes his series of stories by pointing out that certain
problems, such as population growth, wasteful water consumption
practices, and inappropriate agricultural water use must be addressed
by the society as a whole. As the author noted throughout his stories,
growth presents the ultimate threat to our springs, streams, rivers,
wetlands, and estuaries. Moreover, after reading the various stories, it
becomes clear (if it is not already) that citizens waste an appalling
amount of water, be it in the mining industry, in the agricultural

industry, or for recreation purposes.
The author concludes by offering various solutions to the very
important issue of water and water use. Some of those suggestions

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 6

include the enactment of water conservation standards; the
establishment by the legislatures of minimum stream flows; and
provisions to protect those flows from pumping of hydrologically
connected groundwater; the elimination of unregulated groundwater
pumping; the imposition of extraction taxes on water pumped from
any well within a certain distance of any river, spring or lake; and for
the implementation of regulations that will impose homeowners and
businesses to pay the true cost of water. The author describes each of
these proposed solutions in detail, and urges the reader that each of
us, as a citizen, can contribute to effect changes and make a
difference.
Gloria MariaSoto
OLIVER HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW,
POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 2ND ED., Environmental Law

Institute, Washington, D.C. (2002); 362pp; $35.96; ISBN 1-58576038-2, softcover.
In the second edition of his book on the total maximum daily load
("TMDL") program, Oliver Houck provides a useful guide to section
303(d) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Simply stated, section 303(d)
requires the use of water quality standards when the best available
technology requirements do not bring a body of water up to standard.
Section 303(d) serves as a safety net for when technology-based
standards do not accomplish the goals of the CWA. Houck exposes
the history and main issues and controversies associated with this
section of the CWA. The reader not only learns about the Clean Water
Act, but also immerses herself into other topics such as federalism,
historical patterns of environmental law, and the wild world of
Washington politics. The back cover of the book touts this work as
"The First Complete Guide to TMDLs Ever Published." "Complete"
might be the best adjective to describe the work.
The first chapter sets the roadmap for the book and also
establishes the tone. Drawing upon a metaphor, Houck starts the
book by stating that the CWA "is changing course." From the
beginning, Houck tries to make the book accessible to all readers.
Lawyers, scientists, citizens, and regulators feel at home when reading
this book because it provides the proper balance of law, policy, history,
and scientific data to give perspective to the unrelenting problem of
water pollution.
Chapter two entangles the reader in the history of the CWA. He
charts the changing course of water pollution laws starting with Water
Pollution Control Act of 1948. Houck starts the reader with a
quandary about the oldest dilemma in environmental law: should the
nation and states protect the environment or simply manage it for
human use? He provides the arguments for a water quality based set
of standards and also a technology-based set of standards. He also
discusses in depth the federalism arguments associated with
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Houck quotes governors,
controlling water pollution standards.
professors, directors of water utilities boards, representatives in
Congress, and numerous others to give the reader the parameters of
the state sovereignty debate in regards to water quality. The reader
comes out of chapter two with a proper historical perspective of
philosophical and practical arguments of varying ways to control water
pollution.
Chapter three explores the history of the implementation of
section 303 of the CWA. Houck explains that in the 1970's, the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") spent most of its time and
resources towards establishing the technology-based standards or
rather the floor above which states must meet. The "safety net" of
section 303(d) concerned them very little because the triggers of
303(d) came into play when polluted waters did not meet the water
quality standards under the best available technology. The EPA's
complacent attitude changed as various rounds of citizen suits
compelled the EPA to act on section 303(d). The book explains that
until 1996 the EPA only acted when forced to by court orders. In that
same year, the EPA started to pursue on its own initiative,
These measures included
implementation of section 303(d).
assembling a balanced group of twenty individuals to discuss every
aspect of the TMDL program. Houck details the problems and issues
associated with the TMDL program as developed by the twenty-person
group. The eligible waters, scientific uncertainty, implementation,
and controlling nonpoint sources comprise four of the main
problematic issues.
Chapter four describes the new framework for the TMDL program
by showing how the EPA dealt with controversial issues. The chapter
also reveals other actions by federal agencies and states that helped
shape the TMDL program. The chapter explains that the TMDL
program has been completely driven by litigation. Houck postulates
that citizen suits, Congress, and the EPA may push along the
implementation of the TMDL program, but getting states to act
becomes the crucial element of success.
In chapter five, Houck recaps the course that the CWA has run as
well as indicates where the EPA, states and Washington are taking the
CWA. The chapter expresses the theme that the TMDL is not a
perfect system and strong opponents including legislatures heavily
dominated by forestry, agricultural and construction interests create
Further, it
hurdles in creating an efficacious TMDL program.
reinforces that the EPA may only go as far as the CWA allows
enforcement of TMDL programs. The EPA must change the statutory
language of CWA in order to extend its reach under section 303(d).
Houck asserts that in order for a TMDL program to be successful, the
EPA, among others, must convince the majority of the states to buy
into the TMDL program. He concludes the chapter by projecting the
reservations of many states and industries because implementation of
TMDL requires much more than consensus based decisions to reduce
pollution.
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Chapter six provides an explanation of the current TMDL rules,
adopted in 2000. Houck also speculates about the effectiveness of the
current program. This chapter explains the true nuts and bolts of the
TMDL program. Houck writes with an historical perspective when
describing the "showdown" that occurred during the adoption of the
final TMDL rules in 2000. The EPA attempted to take a carrot and
stick approach to the TMDL program. However, strong interest
groups opposed to the potential for regulation of nonpoint sources
disagreed with many of the sticks. Houck wrote, "[w]hat ensued was a
high-stakes clash of power in which the EPA won the battle but its
opposition, strongly backed by Congress, won the war." He then
proceeds to explain how the final rules became watered down and
heavily focused on the carrots without the enforcement power of the
sticks. The changing administration of the EPA also reduced the
TMDL program. At the end of the chapter, Houck provides his
analysis of the current state of the TMDL program. Even with its
shortcomings, he agrees that the program could be effective.
However, he notes that a corollary of a successful TMDL program
requires consequences. A successful program cannot survive solely
with carrots. Houck ends the chapter on the notion that if the EPA
creates consequences, the agency may make significant impacts in
abatement of water pollution.
Oliver Houck concludes the book with his final thoughts on the
TMDL issue. He notes the magnitude of the shift towards a TMDL
program.
He reminds the reader that the technology-based
regulations significantly reduced water pollution, but the nation's
waters still contain pollution. He sees TMDLs as the frontier for
reducing the elusive yet great in quantity pollutants from nonpoint
sources. TMDLs are not perfect, he asserts, but he states, "if ever there
were a stakeholder program likely to produce more results than
bologna, it is §303(d)." In the end he acknowledges the challenges to
implementing and sustaining a TMDL program but also relates the
potential viable and effective solution that could result from the
TMDL program.
The Clean Water Act TMDL Program: Law, Policy, and Implementation
must make its way on the desk of every lawyer, citizen, and politician
concerned or working with CWA issues. The book provides useful
knowledge and truly lays out in detail the future of the CWA. The
seven chapters provide a magnitude of information. Houck also
packed the appendices with useful information such a summary of
TMDL litigation by state and a summary of TMDL determinations up
to April 1998. Oliver Houck wrote a book useful to everyone affected
and who will continue to be affected by the CWA.
Adriano Martinez
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GEOFFREY O'GARA, WHAT YOU SEE IN CLEAR WATER: INDIANS, WHITES,
AND A BATTLE OVER WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST, Vintage

Books, New York, NY (2002); 285pp; $14.00; ISBN 0-679-73582-8,
softcover.
What You See in Clear Water tells the story of twenty years of
litigation over water in the Wind River Valley, in its regional context.
O'Gara includes tidy primers on the scientific, political, and legal
aspects of the issues, but illuminates them foremost by shining the
light elsewhere, on the people intimately involved, who have the most
particular and immediate interest.
O'Gara describes the lay of the land, physically and socially,
through individual experiences, including his own. His descriptions of
geography and hydrology, water law and Indian law, and history, are
all twined into and animated through the lives of people in the Valley
and the communities that have evolved therein. The battle for water
in the Valley is basically a battle between reservation Indians and white
farmers; perhaps the book's most important revelation is that, while
that characterization is accurate, it fails to grasp the complexity of the
situation, borne out of a living cast of characters, a diversity of
motivations and concerns over real-world consequences.
Internal divisions among the Indians on the Reservation-some far
older than the Reservation-create further, and perhaps more
difficult, complications. Arapaho and Shoshone have been thrust
together on a reservation originally promised to the Shoshone alone;
the Tribes, traditional enemies, continue on in their uncomfortable,
federally imposed conjugation. They have in common an almost
hereditary distrust for outsiders and their institutions, which, if
warranted, creates terrific obstacles even for the well intentioned.
Water could be the new oil for the Tribes, but they have evolved, by
necessity, into a gun-shy culture, after centuries of intrusion,
indifference, and mulct.
The white farmers are a less internally fractured group. They have
labored for, and wrested, spare livings in arid country, and are almost
uniformly unmoved by arguments that, by their estimation, seek to
assess damages against them for historic improprieties they did not
commit. They are in the West largely according to an imperative of
the federal government, and to correct injustices of past federal policy
toward Indians at their expense would be patently unfair.
O'Gara is objective on the central issues, airing both sides-or,
more accurately, all sides-with careful attention and without
judgment. His revelations of the various local sensibilities and
expectations quietly radiate with compassion, as he pieces together a
complex mosaic of conflicts between various hopes and fears, needs
and rights. If O'Gara apprehends an adequate ultimate resolution to
the conflicts he writes about, it is not obvious in his depiction. After
twenty years' litigation-and at the end of O'Gara's book-what
anyone has gained or lost is unclear. For practical purposes, the
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parties appear situated much as they were before the series of cases
began, and the applicable laws remain murky and unpredictable.
Specific to its place, Wat You See in Clear Water may also serve as a
general model-intended or not-of old and ongoing struggles over
resources, occurring variously around the country, and particularly in
the West. Each instance must involve its own geographical and social
character, but each involves essentially the same fight: Indian versus
non-Indian rights to resources, the former theoretically, and the latter
historically, encouraged and subsidized by the federal government.
Water law and Indian law are intertwined, in the West as nowhere
else. What You See in Clear Water is a refresher on the humanitysometimes rendered unrecognizable in its distilled legal form-that
remains author, agent, and subject of these laws.
Owen Walker

COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Washoe County v. United States, 319 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(holding the government's refusal to issue a right-of-way permit on
public property did not constitute a physical taking because the
government neither physically appropriated nor denied meaningful
access to use of a water right; and because the refusal of the permit was
an internal regulatory act, it did not effect a regulatory taking).
Washoe County, Nevada ("Washoe County") and Northwest
Nevada Water Resources Limited Partnership ("Northwest Nevada")
appealed the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims
granting summary judgment to the United States and denying their
motion for partial summary judgment. The lower court held that the
government's action did not effect a taking of the parties' water rights.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed and
affirmed.
In 1988, Washoe County entered into an agreement with
Northwest Nevada to acquire an option to purchase Northwest
Nevada's water rights at Fish Springs Ranch ("Ranch") and the right to
change the place and manner of use of the water. In 1989, Washoe
County applied to the Nevada State Engineer to change the Ranch's
agricultural water use to municipal and industrial use at the RenoSparks metropolitan area located forty miles to the south. The
neighboring Pyramid Lake Tribe of Indians ("Tribe") and the United
States Army Depot ("Army") both objected to the granting of the
application because the change in use would divert water outside of
the Honey Lake Valley and negatively affect their water rights. The
State Engineer granted Washoe County's reallocation application, over
these objections.
Since the only feasible way to transport the Ranch's water to the
Reno-Sparks metropolitan area was by pipeline over federal land,
Washoe County applied to the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM")
for a right-of-way permit in 1989. The BLM distributed a draft
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") for comment in compliance
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with the requirement of issuing a right-of-way permit. Both the Army
and the Tribe expressed objections to it. The BLM referred the
decision whether to proceed with development of a final EIS to the
Secretary of the Interior. The Secretary issued an order in 1994
directing the BLM to suspend work on the EIS until Washoe County
resolved the objections to diverting the Ranch's water from the Honey
Lake Valley. When Washoe County was unable to resolve these
objections and proceed with the pipeline, it filed suit against the
government. Washoe County claimed the denial of the right-of-way
permit application constituted a taking of the Ranch water rights and
sought compensation.
The appellate court first considered whether Washoe County's
takings claim was ripe for review. The court concluded the claim was
ripe for review because Washoe County knew with a reasonable degree
of certainty that the BLM would not grant a right-of-way permit for
transporting the Ranch's water to Reno-Sparks.
Next, the court reviewed whether the government's refusal to issue
the right-of-way permit constituted a physical or regulatory taking of
Washoe County's water rights. The court found that because the
government merely denied Washoe County permission to use the
government's own land to exploit the Ranch water rights, the
government neither physically appropriated nor denied Washoe
County meaningful access to the water. Therefore, the court held that
the government did not affect a physical taking.
Finally, the court found that because government regulation of
private property was not at issue, Washoe County had not established a
regulatory taking. The court stated that the government applied
internal
regulations
concerning
the
federal
government's
management of public lands, and that it did not act in its regulatory
capacity when it denied Washoe County a right-of-way permit. The
court also clarified the government had no obligation to assist Washoe
County in putting their water rights to the most profitable use. Thus,
because the government did not impose any regulations on Washoe
County's water rights, its actions did not constitute a regulatory taking.
Concluding the government's actions did not affect a physical or a
regulatory taking, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
affirmed the decision of the Court of Federal Claims granting
summary judgment to the government.
Mark Shea
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NINTH CIRCUIT
Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 319 F.3d 398
(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Environmental Protection Agency's
failure to require review of Notices of Intent, the equivalent of a
permit, and failure to allow public availability and public comment of
the Notices of Intent violates the express requirements of the Clean
Water Act).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard
three consolidated cases challenging a final rule ("Phase II Rule")
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). The
EPA issued a rule pursuant to the Clean Water Act ("CWA") to control
pollutants entering the nation's waters by storm sewers. The rule
mandated that discharges from construction sites between one and
five acres and from small municipal separate storm sewer systems
("MS4s") be subject to the general permitting requirements of the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES"). The
Texas Cities Coalition on Stormwater and the Texas Counties
Stormwater Coalition ("Municipal Parties") challenged the rule in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on the following
grounds: (1) the EPA promulgated the rule in a procedurally defective
manner; (2) the rule violated the Tenth Amendment because it
impermissibly requires municipalities to regulate their own citizens;
and (3) the rule violated the First Amendment because it requires
municipalities to communicate a federally mandated message. The
Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") intervened against the
The Environmental Defense Center ("EDC"),
Municipal Parties.
("Environmental Parties") challenged the rule in
NRDC,
the
by
joined
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit claiming that
the regulations: (1) constitute a program of impermissible selfregulation; (2) fail to provide adequate public participation; and (3)
do not address stormwater runoff from other significant sources of
The National Association of Home Builders and the
pollution.
American Forest and Paper Association ("Industry Parties") challenged
the rule in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
asserting: (1) the EPA promulgated the rule defectively in violation of
the Regulatory Flexibility Act; (2) the EPA acted ultra vires by
regulating future sources of runoff pollution; and (3) the EPA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously by choosing to regulate construction sites
between one and five acres. The court upheld the rule as to all the
challenges except the first two asserted by the Environmental Parties.
Stormwater runoff is a significant contributor to water pollution in
The sources of stormwater runoff include
the United States.
discharges from construction sites, industrial facilities, urban
development, and many more. In 1985, three-quarters of the states
cited urban runoff as a major cause of water body impairment. Also,
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stormwater runoff is associated with the impairment of surveyed ocean
waters.
Congress attempted to minimize the pollution from
stormwater by requiring the EPA to enact a Phase I Rule and a Phase II
Rule. The Municipal, Environmental and Industry Parties challenged
the Phase II Rule in this case.
MunicipalParties
The Municipal Parties first claimed that the statutory authority
under section 402(p) (6) of the CWA requiring the EPA to develop a
comprehensive program to regulate stormwater runoff excluded the
option of enacting a program based on NPDES permits. They argued
that Congress failed to include permitting in the statutory list of
actions. In refuting this claim, the appellate court reiterated that the
list is not manifestly exclusive. For this reason, Congress intended to
give the EPA more than the listed activities in the statute. The
Municipal Parties also argued that the structure of section 402(p),
which contains a separate statutory section requiring permits for
medium and large MS4s, indicates that Congress would have inserted a
separate statutory section for permitting of small MS4s. The court
looked to a statutory section enacting a permitting moratorium that
applied only to Phase II dischargers. The court determined that the
existence of a moratorium necessarily implied that the EPA retained
authority to require permits after the expiration of the moratorium.
The Municipal Parties' argument therefore violated the principle that
interpretation of a statute should not render other provisions
superfluous. The court determined that the EPA acted within its
statutorily granted authority.
The Municipal Parties raised a facial Tenth Amendment challenge
to the Phase II Rule. In particular, the Municipal Parties claimed the
Phase II Rule excessively interfered with local government functions
and compelled small MS4s to regulate upstream dischargers. The
court started with the premise that for a facial challenge, the
Municipal Parties must demonstrate there are no circumstances in
which the challenged provision is constitutional. The court concluded
that the individual and general permitting requirements of the Phase
II Rule, even though they require operators of small MS4s to regulate
third parties, do not unconstitutionally coerce because the small MS4
discharges have two alternative options to the permits: not discharging
and the alternative permit option. The Municipal Parties argued that
not discharging stormwater into federal waters provided an unfeasible
option. The court stated that the fact that the alternative proved to be
more difficult or more expensive did not alter the legal framework
under which a municipality may chose to discard their stormwater.
Further, the alternative permit option allowed the operator of a small
MS4 to seek individualized permission to discharge based on the Phase
II Rule permitting rubric for large and medium MS4s. This option
allowed small MS4s to avoid regulation of third parties. The court
ruled that the Municipal Parties failed to meet the standard of
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demonstrating no circumstances where the alleged rule was
constitutional.
Finally, the Municipal Parties argued that the Phase II Rule
violated the First Amendment. The key challenge resulted from a part
of the rule entitled the "Public Education and Outreach" Minimum
Measures, which ordered small MS4s to distribute materials to the
community about the impact of stormwater runoff on water sources.
The Municipal Parties argued that neither Congress nor the EPA may
dictate the speech of small MS4s. The court rejected the argument
because the broad requirements did not dictate that the small MS4s
convey either a specific message or an affirmation of a specific belief.
Conveying information to the public about safe toxin disposal
contained no ideological component. For these reasons, the court
held that the public information component was constitutional.
EnvironmentalParties
The Environmental Parties challenged the Phase II Rule claiming
it contravened the CWA by allowing small MS4s to create stormwater
The
pollution controls without adequate regulatory oversight.
Environmental Parties specifically challenged the general permitting
scheme. The court determined that general permitting schemes
provide the EPA with lawful means of regulating discharges. Under a
general permitting scheme, each general permit outlined the
technology required and the effluent limitations to adequately protect
a water source from a class of dischargers. The dischargers may then
acquire permission to discharge by filing a Notice of Intent ("NOI").
The NOI simply represents an acceptance of the parameters of the
general permitting scheme and the EPA need not review each
particular NOI.
The general permitting scheme for the Phase II Rule differed from
traditional general permitting schemes mentioned above. The CWA
requires that the EPA ensure that operators of small MS4s comply with
general effluent limitations, but at the same time, EPA must ensure
that operators of small MS4s "reduce the discharge of pollutants to the
maximum extent practicable." Using the first part of the Chevron test,
where Congress clearly expressed its intent, the court required that the
EPA must review each individual NOI. The court decided that a
general permitting scheme would ensure that every discharger meet
the effluent limitations, but the scheme in no way could ensure that
every small MS4 reduced "the discharge of pollutants to the maximum
extent practicable." The court required meaningful review by the
appropriate regulatory agency before approval of an NOI.
The Environmental Parties also claimed that the general
permitting scheme failed to provide adequate public participation
because the EPA did not provide the public with notice or opportunity
for NOI hearings. The court used the first part of the Chevron test and
looked at provisions in the CWA requiring that permit applications be
available for public review and a hearing. The court then stated that
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the NOI equivocated to a permit application, so the EPA must involve
public participation in the general permitting scheme.
Finally, the Environmental Parties argued that the EPA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously when designating regulated sources under
the Phase II Rule. The Environmental Parties asserted that many
other serious sources of stormwater pollution designated in a list called
Group A Facilities were subject to regulation under the Phase II Rule.
The Group A Facilities consisted of stormwater dischargers similar to
regulated dischargers under the Phase I Rule, but intentionally
excluded from regulation. The EPA conducted studies of many
sources of stormwater pollution, but the EPA only enacted the Phase II
Rule to apply to small MS4s and construction sites. The court deferred
to the EPA's interpretation of the statute because the statute did not
require the EPA to consider Group A sources individually. The
Environmental Parties also claimed that the EPA acted arbitrarily by
not including forest roads under the Phase II Rule. The court
deferred to the EPA's interpretation because the statutory language
only mentioned that the Phase II Rule specifically applied to
municipal and industrial sources and not agriculture.
Industry Parties

The Industry Parties contended that the EPA violated the
Regulatory Flexibility Act ("RFA") by not conducting the requisite
analysis. The RFA requires federal agencies to prepare and analyze
the economic impacts proposed rules may have on small business
entities. Under the RFA, an agency need not conduct the analysis if
the proposed rule will not have significant economic impacts on a
substantial number of small entities. The court concluded that the
EPA correctly determined that the Phase II Rule did not trigger an
RFA analysis. The court determined that even if the EPA erroneously
concluded that there was no impact, the Small Business Advocacy
Panel conducted by the EPA sufficed for the economic analysis under
the RFA.
The Industry Parties also argued that the EPA improperly acted by
authorizing the designation of future sources of stormwater pollution.
The Phase II Rule allowed the EPA and authorized state agencies to
require currently unregulated stormwater dischargers to apply for a
permit under the rule when future circumstances warrant regulation.
The Industry Parties argued that allowing future designation falls
outside of the EPA's permitted authority. The court rejected the
Industry Parties' argument on the basis that section 402(p)(6)
authorizes a comprehensive approach, which allows regional
determination of polluting dischargers even if that type of source does
not compromise water quality on a national scale. The court looked to
the plain language of the statute, which provided no specific date for
designation of stormwater sources and rejected the Industry Parties'
argument.
Finally, the Industry Parties contended that the EPA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously when designating small MS4s and small
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construction sites within the purview of the Phase II Rule. They
argued that the EPA's use of Census-Bureau data to designate small
MS4s lacked a sound basis. The Industry Parties asserted that the EPA
failed to establish a correlation between population size and
stormwater pollution. The court treated the EPA's designation with
great deference. The court denied the Industry Parties' assertion that
the EPA must establish the correlation with pinpoint precision. For
areas of technical expertise, courts do not require perfect data or
studies. The Industry Parties also argued that the EPA's designation of
small construction sites between one and five acres as falling under the
Phase II Rule lacked sufficient support in the record. Again, the court
gave great deference to the EPA on this claim. Under an arbitrary and
capricious standard, the court would have reversed only if the EPA
relied on factors Congress did not intend for them to consider. The
court looked to the record, which contained more than twenty studies
of stormwater pollution impacts from small construction sites, and
found EPA's designation of small construction sites under the Phase II
Rule plausible. Thus, the EPA acted according to the record when
designating small construction sites under the Phase II Rule.
Adriano Martinez

California Trout, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Conmn'n, 313 F.3d
1131 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding state water quality certification required
by the Clean Water Act does not limit federal authority to permit
ongoing projects pending relicensing).
California Trout, Inc. ("Trout") petitioned for review of a Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") order that denied its request
for rehearing and revocation of the annual license for Project 1933,
operated by Southern California Edison ("Edison"). At issue was
whether FERC acted within its authority when it issued annual licenses
to Edison pursuant to the Federal Power Act ("FPA"), though Edison
had not received state water quality certification as required by the
Clean Water Act ("CWA"). FERC denied this request for rehearing
and Trout appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b). The court affirmed
FERC's denial.
This dispute arose from the 1996 expiration of Edison's fifty-year
FPA license for Project 1933 permitting the diversion of water from the
lower portion of the Santa Ana River for both water supply and power
generation. Edison filed an application for a new license for the
project in 1994 and simultaneously requested water quality
certification pursuant to the CWA. The state denied water quality
certification, but Edison received a temporary suspension through
March 2002. After that date Edison filed a new application for water
quality certification.
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In May 1996, FERC issued an annual license to Edison for the
continued operation of Project 1933. FERC would renew this annual
license automatically every year until it issued a new long-term license.
Trout sought to vacate this annual license until Edison received state
water quality certification.
Trout argued that the conflicting
provisions of the FPA and the CWA could only be "harmonized" by
issuing annual licenses when the state either granted or waived water
quality certification.
FERC held, and the court confirmed, that the issuance of an
annual license is an administrative or nondiscretionary act, requiring
FERC to authorize continued project operation under the terms and
conditions of the original license. Therefore, annual licensing is not a
licensing action that triggers the requirements of CWA. Furthermore,
the court looked at congressional intent of the CWA and stated that
Congress did not intend to restrict FERC's authority to prevent the
closure of a licensed project pending relicensing. Instead, the FPA
and the CWA function together because no new project license or
license amendment can issue without compliance with the state water
quality certification requirement of the CWA.
Erika Delaney Lew

League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding pesticides sprayed from a plane constitute a point
source pollutant necessitating a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System permit, and requiring an analysis of pesticide drift
to supplement the Environmental Impact Statement).
The League of Wilderness Defenders and other environmental
groups ("League") brought suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Oregon seeking an injunction preventing the United
States Forest Service ("USFS") from continuing to spray insecticide to
kill the Douglas Fir Tussock Moth ("moth"). The League claimed that
the USFS required a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit and revised Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") for further spraying. The district court granted summary
judgment to the USFS on both issues. The League appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The court
reversed and remanded the case to the district court, enjoining the
USFS from further spraying until it obtained an NPDES permit and
revised its EIS to consider the impact of pesticide drift.
The USFS initiated pesticide sprays in response to early warning
system predictions that a moth outbreak in 2002-2003 would result in
substantial defoliation. However, drift of the aerial pesticide used
possesses many potentially dangerous side effects including the
possibility of harming beneficial species, insect food supplies for fish,
and possible harm to birds and plants.
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The League appealed three issues: (1) whether pesticides sprayed
from a plane constituted a point source pollutant, requiring an NPDES
permit; (2) whether administrative regulations and agency
correspondence containing interpretations of regulations exempted
USFS spraying from the NPDES requirement; and (3) whether the EIS
should consider the environmental impacts of pesticide drift.
The court first addressed whether the pesticides sprayed from a
plane constituted a point-source pollutant under the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). Under the CWA, discharge of a point source pollutant
requires an NPDES permit. Nonpoint source pollutants arise from
various dispersed activities whereas the statute clearly defines point
source pollutants. The court determined that the pesticide discharge
fell within the statutory definition of a point source pollutant since
pesticides constitute pollutants under the statute, and because the
spray arose from a "discrete conveyance," discharged by a "floating
craft."
Next, the court responded to USFS' allegation that regulations
issued by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") specifically
exempted silvicultural pest control from the requirement of obtaining
an NPDES permit. The court held that because the statute itself
clearly defined point-source pollutants, the administrative regulations
could not exempt silvicultural pest control since this would contravene
congressional intent. The court also found that the spraying could not
constitute a nonpoint source pollutant because the statutory language,
"natural runoff," modified the list of exempted activities. Since no
natural runoff caused the pesticide spray, the court found it could not
fit within the interpretation of a nonpoint source pollutant. The court
also discarded USFS's argument that specified point source pollutants
in the EPA regulation meant that silvicultural pest control could not
constitute a point source pollutant. The court found that such
specification only prevented removing the four specified point
sources, but did not exclude other point sources such as pesticide
spray.
The court held that informal correspondence from the EPA failed
to exempt USFS from the NPDES permit requirement.
The
documents included one line in a guidance manual and two short
letters, which the court found lacked sufficient analysis to constitute an
exemption. In addition, the court held that while the EPA may define
point sources when reasonable room to interpret them exists, the EPA
may not do so when such an interpretation contravenes the will of
Congress. Because the informal correspondence lacked analysis and
contravened the intent of Congress, it failed to exempt USFS from the
NPDES permit requirement.
The final issue the court addressed involved the EIS required for
spraying. The League challenged the EIS, claiming that it lacked
analysis of the potential environmental impact of pesticide drift. The
court agreed, finding that the EIS totally failed to address the issue of
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pesticide drift, and also failed to sufficiently analyze potential
mitigation measures.
JaredEllis

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
McAbee v. City of Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the limitation on actions provision of the Clean Water Act may
preclude a citizen suit only if the state laws under which the state is
bringing or has brought the enforcement action contain public
participation provisions that are roughly comparable to the analogous
Clean Water Act provisions).
Kim McAbee commenced a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act
("CWA") against the City of Fort Payne, Alabama ("City") for violation
of their state issued National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
Permit ("NPDES"). The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama denied the City's motion for summary judgment,
holding that the public participation provisions of the Alabama
Environmental Management Act and the Alabama Water Pollution
Control Act were not comparable to the CWA provisions, and did not
preclude McAbee from bringing a citizen suit. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of
the district court, holding the statutes were not comparable as a matter
of law.
McAbee alleged that the City violated its NPDES issued by the State
of Alabama. At the time McAbee filed suit, the City was already
operating under an enforcement order issued by the Alabama
Department of Environmental Management for a number of previous
permit violations. The final order provided for a monetary penalty to
be assessed against the City and ordered the City to provide notice of
the violations and penalties in the newspaper. The City's news article
stated the name of the plant and the penalties imposed, but did not
provide notice that citizens wishing to appeal the penalties and
findings stated in the enforcement order had only fifteen days to raise
such appeals.
The "Limitation on Actions" provision in the CWA precludes
citizens from bringing citizen suits for CWA violations provided the
state is diligently prosecuting an action or has issued a final order
under state law comparable to the analogous CWA provisions.
Therefore, the issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in
holding that the Alabama statutes were not comparable to the CWA
provisions. The court rejected the City's argument that the statutes
need only be comparable as a whole, and held that each provision in
the state law should be "roughly comparable" to the equivalent CWA
provision. Applying the test of rough comparability, the appellate
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court found that the state statutes regarding public participation in
enforcement actions were inadequate to warrant precluding a citizen
suit. The court reasoned that the ex post facto nature of the Alabama
notice provisions were not comparable because the analogous CWA
provisions provided notice to the public and the ability to present
evidence in hearings prior to issuance of the final order. The court of
appeals additionally held that fifteen days was an unreasonable time
for the public to make proper requests for a hearing to appeal the
decision on the final order. Consequently, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of
summary judgment and held that the public participation and notice
sections of the statute were not comparable with the analogous CWA
provisions. Thus, McAbee's citizen suit could proceed as a matter of
law.
Holly Shook

FEDERAL CLAIMS COURT
Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. C1. 570 (Fed. C1. 2002) (holding that
continual beneficial use of water for ranching established vested water
rights and that because plaintiff possessed rights-of-way to ditches
under the 1866 Ditch Rights-of-Way Act, he need not prove that the
ditches remained in the same beds).
E. Wayne Hage and the Estate of Jean N. Hage ("Hage") sued the
United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims seeking
damages for unconstitutional takings of: (1) vested water rights in the
Southern Monitor Valley; (2) vested water rights in the Ralston and
McKinney allotments; (3) ditch rights-of-way; (4) grazing permits; and
(5) a surface estate. The United States moved to dismiss. The court
deferred claims regarding takings and compensation, and focused
solely on whether Hage demonstrated a property interest, and the
scope of that interest. The court found that Hage possessed vested
water rights in both the Southern Monitor Valley and the Ralston and
McKinney allotments and rights-of-way to three ditches and therefore
denied the United States' motion to dismiss with regard to these
claims. The court found that Hage possessed no rights to grazing
permits or a surface estate and granted the motion to dismiss with
regard to these claims.
Hage owned the Pine Creek Ranch in Nevada, and filed suit
alleging takings in 1991 because the government revoked his grazing
permits; diverted the water on his grazing allotments; blocked access to
ditches; allowed other species to use the water reserved for his cattle;
impounded his cattle; deprived Hage of the economic use of the
ranch; and owed Hage for improvements made to the rangeland. In
1996, the court partially granted the United States' motion for
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summary judgment, but held that Hage retained the opportunity to
determine whether his claimed rights existed. Hage amended his
complaint to add a claim for a surface estate, which the court refused
to rule on until after conducting an evidentiary hearing. In 1998, the
court held a two-week trial and issued a preliminary opinion for
purposes of encouraging a settlement. The holding in this case
rescinded all of the preliminary opinion not explicitly reaffirmed in
this opinion.
The court first addressed jurisdiction, challenged by the state of
Nevada by a Writ Petition for Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition.
Nevada argued that the court should halt this proceeding because the
state began its adjudication process in September 1998, immediately
prior to the evidentiary hearing for the federal takings proceeding.
Nevada claimed that the in rem nature of the takings suit meant that
the court should halt its consideration of the rights issues and give
Nevada jurisdiction because the adjudication initiated in rem
proceedings at the state level first. The court found it possessed
jurisdiction because Hage sought monetary compensation for takings
by the government so the proceeding was not in rem and the court
could determine validity of claims, even while the state adjudication of
the basins took place.
Next, the court addressed Hage's claims for vested water rights.
The court found that possession of a vested right requires acquisition
of a right from the government, diversion for a beneficial use, and
continuous use.
The court held that Hage proved continued
beneficial use of a water right appropriated by predecessors by the
preponderance of evidence presented, including testimony by the
state engineer, to nine creeks, ditches and springs in the Southern
Monitor Valley.
The court also held that Hage demonstrated continuous and
beneficial use of water rights appropriated by predecessors to several
bodies of water in the Ralston and McKinney allotments. In the
Ralston allotment, the court found that Hage possessed water rights to
eighteen channels, ditches and wells. In the McKinney allotment, the
court found Hage possessed vested water rights to four springs.
Hage also claimed to possess a property interest to several ditches
covered by the 1866 Ditch Rights-of-Way Act ("Act"). The United
States argued that only one of the ditches fell under the Act because
the others no longer followed their original ditch beds. The court
decided requiring Hage to prove that the ditches ran in the same beds
placed an unreasonable burden on him because flooding and other
natural forces changed the course of beds. Therefore, the court found
that Hage demonstrated rights-of-way to ten ditches under the Act.
The court found Hage failed to meet the necessary burden of proof
for six right-of-way claims to other pipelines and ditches.
The court agreed with the United States argument that a vested
right-of-way is potentially subject to reasonable regulation. However,
the court found that such regulation could not deny access to water
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rights without allowing Hage to divert water to another beneficial use,
therefore the court granted Hage the right to divert the water.
The court addressed the United States' argument that a United
States Forest Service ("USFS") manual determined the scope of rightof-way easements, and that a right-of-way of fifty feet exceeded the
necessary amount for reasonable maintenance. The court ruled that
the USFS manual lacked the force of law and constituted only
persuasive authority. In addition, the court found that the USFS
lacked the authority to adjudicate rights-of-way under the Act, since
that role was reserved for the judiciary. Finally, the court found that
legislative intent, and common sense, supported a fifty-foot right-ofway to allow access to the ditches for maintenance.
The court next addressed Hage's claim regarding the grazing
permit. The court held that the Taylor Grazing Act and several cases
hold that permits are only a license to use the land for grazing, not an
absolute right, and that the Secretary of the Interior may cancel or
modify permits. Therefore, Hage possessed no property interest in the
grazing permit, and no compensable right existed.
Finally, the court addressed Hage's claim to a 752,000-acre surface
estate for grazing originating under the Ordinance of May 20, 1785;
Kearney's Code and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo; the Act of 1866;
the Desert Lands Act of 1877 and the subsequent Acts of 1888 and
1890; the Creative Act of 1891; the Forest Service Organic
Administration Act; the Livestock Reservoir Siting Act; the Stock
Raising Homestead Act; the Taylor Grazing Act; and Nevada's Three
Mile Grazing Rule. The court found that legislative intent behind
these statutes did not support granting Hage a large surface estate
under these acts, and that at most Hage could go on the land to access
water in which he owned a vested right.
JaredEllis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
City of Olmstead Falls v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 233 F.
Supp. 2d 890 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (holding the sovereign immunity
waiver in the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision does not apply if
the citizen fails to provide notice prior to filing suit; the sovereign
immunity waiver in the federal facilities pollution control provision
does not apply when there is no allegation of a federal facility
engaging in polluting; the Administrative Procedure Act's sovereign
immunity waiver does not apply to discretionary actions; and the
mandamus statute does not apply to allegations of failure to perform
discretionary duties).
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The City of Olmstead Falls and a city resident ("Olmstead Falls")
alleged the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"),
the Department of the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), and
various other federal and state entities and officials violated the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") by failing to revoke a "dredge or fill" permit issued
to the nearby City of Cleveland for an airport construction project.
The Corps issued the permit to Cleveland following a waiver of
authority by the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency ("OEPA") to
act on the permit application. Olmstead Falls appealed the waiver to
the Ohio Environmental Review Appeals Commission, which ruled
that Ohio law did not permit such a waiver. Olmstead Falls requested
that the Corps and the EPA revoke the permit due to the invalidity of
Cleveland's application. The federal agencies refused. Olmstead Falls
brought suit in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio against the EPA, the Corps, and various other federal and state
entities and officials. The government agencies moved to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the argument that the
federal question statute, the federal mandamus statute, and the
Declaratory Judgment Act did not contain statutory waivers of
sovereign immunity, and the CWA and the Administrative Procedure
Act contained statutory waivers of immunity that were inapplicable to
this case. After considering the necessary facts and allegations, the
court granted the motion to dismiss.
The court first reviewed the waiver of immunity contained in the
citizen suit provision of the CWA. The court found that Olmstead
Falls failed to provide the EPA with the statutory sixty days notice of
intent to file suit regarding the disputed permit. This prevented the
waiver of sovereign immunity on the part of the Corps and the EPA
and therefore stripped the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The
court then reviewed the waiver of sovereign immunity stated in the
federal facilities pollution control provision and found that it provided
a waiver of immunity only with respect to actions in which the
government is the alleged polluter. Thus, the court held that there
was no waiver of immunity and that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the Corps and the EPA under the CWA provisions.
Next, the court reviewed the general waiver of immunity included
in the APA. The court found that the APA granted courts jurisdiction
to review the actions taken by an agency of the federal government
except when the action is discretionary by law. Accordingly, the court
examined Olmstead Falls' complaint to find if it challenged a
nondiscretionary act on the part of the Corps and the EPA. The court
found that Olmstead Falls' complaint did not challenge the issuing of
the permit to the City of Cleveland, but rather the Corps' and EPA's
failure to revoke the permit once they knew Cleveland's application to
be invalid. Because the court found that the agencies' decision not to
revoke the permit was discretionary, it held that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to review the action under the APA.
Finally, the court addressed the waiver of sovereign immunity
contained in the federal mandamus statute. It found that in order for
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the mandamus jurisdiction to lie, plaintiffs must show the defendant
violated a clear, nondiscretionary duty owed to plaintiffs. Because the
court evaluated the actions of the Corps and the EPA and concluded
that their failure to revoke the "dredge or fill" permit issued to the City
of Cleveland was discretionary, the court held that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over Olmstead Falls' mandamus claim against the
Corps and the EPA.
For the reasons set forth, the court found that there was no waiver
of sovereign immunity on the part of the Corps or the EPA and that
the court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Olmstead
Falls' claims against the government agencies.
Mark Shea

Swartz v. Beach, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (D. Wyo. 2002) (holding the
Eleventh Amendment disallows monetary damages against officials
acting in their official capacity; the right to seek redress via federal
statutory authority for a violation of independently existing
constitutional rights exists even if the same set of facts also give rise to
a cause of action for a violation of statutory rights; a regulation goes
"too far" if it deprives the individual of all economically beneficial use
of his or her property and it does not substantially advance state
interests; a regulatory taking may occur if state officials ignore their
statutory and regulatory obligations; a specific Fifth Amendment
takings cause of action subsumes a more general Fourteenth
Amendment takings cause of action; and notice of conduct potentially
in violation of the Constitution prevents the qualified immunity
defense).
Edward Swartz ("Swartz") owned and operated a 280-acre ranch in
Campbell County, Wyoming. Swartz filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Wyoming against Gary Beach and
Dennis Hemmer ("Officials") individually and in their official
capacities as Administrator and Director respectively of the Wyoming
Department of Environmental Quality, Water Quality Division
("WDEQ"). Swartz also named as a defendant Redstone Resources,
Inc. ("RRI"), a Colorado corporation, who operated a gas company
producing coal bed methane ("CBM") in the Powder River Basin of
Wyoming. Swartz's suit alleged the taking of private property without
just compensation or due process by the Officials' failure to perform
statutory and regulatory duties without due process. Furthermore,
Swartz sought to enjoin defendants from allowing discharge of
contaminated water in violation of his constitutional rights and federal
and state environmental laws.
The Officials and RRI filed
independent motions to dismiss the compliant. The court granted the
Officials' motion to dismiss to the extent the complaint sought
monetary damages against the Officials acting in their official capacity
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and to the extent the complaint sought to require the officials to
comply with Wyoming state law. The court denied the motion to
dismiss in all other aspects, and it denied RRI's motion to dismiss in its
entirety.
This suit arose when RRI's discharge water produced by coal bed
methane wells flowed though Swartz's ranch. As a result, the creek,
which Swartz used for irrigation of his hay meadows, had insufficient
flow to allow for irrigation during the summer months. Furthermore,
the discharge water caused permanent soil damage due to its elevated
salinity and sodium absorption ratios. Swartz claimed RRI and the
Officials deprived him of his adjudicated water rights in 2000 and
2001. RRI and the Officials each filed independent motions to dismiss
the claims.
The court denied RRI's motion to dismiss for three reasons. First,
the court found that Swartz pled sufficient facts to state a claim for a
violation of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Swartz brought his claim
under the CWA's citizen suit provision alleging an ongoing violation of
state-imposed "effluent standards or limitations." Secondly, the court
found because Swartz issued a "Notice of Citizen Suit Under the Clean
Water Act," the court maintained subject matter jurisdiction over
Swartz's CWA claims. Finally, the court held Swartz did not fail to join
necessary or indispensable parties because even though others
produced discharge water into the creek, those parties are not
indispensable.
The Officials argued several different elements in their motion to
dismiss. They first argued the court lacked both personal and subject
matter jurisdiction based on the Eleventh Amendment. A plaintiff
may obtain relief against a state under the ex parte Young doctrine,
which says a federal district court may retain jurisdiction over a suit
against a state official in his official capacity to prevent a continuing
violation of the law, notwithstanding a state's sovereign immunity. The
Eleventh Amendment permits suits seeking prospective relief if the
plaintiff files suit against the official rather than the sovereign state.
Swartz sought prospective injunctive relief preventing a continuing
violation of federal and state environmental laws, and therefore the
court retained jurisdiction. Swartz also sought punitive damages,
which may be prosecuted against a state officer in his individual
capacity for unconstitutional or wrongful conduct attributable to the
officer himself so long as the relief sought comes from the officer
personally. Therefore, the court granted the motion to dismiss to the
extent Swartz sought monetary damages against the Officials while
they acted in their official capacity. The court denied the motion for
lack of personal jurisdiction.
The Officials moved to dismiss, in the same motion, Swartz's claim
based on federal statutory authority because Swartz used it as a vehicle
to bring his private takings claims, which were based on alleged
violations of the CWA. The court denied the Officials' motion relying
on the National Sea Clammers doctrine, which does not restrict a
plaintiff's right to seek redress via federal statutory authority for the
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violation of independently existing constitutional rights even if the
same set of facts also give rise to a cause of action for a violation of
statutory rights.
The Officials also moved to dismiss the cause of action for the
taking of private property without just compensation. The court
denied the motion because Swartz alleged sufficient facts to state a
claim for a physical taking by the Officials. Similarly, Swartz alleged a
regulatory taking of his land. A government regulation can constitute
a taking if the regulation makes it commercially impracticable to
engage in the economic activity under construction or goes "too far."
A regulation goes "too far" if it deprives the individual of all
economically beneficial use of his or her property and it does not
substantially advance state interests. Here, Swartz did not allege that
the Officials deprived him of all economically beneficial uses of his
land. Therefore, the court conducted a fact specific inquiry. The
court found the Officials' inaction failed to advance a legitimate
government interest, and the Officials effectuated a regulatory taking
by ignoring their statutory and regulatory obligations despite Swartz's
requests that they take action.
In order for his takings claim to be ripe, Swartz had to prove the
state deprived him of his property and refused to compensate him for
the deprivation. The Officials argued that because Swartz did not
properly file the claim, Swartz did not request compensation from the
state thus making his claim not ripe. The court, however, held the
claims were ripe for review because the government entity charged
with implementing the regulations reached a final decision regarding
the application of the regulations on the property issue, because
Swartz sought compensation through state procedures for the
deprivation of his property and because Swartz made a sufficient
allegation of an actual and concrete injury.
The Officials claimed the more particular Fifth Amendment
takings cause of action subsumed the general Fourteenth Amendment
takings cause of action. The court agreed, citing a previous Tenth
Circuit Court holding, "because... the Fifth Amendment imposes very
specific obligations upon the government.., we are reluctant in the
context of a factual situation that falls squarely within that clause to
impose new and potentially inconsistent obligations upon the parties
under the substantive or procedural components of the Due Process
Clause." Therefore, the court denied the Fourteenth Amendment
takings cause of action.
Finally, as another effort in their motion to dismiss the claim, the
Officials claimed qualified immunity. However, the court held
because Swartz brought suit against the Officials in both their official
and individual capacities and Swartz adequately put the Officials on
notice based on his continued efforts to have the Officials enforce
their statutory and regulatory obligation, the Officials failed to meet
the requirements for qualified immunity.
In summation, the court denied RRI's motion to dismiss in its
entirety. With respect to the Officials' motion to dismiss, the court
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granted the motion to the extent the complaint sought monetary
damages against the Officials acting in their official capacity and to the
extent the complaint sought to require the Officials to comply with
Wyoming state law. The court denied the Officials' motion in all other
respects.
Staci A. McComb

Ozark Soc'y v. Melcher, 229 F. Supp. 2d 896 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (denying
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
holding that defendant's issuance of conditioned dam construction
permit was a final agency action; plaintiffs had standing to bring suit
against defendant; and plaintiffs' claims were ripe).
This case arose when several river advocacy groups ("Ozark
Society") sued the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps").
The Ozark Society claimed the Corps, in issuing a conditioned
construction permit for a dam on Arkansas' Bear Creek, failed to
follow certain procedural mandates. These mandates were found in
the Buffalo National River enabling legislation, the National
Environmental Policy Act, and the Federal Water Pollution and
Control Act. The Corps filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, alleging that: (1) no final agency action had
occurred; (2) the Ozark Society lacked standing to bring this suit; and
(3) Ozark Society's claims were not yet ripe. The District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas disagreed with each of the Corps'
allegations and denied the motion to dismiss.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), only final
agency actions are subject to judicial review. On August 3, 2001, the
Corps issued a permit to the Searcy County Regional Water District
("Searcy County") for construction of a dam on Bear Creek.
Generally, the issuance of such a permit is a final agency action.
However, the Corps conditioned the permit given to Searcy County,
requiring further action by the Corps, other federal agencies, and
Searcy County before construction could begin. The conditions had
not yet been met at the time of this suit. The Corps argued that a final
agency action would only occur upon fulfillment of these conditions,
as until then the permit could still be revoked for noncompliance.
However, the court held that it is issuance of a permit, not the meeting
of attached conditions, which comprises a final agency action. As the
Corps issued the permit, it had taken a judicially reviewable final
action.
The Corps also argued that the Ozark Society lacked standing
because it had not yet suffered an injury in fact, and because its
injuries were not redressable by the court. In support, the Corps
noted that the proposed dam might never be built. However, the
court stated that the procedural requirements ensured that any
proposed dam would not have an adverse effect, either on Bear Creek
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or further downstream. The Ozark Society frequently enjoyed the
waters downstream from the proposed dam site. Essentially, the
procedural requirements ensured that people in Ozark Society's
position were considered when dam construction was proposed. By
alleging the procedures were not followed, the Ozark Society alleged
an injury in fact-the Corps' failure to consider the impact of the dam
upon Ozark Society when it was approved. Furthermore, the court
found this injury redressable, noting that under the APA, courts have
the ability to set aside agency actions, findings, or conclusions. Thus,
the court held that the Ozark Society had standing to bring this suit.
The Corps also argued that the Ozark Society's claims were not yet
ripe, again because the dam might never be built. However, the court
pointed out that the cause of the Ozark Society's injuries was the
Corps' failure to follow proper procedure, not the (speculative)
construction of the dam itself. These injuries had already occurred,
thus suits based on these injuries were ripe for review.
The Corps had taken a final agency action. The Ozark Society had
standing to bring a suit for injuries arising from that action, and any
such claims were ripe for review. Accordingly, the court denied the
Corps' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
James Siegesmund
Knaust v. City of Kingston, 193 F. Supp 2d. 536 (N.D.N.Y. 2002)
(holding that lack of ownership rights to water in subterranean caves
without proof of actual or imminent injury to reasonable use rights is
insufficient to establish standing).
Mark and Barbara Knaust ("Knausts") sought injunctive relief
and compensatory damages against the City of Kingston ("City") in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York,
alleging Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment takings, as well as state law
causes of action, including New York State Environmental Quality
Review Act violations and common law nuisance. The Knausts claimed
that storm water originating on the adjacent City of Kingston-funded
Business Park contaminated water in subterranean caves beneath their
property, interfered with their reasonable use, and constituted a
taking. In an earlier decision, the New York State Supreme Court,
Ulster County held that the Knausts owned the caves and rights to use
the water, but not the water itself. The district court initially denied
the Knausts' motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the
Business Park's construction, because absent evidence that their
property suffered a physical invasion, they could not demonstrate
injury in fact sufficient to support standing. The United States Second
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the Knausts' appeal on this issue,
and on remand, the City contended that the Knausts failed to establish
standing, and that even if they could, the City nevertheless deserved
summary judgment. The Knausts' failure to show the Business Park
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management system's imminent threat to their reasonable use was
insufficient to establish standing, and the court dismissed their takings
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Based on this dismissal,
the court similarly dismissed the Knausts' state law claims without
prejudice, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
The Knausts' regulatory takings claim resulted from the Business
Park's alleged interference with their plans to construct a commercial
mushroom farm.
The Business Park's two-level storm water
management system discharged only benign, contaminant-free,
treated storm water not subject to EPA regulation. The district court
noted that the Knausts failed to produce any evidence of
contamination.
In fact, the Knausts admitted that they neither
collected runoff samples for laboratory analysis, nor did they detect
contamination in any water samples from the subterranean lakes.
Further, the Knausts did not offer proof that the water management
system failed to remove the contaminants it was designed to eliminate.
Despite lacking subject matter jurisdiction because collateral
estoppel precluded claims regarding the Knausts' ownership interest
in the subterranean caves and the waters therein, the court addressed
the merits of the takings claim. The court granted the City summary
judgment because the Knausts could not support a takings claim
against water they did not own, and because they produced no
evidence that the Business Park's alleged contamination sufficiently
threatened their reasonable use, causing "actual or imminent injury."
Ripeness problems mandated the takings claim dismissal, because the
Knausts never applied to the City for a zoning change permitting the
development.
Until that occurrence, the court was unable to
determine the zoning law's economic impact on the Knausts, and its
interference "with reasonable investment-backed expectations"crucial elements in takings analysis.
Robert Lykos
FD&P Enters., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 993500, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 497 (D.N.J. Jan. 15, 2003) (holding the
appropriate test forjurisdiction under the Clean Water Act was
whether there is a substantial nexus, beyond a mere hydrological
connection, between the property and a navigable body of water; and
jurisdiction over the filling of wetlands in order to build a commercial
facility to further interstate freight transportation was not violative of
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution because it was
an activity that would "substantially affect" interstate commerce).
FD&P Enterprises ("FD&P") provided freight transportation to the
New York-New Jersey metropolitan area. FD&P owned 100 acres of
wetlands in Jersey City, New Jersey, the western perimeter bordering
Penhorn Creek, a non-navigable tributary of the Hackensack River, a
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navigable body of water utilized for interstate commerce.
On
December 18, 1992, FD&P applied to the United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") for a permit under the Clean Water Act ("CWA")
to fill 53.5 acres of its wetlands and build an intermodal facility.
On June 23, 1999, after seven years of failed negotiations, FD&P
brought this action against the Corps in the United States District
Court of New Jersey alleging the Corps lacked jurisdiction over the
wetlands on the FD&P Property; and if the Corps' had jurisdiction over
the FD&P wetlands, it would violate the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution.
On the first count, FD&P moved for summaryjudgment. The issue
presented was whether the Corps had jurisdiction under the CWA over
the wetlands on the FD&P Property that were adjacent to a nonnavigable tributary that fed into a navigable body of water. The CWA
granted the Corps authority to issue permits for the discharge of
material into "navigable waters of the United States."
Originally, the courts interpreted the statute broadly to permit
regulation of wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries that fed
navigable bodies of water. However, in 2001, the Supreme Court held
a significant nexus between the wetlands and the "navigable" waters
was necessary to determine jurisdiction under the CWA in Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs ("SWANCC').
Although the Court recognized the ponds at issue in SWANCC were
hydrologically connected to navigable waters, it declined to find a
sufficient nexus between the two isolated waters to allow the CWA's
regulation.
The SWANCC decision caused confusion about the scope of the
CWA and a split of authority represented by the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits. The Fifth Circuit interpreted SWANCC to permit the CWA to
regulate a body of water if it was actually navigable or adjacent to an
open, navigable body of water. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit
interpreted SWANCC only to apply to "isolated waters," and
maintained that non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters were
subject to jurisdiction under the CWA. After noting the CWA's
valuable purpose, the court concluded the appropriate test for the
CWA's jurisdiction in the instant case was whether there was a
substantial nexus, beyond a mere hydrological connection, between
the FD&P Property and the navigable waters of the Hackensack River.
The Corps argued FD&P's wetlands were sufficiently related to the
Hackensack River and the company's plan to fill the wetlands would
release greater levels of sediments and chemicals and damage the
river. FD&P contended their wetlands provided no environmental
benefit to the Hackensack River and denied the filling of the wetlands
would cause any damage to the river.
Because the evidence put forth by both parties generated a
genuine issue of material fact as to a substantial nexus between the
FD&P Property and the Hackensack River, and the effect the filling of
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the wetlands would have on the river, the court denied FD&P's motion
for summary judgment.
On the second count regarding the violation of the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution, the court stated that
Congress may regulate three categories of activity under its commerce
power: (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons and things in interstate commerce;
and (3) activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce.
Although FD&P asserted filling its wetlands would not "substantially
affect" interstate commerce, the court found FD&P's plan to fill their
wetlands to build a commercial facility to further interstate freight
transportation to suffice as "substantially affecting" interstate
commerce. Therefore, the court held the Corps' jurisdiction over the
FD&P Property would not violate the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution.
JessicaL. Grether
Bailey v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, Civ. No. 02-639, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23272 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2002) (holding that a
restoration order, after the denial of an after-the-fact permit for the
building of an access road which included dredging and filling
wetlands, does not give rise to pre-enforcementjudicial review until all
existing state procedures are exhausted).
Gary Bailey ("Bailey") sought judicial review in the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota of decisions made by the
United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), state agencies
("MPCA") and Lake of the Woods County ("County"), as well as
compensation for the alleged taking of property in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. The Corps, MPCA and the County brought
motions to dismiss and the court granted each.
Bailey owned a parcel of lakefront property in northern
Minnesota. The land included wetlands adjacent to navigable waters
and fell under the jurisdiction of the Corps pursuant to the Clean
Water Act ("CWA"). Bailey submitted a plat to the County for a
residential development and before the plat was approved, he began
building an access road across the land by dredging and filling
wetlands. He then applied for an "after-the-fact" permit for the project
from the Corps and submitted a wetland "replacement" plan because
the project would drain and fill the wetlands. The Corps rejected the
permit because the lots did not have sufficient areas of upland and the
land was insufficient for locating individual sewage treatment systems
that would comply with state regulations. The Corps directed Bailey to
remove the road and the Department of Natural Resources directed
Bailey to restore the wetlands to the lot. Bailey did not comply with
the order and the Corps did not seek enforcement of the order.
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Pursuant to the CWA, it is unlawful for any person to discharge a
pollutant into navigable waters unless that person has a permit.
"Pollutant" included the rock, sand and dirt Bailey used to construct
the road. The CWA authorizes the Corps to issue permits for the
discharge of dredged or fill materials into wetlands. Minnesota also
enacted the Wetland Conservation Act ("WCA") prohibiting draining
and filling of wetlands unless the person replaced the impacted
wetlands by restoring or creating other wetland areas. The WCA
required MCPA to approve any restoration proposal.
After several applications for a permit, proposals for wetland
replacement and subsequent modifications to the road, the Corps
approved the permit and MPCA approved the restoration project.
After completion, the Corps conducted an on-site wetland delineation
for the plat and found the impact of the road project much more
substantial than originally approved. MPCA revoked the certification
for the project and issued a restoration order directing Bailey to
remove the access road, fill in the ditches, and return the land to its
natural state.
The Corps moved to dismiss two of Bailey's claims. First, the Corps
argued that sovereign immunity precluded the court from deciding
Bailey's challenge to the restoration order. The court held preenforcementjudicial review was not available to Bailey for a restoration
order because review of the order before the Corps brought an action
to enforce the order would negate the discretion Congress gave the
agency to decide whether or not to bring an enforcement action.
Second, the Corps argued the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to consider Bailey's claim that the Corps violated Executive Order
12,630 because no private right of action exists to enforce that order.
The court agreed with this argument and dismissed Bailey's takings
claim because the Executive Order did not intend to create any right
at law by a private party against the United States.
MPCA moved to dismiss Bailey's claims seeking judicial review of
the revocation of certification of the road project and the restoration
order. MPCA moved to dismiss these claims, arguing immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment. Bailey argued MPCA waived its immunity
through its conduct of reliance on the Corps' decisions. The court
held Bailey failed to meet the stringent requirements necessary to
establish waiver and dismissed the claim. Bailey, in the alternative, also
claimed MPCA's actions caused a taking without just compensation.
MPCA moved to dismiss this claim on the grounds that Bailey failed to
pursue all available state condemnation remedies and found them to
be inadequate. The court agreed with MPCA and held the claim was
not ripe until Bailey failed to exhaust existing state procedures.
The County moved to dismiss Bailey's claim that he relied to his
detriment on statements made to him about the county's possession
and ownership of the access road. Bailey asserted the County was to
take control of the access road and take responsibility of the permit
applications. Bailey asserted harm due to his reliance because the
County failed to follow through on its application for a permit from
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the corps. The court dismissed this claim because claim preclusion
barred common law claims against the County regarding the access
road. The County also moved to dismiss Bailey's taking without just
compensation claim. The court reached the same conclusion as the
MPCA takings claim and decided the claim was not ripe for
adjudication.
Julie S. Hanson

Johnson v. Calpine Corp., No. 02-2242, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEX S 22580
(E.D. La. Nov. 20, 2002) (holding federal courts have original
jurisdiction over the Clean Water Act).
Jewel Junior Johnson and Ina Mae Carter Johnson ("Johnsons")
brought an action against the Calpine Corporation ("Calpine") under
the Federal Water Pollution Act, as amended by the Clean Water Act
of 1977 ("CWA"), in Louisiana state court. Calpine removed the
matter to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana based on federal question jurisdiction and diversity
jurisdiction. The Johnsons moved to remand the case back to state
court. The district court held that federal jurisdiction was proper and
denied the Johnsons' motion to remand.
The Johnsons objected to the removal on several grounds. First,
they stated removal was improper because the mere grant of
jurisdiction to a federal court does not preclude a state court from
concurrent jurisdiction.
Also, the Johnsons contended that for
removal to be proper a federal court must have exclusive jurisdiction.
In addition, they argued that a section of the CWA mandates claims to
be held in state court. Further, the Johnsons asserted that there was
no factual basis for federal question jurisdiction over their pond to
establish subject matter jurisdiction. Lastly, they claimed that their
state claims predominated.
The district court determined that Calpine could remove a civil
action filed in state court if the federal court has original jurisdiction.
Further, the district court found that the CWA expressly provides for
federal jurisdiction. While the Johnsons contended that a section of
the CWA mandated that such claims be held in state court, the district
court held that this section only preserves rights and remedies under
other available laws, but does not restrict federal court jurisdiction.
The district court did not express any opinion as to the Johnsons'
subject matter jurisdiction claim, and did not find sufficient support
for the Johnsons' claim that their state claims predominated. Thus,
the district court held that its federal jurisdiction was proper and
denied theJohnsons' motion to remand.
NatalieLucas
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STATE COURTS
ARKANSAS
Arkansas Soil & Water Conservation Conn'n v. City of Bentonville, 92
S.W.3d 47 (Ark. 2002) (holding the Water Commission acted within its
statutory authority in approving a city's water distribution project
because substantial evidence supported the Commission's approval
and the Commission did not materially alter the proposed projeft).
The City of Bentonville ("Bentonville") brought suit against the
Arkansas Soil and Water Conservation Commission ("ASWCC") in
Benton County Circuit Court in response to ASWCC's decision
approving the City of Centerton's ("Centerton") water distribution
project. The circuit court held that ASWCC exceeded its statutory
authority by permitting Centerton to provide water service to
customers within Bentonville's five-mile extraterritorial planning area.
On appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, ASWCC argued there was
substantial evidence supporting its decision. Bentonville maintained
that ASWCC modified Centerton's proposed project and thus based its
approval of the plan not only on incorrect procedure, but insufficient
evidence as well. The court reversed and remanded with directions to
reinstate ASWCC's decision and held that the Arkansas Water Plan
("Water Plan") provided sufficient authority for the approval and that
ASWCC showed it considered all relevant evidence.
Therefore,
ASWCC's decision was not arbitrary.
ASWCC contended that approving Centerton's project was within
its authority and was not arbitrary. Though Bentonville claimed
exclusive jurisdiction over the extraterritorial area outside its city limits
for providing utilities to residents therein, the Water Plan provides
ASWCC with the authority to approve any water development project,
denying municipalities the right to proceed with such projects until
they receive ASWCC approval through Water Plan compliance. This
approval did not deny Bentonville the power to provide water to its
own residents, but only permitted Centerton to provide water to
residents in its surrounding areas, which Bentonville had no plan to do
itself. ASWCC's approval was therefore within the Water Plan's
statutory authority.
Bentonville based its contention that ASWCC materially modified
Centerton's project by excluding certain areas, and by specifying that a
certain regional water system provide the water, on the assumption
that Bentonville would annex the disputed area. The court found this
scenario highly speculative, especially because the regional water
system's role was specified early in the planning process, as well as in
the adopted Preliminary Engineering Report ("PER"). As such, any
change was neither material, nor even apparent.
Bentonville's
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additional contention that ASWCC's decision was arbitrary because
substantial evidence did not support it was likewise unpersuasive
because the PER detailed the project's benefits, cost, feasibility, and
necessity. ASWCC also weighed all interested parties' testimony,
comments and evidence, including that from engineers and residents
confirming the existing water's low quality, and the need to implement
new-supply delivery in accord with the Water Plan despite some local
opposition.
Robert Lykos

CALIFORNIA
Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the Env't v. County of Los Angeles, 131
Cal. Rptr. 2d 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding an environmental
impact report must include adequate analysis of actual or projected
delivery capacity of its water suppliers in order to provide the public
and responsible officials information to make educated approval
decisions).
Newhall Land and Farming Company and Valencia Corporation
("Newhall") proposed West Creek, a commercial development, in the
Santa Clarita Valley of Los Angeles County. The proposal projected
West Creek's water demands could be satisfied largely by water
entitlements from the State Water Project ("SWP"). In view of such
entitlements, the County of Los Angeles ("County") approved the
project. Santa Clarity Organization for Planning the Environment and
the Friends of the Santa Clarita River ("SCOPE") petitioned the
Superior Court for the County of Santa Barbara to vacate the County's
approval. SCOPE argued the actual water available was different than
the water entitlements provided in West Creek's environmental impact
report ("EIR"). The Superior Court denied SCOPE's petition. SCOPE
appealed to the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate
District, Division Six. The appellate court found the water service
portion of West Creek's EIR insufficient and held the County erred in
approving the project.
On appeal, SCOPE claimed the EIR did not explain the actual
amount of water available for West Creek. It also claimed the SWP
could not deliver all promised water entitlements. Citing Dry Creek
Citizens Coalition v. County of Tulare, the court reiterated an EIR must
include adequate detail to allow others to "meaningfully" consider the
important issues of the project. Here, West Creek's EIR relied
primarily on SWP "entitlements" rather than "actual" water supplies.
According to the court, such water entitlements did not provide
meaningful detail regarding the project's water supply. Moreover, as
in Planning & Conservation League v. Department of Water Resources, the
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court found "there [was] a huge gap between what is [entitled] and
what can be delivered" because the SWP system was never completed.
Newhall's EIR also failed to include estimates from the
Department of Water Resources, the agency that oversees the SWP,
projecting how much water could be delivered during wet and dry
years. The court held that without projected or actual water supply
information the development's cumulative impact could not be
determined.
The court continued to analyze the sufficiency of Newhall's EIR. It
explained that under Clearly v. County of Stanislaus, an EIR should
include detailed analysis of potential problems and serious issues
raised by the public. Newhall's EIR, however, failed to respond
directly to project opponents' water supply concerns. It also failed to
undertake analysis of actual SWP water supplies and improperly relied
on information in the administrative record. Accordingly, the court
found Newhall failed to demonstrate a sufficient water supply existed
for West Creek.
In its defense, Newhall contended the County's approval of West
Creek was final, and therefore, the court could not review new
information or reopen the project's approval process. But the court
parched Newhall's argument and found the SWP's inability to deliver
water entitlements did not constitute new information. Accordingly,
the court reversed the trial court's decision.
J. Reid Bumgarner

Not About Water Conmm. v. Solano County Bd.of Supervisors, 116
Cal. Rptr. 2d 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that under the United
States Constitution and California statutory law, a water district may
assign varying weights to participants' ballots in a vote to assess fees to
fund construction of a water delivery system).
Not About Water Committee ("Committee Residents"), a
federation of aggrieved parties and residents, filed a mandamus
proceeding in the Superior Court of Solano County to challenge plans
of the Solano County Board of Supervisors ("Board") and the Rural
North Vacaville Water District ("District") to form an assessment
district which would levy fees to construct a water delivery system. The
trial court denied the petition. The Committee Residents appealed
the decision to the California Court of Appeal, First District, Division
Four. The California legislature had determined that courts would
decide such controversies in "validation proceedings" which limited
the appeal court's power to a determination of whether the
Committee Residents' real property would receive a special benefit,
proportional to the assessments levied, resulting from the formation of
the assessment district. The court held the Committee Residents
enjoyed such a benefit, and affirmed the ruling of the superior court.
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English Hills, which lay between Sacramento and Silicon Valley,
underwent a period of growth in which agricultural lands gradually
gave way to residential communities. County officials and certain
residents began to explore means of encouraging additional growth by
creating a modern water delivery system. The Board endorsed a water
district that excluded Committee Residents because they had water
wells on their property. According to an engineer's report, the
Committee Residents would have no obligation to pay for a water
delivery system, as they had no need for one. The county then held a
referendum in which the Committee Residents received no
opportunity to vote, as their property lay outside the proposed district.
The pro-water district forces won the referendum easily.
Over the course of the next two to three years, and after various
hearings and engineering studies, the Board voted to establish a
"benefit assessment district" to fund the construction of the water
delivery system. This vote gave varying weights to the participants'
ballots, depending on the financial obligations the assessment would
impose upon them. As a result, residents within the water district had
as much as eight times the voting power per vote as each committee
resident. The vote for the proposed benefit assessment district passed
with an overwhelming majority.
In their suit, Committee Residents alleged that the weighted voting
scheme denied them due process and amounted to a taking in
violation of the Constitution's Fifth Amendment. They further alleged
that the vote was a product of a "civil conspiracy" among members of
the Board, planning commission, water district, and certain residents.
In its defense, the county argued that Proposition 218, amending
article XIII of the California Constitution, required the use of a
weighted voting scheme.
The court determined that an assessment district is not a legal
entity, but rather a group of properties standing to benefit from
improvements made as a result of the assessment. Relying chiefly on
case law, the court further determined that an assessment is valid
unless it is not proportional to the benefits, or that no benefits could
accrue to the assessed properties. Finally, the court held that the
burden of proof as to the benefits derived from the assessment lay with
the agency seeking to levy it. Acknowledging that improvement
agencies receive great latitude under California law, the court
identified three benefits Committee Residents enjoyed which enabled
the Board to meet its burden of proof: (1) potential increases in
property values as a result of a reliable water supply for fire
suppression; (2) a potential reduction in fire insurance rates; and
(3) enhanced security from the ability to suppress fires.
Turning to the issue of the weighted voting scheme, the court
found that the United States Supreme Court has long recognized
exceptions to the constitutional principle of one person, one vote.
Specifically, units of government established to affect definable groups
of constituents more than others could apportion votes without
offending the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. The
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assessment district lacked the indicia of general governmental powers
and therefore qualified as the sort of special-purpose unit of
government exempt from the one person, one vote standard.
The court also considered whether the particular voting scheme in
question-which assigned more weight to those who would pay more if
the assessment proposal passed-violated constitutional requirements.
Relying on Supreme Court authority indicating that a rational basis
standard was appropriate under these circumstances, the court held
that it was rational to allocate weight based on potential financial
outlay. Having determined that the voting scheme in no way offended
the United States Constitution, the court observed that Proposition
218, now articles XIII(C) and XIII(D) of the California Constitution,
required the use of weighted voting schemes in all referenda on
proposed assessments.
Dealing finally with the issue of civil conspiracy, the court
sympathized with the Committee Residents' position, but pointed to a
total lack of evidence upon which the court could fashion a remedy.
Curtis Graves

Topsail Court Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Santa Cruz, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding a challenge to the legality
of land parcels is a challenge to the original parcel map approval, and
is therefore subject to the statute of limitations governing such
approval; and water treatment facilities are not exempt from city and
county zoning laws).
Topsail Court Homeowner's Association ("Topsail") represented
three homeowners of adjoining land parcels. Soquel Creek Water
District ("SCWD") owned the fourth parcel of land at issue and
planned to build a water treatment facility on the property. The
County of Santa Cruz ("County") was responsible for approving the
initial division of property into parcels. Topsail originally filed for a
writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Santa Cruz County to compel
the County to issue certificates of compliance for all four parcels of
land, and to compel SCWD to comply with all zoning laws with respect
to the water treatment facility it planned to build. The trial court
issued an alternative writ of mandate compelling the County to issue
conditional certificates of compliance for the land parcels, and
determined that SCWD's proposed water treatment facility was exempt
from zoning laws. The County appealed the trial court's writ of
mandate, asserting that the statute of limitations barred Topsail's
challenge to the legality of the parcels. Topsail cross-appealed,
challenging the trial court's judgment exempting SWCD's proposed
water treatment facility from zoning laws. The Court of Appeal of
California for the Sixth Appellate District concluded that Topsail's
original petition challenging the legality of the four parcels was also a
challenge to the County Surveyor's original parcel map approval, and
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therefore subject to the ninety-day statute of limitations governing
such approval. In addition, the court concluded that the trial court
erred in exempting SCWD's proposed water treatment facility from
zoning laws.
The court first determined whether Topsail's original petition,
which challenged only the County's 1999 parcel legality
determination, also represented a challenge to the County's 1992
parcel map approval. Topsail challenged the legality of the parcels
pursuant to a determination made by the County's Planning
Department in 1999 that the parcels were legal, despite the original
subdivider's failure to comply with conditions to the 1992 Minor Land
Division approval. The court concluded that any challenge to the
legality of the parcels represented a challenge to the erroneous 1992
approval, since that approval originally established the legality of the
parcels. The court then determined that a ninety-day statute of
limitations governed the 1992 approval pursuant to the relevant
government code. Thus, the trial court should have barred Topsail's
challenge.
The court then addressed whether SCWD's proposed water
treatment plant was subject to zoning laws. Specifically, the governing
statute exempts facilities that produce or generate water from zoning
laws. Finding minimal help in the plain meaning of the statute and
the legislative history behind the statute, the court resorted to the
general rules of construction that mandate courts to strictly construe
exceptions in statutes. The court determined that a strict construction
of the statute leads to the conclusion that the proposed water
treatment facility is subject to zoning laws; therefore, the trial court
erred in exempting SCWD's proposed facility from the zoning
ordinances.
The court directed the trial court to vacate its original order, and
to enter a new order denying Topsail's challenge to the legality of the
parcels and granting Topsail's petition to compel SCWD compliance
with zoning laws regarding its planned water treatment facility.
Kate Osborn
Vadnais v. Cambria Cmty. Servs. Dist., No. B 153607, 2003 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 1549 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2003) (denying property
owners' takings claim because receiving a water connection is not a
protected property interest).
Dean and Gloria Vadnais and Fred Keeler ("Vadnais") filed a
petition for a writ of mandate and complaint for damages against the
County of San Luis Obispo ("County") and the Cambria Community
Services District ("District") for denying their permit for a
condominium project. Vadnais also filed a cease and desist motion for
an alleged violation of the County's Local Coastal Program ("LCP").
The Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County sustained the
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demurrers to the petition and complaint without leave to amend and
denied the cease and desist motion. The Court of Appeal of
California, Second Appellate District, Division Six affirmed the
judgment of dism;ssal.
Vadnais owned an eleven-acre parcel of property in an
unincorporated area in the County and planned to develop part of the
land into twenty-five condominium units. Vadnais submitted a
condominium development plan that the Coastal Commission
Those opposing the project
("Commission") initially approved.
appealed to the Commission and the Commission then overturned its
decision because Vadnais was unable to obtain an intent-to-serve letter
from the District which provides sewer and water service. Though the
County placed Vadnais on its waiting list, the District refused to issue
intent-to-serve letters to projects on the County's list until the District
exhausted its own list.
The County's LCP limited the number of residential building
permits for the area and required the District to reserve thirty percent
of its water allocations for multi-family units. However, the County
only issued twenty percent of its building permits to multi-family
housing projects. Vadnais maintained that the County must issue the
full thirty percent to multi-family housing projects.
Vadnais first argued the trial court erred when it sustained the
County's demurrer to the causes of action for mandate and declaratory
relief because the County had a mandatory duty to comply with the
thirty percent figure of the LCP. The court found that the Coastal Act
did not require the County to issue any development permits and did
not create a mandatory duty on the County to provide permits. By
arguing the issue in the abstract, Vadnais did not show how the County
failed to comply with LCP. The Commission rejected the project
because of the lack of an intent-to-serve letter required under the LCP.
Therefore, the court found that the LCP demanded permit denial and
the County did not violate the LCP.
Vadnais next argued the trial court erred in sustaining the
District's demurrer without leave to amend. The court found the LCP
was not binding on the District and did not require the District to issue
an intent-to-serve letter and Vadnais failed to show that the District did
not comply with the LCP.
Finally, Vadnais contended that the County and District's actions
resulted in a taking of property without just compensation. The court
also found this contention to fail because the entire parcel owned by
Vadnais was not fully restricted. Vadnais could still receive an intentto-serve letter once the District fulfilled its waiting list. Vadnais did not
have a protected property interest in receiving a water connection,
thus, the court found no taking of the property.
Julie S. Hanson
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N. Kern Water Storage Dist. v. Kern Delta Water Dist., F033370, 2003
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1130 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2003) (holding
there is no uniform rule regarding the use or nonuse of water
applicable to all cases, and therefore the question of whether a holder
of water rights forfeited those rights is one of fact, based upon
measurements taken during a specific period of time and a
consideration of all other relevant factors disclosed by the evidence).
North Kern Water Storage District ("North Kern") filed an action
against Kern Delta Water District ("Kern Delta") in the Superior Court
of Tulare County. North Kern alleged that Kern Delta forfeited a
portion of its rights to Kern River water, and that those rights passed to
North Kern. Kern Delta filed a cross-complaint seeking a declaration
that it lost none of its rights to Kern River water. In its crosscomplaint, Kern Delta named North Kern and the City of Bakersfield
("Bakersfield") as cross-defendants. Bakersfield filed a cross-complaint
seeking a determination that North Kern and Kern Delta both
forfeited a portion of their Kern River water rights.
After a bench trial, the court held Kern Delta forfeited a
substantial portion of its historical Kern River water rights by nonuse.
It also held that the forfeited water reverted to unappropriated status,
and was therefore subject to jurisdiction of the State Water Resources
Control Board ("SWRCB"). It rejected all other claims, and the parties
both appealed to the Court of Appeal of California, Fifth Appellate
District. In its appeal, North Kern argued the trial court erred in
holding the water Kern Delta forfeited reverted to unappropriated
status, while Kern Delta argued the trial court erred in holding Kern
Delta forfeited its water rights by nonuse.
The Kern River is a natural waterway originating in the Sierra
Nevada mountain range and draining into the San Joaquin Valley a
few miles northeast of Bakersfield. Since the early 1860s, a series of
canals diverted Kern River water for agricultural use. Current Kern
River water rights date back to the 1860s. Kern Island Irrigation and
Canal Company ("Kern Island") filed a notice of appropriation in
1870. Under the Miller-Haggin Agreement ("MHA"), Kern Island had
a first priority right to three hundred cubic feet per second ("cfs") of
Kern River water daily. The remaining water rights holders could
apportion Kern River water only after Kern Island satisfied its needs. A
few years after MHA execution, insufficient availability of Kern River
water caused a dispute among upstream users ("First Point Users"),
who sought an injunction against Kern Island's diversions. In the
ensuing litigation in 1901, Judge Lucien Shaw issued a decree ("Shaw
Decree") that "reaffirmed the MHA, set a maximum flow available for
diversion an appropriation by each First Point User, and established an
order of priority for diversions among them, including Kern Island."
In addition to listing the specific quantity of water entitled to each
right holder, the Shaw Decree awarded Kern Island an additional fiftysix cfs.
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Subsequently,
Kern
Delta
administered
Kern
Island's
appropriations. Per the MHA and the Shaw Decree, Kern Delta, which
held Kern Island's entitlement, had a first priority right to Kern River
water. The amount of Kern River water available to all other water
rights holders depended on Kern Delta's usage.
In 1964, the SWRCB declared the waters of the Kern River fully
appropriated. Therefore, the SWRCB refused to consider applications
for appropriative rights to Kern River waters, unless a study showing
available unappropriated waters accompanied the application.
Anticipating the trial court would revert water forfeited by Kern Delta
to unappropriated status, the parties petitioned the SWRCB "for the
appropriation of any such forfeited water." The SWRCB postponed
ruling on these petitions until completion of litigation.
Kern Delta appealed the trial court's finding that it forfeited its
appropriative rights. The appellate court held that use of water
determined water rights. No one could hold water rights in perpetuity
without putting the water to beneficial use. The appellate court found
no language in either the MHA or the Shaw Decree that made Kern
Delta's right to three hundred cfs daily inviolate, thereby precluding
claims by North Kern and Bakersfield. Even if such language existed,
it would violate public policy, as water is too precious a commodity to
waste, and effectively voided both the MHA and the Shaw Decree.
Kern Delta argued the trial court incorrectly rejected its laches
defense; specifically that North Kern and Bakersfield filed their
forfeiture actions after unreasonably waiting "more than one hundred
years after Kern Delta commenced" releasing surplus Kern River water.
The appellate court held that North Kern and Bakersfield did not have
claims prior to 1976, as water use by junior appropriators was
permissive and contingent upon surplus released by Kern Delta. Kern
Delta's water usage did not threaten North Kern or Bakersfield "until
1976, at the earliest, when Kern Delta sought to increase its own use
beyond historical amounts." Thus, the court found that North Kern's
and Bakersfield's claims originated approximately thirty years prior to
litigation.
Kern Delta also argued that releasing its own unused water to
junior appropriators constituted a beneficial use that precluded
forfeiture. With respect to this claim, the appellate court held that the
terms of the MHA and the Shaw Decree merely acknowledged the
practice of releasing water as customary among the parties. The
custom itself did not establish independent rights or duties.
Furthermore, because the doctrine of beneficial use required the
release of excess water to junior appropriators, Kern River water users
retained only enough water to meet their own needs, and no more. As
such, Kern Delta's practice of releasing its own unused water was
required pursuant to the beneficial use doctrine, and therefore was
not a "beneficial use."
The appellate court disagreed with the trial court in two respects.
First, the trial court failed to consider the statutorily imposed five-year
period for measuring statutory forfeiture. The appellate court held
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that due process required the trial court to identify a specific five-year
period over which to measure whether forfeiture actually occurred.
Second, the appellate court held that the trial court incorrectly
premised its holding upon Kern Delta's use of water rather than its
nonuse. Because water rights were contingent upon beneficial usage
of the water, an assessment of nonuse rather than use should
determine forfeiture. The appellate court held that the measurement
needed to include the quantity of water not used over the statutorily
imposed period of time because both time and quantity help govern
the "law of the river." The appellate court declared that because
measuring water usage for irrigation purposes "involves factors not
subject to precise human control," there was not a uniform rule with
respect to use or nonuse applicable to all cases. The facts of the
individual case determine whether a water right holder forfeited those
rights through nonuse.
As such, the appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial
court, and remanded for retrial the issue of whether Kern Delta
forfeited any of its MHA entitlement by nonuse, based upon a
measurement taken over a specific time period imposed by statute.
The appellate court also remanded for retrial the parties' other issues
not specifically resolved on appeal, waived, or abandoned.
Kyle K Chang

Long v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., No. E030817, 2002 Cal.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 11584 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2002) (holding
violating the terms of a United States Forest Service special use permit
is "unlawful" conduct under California's unfair competition law; and
taxpayer suits against state officials under Civil Procedure Code section
526(a) are not permissible means of compelling discretionary actions
of the State Water Resources Control Board).
Under a United States Forest Service special use permit, Great
Spring Waters of America, Inc. ("Great Spring") extracted water from
within the San Bernardino National Forest for public sale. In February
2000, Russell Long ("Long") filed suit in the Superior Court of San
Bernardino County, alleging Great Spring violated California's unfair
competition law (Section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code).
Long also sued the State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB"),
claiming it breached its duty to prevent waste or unreasonable use of
water by allowing Great Spring's extraction. The trial court sustained,
without leave to amend, Great Spring's and the SWRCB's demurrers to
all of Long's seven claims for relief. Long appealed to the California
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Two, seeking to overturn
demurrers to one claim for relief against Great Spring and two claims
against the SWCRB.
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On appeal, the court first considered Long's unfair competition
claim. Long alleged Great Spring engaged in unfair business practices
by extracting water under a special use permit not conferring that
right; extracting water without paying fees; violating the conditions of
its special use permit; not securing water rights under the Water Code;
and gaining an unfair competitive advantage by selling water at the
expense of resources held in public trust. The court found the only
allegation stating a valid unfair competition action was the claim that
Great Spring violated the terms of its special use permit. The taking of
the water itself, and the effect of this violation, excessive water
extraction or resource depletion, was not actionable under this statute.
Specifically, Long claimed Great Spring illegally increased its
extraction capacity by laying pipe, excavating trenches, and developing
wells greatly exceeding the dimensions specified in its permit. To
support a valid unfair competition claim, one must show a defendant's
business practices were "unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent."
In its
analysis, the court relied on Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., where that
court ruled noncompliance with the terms of a county conditional use
permit was "unlawful" under the unfair competition law. The court
noted that the Forest Service issues special use permits pursuant to
federal law, and that violating the terms of a permit, or conducting
activities requiring a permit without obtaining one, are federal
criminal offenses. Hence, it reasoned violating the terms of a special
use permit is "unlawful" within the meaning of the unfair competition
law. As Long only needed to state one possible cause of action, the
court reversed the dismissal of his unfair competition claim.
Although finding Long's remaining allegations insufficient to
support an unfair competition action, fearing confusion at remand,
the court addressed each to clarify the scope of the permissible claim.
The allegation that Great Spring's special use permit did not grant a
right to extract water did not establish the extraction was "unlawful,
unfair, or fraudulent." Because state law governs the appropriation of
water on federal lands, and Long did not allege any facts indicating
Great Spring's appropriation was contrary to state law, the court found
this allegation insufficient to show the extraction was "unlawful."
Under this statue, conduct is "unfair" if a victim's suffered harm
outweighs the conduct's utility. Long did not show this extraction was
"unfair" because he did not allege Great Spring's actions harmed
anyone. Additionally, while claiming Great Spring's actions were
misleading, Long did not demonstrate these actions were likely to
deceive the public, as required to find "fraudulent" conduct under this
statute.
The allegation that Great Spring did not pay an extraction fee also
failed to support an unfair competition claim. No state or federal
authority requires a water appropriator to pay a fee, or permits the
state to charge a fee, for appropriating water from public land.
Similarly, Long's allegation that Great Spring failed to secure its rights
under the Water Code was also deficient. The Water Code requires a
permit for appropriations of surface water, or subterranean streams
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flowing in defined channels, initiated after 1914. As Long did not
specify when Great Spring initiated the appropriation, he did not
demonstrate the necessity of a permit.
In the court's view, Long improperly invoked the public trust
doctrine as a basis for his unfair competition claim. The public trust
doctrine protects specific public interests in navigable waters and
nonnavigable waters (to the extent any diversion affects navigable
waters).
However, Long never alleged Great Spring's extraction
affected navigable waters or any interest protected by the public trust
doctrine.
Long also claimed Great Spring's extraction of water held in the
public trust violated the California Constitution's reasonable use
doctrine, which mandates the prevention of waste and unreasonable
use of water. Under the doctrine, a use is considered unreasonable if
it injures a competing use. Despite claiming Great Spring's extraction
depleted a scarce public resource, Long's claim was deficient because
he did not allege that the use harmed competing users.
Last, the court addressed Long's claims the SWRCB breached it
duties by allowing Great Spring's unreasonable use of water, thereby
wasting taxpayer funds. Long sought a court order declaring the
SWRCB's actions unlawful and directing it to enjoin Great Spring,
conduct an investigation, and make conclusions of facts and law. He
also sought the return of any funds due to the SWRCB for the use of
the water. Long based these claims on Civil Procedure Code section
526(a), which permits taxpayer suits against state officials to prevent
waste or illegal use of state funds or property. However, these taxpayer
suits may not be employed to compel discretionary agency action.
Relying on the plain language of the Water Code, the court concluded
Long was seeking to order the SWRCB to undertake discretionary
action. For this reason, Long's taxpayer suit did not state permissible
claims against the SWRCB. Thus, the court upheld the dismissal of
Long's claims against the SWRCB.
Arthur R. Kleven

COLORADO
Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214 (Colo. 2003) (certifying that
continued migration and ongoing presence of toxic pollution on a
landowner's property constituted a continuing trespass and nuisance
for as long as the pollution existed without removal or abatement by
the egregious party, even if the condition causing the pollution has
ceased).
Robert Hoery brought suit against the United States in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado under the Federal
Torts Claim Act for continued trespass and nuisance caused by release

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

of trichlorethylene ("TCE") and other toxic chemicals from the Lowry
Air Force Base into the ground which caused contamination of his
nearby property. While the United States ceased all use of TCE at
Lowry in 1994, TCE still remained on Hoery's property and continued
to enter his land and groundwater daily. The court dismissed the case
because the release of TCE ended in 1994, and determined the
nuisance and trespass on Hoery's land was limited to the actual release
of TCE and was, therefore, not continuous. Hoery appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Because of
lacking controlling precedent, the Tenth Circuit certified to the
Colorado Supreme Court the question of whether the continued
migration and ongoing presence of toxic chemicals on Hoery's
property caused by releases made by the United States constituted a
continuing trespass and nuisance under Colorado law. The court held
that continuous migration and presence of toxic chemicals on Hoery's
land, due to the United States' failure to abate or remove the
chemicals, constituted a continuous trespass and nuisance under
Colorado law.
In 1993 Hoery acquired a residence served by a groundwater well
in a Denver neighborhood. Hoery's well was located seven blocks
north of Lowry Air Force Base. The United States operated Lowry as
an active military base beginning in the 1940s and ceased operations in
September 1994. During its operation, the United States dumped
TCE and other chemicals at Lowry. These releases created plumes of
toxic pollution extending many miles north of Lowry. In 1997, testing
conducted by the United States showed that TCE contaminated
Hoery's well.
The Colorado Supreme Court first determined that the harm
caused by the release of TCE by the United States constituted a
continuous tort rather than a permanent tort under Colorado law.
The importance of making this distinction related to when the statute
of limitation began to run-a permanent tort claim accrues at the time
the harm took place, conversely, a continuous tort claim only accrues
once the harmful condition is removed. The court found that
Colorado law recognizes continuing trespass and nuisance for
invasions of property where the egregious party fails to stop or remove
a wrongfully placed invasion on the property. The only exception to
this rule applies to irrigation ditches or a railway line, classified as
permanent torts.
The court determined that the contamination constituted a
continuing trespass and nuisance even though the condition causing
the contamination had ceased. Because this was an issue of first
impression, the court applied the reasoning from the Ninth Circuit
case, Arcade Water Dist. v. United States, which stated that the most
important factor to consider is presence of continued contamination
on the property, not whether the contamination source ceased to
pollute. TCE remained on Hoery's property regardless of the fact that
the use of TCE ceased. Therefore, because the United States failed to
remove the TCE, a continuous invasion remained. In addition, the
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court reasoned that the TCE continued to migrate onto Hoery's
property, and the failure to prevent the pollution plume also
constituted a continuing property invasion.
So long as these
continuing property invasions remained, the court stated that it was
immaterial whether the United States continued to release TCE. The
court thus affirmatively certified that migration and ongoing presence
of toxic chemicals, regardless of whether the pollution has ceased,
constitutes a continuing trespass or nuisance under Colorado law.
Karen L. Golan

CONNECTICUT
Agnello v. Urbano, No. CV000273689S, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS
3421 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 2002) (holding that abutters cannot
divert surface water onto the adjacent landowner's property; that
abutters cannot interfere with an express, implied, or prescriptive
easement; and that interference with an easement reasonably
necessary for the use and normal enjoyment of property is trespass).
Joseph and Sharon Agnello filed a six-count complaint against
Armando and Maria Urbano, the adjacent property owner, in the
Superior Court of Connecticut at New Haven.
The complaint
addressed three main issues: (1) whether Urbano diverted surface
water onto Agnello's property; (2) which owner possessed title to a
triangular area of land; and (3) Agnello's easement rights. Urbano
filed a counterclaim, which sought to quiet title and alleged Agnello
trespassed on his property. The court found in favor of Agnello on all
counts.
Agnello and Urbano owned adjacent properties. A twenty-five foot
right-of-way provided access to Agnello's property. In 1999, Urbano
removed a split rail fence located on the adjacent property and
constructed a new fence. In addition, Urbano placed materials in the
right-of-way, which deprived Agnello of access and constructed a
cinder block wall in order to divert surface water onto Agnello's land.
Agnello requested and received a temporary restraining order before
trial. The order prevented Urbano from diverting the water onto
Agnello's land and from interfering with the right-of-way access.
Urbano violated the order by building various barriers and limiting the
right-of-way.
First, the court addressed whether Urbano wrongfully diverted
surface water. The court applied the test formulated in Tide Water Oil
Sales Corp. v. Shimelman, which states, "the landowner, in dealing with
surface water, is entitled to take only such steps as are reasonable."
Accordingly, the court held Urbano improved his land and caused the
water to impermissibly flow on to Agnello's land. The court further
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found Urbano used the surface water unreasonably, because the water
could have been diverted without adversely impacting Agnello.
Second, the court discussed the quiet title claim. The court found
Agnello's expert witness offered more credible evidence than
Urbano's expert witness. Therefore, the court held in favor of Agnello
on the quiet title claim. Additionally, Agnello claimed Urbano
trespassed on her land. The court concluded Urbano had trespassed,
finding Agnello owned the property, Urbano intruded on the land by
intentionally placing materials on the property, and the intrusion
caused direct injury to Agnello. The court refused to award damages
on the trespass claim.
Finally, Agnello claimed easement title based on an easement
conveyed by deed, easement by implication, and easement by
prescription. Agnello produced her property deed, which specifically
mentioned an easement right. The court found Agnello presented
adequate evidence to prove an express easement for "ingress and
egress" purposes. Next, the court stated the factors for easement by
implication-"the intention of the parties and whether the easement is
reasonably necessary for the use and normal enjoyment of the
Moreover, Agnello established easement by
dominant estate."
prescription by proving adverse possession. Agnello proved the open
visibility of the easement, the uninterrupted use of the easement for
fifteen years, and thus possessed a claim of right.
In conclusion, the court ruled in favor of Agnello and ordered
Urbano to install a drainage system to divert surface water into the
public storm drain system and to cease interference with the easement.
Susan Curtis

ILLINOIS
Nottolini v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 782 N.E.2d 980 (IM.App. Ct. 2003)
(holding that a water-filled quarry is not of natural origin, and
therefore is not a lake).
In 1999, Alecia, Cheryl, and Rick Nottolini ("Nottolinis") filed a
complaint in the Circuit Court of Kane County for a declaration of
their rights to make reasonable use and enjoyment of the surface
The
waters of an abandoned, water-filled quarry ("Quarry").
Nottolinis also requested a permanent injunction to bar the Quarry
owner, William Dwyer ("Dwyer"), from maintaining any fences and
barriers around the Quarry that would restrict their access to it. Dwyer
counterclaimed for a declaration of his exclusive rights to the Quarry.
The court held for the Nottolinis, and denied Dwyer's counterclaim.
Dwyer appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District,
claiming that the circuit court was mistaken in defining the Quarry as a
lake. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case back to the
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circuit court, with instructions to enter ajudgment in favor of Dwyer's
counterclaim, awarding Dwyer exclusive rights to the Quarry.
In 1925, LaSalle National Bank acquired title to the abandoned,
water-filled limestone Quarry in South Elgin, Illinois. Dwyer is the sole
beneficiary of the trust that includes title to the Quarry. Until a 1997
drowning, Dwyer permitted adjacent landowners to use the Quarry for
swimming.
Following the drowning, Dwyer prohibited further
recreational use of the Quarry, and requested that adjacent
landowners erect fences around the Quarry to prevent unauthorized
access. Dwyer also erected his own fences where adjacent landowners
had not.
In Illinois, if a body of water rises onto a landowner's property
enough to denude it of vegetation, that portion of land is considered
part of the lakebed. If a landowner owns a portion of a lakebed, the
landowner is given the right to make reasonable use and enjoyment of
the surface waters of the entire lake. The circuit court held that the
Quarry constituted a lake, and because a portion of it rested on the
Nottolinis' property, denuding it of vegetation, the Nottolinis were
entitled to a right of reasonable use and enjoyment of the entire
surface of the Quarry.
Prior to this case, no court in Illinois had addressed the question of
whether a water-filled Quarry could be defined as a lake, nor had any
Illinois court ever defined the term "lake." The appellate court
examined the definitions of "lake" utilized by other jurisdictions, and
adopted the definition of a lake as a reasonably permanent body of
water at rest in a depression of the earth, if both depression and body
of water are of natural origin.
The appellate court then applied this definition to the facts of the
case. The Quarry was a man-made body of water, and was therefore
not of natural origin. The court could not define the Quarry as a lake,
and as a result, the Nottolinis' ownership of a portion of its bed did
not provide them with any right to use the entirety of the Quarry's
surface water.
Steven j Rypma
MASSACHUSETTS
Greater Lawrence Sanitary Dist. v. Town of N. Andover, 785 N.E.2d
337 (Mass. 2003) (holding the doctrines of preemption and essential
government function do not prohibit a municipality from regulating
an inter-municipal sanitation district to the extent the regulations do
not interfere with the sanitation district's essential functions or the
state regulatory regime).
The Greater Lawrence Sanitation District ("GLSD") sued the Town
of North Andover, its Board of health and its Board of selectmen
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("Town") in the Essex Superior Court for an injunction to prevent the
Town from exerting control over or interfering with GLSD, and for
the return of $200,000 GLSD paid the Town for a building permit. At
trial both parties filed motions for summaryjudgment. The trial court
granted GLSD's motion, broadly ruling the Town had no authority to
impose conditions on the facilities' development. The trial court
reasoned "GLSD is a legislatively created body performing an essential
government function and therefore is immune from municipal
regulation."
The trial court also reasoned the Massachusetts
Department of Environmental Protection ("Department") had plenary
authority to regulate the facilities, preempting municipal regulation.
The trial court further ordered the Town to grant a new building
permit without conditions or charge, and ruled all other issues
regarding the permit moot. Both parties appealed and the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted application for direct
appellate review.
In 1997, the Massachusetts Legislature authorized GLSD to build
an "on site biosolids processing Facility" and to contract for the
"disposal and beneficial use of sludge related thereto." By 1998, GLSD
had a plan for such a facility ("Facility I") and also for a facility to turn
waste sludge into commercially viable fertilizer pellets ("Facility II").
GLSD sought and gained approval from the Department, the Town's
conservation commission and the FAA (this was necessary because of a
smokestack at Facility II) for both facilities.
The Town requested, and GLSD paid, a $200,000 building permit
application fee during planning and development of the facilities. In
March of 2000, the parties executed a memorandum of understanding
("Initial MOU") to alleviate disagreements over the Town's authority
to regulate the facilities' development. The Initial MOU recognized
the disagreements but provided process for the Town's Board of
health ("Board") to review environmental, health and safety impacts of
the development. On June 18, 2000, the Town issued building permits
for both facilities, but stated in the permits that the Board might still
disapprove of or impose conditions on the facilities' development.
The next day, the Board approved Facility I but not Facility II. GLSD
commenced this action in July 2000. In September, the Board
rescinded its disapproval of Facility II and in November issued a final
memorandum of understanding ("Final MOU") imposing numerous
conditions on Facility II.
The court began its analysis with the Town's authority to impose
conditions on the facilities' development. The court recognized that,
absent a statutory "municipal veto," the doctrine of essential
government function proscribes municipalities from interfering with
the legislatively mandated purpose of legislatively created agencies or
entities. The court further recognized the trial court's ruling that
GLSD was such an agency performing an essential government
function. The court noted this did not grant GLSD immunity from all
municipal regulation.
Rather, GLSD "remains subject to
regulations ...that do not interfere with its ability to fulfill its essential
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governmental purposes and have only a negligible effect on its
operations." The court ruled that whether the conditions the Town
imposed passed this test was a factual issue to be resolved on remand.
The court then turned to whether the Department's regulatory
authority preempted the Town from imposing conditions on water
and air quality. The Department has broad authority to regulate water
and air quality, particularly that of the facilities. The court concluded
the Department's regulatory authority did not preempt but restricted
municipal regulation. Specifically, the Town may impose conditions
consistent with the Department's regulations. The court held the
question of whether the conditions were inconsistent with the
Department's regulations was a factual issue to be resolved on remand.
The court then addressed the Town's claim that it had statutory
authority to issue the conditions. The court noted the Town issued
the conditions as part of the Final MOU based on contractual
authority from the Initial MOU. The court further noted that the
Town relied on this contractual authority at trial and held the record
was incomplete to resolve the question of whether the Town had such
statutory authority. The court held this question to be an issue for
resolution upon remand.
The court finally turned to the issue of the building permit fee.
GLSD claimed that because the trial court found the Department
preempted the Town from regulating GLSD, the Town should refund
the full $200,000 fee. The court noted the premise of GLSD's claimpreemption-was incorrect. The court further noted state statutes
specifically charged the local building inspector with enforcement of
the state building code as to any "building or structure within the city
or Town... including any building or structure owned by any
authority established by the legislature but not owned by the
Commonwealth." The court noted GLSD was such an authority, that
nothing in its enabling statute or the building code exempted GLSD
from local inspection, and that local inspection did not interfere with
GLSD's essential government function. The court held, therefore,
that GLSD must "obtain a building permit, in compliance with the
State Building Code, as enforced by the local inspector." The court
held the issue of the Town's contractual obligation to refund the fee
under the initial MOU was an issue for resolution on remand.
James Parrot

MICHIGAN
Eberhard Lake Ass'n v. Walters, No. 234586, 2002 Mich. App. LEXIS
2256 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2002) (holding that to survive a motion
for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must present
evidence that the riparian owner's use of water is unreasonable).
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Eberhard Lake Association and multiple riparian property owners
("Landowners") whose property abutted Lake Eberhard ("Lake") sued
Walters, another riparian owner, in St. Joseph Circuit Court seeking
injunctive relief to prevent Walters from using the Lake to irrigate
non-riparian farmland. Walters owned riparian property abutting the
Lake, and used the Lake to irrigate crops on his riparian farmland and
his non-riparian farmland. The Landowners alleged that Walters' use
of the Lake to irrigate his non-riparian farmland was unreasonable.
The Landowners further alleged that Walters' unreasonable use of the
water caused the lake to drop below its "normal" level as established by
the St. Joseph Circuit Court in a separate proceeding, and as a result,
the Landowners were unable to use the Lake for "recreational
purposes such as boating, swimming, and fishing."
Walters filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he had
established a prescriptive right to use the Lake for all his irrigation,
and such right precluded a lawsuit alleging unreasonable use. The
trial court granted the motion on two bases: (1) Walters had
established a prescriptive right which precluded the Landowners' suit;
and (2) the Landowners had not introduced enough evidence to
create a genuine issue of material fact supporting their claim of
unreasonable use. The Landowners appealed the summary judgment
on both the prescriptive rights basis as well as the issue of material fact
basis. The Michigan Third District Court of Appeals reviewed the trial
court's decision de novo.
The court recognized that multiple riparian owners on an inland
lake have a duty to use the waters in such a way so as to not interfere
with the reasonable use of the waters by the other riparian owners.
However, the court agreed with the trial court that the Landowners
failed to present evidence beyond their pleadings that a material issue
of fact existed as to whether Walters' use of the Lake was reasonable.
The court noted that a party could not survive a motion for summary
judgment based on mere pleadings.
The court further agreed with the trial court that Walters had
established a prescriptive easement to use the Lake for irrigation
purposes by "open, notorious, adverse, and continuous" use for more
than twenty years, where the statutory period for adverse possession
was only fifteen years. The court disagreed with the Landowners that
Walters' seed corn contract provided enough evidence to create a
genuine issue of material fact supporting the Landowners' assertion
that Walters had increased his use beyond his prescriptive easement.
Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment.
James Parrot
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MINNESOTA
O'Brien v. Card, No. C3-02-860, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 282 (Minn.
Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2003) (holding permission to use riparian rights on a
lake may defeat a claim of trespass since the riparian rights allow access
to other properties on the lake).
Thomas O'Brien ("O'Brien") brought an action in the Le Sueur
County District Court against Larry Card, Thomas Card, and James
Card ("Cards") for common law and statutory trespass on his land.
The district court found in favor of the Cards. O'Brien appealed to
the Court of Appeals of Minnesota which affirmed the district court's
determination.
O'Brien owned a tract of land that he claimed contained three
basins of water that comprised Mud Lake. William Strangler and Mark
Pettis owned land adjacent to O'Brien's land, and they granted
permission to the Cards to enter their properties to hunt. Strangler
and Pettis contended that Mud Lake was one basin of water, and that
as riparian owners, they, or their invitees, had access to the entire
basin. The Cards conceded that they hunted on portions of Mud Lake
that were within the boundaries of O'Brien's property, but they
asserted the affirmative defense that Mud Lake was public water and
that they traveled on the Strangler and Pettis properties to the shore of
the lake and used a boat to hunt. O'Brien claimed that he acquired
Strangler's riparian rights through quitclaim deeds, and that Mud
Lake was so low that no access to the water from the Strangler and
Pettis properties existed except through a ditch on his own property.
The district court found that: (1) Mud Lake was one basin; (2)
Pettis' and Strangler's properties bordered Mud Lake; (3) there was
riparian access to the lake from these properties; (4) Strangler did not
lose his riparian rights to Mud Lake by the exchange of deeds; and (5)
as the holders of riparian rights, Strangler, Pettis, and the Cards, as
their invitees, had the right to use the surface waters of Mud Lake.
The appellate court determined that for O'Brien to prove
common law trespass he had to demonstrate a rightful possession in
himself, and unlawful entry upon such possession by the Cards. The
court reviewed the record in the light most favorable to the judgment
of the district court, and did not reconcile the conflicting evidence as
to the levels of Mud Lake when the Cards traveled upon it. Also, the
court did not determine whether the ditch provided legal access to the
lake since the district court did not address the issue. The court noted
that there were additional ways to reach the water on O'Brien's
property other than the ditch.
In addition, the court declined to address the issue of statutory
trespass since the statute and its elements were not fully discussed at
the district court trial. Further, the court determined that the deed
from O'Brien to Strangler reserved Strangler's riparian rights west of
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the boundary line and did not extinguish them. Lastly, the court
affirmed O'Brien's motion to strike part of the Card's appendix, a
color-coded map, since it was never filed with the district court as an
exhibit.
NatalieLucas

MONTANA
Graveley Sirmnental Ranch Co. v. Quigley, 65 P.3d 225 (Mont. 2003)
(finding that reasonable limitations pertaining to ditch maintenance
on easements are appropriate and joint liability for such ditch repair is
proper).
Graveley Simmental Ranch Co., Clifford E. Graveley, McIntosh
Ranch, and William McIntosh ("Graveley") owned and maintained a
ditch ("Graveley Ditch") that carried water from Ophir Creek to their
property in Powell County, Montana. James C. Quigley ("Quigley")
owned and maintained a separate ditch ("Quigley Ditch") that
transported water from Ophir Creek. Quigley's ditch ran across
Graveley's land pursuant to a secondary easement, and followed the
same course as the Graveley Ditch. Over the past several years,
Graveley unsuccessfully contested Quigley's ownership rights to the
Quigley Ditch, and sought numerous judicial decrees to limit Quigley's
ditch flow right and ditch size due to a breach and subsequent washout
in 1948 caused by the Quigley Ditch carrying too much water. On May
23, 1995, the Quigley Ditch broke again, causing a washout that
destroyed the Graveley Ditch and damaged Graveley's property. This
landslide prompted the initial lawsuit filed by Graveley against Quigley
in the Third Judicial District Court in Powell County. The district
court limited Quigley's ditch right to 800 miner's inches, limited
Quigley's easement rights pertaining to Graveley's property, assigned
joint liability to the parties for the 1995 washout, ordered Quigley to
pay Graveley's attorneys fees, and refused to grant Quigley a new trial
regarding a previous injunction temporarily limiting Quigley's ditch
flow to 400 miner's inches. Both parties appealed the district court's
judgment.
The Supreme Court of Montana reviewed the lower court's
limitation of Quigley's ditch flow right according to the applicable
standard of review, which required the court to affirm the ruling
absent a determination that it was clearly erroneous. The court
reviewed all previous disputes between Quigley and Graveley regarding
Quigley's ditch flow right, and found that, in almost all judicial orders,
the courts decreed the ditch as having a carrying capacity of 800
miner's inches. Since the district court's ruling was not clearly
erroneous, the court affirmed the ruling on this issue.
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Using the same standard of review, the court then reviewed the
district court's limitation of Quigley's easement rights, which limited
the size of machinery Quigley could bring onto Graveley's property to
maintain and repair the Quigley Ditch, and which required Quigley to
access Graveley's property using specific vehicles and specific routes.
The court affirmed all of these limitations except the one limiting the
size of machinery Quigley could use to repair and maintain his ditch.
The court reasoned that limiting Quigley to the use of smaller
equipment could be dangerous and much less effective than using
larger equipment. Thus, the court ordered that Quigley be permitted
to use any equipment designed for ditch repair and maintenance, so
long as such equipment would not damage Graveley's property or
expand the current dimensions of the Quigley Ditch.
Next, the court determined whether the district court erred in
finding both Quigley and Graveleyjointly liable for the washout. The
court reviewed the evidence brought before the district court, which
consisted of two credible, though contradictory reasons for the
washout. Evidence presented by Quigley blamed the washout on
Graveley's recent remodeling of the Graveley Ditch, while evidence
presented by Graveley blamed the washout on the Quigley Ditch
carrying too much water. The court concluded that the district court's
apportionment of equal fault to both parties was not erroneous, and
therefore affirmed the finding.
The court also affirmed the district court's order that Quigley pay
Graveley's attorney's fees. The court found the lower court had
correctly applied the relevant state statute entitling the prevailing party
to reasonable attorney's fees. According to the district court, Graveley
prevailed on the only claim he brought against Quigley-an
encroachment claim-and was therefore correctly awarded attorney's
fees.
Next, the court reviewed the lower court's refusal to grant Quigley
a new trial regarding an injunction temporarily limiting Quigley's
ditch flow to 400 miner's inches until he could prove it was safe to
transport more. The court affirmed the district court's ruling, which
was based on Quigley's failure to present new evidence sufficient to
prove this fact. Lastly, the Court found that the lower court had not
abused its discretion when determining the amount of damage
suffered by each party due to the washout. The court therefore
affirmed this determination.
Kate Osborn
Geil v. Missoula Irrigation Dist., 59 P.3d 398 (Mont. 2002) (holding
legislation permitting irrigation district members to petition for
exclusion from the district for taxation purposes did not violate
district's rights to equal protection or due process).
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Raymond Geil and over 500 additional individuals sought to
exclude their land from taxation by the Missoula Irrigation District
("MID"). Although legislation authorized irrigation districts to tax
district members to pay for irrigation expenses, district members could
petition for exclusion if the irrigation district did not currently serve
the land in question. The District Court for the Fourth Judicial
District consolidated the claims and appointed a special master. After
reviewing the special master's recommendations, the court issued a
Notice of Intent to enter a final order exempting Geil's property from
MID taxation. Despite MID's objection, the district court ultimately
issued the final order. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court,
MID argued three major points: first, the legislation denied MID's
right to equal protection; second, the legislation denied MID's right to
due process; and third, the court's ruling violated the principle of res
judicata with respect to a 1922 court decree finding all of the land
within the MID susceptible to irrigation. The Montana Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's rulings.
In 1909, the Montana legislature passed legislation ("Act")
authorizing the establishment of irrigation districts. Pursuant to the
Act, groups of landowners within a district could petition the district
court for exclusion from taxation if the district's irrigation system
could not successfully irrigate their lands. In 1997, the legislature
temporarily amended the Act (the "Amendment"). The Amendment
loosened those petition requirements, allowing individual landowners
with smaller tracts to request exclusion. Although worded in general
terms, the Montana legislature intended, as evidenced by the
legislative history, for the Amendment to apply only to the MID. MID
challenged the Amendment's constitutionality because it believed
granting the numerous petitions resulting from the Amendment
would result in increased assessments for the remaining district
members.
After ruling MID had standing to challenge the constitutionality of
the Act, the court addressed whether the Act deprived MID of its right
to equal protection under the law. In addressing the equal protection
challenge, the court first identified the classes and determined
whether they were similarly situated. MID argued the Act subjected
MID to a law that did not apply to other similarly situated
districts. The court agreed, finding the legislature intended the
Amendment to apply only to the City of Missoula, and that other
urban districts not covered by the Amendment were similarly situated.
Using rational basis review, the court then addressed whether the
Act violated MID's right to equal protection. Under rational basis
review, the government must have shown the Amendment's objective
was legitimate and the objective bore a rational relationship to the
classification used by the legislature. Citing the trial court's finding
that the legislature intended to ensure only those persons who used
the irrigation works should pay for them, the court held that purpose
to be legitimate.
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The court then addressed whether the purpose bore a rational
relationship to the legislature's classification. MID argued that the
purpose-ensuring only those persons who used irrigation works
should pay for them-was not rationally related to a provision that
only applied to the City of Missoula. In resolving public welfare issues,
a legislature is free to deal with one class at a time. Thus, the court
affirmed the district court's holding that the legislative classification
was rationally related to its objective.
MID also argued the Amendment deprived the district and its
members of due process. First, MID argued the notice provision was
deficient by only requiring a petitioner to mail a petition to the
irrigation district and not to every landowner in the district. Second,
MID argued the Amendment did not provide members an opportunity
to be heard regarding the petition. Specifically, MID alleged the
Amendment did not provide it the opportunity to show users could
feasibly obtain water from the irrigation district.
"Notice sufficiently comports with due process if it is reasonably
calculated, under all circumstances, to inform parties of proceedings
which may directly affect their legally protected interests." MID
argued sufficient notice required a petitioner mail notice to all district
members. However, when arguing it had standing to bring suit, MID
claimed it represented the interests of its members. The court found
MID's notice argument disingenuous given its conflicting earlier
position when arguing for standing.
The court also found MID had an opportunity to show users could
obtain water from the district. Due process requires an opportunity to
be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Under
the Amendment, a district could file an objection to a petition within
15 days. Further, the district court in the instant case held two
hearings regarding MID's objections. For these reasons, the court
held the Amendment afforded Geil due process.
Finally, MID argued res judicata prevented Geil from arguing his
land was not susceptible to irrigation after the original 1922 decree
found all land within the district susceptible to irrigation. Resjudicata
bars litigation if the following four criteria are met: "(1) the subject
matter of each action must be the same; (2) the parties or their privies
of each action must be the same; (3) the issues must be the same and
relate to the same subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons
must be the same in reference to the subject matter and to the issues
between them." The court found the subject matter differed. In 1922,
the subject involved establishment of the MID, whereas the instant
case involved exclusion from the irrigation district.
Therefore, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's ruling.
Brian L. Martin
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NORTH CAROLINA
Neuse River Found., Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 574 S.E.2d 48
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (holding river association's suit against hog
farming companies for improperly handling waste, resulting in
pollution and contamination of certain rivers, failed for lack standing).
The Neuse River Foundation, Inc., riverkeepers and several
noncommercial users joined with riparian landowners and other
commercial users ("River Associations") to file suit in Wake County
Superior Court against three hog farming companies ("Smithfield").
The River Associations alleged that these companies improperly
handled hog waste, which resulted in massive pollution and
contamination of the Neuse, New, and Cape Fear Rivers, and those
river's tributaries and estuaries. The court dismissed the claims
pursuant to rules 12(b) (1) and 12(b) (6) of the North Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure. The River Associations appealed and the North
Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed.
The River Associations based their claims on theories of
negligence, trespass, strict liability, public nuisance, unfair and
deceptive trade practices, private nuisance and the public trust
doctrine. The River Associations alleged that North Carolina's coastal
plain experienced an explosion in its hog population as traditional
North Carolina style family hog farming gave way to mass production
The
pork factories first conceived and devised by Smithfield.
traditional family farmer only maintained a relatively small herd of
hogs in an area sufficient to accommodate the hog waste without
significant contamination.
The River Associations' complaint detailed the harmful effects of
Smithfield's contamination. Instead of being purified through sewage
treatment, hog feces and urine in the mass production pork factories
fell through a slatted floor to a cellar below the warehouses, which
were periodically flushed, into open-air earthen pits known as swine
"lagoons." The River Associations requested the establishment of a
"Court Approved Trust" to pay for the complete remediation of several
of North Carolina's waterways, as well as a prohibition of Smithfield's
use of swine lagoons and sprayfields.
To have standing, an environmental plaintiff must allege injury to
a protected interest that cannot be considered merged in the general
public right; causation; and proper, or individualized, forms of relief.
The court stated that North Carolina had no authority supporting the
contention that injury to aesthetic or recreational interest alone,
regardless of degree, confers standing on an environmental plaintiff.
The court, therefore, concluded that the River Associations did not
have standing to maintain an action against Smithfield under the
alleged circumstances.
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Because Smithfield's lagoon waste management systems existed
pursuant to express legislative authority, the court would not enjoin as
a nuisance an action authorized by valid legislative authority. The
North Carolina General Assembly established a permitting program
for animal waste management systems to help protect water quality
and promote innovative systems and practices which attempted to
minimize the regulatory burden.
The landowners did claim injury to their riparian property or
businesses. However, none of the landowners sought individual
compensation for the invasion of a more personal right not "merged
in the general public right." The landowners sought only ajudgment
prohibiting use of sprayfields and cesspools and monetary damages for
the restoration and remediation of the rivers.
Because landowners did not contend that the General Assembly
exceeded its authority in violation of the state's constitution, the court
declined to prohibit an activity the legislature legally allowed.
Regan Rozier

N.C. Home Builders Ass'n v. Envtl. Mgmt. Comm'n, 573 S.E.2d 732
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (holding North Carolina Environmental
Management Commission had statutory authority to adopt certain
rules regarding wetlands regulations and complied with the local
Administrative Procedure Act in adopting those rules).
A builders association, as well as other parties, filed a petition for a
declaratory ruling with the North Carolina Environmental
Management Commission ("EMC") asserting that EMC did not have
statutory authority to adopt specific wetlands rules and did not comply
with the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). The
EMC originally denied this petition, but subsequently issued a
declaratory ruling that it did possess statutory authority to adopt the
wetlands rules, and that it adopted the rules in compliance with the
requirements of the APA. The builders association brought this
petition for judicial review before the Wake County Superior Court.
The court affirmed EMC's prior declaratory ruling and dismissed the
petition for review. The builders association then filed a notice of
appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. In their appeal, it
asserted two claims of error. They contended the lower court made
erroneous interpretations of law in determining that the EMC
complied with requirements of the APA in adopting the wetland rules;
and that the EMC had statutory authority to enact these rules.
On March 14, 1996, the EMC adopted certain wetlands rules. The
rules classified and designated uses of state wetlands and set forth
procedures for the EMC to review water quality certifications issued
pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. The adopted
regulations differed, in part, from the proposed regulations as
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published, but the changes to the regulations were not published prior
to their adoption. On July 18, 1996, the North Carolina Rules Review
Commission ("RRC") objected to the adoption of the wetlands rules
on the bases that the EMC lacked the statutory authority to adopt the
rules and that the rules were ambiguous. The EMC decided to file the
wetlands rules with the Codifier of the. Rules, over the RRC's
objections.
The appellate court examined each of the builders association's
arguments, ruling on the first claim that the EMC did not need to
publish the changes that altered the wetlands rules, because those
changes did not differ substantially from the text of the proposed rule
already published in the North Carolina Register. Therefore, the EMC
complied with the APA requirements for rule adoption. The appellate
court then investigated the second claim, examining relevant state
statutes to determine if the EMC had statutory authority. After
reviewing the state law regarding the authority of the EMC to develop
and adopt water quality standards, and reviewing the statutory
definition of waters as understood by the state, the appellate court
found that the EMC had statutory authority to enact these rules, and
affirmed the trial court's judgment.
David Hall

N.C. Forestry Ass'n v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., Div. of
Water Quality, 571 S.E.2d 602 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (holding a party
not aggrieved by the exclusion does not have standing to challenge the
Division of Water Quality's decision to exclude certain segments of the
timber industry from coverage under a general stormwater permit).
The Environmental Management Commission ("Commission")
approved the decision of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Division of Water Quality ("DWQ") to exclude wood chip
mills from coverage under a general stormwater discharge permit.
The North Carolina Forestry Association ("NCFA") sought judicial
review in the Wake County Superior Court of the Commission's final
agency decision. The trial court found NCFA was an aggrieved person
and therefore had standing; DWQ had the authority to issue or not
issue a general permit for any class of activities; and the Commission's
final agency decision was timely. NCFA appealed to the North
Carolina Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the trial
court's decision holding that NCFA lacked standing because it was not
an aggrieved person for two reasons: (1) NCFA did not have a right to
a general permit; and (2) NCFA was not denied a permit.
The DWQ issued a general National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System Permit ("NPDES") permit in 1992, expiring in
1997, that included wood chip mills. In 1998, DWQ issued another
general permit that excluded wood chip mills, thereby requiring new
or expanding wood chip mills to apply for individual permits. NCFA, a
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private organization with members in the timber, forest, and wood
chip mill industries, claimed that this new permit would subject its
members to burdensome additional administrative procedures and
requirements.
NCFA argued that the trial court erred in determining that DWQ
had the authority to issue a general permit and erred in finding the
Commission's decision was timely. The DWQ claimed the trial court
erred in finding that NCFA had standing. The appellate court
reviewed de novo whether the North Carolina Administrative
Procedure Act ("NCAPA") conferred standing on NCFA by examining
North Carolina General Statute section 143-215.1. The appellate court
determined that the statute authorized the Commission to issue water
pollution permits and general permits. The statute did not require the
Commission to make general permits available. The appellate court
stated that wood chip mills had no more rights to general permitting
than any other segment of the timber industry that was excluded from
general permits.
Next, the appellate court explained that any aggrieved person is
entitled to a contested case hearing, but NCFA was not an aggrieved
person since NCFA did not claim that DWQ denied it or any of its
members a permit as a result of the new general permit exclusion of
wood chip mills. The appellate court stated that no abrogation of any
right occurred because neither NCFA nor any of its members filed an
application for a permit since implementation of the new procedures.
Stefania Niro

OREGON
Port of Morrow v. Aylett, 62 P.3d 427 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing
and remanding lower court's judgment of relief on the grounds relief
granted specifically disavowed by party seeking relief).
Port of Morrow ("Port") owned an irrigation system capable of
delivering water to certain property owned by Port and also property
owned ("Section 21") and leased ("Sections 27 and 28") by the Aylett
family ("Ayletts"). Due to previous litigation in 1993 between the
Ayletts and Port's predecessors in interest, the Ayletts operated two
pumps to control water flow through Section 21 to Sections 27 and 28.
Port sued the Ayletts in the Morrow County Circuit Court, and alleged
that although the Ayletts had the right to use the water delivery system
for the delivery of water to Section 21, no similar right of delivery to
Section 27 and 28 applied. Port noted that neither the control of the
two pumps operated by the Ayletts nor the price of the water flowing
into Section 21 were at issue in this case. The trial court concluded
that the agreement pursuant to which the Ayletts claimed a right to
delivery of water to Sections 27 and 28 did not give them such a right.
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Thus, the court enjoined them from such delivery of water without
written consent of Port and awarded damages.
The judgment
additionally gave Port exclusive right to operate the water delivery
system providipg Port did not interfere with the Ayletts' right to
uninterrupted use of the system on Section 21. The trial court also
stated Port had the right to charge the Ayletts actual costs of future use
of the irrigation system for delivery of water to Section 21.
On appeal to the Oregon Court of Appeals, the Ayletts made two
arguments concerning the ruling: (1) that the relief granted went
beyond the relief sought and the additional terms were erroneous in
light of Port's assurances that those issues were not before the court
and would be litigated at a later date if necessary; and (2) that the trial
court erred as a matter of law because previous 1993 litigation
established the Ayletts' right to operate the irrigation system. The
court here agreed with the Ayletts' first argument and thus did not
address the second. The court likened the Ayletts' case to Ellison v.
Watson where the relief erroneously granted by the court concerned
subject matter that was not only not the grounds for litigation but was
specifically disavowed by the party seeking relief. Port argues that the
present case is distinguishable from Ellison because the relief at issue in
the instant case was "logically connected" to the relief requested. The
court rejected the connection argument because it failed to see a
connection between the Ayletts' rights to irrigate Sections 27 and 28
and the amount that Port could charge defendant to irrigate Section
21.
Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's ruling on the issue
of additional relief and remanded for entry of an amended judgment.
The court otherwise affirmed the judgment.
GerrittJames Koser

Hale v. Water Res. Dep't, 55 P.3d 497 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (holding
that lack of continuity regarding beneficial use barred plaintiffs from
receiving a permit to use river water for irrigation).
In 1965, the Water Resources Department ("Department") created
Permit 30789 ("Permit"), allowing for the Stanfield Irrigation District,
including Robert Hoskins and Ralph and Albert Seibel, to divert water
from the Umatilla River for irrigation. The Department would grant a
permit if the parties, within the district, applying could establish that
they were putting water to beneficial use. At the final application
deadline-December 31, 1988-the Department determined whether
the district was using the water beneficially by conducting a survey.
Hoskins and the Seibels, owners of two adjacent sections of land, both
sought permits. The Seibel brothers were attempting to irrigate both
the land they owned as well as the neighboring section they leased
from Hoskins. The irrigation began in the early 1970s but ceased in
the early 1980s due to one of the brothers' illness. At this time, the
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brothers advised other irrigators in the region of their intention to
discontinue their Permit. In 1989, the Department made its final
determination of proof for those asserting Permit rights and
determined that neither Hoskins' nor the Seibel brothers' used the
water beneficially.
The Seibel brothers sold their section of property to Rick Hale in
1991. In 1997, Hale and Hoskins requested a hearing to argue that
since the two sections had been put to beneficial use for some
duration in the past, the Department's 1989 cancellation of their
Permit rights was in error. The hearing officer disagreed, and
affirmed the 1989 finding made by the Department, stating that
"continuity" was implicit in the definition of beneficial use. Hoskins
and Hale appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals.
At issue was the definition of a "perfected" water right within the
context of the Department's 1989 decision. Hoskins and Hale argued
that "perfection" was a term of art that could refer to a single incident
where water was briefly put to beneficial use. The Department argued
whether a right had been "perfected" was left solely to the
Department's discretion. The Court of Appeals held that where an
agency's interpretation of law is at issue, the standard of review
depends on whether the term in question is an exact term, an inexact
term, or a delegative term. Here, the court labeled "perfected" a
delegative term, meaning it expressed "incomplete legislative meaning
that the agency is authorized to complete." Thus, the Department had
the authority to define "perfected" as it saw fit.
The court's second responsibility was to review the Department's
decision to deny Hoskins' and Hale's Permits to determine whether it
was within the "range of discretion allowed by the general policy of the
statute." The Oregon Supreme Court has held that continuity is
implicitly contained within the meaning of "beneficial use." Also,
Oregon law provides that where there is a gap of five successive years
between beneficial uses, "there is a rebuttable presumption of
forfeiture of all or part of the water right." Finally, the Water Rights
Act explicitly states that for the Department to grant a permit,
appropriation alone does not suffice; there must also be a beneficial
use in effect when the Department makes its final determination.
Having determined that continuity of beneficial use was a fundamental
policy of the Water Rights Act, the court held the 1989 determination
within the range of discretion allowed by the Water Rights Act.
Hoskins' and Hale's finally argued that, even if the Department's
interpretation of "perfected" was appropriate, the court should require
the Department to express this definition as an administrative rule.
On this issue, the court held that rulemaking was not required in the
absence of express statutory text to the contrary. Because there was no
such statutory language in this case, the court did not require the
Department express their definition as an administrative rule.
Michael Sheehan
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PENNSYLVANIA
Tom Clark Chevrolet, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 816 A.2d 1246 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2003) (holding the common enemy doctrine relieves
landowners from liability for damages caused by surface water so long
as they did not unnaturally or unnecessarily change the quantity,
quality, or channel of surface water).
Tom Clark Chevrolet Dealership filed suit against a series of public
and private entities, including the Pennsylvania Departments of
Transportation, Environmental Protection, and Environmental
Resources ("DOT"), alleging negligence because of failure to maintain
or dredge Long Run Creek's ("Creek") channel. The Dealership also
included in its complaint claims of trespass and nuisance against the
DOT.
The Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas entered
summary judgment in favor of the DOT, and the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment, dismissing the
Dealership's claims.
In 1967, the DOT altered the Creek's course to allow for the
expansion of State Route 48 ("Route"). Due to the cumulative effects
of the DOT's expansion, natural processes, and other construction
projects along the Route, sediment and debris began to accumulate in
the Creek. The increased sediment load caused a narrowing of the
Creek's channel and an increase in the Creek's grade, resulting in an
overall restriction of the Creek's flow capacity. In 1991, the Dealership
built its facilities along the Route. In 1996, the Creek overflowed and
its waters crossed the Route and flooded the Dealership's car lots,
resulting in damage to cars and pavement.
The trial court granted the DOT's motion for summary judgment
on grounds of sovereign immunity, and held that under Pennsylvania
law, a commonwealth agency is immune from suit unless the suit falls
under one of several statutory-listed exceptions. In its appeal, the
Dealership argued that this suit indeed fell under the real property
exception, whereby if commonwealth-owned real property caused
damages, sovereign immunity was not an available defense. The
commonwealth court denied the appeal, holding that even if the
Creek was considered commonwealth property, and the suit fell within
the real property exception, the Dealership failed to show liability on
the part of the DOT.
Pennsylvania law adheres to the "common enemy" doctrine in
regards to surface water liability. The doctrine defines surface water as
a common enemy to all landowners, and requires that each landowner
make efforts to protect his lands from damages caused by surface
water. Under the doctrine, a party is only held liable for damages
caused by surface water if the party artificially altered the water's
natural channel, or if the party unnecessarily changed the quality or
quantity of the surface water.
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The commonwealth court held that the DOT's conduct in
improving the Route and depositing sediment in the Creek did not
artificially or unnecessarily alter the Creek's natural channel, nor had
it increased the Creek's flow. Therefore, under the common enemy
doctrine, the DOT was not liable for damages caused by the Creek's
flooding.
Steven j Rypma

TENNESSEE
Keltner v. Open Lake Sporting Club, No. W2002-00449-COA-R3-CV,
2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2003) (holding
that genuine issues of material fact over ownership of a watercourse
exist where a landowner establishes ownership of property abutting
the watercourse; the opposing party has an ambiguous deed; and parol
evidence does not prove ownership through recognition).
The controversy in this case arose over ownership of a portion of
Right Hand Arm, a water body flowing from Open Lake. Open Lake
Sporting Club ("OLSC") owned the majority of Open Lake. A portion
of Right Hand Arm flowed through property owned by Mrs. Keltner.
OLSC and Mrs. Keltner both assumed they owned Right Hand Arm.
Mrs. Keltner believed that she owned Right Hand Arm and had merely
leased use of it to OLSC. Likewise, OLSC believed it owned Right
Hand Arm and had leased hunting rights on Mrs. Keltner's property.
In 1995, Mrs. Keltner leased use of Right Hand Arm to a third party.
Shortly thereafter, a dispute arose between Mrs. Keltner and OLSC
over Right Hand Arm ownership. Mrs. Keltner commenced a suit
requesting a declaratory judgment to quiet title and to determine Mrs.
Keltner's right to the portion of Right Hand Arm located on Mrs.
Keltner's property. The Chancery Court for Lauderdale County
granted summary judgment to OLSC. Mrs. Keltner appealed to the
Court of Appeals of Tennessee.
First, the appellate court concluded that under the doctrine of
riparian rights, even though Mrs. Keltner owned property adjacent to
Right Hand Arm, that fact alone did not establish she owned the
portion of Right Hand Arm that flowed through her property. The
doctrine of riparian rights provides that landowners have the right to
use water abutting their property, unless the right-to-use the
watercourse is specifically reserved in the deed. However, the doctrine
only presumes a right of use and does not presume ownership of the
water. Hence, Mrs. Keltner's ownership of property abutting Right
Hand Arm only established a right of use.
Secondly, the court concluded trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to OLSC because genuine issues of material fact
existed regarding OLSC's ownership of the portion of Right Hand
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Arm located on Mrs. Keltner's property. The doctrine of riparian
rights presumes the interest of the riparian owner passes to the
grantee when the grantor conveys the upland. OLSC argued that A
Booth Company ("ABC") conveyed the disputed portion of Right
Hand Arm to them. However, the court concluded, based on
testimony of a land surveyor, there was no way to determine what land
ABC actually conveyed to OLSC. Furthermore, in order to determine
ownership, the court concluded it was necessary to determine whether
ABC owned the disputed portion of Right Hand Arm and whether
ABC conveyed the disputed portion of Right Hand Arm to OLSC.
Finally, the court concluded parol evidence was admissible to.
determine whether Mrs. Keltner acquired ownership by agreement
with OLSC because the deeds were ambiguous. Mrs. Keltner argued
that minutes from an OLSC meeting proved OLSC recognized Mrs.
Keltner owned the disputed portion of Right Hand Arm. However,
the court concluded this evidence showed that OLSC recognized Mrs.
Keltner owned the land surrounding the disputed portion of Right
Hand Arm but that genuine issues of material fact still existed as to
whether OLSC recognized Mrs. Keltner owned that portion of Right
Hand Arm.
For the foregoing reasons, the court concluded the trial court
erred because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the
ownership of Right Hand Arm.
HeatherChamberlain

TEXAS
Sabine River Auth. of Texas v. Hughes, 92 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. App.
2002) (holding a claim for inverse condemnation requires the
claiming party to allege that the government intended its action to
result in a taking).
Paul Hughes ("Hughes") brought an inverse condemnation suit
against the Sabine River Authority of Texas ("Authority"). The First
District Court of Newton City granted Hughes' motion for summary
judgment, holding that the Authority's intentional release of reservoir
water resulted in a taking of Hughes' land for public use. The Texas
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling, and affirmed the
Authority's motion for summary judgment.
Hughes alleged that the Authority's intentional release of reservoir
water into the Sabine River caused Hughes' land to be flooded and
resulted in a taking. The Texas Court of Appeals ruled that Hughes'
complaint was insufficient to support a claim of inverse condemnation.
A claim for inverse condemnation required Hughes to allege the
Authority intended its release of water to result in a taking. The court
found as a matter of law that the facts of the case did not warrant a
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claim of intent against the Authority because the Authority's release of
less water than had entered the reservoir through rainfall negated an
inference of intent. Additionally, the Sabine River merged with the
Toro Bayou. The court found that the merging of the two rivers
combined with the additional reservoir drainage caused the flooding
of the Sabine River onto Hughes' land. Thus, the court held the
flooding was unintentional on the part of the Authority, and entered
summary judgment against Hughes, reversing the trial court's
judgment.
Holly Shook

City of San Angelo v. Texas Natural Res. Conservation Conm'n, 92
S.W.3d 624 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding under the Open Meetings Act
commission did not have to include additional language in its
published agenda indicating that it might act on issues under
consideration at open meeting; agenda items were sufficiently
descriptive to inform reader of the broad topics addressed at the
meeting; and commission was not precluded from finding petitions
were insufficient because of referral to State Office of Administrative
Hearings).
The City of San Angelo ("City") petitioned the Texas Natural
Resources Conservation Commission ("TNRCC") requesting the
appointment of watermasters for the San Saba River and the Concho
River Basin to enforce water rights. TNRCC addressed the petition in
an open meeting to determine whether the domestic and livestock
water users on the Concho River Basin were water right holders.
TNRCC published the agenda for the open meeting in the November
26, 2001 Texas Register to give the general public notice it would
consider four specific legal issues regarding the rights holders. After
the December 5, 2001 open meeting, TNRCC issued an interim order
on December 10, 2001 finding that domestic and livestock water users
were right holders but referred the petition to the State Office of
Administrative Hearings ("SOAH") to determine whether the rights
holders were threatened. The City sued TNRCC seeking mandamus
relief and an injunction in Travis County District Court claiming the
interim order violated the Open Meetings Act ("Act") because the
published agenda failed to give sufficient notice that TNRCC would
take action. Holding the notice satisfied the Act, the district court
denied the City's requested relief. The City appealed the decision to
Third District Texas Court of Appeals claiming that notice was
inadequate when read in light of the interim order. TNRCC asserted
that the notice given was sufficient under the Act.
On appeal, the court first stated that determining adequacy of
notice is a question of law. Under this standard, in reviewing notices
under the Act, the inquiry is whether the notice was sufficiently
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specific to alert the general public to the topic to be considered. The
court addressed the City's argument that because the word
"consideration" does not mean "action" the agenda items did not give
notice of the possibility that the TNRCC would take action. The court
stated the Act requires that the TNRCC give "written notice of the
date, hour, place, and subject of each meeting held." When the notice
specifically discloses the subject to be considered at the upcoming
meeting, the notice requirement is met. The court also relied on
Texas Turnpike Auth. v. City of Fort Worth, in which the Texas Supreme
Court held it unnecessary to state all consequences which may
necessarily flow from the consideration of the subject stated.
Furthermore, the court interpreted "consideration" as necessarily
encompassing "action." Applying these principles, the court held that
the TNRCC did not have to include additional language in its public
notice indicating it might act on issues under consideration.
The court also addressed the City's argument that TNRCC gave a
narrow and restricted notice limited to consideration of specific legal
issues, while acting on more general issues outside the scope of the
agenda. The court stated that in order to satisfy the Act's intent of
giving the public opportunity to inform itself of the topic of each given
meeting under the Act, the notice must be sufficiently descriptive to
alert readers to the particular issue the governing body will address.
Looking at the agenda in its entirety, the court held the agenda items
were sufficiently descriptive to inform a reader of the broad topics to
be addressed at the meeting and that it was not necessary for the
agenda to enumerate the specific legal issues.
Finally, the court dismissed the City's claim that TNRCC's referral
of the petitions to SOAH precluded TNRCC from finding the petitions
were insufficient to warrant appointment of a watermaster. The court
found that in referral, TNRCC actually afforded the City's interests
greater procedural protection, and the referral did not preclude
TNRCC from action. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's
judgment.
JaredB. Briant

Herrmann v. Lindsey, No. 04-02-00184-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS
1498 (Tex. App. Feb. 19, 2003) (holding the grantor of a warranty
deed had no right to rescission based on an illegal reservation of base
irrigation groundwater rights).
In 1996 E.J. Hendrix filed an application for an initial regular
permit with the Edwards Aquifer Authority ("Authority") to irrigate
500 acres of land in Medina County. Hendrix then sold his land and
water rights to Ronald and Karen Herrmann ("Herrmanns"). On
August 1, 1998, the Herrmanns transferred a one-half interest in the
permit consisting of unrestricted groundwater to Columbia Realty
("Columbia"). On August 5, 1998, the Herrmanns transferred the
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remaining one-half interest in the permit consisting of base irrigation
water to Columbia. On October 28, 1998, the Herrmanns sold 209
acres of their 500-acre tract of land to Glenn and Cynthia Lindsey
("Lindseys"). The Herrmanns reserved all water rights under the
permit except for 25,000 gallons per day for domestic and livestock use
in a warranty deed. In May of 1999, the Herrmanns and Columbia
sued the Lindseys in the thirty-eighth Judicial District Court in Medina
County seeking a declaratory judgment that the transfers to Columbia
were valid under the Edwards Aquifer Act.
The Lindseys counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that
they were entitled to the base irrigation water rights portion of the
permit. The Herrmanns responded to the counterclaim arguing the
deed should be set aside because of a mutual mistake in the
reservation of rights in the base irrigation water. The Lindseys then
filed a notice of transfer with the Authority, claiming they acquired the
rights to the base irrigation water from the sale. The Authority
approved the transfer, finding: (1) Columbia owned the unrestricted
groundwater portion of the permit; (2) the Hermann's sale to the
Lindseys voided the transfer of the base irrigation water portion to
Columbia; and (3) the Herrmann's sale to the Lindseys effected a valid
transfer of the base irrigation water portion of the permit. The
Lindseys then filed a motion for summary judgment on their
counterclaim alleging a valid interest in one half of the permit rights
from the sale. The trial court granted the Lindsey's motion, ordering
reformation of the warranty deed to reserve only one half of all water.
The Herrmanns appealed the trial court's order to the Fourth District
Texas Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the Herrmanns first claimed the Lindseys' motion
incorrectly alleged that they were entitled to judgment pursuant to
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 166(a) (i), which allows a party to
move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence
of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an
adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. The court
denied this claim because the Herrmans failed to file special
exceptions to the pleadings under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 90,
requiring pleading of specific exceptions to avoid waiver of a claim.
The Herrmanns also made three arguments supporting the merits of
their appeal. First, they argued lack of consideration because the
Lindseys did not pay for the water rights received. Second, they
argued the illegal reservation was material to the contract. Third, they
argued including the illegal reservation in the deed was a mutual
mistake of fact allowing rescission of the contract.
The court held contract principles did not apply to the dispute
because the contract between the parties no longer existed and
nothing was left to be enforced after payment of consideration and
delivery of the deed. The court instead applied property principles to
determine the rights of the parties. The court stated: (1) a grantor of
a deed is afforded no right of rescission by reason of total or partial
failure of consideration; (2) an illegal provision in a deed is simply not
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enforced; and (3) a mistake of law is not a ground for rescission or
cancellation of a deed. Applying these rules, the court found the
Herrmanns had no remedy of rescission or cancellation of the
warranty deed and thus affirmed the trial court's judgment.
JaredB. Briant

WASHINGTON
Kim v. Pollution Control Hearing Bd., 61 P.3d 1211 (Wash. Ct. App.
2003) (holding an "industrial purposes" exception to a permitting
requirement for public ground waters applies to commercial
horticultural uses).
Joo I1Kim and Keum Ja Kim ("Kims") sought judicial review of a
final decision by the Pollution Control Hearing Board of Olympia,
Washington ("PCHB"). PCHB affirmed an order by the Department
of Ecology ("DOE"), requiring the Kims to apply for a permit to use
well water for their commercial nursery. The Superior Court for
Kitsap County affirmed the decision of the PCHB. The Kims appealed
to Division Two of the Court of Appeals of Washington. The court
decided the issue of whether the use of 100 to 300 gallons per day to
water plants for sale to the general public constituted "an industrial
purpose," thus falling under an exception to the permitting
requirement. The court reversed and held that the Kim's nursery fell
within the industrial exception.
The main controversy came from an interpretation of a 1945
statute requiring a permit to use the public ground waters of
Washington subject to a "small withdrawals" exception. This exception
applied in four instances: (1) any quantity of water for livestock;
(2) any amount of water for a noncommercial garden of a half acre or
less; (3) not more than 5,000 gallons per day for domestic use; and (4)
not more than 5,000 gallons per day for an industrial purpose.
In 1995, the DOE altered its interpretation of "industrial
purposes." DOE first asserted that the term "industry" excluded
agriculture. Second, the DOE argued that interpreting the industrial
exception to apply to irrigation made the exemption for
noncommercial gardens of one-half acre or less meaningless. Third, it
concluded that defining industrial purposes to include agriculture or
horticulture drastically increased the scope of the exception and
undermined the statute's purpose. In 1998, the DOE required that
the Kims file for a permit.
The court rejected all of the DOE's changed interpretations of the
1945 statute. The court noted that twenty-four Washington statutes,
ten Washington cases, and six Washington regulations refer to the
"agriculture industry."
The court also used the dictionary and
numerous other examples of reference to the "agriculture industry"

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 6

from other jurisdictions to conclude that the "industrial purposes"
exception applied to the Kim's nursery. The court also rejected the
DOE's second argument because the noncommercial garden provision
differs from the Kim's commercial garden irrigation uses. Finally, the
court rejected the DOE's third argument because the DOE interpreted
the statute and applied it differently than in the past. An agency may
not alter the plain meaning of a statute to cater to changed societal
conditions. The legislature must amend the statute to properly
remedy a statute's application to changing societal needs.
Thus, the court reversed the superior court's ruling, and held that
the Kim's nursery fell within the industrial exception.
Adriano Martinez
McNally v. Zadra, No. 20426-0-III, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 68 (Wash.
Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2003) (holding plaintiff landowners' rights in water
system passed appurtenant to their land; plaintiff landowners' efforts
to promote their shared water system's continued use complied with
easement agreement; and defendant landowner forfeited rights in the
water system by drilling a private well).
Plaintiffs William and Melody McNally ("McNallys") owned Lots C
and D, among other property, located adjacent to defendant Elizabeth
Zadra ("Zadra"), the owner of Lot A. Significantly, the lots shared a
water system which included buried water lines spanning across the
lots and a cistern on Lot A. The parties' predecessor in interest
conveyed the lots by real estate contract establishing appurtenant
easement rights in the water system. A few years later, the parties'
predecessor reassigned the rights in the water system to Lot 3. In
1993, Mr. McNally disconnected power to the pump house on his land
and removed the water line from the cistern located on Zadra's lot to
make repairs to the water system. As a result, a series of disputes
transpired between the landowners including issues of ownership and
responsibility for the water system.
The McNallys sued Zadra alleging the right to receive water by
running it over Zadra's lot. In 1996, the Superior Court of Stevens
County granted the McNallys' motion for partial summary judgment,
holding the easement in the water system was appurtenant to the
McNallys' land; therefore, it passed to them as a matter of law. The
McNallys also claimed Zadra drilled a separate well and should forfeit
her rights in the water system. The McNallys sought damages and
equitable relief for Zadra's interference with their easement rights.
Zadra counterclaimed alleging breach of water and road easements,
trespass, outrage, conversion and trespass to chattels. Subsequently, at
a bench trial in 1999, the trial court concluded the McNallys had not
breached the easement agreement and Zadra's separately drilled well
effectively relinquished her rights in the water system. As such, she was
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not entitled damages and thus could not mitigate by drilling her own
well.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Three,
Panel Two examined two partial grants of summary judgment.
Specifically, the court considered whether the water system easement
was appurtenant to Lots C and D, and whether the parties may offer
evidence to establish the parties intended the rights of the water
system easement to be assigned differently than stated in the easement
agreement. In addition, the court addressed trial court's findings of
fact.
First, the court explained that an appurtenant easement "applies to
a specific parcel of land" and that such easements "inhere in the land
and cannot exist separate from it; nor can [the easement] be
converted into and easement in gross." By way of example, the court
noted in Pitman v. Sweeney an appurtenant easement expressly
mentions the land it is "intended to benefit." Here, the easement was
established for the benefit for Lots A, B, C and D. As such, the court
recognized the McNallys, as purchasers of Lots C and D, were entitled
to the benefits of the appurtenant water system easement.
Second, the court found inadmissible any evidence offered to show
the parties' predecessors intended for water system rights to be
assigned differently than provided for by the easement agreement.
Under the context rule, as stated in Hollis v. Carwall, Inc., extrinsic
evidence is not admissible if offered to prove "an intention
independent of the instrument." Despite such a restriction, Zadra
attempted to submit affidavit testimony from the creator of the
easement agreement. However, the court excluded the affidavit which
attempted to show intent contradictory to the easement agreement
and noted McNallys' deed expressly established Lots C and D's
beneficial use of the water system. Accordingly, the court concurred
with the decision below and excluded Zadra's proffered evidence as
"inadmissible under the context rule."
Next, the court held the water system easement inhered in the
land and was appurtenant to Lots A, B, C and D such that no legal
instrument could reassign the rights. The court explained, all
easement rights existed "appurtenant to the property itself' and passed
exclusively to owners of Lots A, B, C and D. Despite the assignment of
water system rights to Lot 3 by Zadra's predecessor in interest, the
court found that such an assignment could not convert the easement
already annexed to Lots A, B, C and D. The easement passed to the
owners of Lots C and D by deed, and Zadra's predecessor in interest's
attempted assignment failed to dilute the McNallys rights in the water
system.
Finally, the court concluded all findings by the trial court were
"supported by substantial evidence," and, even if erroneous, were not
prejudicial.
Specifically, the court examined Zadra's claim for
damages. The court determined Mr. McNally did not breach the
easement agreement when he disconnected power to the pump house,
requested retroactive power service payments, and removed the water
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line from the cistern. No breach of the easement terms occurred
because Mr. McNally undertook such action to ensure continued use
of the shared water system, a right he enjoyed under the easement
agreement. Accordingly, Zadra was not entitled to damages for breach
of the easement agreement and thus could not mitigate by drilling a
separate well.
Still in effect, the easement agreement required forfeiture of
interest in the water system if the users "secure or obtain a working
well." The court noted Zadra's separately drilled well satisfied her use
requirements of the water system; therefore, her duty to forfeit rights
in the shared system was not excused.
Thus, the court affirmed the superior court's holding in favor of
the McNallys.
J Reid Bumgarner

O'Hagan v. Kelley, No. 262274-, 2002 Wash App. LEXIS 3192 (Wash.
Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2002) (holding that to establish an injury from
decreased water level due to an excavation project, plaintiff must
establish the excavation project caused the decreased water level and
not merely that the water level fell after they completed excavating).
The O'Hagans, the Kelleys, and the Hulberts jointly used water
from Deer Creek in Pacific County.
In 1993, Pacific County
authorized the Pacific County Drainage District ("PCDD") to excavate
a drainage ditch from Deer Creek. During the excavation project,
Brian Hulbert, the PCDD commissioner, selected the excavation site.
After PCDD completed the excavation project, the water level fell
below the O'Hagan's culvert. Consequently, the O'Hagans sued
Pacific County, PCDD, and the Hulberts for diverting water,
negligently or intentionally, from the O'Hagans' property.
Additionally, the O'Hagans sued the Kelleys for moving their diversion
point, which the O'Hagans claimed also diverted water from their
property. The Pacific County Superior Court found the Kelleys had
moved their diversion point and diverted water from the O'Hagan's
property. However, the superior court granted summary judgment to
Pacific County and PCDD on the negligence claim, finding they did
not owe the O'Hagans a special duty. The superior court also
dismissed the remaining claims against Pacific County, PCDD, and the
Hulberts, finding the O'Hagans did not establish the excavation
altered the flow of Deer Creek. The O'Hagans appealed to the
Washington Court of Appeals, challenging the superior court's grant
of summary judgment and dismissal.
The appellate court first addressed whether the superior court
correctly concluded the excavation project did not cause the water
level to fall. The superior court found the Deer Creek water level fell
below the culvert after PCDD completed the excavation project.
However, the superior court concluded that the Kelleys caused the
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water level to fall by moving their diversion point, rather than finding
the excavation project caused the lower water level. After evaluating
this issue, the court found the superior court's conclusion consistent
with the facts because the O'Hagans only established the water level
fell after the excavation, not whether the excavation caused the water
level to fall.
Next, the court determined whether the superior court correctly
concluded the public duty doctrine applied and hence Pacific County
and PCDD did not owe the O'Hagans a duty. Under the public duty
doctrine, public officials are only liable for negligence if the plaintiff
establishes an official breached a specific duty owed to them, rather
than the public generally. However, there are three exceptions to this
doctrine: (1) if the plaintiff establishes a special relationship; (2) if the
public official fails to enforce a statute; or (3) if the government acts in
a proprietary function. First, the court found the O'Hagans failed to
establish a special relationship because they did not prove they relied
on Pacific County's or PCDD's assurances. Secondly, although the
O'Hagans asserted a violation of a takings and nuisance statute, the
O'Hagans failed to establish the failure to enforce exception because
they did not establish the legislature specifically charged Pacific
County or PCDD with enforcing these statutes. Finally, the court
concluded the O'Hagans failed to establish the excavation project was
too small to benefit the public as a whole and hence, the proprietary
function exception did not apply.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the superior court's finding
because the O'Hagans did not establish the excavation project caused
the lower water level and because the O'Hagans failed to establish an
exception to the public duty doctrine.
Heather Chamberlain

Uselmann v. Clark County, No. 27949-5-11, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS
2930 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2002) (holding that so long as a fee is
for the purpose of regulating storm water quality, is directly related to
that regulation, and is allocated only to the regulation of storm water
quality, the fee is regulatory in nature and not an unlawful tax).
Edwin Uselmann and Tom Miekle ("landowners") filed a
complaint in the Superior Court of Clark County against Clark County
("County") challenging the validity of a County ordinance that
assessed a fee on property with improvements valued over $10,000
located in the unincorporated areas of the County. The County used
the fee to regulate storm water quality, in compliance with its
obligations under the federal Clean Water Act. The landowners
sought a declaratory judgment that the fee was an unconstitutional tax.
The trial court granted the County's cross-motion for summary
judgment. The landowners appealed to the Washington Court of
Appeals for Division Two.
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On appeal the landowners maintained that the charge in question
was a tax rather than a regulatory fee. The court of appeals applied
three factors to determine whether the fee in question was regulatory
or a tax. First, it reviewed whether the County's primary purpose to
raise revenue with a tax, or to regulate with a regulatory fee. Second,
it considered whether the County allocated the money collected only
to the authorized regulatory purpose of regulating storm water quality.
And third, it assessed whether there was a direct relationship between
the fee charged by the County and the service received by those who
paid the fee, or between the fee charged and the burden produced by
the fee payer. Applying these factors to the charge in question, the
court of appeals determined the fee was regulatory and not a tax.
The court of appeals found the language of the ordinance clear.
The fee imposed would specifically fund activities related to the
regulation of issues impacting storm water quality; any additional funds
would be used only for the acquisition and construction of new storm
water facilities. All the funds collected would be utilized solely in the
unincorporated areas of Clark County. Because the charge met the
criteria for a regulatory fee the court held it was not an impermissible
tax, and affirmed the County's cross-motion for summary judgment.
Jason V. Turner
WISCONSIN
Lesaffre Yeast Corp. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., Appeal No.
02-1685, 2003 Wisc. App. LEXIS 219 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2003)
(holding summary judgment improper when issues of material fact
remain regarding the source of well contamination, frequency of
contamination, and knowledge that operation of a tunnel would result
in ground water contamination).
Lesaffre Yeast Corporation ("Lesaffre") filed suit against the
Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District ("MMSD") in the
Milwaukee County Court alleging inverse condemnation and nuisance.
The court granted summary judgment in favor of MMSD because
Lesaffre failed to satisfactorily plead all the elements necessary to
constitute a taking in an inverse condemnation action. The court also
found MMSD was entitled to governmental immunity on the nuisance
cause of action. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District One,
reversed the judgment and remanded the case because disputed issues
of material fact existed.
Lesaffre's Red Star Yeast and Products plant installed a 1700-foot
deep, high-capacity production water supply well, in 1948, to draw
water from two aquifers. MMSD constructed a tunnel within 660 feet
of the Red Star well to relieve peak flow demand on an existing sewer
system by collecting and storing storm water overflow and excess
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sewage until MMSD could transport it to the sewage treatment plants.
Lesaffre contended that MMSD knew that the operation of the tunnel
would contaminate Red Star's well because the tunnel walls were hewn
through unlined bedrock. Lesaffre also alleged that fractures in the
bedrock wall provided a channel through which sewage containing E.
coli and other fecal coliform bacteria could migrate in and out of the
tunnel, flow into the aquifer, and into the Red Star Well.
MMSD began operation of the tunnel in 1994 and by the spring of
1999, samples from the Red Star well consistently tested positive for
total coliform bacteria, fecal coliform, and E. coli.
Red Star
consequently discontinued use of the well and increased its use of city
water. Lesaffre alleged that MMSD failed to properly operate the
tunnel so as to prevent the contamination of its well and that MMSD's
action constituted a taking. The circuit court ruled that the facts
alleged fell into a category of cases described as "constructive takings
with physical invasion" which constituted a "regulatory taking."
The appellate court determined that the allegations presented in
the complaint were closer to a physical taking than a regulatory taking.
Applying the case law for physical takings, the court concluded that it
was premature to dismiss the case on summary judgment because
there were several issues of material fact in dispute. Specifically,
whether the operation of the tunnels was the source of the
contamination of the Red Star well, the frequency of the
contamination, and whether MMSD had the knowledge to create the
conditions that caused the contamination of the well. The court also
ruled that the doctrine of immunity did not generally bar a claim for
the creation of a private nuisance.
Regan Rozier

Wisconsin v. Fedler, 2002 WL 31193360 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2002)
(holding that where a property owner dredges in wetlands or ponds
without a permit, civil forfeitures and restoration of property to the
condition before alteration may be required even where there is no
direct connection to a navigable waterway).
In December 2000, Ronald G. Fedler ("Fedler") received two
tickets from the Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") for
enlargement of a waterway without a permit. Fedler plead not guilty to
both citations. The Circuit Court of Iowa County found Fedler guilty
and ordered him to pay civil forfeitures and either remove the lower
pond or obtain a permit for its construction. Fedler appealed to the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District Four where the court upheld the
verdict. The court found that Fedler violated a Wisconsin statute and
was required to restore the land to the condition previous to dredging.
Fedler's property contained two ponds that the previous owner
created in 1963. The water from the ponds flowed out of the ponds
down through a culvert and eventually met up with a Class-II trout
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stream. Over time, the lower pond gradually filled in with sediment
creating a secondary wetland. Felder applied for a permit to dredge
the ponds. The DNR denied the permit based upon the fact that the
dredging would lead to a raise in the temperature of the water above
the legal limit, thereby endangering fish downstream.
Two years later, the DNR was informed that Felder created a new
pond where. he originally sought to obtain a permit to dredge. The
DNR cited Fedler for two violations of state statute for the enlargement
of a waterway without a permit. Fedler claimed that he had not
created a new pond, but merely cleaned out the lower pond that was
gradually filling with sediment.
Fedler claimed that the DNR did not have jurisdiction to issue
citations under the statute. Additionally, Fedler argued that his
actions were "grandfathered" under the statute, as the statute was
enacted after the creation of the ponds in 1963. The court rejected
Fedler's claims and found that the DNR had jurisdiction to require
permits under the statute. The statute existed before Fedler owned
the property and therefore applied to his actions.
Fedler further contended that he was not in violation of the statute
in that he was not trying to connect to a "navigable stream." The court
found that the statute merely required an "ultimate connection" of a
private waterway to a navigable waterway and did not require a "direct
connection."
Colleen M. Cooley
WYOMING
Polo Ranch Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 61 P.3d 1255 (Wyo. 2003)
(holding developer had no right to drill for water because agreement
granted city the exclusive right to water and said agreement was not in
violation of public policy).
Developer, Polo Ranch Company, John N. Morris, and Norma B.
Morris ("PRC") filed a complaint against the City of Cheyenne Board
of Public Utilities ("City") seeking recovery for hay crop losses caused
when the City refused to provide irrigation water. The City refused to
provide water based on a water use agreement ("Agreement") entered
into by the City and the previous landowner of PRC's property. The
agreement granted the City the exclusive right to water on stipulated
lands. The District Court, Laramie County, entered a partial summary
judgment in favor of the City and against PRC. PRC appealed to the
Supreme Court of Wyoming. The court affirmed the district court's
holding that resjudicatabarred defining the "exclusive" right the City
possessed under the Agreement as unenforceable due to public policy,
and that PRC had no right to drill for water because of the City's
exclusive right under the Agreement.
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On August 2, 1990, in a previously litigated case, the City filed a
complaint against PRC for pumping expenses PRC owed under the
Agreement. PRC included in its claim a request for a declaration of
the time period under the Agreement that the City had the exclusive
right to drill for water. PRC also asserted an affirmative defense that
the Agreement violated public policy and was therefore void. The
district court found that the City had exclusive right to drill and use
the water from the subject land in the Agreement, and that PRC was
constrained from using their share of the water on any land other than
the land described in the Agreement. PRC appealed the judgment to
the Supreme Court of Wyoming, however, PRC neglected to appeal
the issue of City's exclusive right to water and the issue that the
Agreement violated public policy.
On October 7, 1997, PRC commenced the present litigation
seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the breadth of the exclusive
right to drill clause found in the Agreement. The district court held
that res judicata barred PRC from relitigating the issue of the
"exclusive" nature of the City's rights stated in the Agreement, and
granted injunctive relief to the City because PRC had no right to drill
for water on lands subject to the Agreement.
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court found that PRC was
precluded from relitigating these issues because they were necessarily
decided amongst the same parties in the previous litigation. The court
came to this conclusion because in the previous litigation the district
court issued a declaratory judgment explicitly declaring that the City
had the exclusive right to drill and use water on lands subject to the
Agreement. Furthermore, in a counterclaim during the previous
litigation, PRC requested a declaration of the specific time of the City's
exclusive right, thereby admitting that the City had the exclusive right.
PRC also failed to raise either of these issues on appeal.
Next, the court found the district court did not abuse its discretion
by permanently enjoining PRC from drilling wells on the land covered
by the Agreement. PRC had no right to drill on the lands subject to
the agreement because of the City's exclusive right. Irreparable harm
would have continued if the court did not grant injunctive relief to
prevent PRC's violation of the City's exclusive right to drill and use the
land under the Agreement. Finding the district court did not err in
barring the relitigation of the term "exclusive" in the Agreement, nor
did the district court abuse its discretion in granting the City injunctive
relief, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
judgment.
Karen L. Golan

COLORADO WATER RIGHTS APPLICATIONS
WATER COURT DIVISION 1
APPLICATION FOR QUANTIFICATION OF WATER RIGHTS, CONCERNING
THE APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS OF THE CITY OF AURORA,
ACTING BY AND THROUGH ITS UTILITY ENTERPRISE, IN ADAMS,
ARAPAHOE, DENVER, AND DOUGLAS COUNTIES, COLORADO. Case No.

2002CW341 (Water Division 1, Dec. 30, 2002). Applicant: City of
Aurora, Colorado (Atty. John M. Dingess, Duncan, Ostrander &
Dingess, P.C.).
1. Application
The City of Aurora ("Aurora") seeks to quantify the amount of flow
Aurora is entitled to claim from return flows of lawn irrigation runoff
in creek basins within the present and future boundaries of the City of
Aurora. Aurora also requests the court declare that Aurora maintains
dominion and control over all such return flows as the court may
quantify.
Aurora is not requesting an amendment of the
quantifications previously decreed in the Cherry Creek and Shop
Creek return flows above Cherry Creek Reservoir. Rather, Aurora
seeks a similar determination for flows tributary to Box Elder Creek,
Coal Creek, First Creek, Irondale Gulch, Lost Creek, Cherry Creek,
Murphy Creek, Sand Creek, Second Creek, Third Creek, Tollgate
Creek (East and West), and Westerly Creek.
Aurora suggests the court utilize the "Cottonwood Curve" method
of determining return flows through deep percolation, as utilized in
prior quantification decrees. Aurora claims to have the right to use
the water utilized for lawn irrigation and subject to return flows to
extinction, including water acquired from the basins of the Colorado,
Arkansas, and South Platte Rivers, and well water from the Denver
Basin, transported and stored under prior decrees. Additionally,
Aurora may acquire the right to use to extinction water pending a
transfer agreement from the City of Thornton. Aurora claims the
construction of additional facilities for utilization of this water will not
be required, and will use return flow water for all municipal and
domestic uses. Aurora requests an appropriation date of December
17, 2002, as Aurora's intent to act is evidenced by a resolution passed
by the Aurora City Council on December 16, 2002.
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2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
Chris Cummins
APPLICATION OF ST. VRAIN & LEFT HAND WATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT FOR A CHANGE OF WATER RIGHTS AND APPROVAL OF PLAN
FOR AUGMENTATION INCLUDING APPROPRIATIVE RIGHTS OF

EXCHANGE. Case No. 2002CW334 (Water District 1, Dec. 20, 2002).
Applicant: St. Vrain & Left Hand Water Conservancy District (Atty.
Bernard, Lyons, Gaddis & Kahn, P.C.).
1. Applications
The St. Vrain & Left Hand Water Conservancy District ("District")
proposes to augment various wells and surface water diversion
structures ("participating diversions") within the boundaries of the
District, and located in the St. Vrain Creek and Left Hand Creek
drainage basins. Descriptions of the twelve augmentation structures
follow, and, unless otherwise stated, the District intends to change the
uses to include domestic, commercial, industrial, irrigation,
recreation, fish and wildlife propagation, augmentation, replacement
and exchange for use by the District anywhere within the District's
boundaries.
The decree for water rights to Copeland Reservoir entered on
June 1, 1926 in Case No. W-6673 for surface storage is the first in the
plan for augmentation. The north fork of St. Vrain Creek feeds
Copeland Reservoir, and the amount originally decreed was 75.5 acrefeet, absolute, and 100 acre-feet, conditional. The appropriation date
of this decree was June 30, 1913. Historically, water from Copeland
Reservoir has been used for domestic, irrigation, lighting and power
purposes for residents of the City of Longmont.
Water rights to Coffintop Reservoir is the second decree listed for
augmentation. This decree was entered on August 14, 1978 in Case
No. W-66 for surface storage of 902.74 acre-feet, conditional. Sources
for Coffintop Reservoir are the South St. Vrain Creek, Middle St. Vrain
Creek, and all creeks that are tributary to the South St. Vrain Creek.
Municipal uses for water from Coffintop Reservoir include domestic,
mechanical and manufacturing use, generation of electric power,
power generally, fire protection, use for sewage treatment, street
sprinkling, watering of parks, trees, lawns and grounds, maintaining
adequate storage reserves, irrigation, replacement and adjustment and
regulation of other units of the District's water system, recreation and
other uses including replacement, adjustment and regulation with the
City of Longmont.
The third decree listed is for storage rights to Coffintop Reservoir
First Enlargement, entered on March 9, 1990 in Case No. 80CW462 for
84,000 acre-feet, conditional. Sources for Coffintop Reservoir First
Enlargement are the same as above for Coffintop Reservoir. Original
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decreed uses for this water are municipal, industrial, irrigation,
hydroelectric power generation, flood control, water quality control,
recreation and fishery enhancement.
The fourth decree is for 200 acre-feet of surface storage in Beaver
Park Reservoir, entered originally on March 13, 1907, and enlarged on
June 1, 1926 in Case No. W-4790. Beaver Creek feeds Beaver Park
Reservoir; tributary to St. Vrain Creek. The decreed amounts are 888
acre-feet absolute from the original, and 959 acre-feet absolute from
the first enlargement, and 335 acre-feet absolute from the second
enlargement. These amounts are the total amounts adjudicated to
Beaver Park Reservoir, however, the District is claiming the right to
change 200 acre-feet.
Original decreed uses are domestic and
irrigation uses; historically the water been used under the Supply Ditch
and Highland Ditch to supplement direct flows for irrigation.
The fifth decree is for surface storage in Green Lake Reservoir,
entered on June 1, 1926 in Case No. W-6673 for 71.90 acre-feet
absolute and subsequently adjudicated on July 23, 1951 in Case No.
11715 for 81,40 acre-feet absolute. The source of the Green Lake
Reservoir is the Middle St. Vrain Creek, which is a tributary of St. Vrain
Creek.
Original decreed uses were irrigation, and the second
adjudication specified the uses as being both irrigation and domestic.
Historically, water from Green Lake Reservoir has been used under
the Supply Ditch for irrigation and by the Town of Mead for municipal
uses.
The sixth decree is for surface storage in Rock'n WP Ranch, Lake
No. 4 ("Lake No. 4"), entered on May 3, 1995 in Case No. 88CW074
for 880 acre-feet, conditional. Water diverted from St. Vrain Creek via
Goss Private Ditch No. 2 feeds Lake No. 4. Decreed uses for this water
include augmentation, replacement and exchange, irrigation,
industrial, recreation, and fish and wildlife preservation and
propagation. The depletions proposed to be augmented are those
associated with mining activities in connection with, and evaporation
gravel pits.
The seventh decree is for new surface storage rights in Lake No. 4.
The District filed the application on December 19, 2001 in Case No.
2001CW862 for 600 acre-feet, conditional, which is currently pending.
The District claims an appropriation date of December 11, 2002 for
uses including: domestic, commercial, industrial, irrigation of lands
within the District or Boulder County, recreation, fish and wildlife
propagation, maintenance of minimum stream flows for fish,
recreation, wildlife and other purposes, augmentation, replacement
and exchange of the above uses.
The eighth decree is for surface storage in Elliott Ponds Nos. 1, 2
and 3, and for refill of all ponds and expansion of Ponds 2 and 3,
entered on February 28, 1990 in Case No. 84CW298(A) and July 2,
1992 in Case No. 89CW073. The sources of water for Elliott Pond Nos.
1, 2 and 3 are the St. Vrain River via the Denio-Taylor Mill Ditch and
storm drainage water from the Fordham Storm Sewer System. Sources
for the refill and expansion of Pond Nos. 2 and 3 are the St. Vrain
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River via the Denio-Taylor Mill Ditch, Zweck and Turner Ditch, and
the Golden Ponds Diversion Structure. The amounts of water decreed
in each pond are as follows: 93 acre-feet absolute in Elliott Pond No. I
and refill, 61 acre-feet absolute in Elliott Pond No. 2, 42 acre-feet
absolute in Elliott Pond No. 2 expansion, 103 acre-feet absolute in
Elliott Pond No. 2 refill, 100 acre-feet absolute in Elliott Pond No. 3,
56 acre-feet absolute in Elliott Pond No. 3 expansion, and 156 acre-feet
absolute in Elliott Pond No. 3 Refill. Decreed uses of Elliott Pond Nos.
1, 2 and 3 are agricultural, domestic, municipal, commercial,
industrial, recreation, fish propagation, augmentation, replacement
and exchange. Historically, these waters have been used within the
boundaries of the District and the Central Colorado Water
Conservancy District for the decreed uses.
The ninth decree is for 100 shares of the Left Hand Ditch
Company. The District anticipates acquiring 100 shares of Left Hand
Ditch Company from the City of Longmont. Case No. 87CW127
determined the historic use of the Left Hand Ditch Company, where
the court found the average delivery per share was 1.2867 acre-feet and
historic consumptive use per share at 0.6370 acre-feet.
The tenth decree is for one share of direct flow of the Longmont
Supply Ditch Company, out of a total of 200 shares. Decreed use of
the water from Longmont Supply Ditch Company is irrigation, and
water associated with this share was historically used for irrigation.
Similarly, the next decree is for one share of direct flow of the Bonus
Ditch Company, out of a total of 100 shares - historically used for
irrigation. Lastly, the final decree is .75 shares for direct flow and
storage rights in the Oligarchy Irrigation Company, out of a total of
300 shares. The rights are divided between direct flow rights and
storage rights, both historically used for irrigation.
The District's Statement of the Plan for Augmentation asserts it will
provide augmentation water for participating diversions, including
augmentation of wells, pipelines, ponds, pumps, and springs diverting
tributary water for irrigation, stock watering, gravel mining and
domestic and commercial uses within the boundaries of the District.
This area generally covers the valley of the St. Vrain Creek and its
tributaries, North St. Vrain Creek, Middle St. Vrain Creek, South St.
Vrain Creek, and Left Hand Creek. The District will augment all
consumptive use depletions from the structures included in this plan
for augmentation, and also provide augmentation water to replace all
out-of-priority consumptive use depletions resulting from participating
water users that have wells, ponds or other diversions located within
the District. Additionally, the District stipulates that the water users
with out-of-priority depletions who wish to participate in this plan must
have land located within the District and obtain approval from the
District and the District Engineer.
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2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
David W. Hall
CONCERNING THE APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS OF THE LOWER
SOUTH PLATTE WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT WATER ACTIVITY
ENTERPRISE, Case No. 2002CW320 (Water Division 1, Dec. 16, 2002).
Applicant: The Lower South Platte Water Conservancy District Water
Activity Enterprise (Attys. Kim R. Lawrence, P. AndrewJones, & KellyJ.
Custer, Lind, Lawrence & Ottenhoff, L.L.P.)

1. Application
On December 16, 2002, the Lower South Platte Water Conservancy
District Water Activity Enterprise ("District") submitted an application
to the Division 1 Water Court for approval of a plan of augmentation
and application for water rights. The District seeks to augment sixtyfive wells operated under contract with the District. The District also
seeks absolute and conditional rights for two wells intended as sources
of augmentation, replacement, and exchange.
The plan will augment any replacement wells or alternate points of
diversion authorized for sixty-five privately owned wells currently
augmented by the District. The wells are located on forty-four parcels
in Sedgwick County. This plan will also augment any additional wells
the District is permitted to include. The wells' source is groundwater
tributary to the South Platte River. Under the plan, the District will
also replace out-of-priority depletions caused by these wells.
Replacement will not be required from October 15 to April 15. Also,
the District reserves the right to operate pursuant to the 2002
Amended Rules and Regulations (Case No. 2002CW108), and
Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92-308.
The District intends to provide augmentation water from a variety
of sources within Water Division 1. The District plans to use decreed
absolute and conditional rights from the Lower South Platte Recharge
Project and the Liddle Ditch Recharge Project. It also intends to use
augmentation credits purchased from decreed and pending rights
(Case No. 95CW283) of the Julesburg Irrigation District. Additionally,
pursuant to various contracts, the District proposes to augment with
recharge credits from decreed rights of the Tamarack Project, and
rights from eleven sites either decreed to the District or applied for by
the Julesburg Irrigation District in Case No. 90CW182. The District
also plans to use replacement water purchased from six of the wells
this plan is intended to augment. Also planned as augmentation water
In
are the two well rights the District seeks in this application.
addition, all of these sources will be used to replace out-of-priority
depletions.
As a component of the plan, the District seeks approval to change
its method of determining well depletions. Currently, depletions are
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based on actual well pumping data. The amount of water projected
for the next year's pumping is based on a rolling average of the last
five year's pumping data. The District proposes to measure future well
depletions based upon a monthly water budget developed for each
parcel. The water budget will be based upon the historic consumptive
use of each parcel estimated for the period from 1974-2002 and future
years as added. The historic consumptive use will be estimated by the
modified Blaney-Criddle crop evapotranspiration method.
The
amount of well water needed to fulfill net crop irrigation requirements
will be determined after crediting surface water irrigation sources,
effective precipitation, and soil moisture.
The District also seeks absolute and conditional rights for two wells
intended as sources of augmentation, replacement, and exchange for
this plan. Both wells are located in Sedgwick County and have
groundwater tributary to the South Platte River as their source. The
District claims 3000 gallons per minute, absolute; 638 acre-feet,
absolute; and 862 acre-feet, conditional; with an appropriation date of
April 3, 2001, for District Well No. 1. At District Well No. 2, the
District claims 3700 gallons per minute, absolute; 1300 gallons per
minute, conditional; 1400 acre-feet, absolute; and 3600 acre-feet,
conditional; with an appropriation date ofJune 4, 2001.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
ArthurR. Kleven
APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL OF PLAN FOR AUGMENTATION
INCLUDING APPROPRIATVE RIGHTS OF EXCHANGE. Case

No.

2002CW389 (Water Division 1,Jan. 6, 2003). Applicant: Upper South
Platte Water Conservancy District and Center of Colorado Water
Conservancy District (Atty.JeffreyJ. Kahn, Bernard, Lyons, Gaddis &
Kahn, P.C.).
1. Applications
The Upper South Platte District ("USPD") and the Center District
("Center") (collectively the "Districts") seek to augment various wells
and surface water diversion structures. All of the wells and diversion
structures are located in the drainage basin of the North Fork of the
South Platte River and the South Platte River above their confluence.
Those who currently seek augmentation of their water rights include:
Saint Mary of the Rockies, Fairplay Mobile Home Park, Forest Glen
Sports Association and Lininger Reservoir. However, the application
provides that new participating diversions may be added subject to
conditions including permission from the Districts and the Division
Engineer.
There are four water rights that will be used for the proposed
augmentation. The first water right involves the thirty-seven acre-feet
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of firm yield that the City of Aurora deeded to the USPD. The
proposed water right includes an undivided interest in the right of first
use of the thirty-seven acre-feet of firm yield per annum from water
rights owned by the City of Aurora deeded for storage in the Spinney
Mountain Reservoir. The second water right involves fifty acre-feet of
storage space in the Spinney Mountain Reservoir that the City of
Aurora assigned to the Upper South Platte District. The third water
right involves 21.5 shares of the Mountain Mutual Reservoir Company
("MMRC"). The USPD, by virtue of its shareholder status in MMRC,
receives 0.675 acre-feet of consumptive use water yearly.
The delivery of the 21.5 shares will take place at various points
from several sources. These sources include 2.868 cubic feet per
second ("c.f.s.") of the water rights decreed to Guiraud 3T Ditch, with
an adjudication date of October 18, 1889 and appropriation date of
July 7, 1867. The second source involves eighty acre-feet of water
owned by MMRC stored in the Spinney Mountain Reservoir, with an
adjudication date of 1973 and appropriation date of March 26, 1973.
The third source comes from a 25.2% interest in the Lower
Sacramento Creek Reservoir No. 1, with an adjudication date of 1974
and an appropriation date of July 25, 1974. The USPD acquired the
21.5 shares by assignment in May 1991. The water rights associated
with the 21.5 shares may be exchanged upstream by utilizing
exchanges decreed in Case No. 80CW050 or by exchanges claimed in
this application. Finally, the fourth water right involves four water
rights, which are subject to an application for a change of water rights.
First, the McCartney Ditch, which maintains an undivided threeeights interest in the McCartney Ditch with the right to divert seventyfive c.f.s. as appropriated on May 20, 1885 from the Tarryall Creek
though the headgate of the McCartney Ditch. Second, the Sessions
Ditch, which retains an undivided one-third interest consisting of the
right to divert 3.5 c.f.s. from the Michigan Creek with an appropriation
date of July 31, 1880. Third, the Michigan Ditch, which retains a
diversion right of 2.0 c.f.s. as appropriated on June 30, 1875 from the
Michigan Creek through the headgate of the Michigan Ditch. The
fourth and final water right involves the Tarryall Ditch, which
maintains the right to divert 7.9 c.f.s. from the Tarryall Creek through
the headgate of the Tarryall Ditch as appropriated on June 15, 1875.
The Districts plan to use the consumptive use credits quantified in
Case No. 02CW240, however they reserve the right to exchange the
consumptive credits from that case using exchanges decreed in that
case or in this case.
The Districts' application plan offers they will provide the
augmentation water for participating diversions including wells,
pipelines, ponds, pumps, and springs diverting tributary water for
irrigation, stock watering, gravel mining, domestic and commercial
uses within the boundaries of the Districts. The Districts plan to
provide augmentation water to replace all consumptive use depletions
resulting from participating water users that have wells, ponds or other
diversions located within the District.
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The application contains detailed descriptions for determining the
amount of replacement water required for residential indoor use,
indoor consumptive use, irrigation consumptive use, livestock use,
pond water surface evaporation, and commercial, industrial and
business water use. Similarly, the application details the description of
the conditional exchanges and the absolute exchanges that will take
place. Affected streams for conditional exchanges include the South
Fork of the South Platte River (2.0 c.f.s.), the Middle Fork of the South
Platte River (2.0 c.f.s.), Tarryall Creek (3.0 c.f.s.), Michigan Creek (2.0
c.f.s.), Jefferson Creek (2.0 c.f.s.), the North Fork of the South Platte
River (3.0 c.f.s.), the South Platte River (2.0 c.f.s.), Horse Creek (2.0
c.f.s.), West Creek (2.0 c.f.s.) and Trout Creek (2.0 c.f.s.). All of the
above listed conditional exchanges have an appropriation date of
December 4, 2002. The downstream points of exchange for the
absolute exchanges include the Spinney Mountain Reservoir and the
confluence of the North Fork of the South Platte River and the South
Platte River. The upstream points of exchange for the absolute
exchanges consist of a well owned by Saint Mary of the Rockies (0.1
c.f.s., January 6, 1999), a well owned by Fairplay Mobile Home Park
(0.1 c.f.s., January 1, 1998), a well owned by Forest Glen Sports
Association (0.1 c.f.s., April 30, 1998) and the Lininger Ditch from
Beaver Creek owned by the Lininger Reservoir Kenosha Trout Club
(2.2 c.f.s., March 14, 2000). An agreement of the USPD to replace
depletions to each of the structures initiated the appropriation dates.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
Staci A. McComb
APPLICATION OF ROLAND DIXON FOR WATER RIGHTS AND FOR
APPROVAL OF CHANGE OF WATER RIGHT AND PLAN FOR

AUGMENTATION.

Case No. 2002CW328 (Water Division 1, Dec. 2002).

Applicant: Roland Dixon (Atty. David F. Jankowski, White &Jankowski,
L.L.P.).
1. Application

Roland Dixon ("Dixon") requests a change in a portion of his
decreed water right. Dixon owns fifty inches of water adjudicated to
the Pleasant Valley and Lake Canal ("PVLC"). Dixon requests up to
one inch of his water right for piscatorial, wildlife habitat, stock
watering, recreation and aesthetic purposes, and for augmentation,
substitution, replacement and exchange uses. Dixon seeks to add this
change to his presently decreed irrigation use.
The point of diversion is located on the south side of the Cache La
Poudre River.
The original appropriation occurred between
September 1, 1861 and June 10, 1864. Dixon presently uses the water
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for irrigation on Pleasant Valley Farm. The PVLC Water will be
diverted, stored, and used in Lone Bear Pond and Little Bear Pond.
Dixon also requests a decree confirming his Lone Bear and Little
Bear Pond water rights. Dixon claims six acre-feet of Lone Bear Pond
("Pond I"), with January 10, 1996 as the date of appropriation.
Further, Dixon claims two acre-feet of Little Bear Pond ("Pond II"),
with January 10, 1996 as the date of appropriation. Dixon does not
claim a right to recapture irrigation waste water or return flow under
the original decree on either pond.
The Plan for Augmentation replaces out-of-priority evaporative
depletions of tributary groundwater from the surface of Ponds I and II.
The Ponds are unlined excavations filled by tributary groundwater,
irrigation waste water, and irrigation return flows. Dixon's requested
uses may deplete the Cache La Poudre River by evaporation of
tributary groundwater.
Dixon will replace depletions through
augmentation, substitution, replacement and exchange water rights.
The exchange water rights consist of one inch of PVLC water, water
purchased by Dixon from West Fort Collins Water District, and water
released from Joe Wright Reservoir.
Dixon will provide augmentation supplies in three ways. First, he
may divert the PVLC water of 0.55 acre-feet maximum into the ponds.
Second, Dixon may purchase water from West Fort Collins Water
District and deliver 0.55 acre-feet into the ponds. Third, Dixon may
use Joe Wright Reservoir water based on a lease with Fort Collins as
replacement supply for evaporative depletions under a substitute
supply plan approved by the State Engineer. Dixon asserts the Plan for
Augmentation does not injure the owners and users of water rights on
the Cache La Poudre River.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
i

Susan Curtis

WATER COURT DMSION 2
APPLICATION OF THE TOWN OF FOWLER, COLORADO TO MAKE WATER
RIGHT ABSOLUTE. Case No. 2002CW167(79CW186) (Water Division
2, Dec. 31, 2002). Applicant: Town of Fowler (Atty. H. Barton
Mendenhall, Mendenhall & Malouff, R.L.L.P.)
1. Application
The Town of Fowler ("Fowler"), in Otero County, Colorado, seeks
permission to use replacement water from any source for the
Hammond Spring. The original decree for the Hammond Spring was
entered on December 17, 1985. The water source for the Hammond
Spring is the Arkansas River, appropriated on April 5, 1979 in the
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amount of 4456 cubic feet per second. Fowler obtained replacement
water from the Colorado Water Protective Development Association
and seeks to use replacement water from this source, the Frying Pan
Arkansas Project, or any other sources approved by Water Division 2 or
the State Engineer.
The historic use for the water rights is municipal use in the Town
of Fowler. Per the December 17, 1985 decree, Fowler has completed
construction of a collection building and galleries and installed and
maintained a totalizing flow meter. Fowler requests to make this water
right absolute.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
Stefania Niro
APPLICATION OF COLORADO SWITZER, L.L.C. FOR WATER STORAGE
RIGHTS IN HUERFANO COUNTY, COLORADO. Case No. 2002CW175

(Water Division 2, Dec. 24, 2002). Applicant: Colorado Switzer, L.L.C.
(Atty. Julianne M. Woldridge, MacDougall, Woldridge & Worley, P.C.).
1. Application
Colorado Switzer LLC ("Switzer") requests a water storage right for
nontributary ground water drawn from Rio South Well No. 1, which
was originally decreed on February 7, 1973 in Case No. W-4208 for
municipal, industrial and commercial uses.
Switzer will fill and refill a total of 400 acre-feet of water per year in
the River Ridge Ranch Pond, located on the Dacodle Creek Ranch, for
piscatorial and recreational uses. Switzer initiated this appropriation
on December 30, 2002 by filing this application.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
Jessica L. Grether
APPLICATION OF BOVAIRD LAND COMPANY FOR WATER STORAGE
RIGHTS, SURFACE WATER RIGHT, CHANGE OF WATER RIGHT, AND
APPROVAL OF PLAN FOR AUGMENTATION. Case No. 2002CW172

(Water Division 2, Dec. 20, 2002). Applicant: Bovaird Land Company
in Fremont County (Atty. Steven T. Monson, Felt, Monson & Culichia,
L.L.C.).
1. Application
The Bovaird Land Company ("Bovaird") requests a decree
adjudicating three ponds ("Iron Horse Ponds") on Bovaird's property
and a change in a senior surface water right to augment the water
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source. To irrigate part of their land, Bovaird uses its water rights of
1.0 cubic feet per second ("c.f.s.") of water from Vipond Ditch and an
additional 1.0 c.f.s. from Mill Ditch. Both ditches issue from Texas
Creek, which is a tributary of the Arkansas River. Both the Vipond
Ditch and the Mill Ditch were decreed in 1894 as part of the original
Adjudication of Water Rights in District 12, District Court of the
Eleventh Judicial District in Fremont County, Colorado.
Bovaird holds water storage rights for the Iron Horse Ponds, which
it uses for stock watering, recreation, fish culture and propagation, and
creation and enhancement of wetlands and wildlife habitat. The
original date of appropriation for water to fill the ponds was July 31,
1983. The total amount of water appropriated in the storage right is
1.98 acre-feet, to fill and refill the capacity of the pond. Bovaird
diverts the water to fill the ponds from Vipond Ditch. Based on State
Engineer's standards, the net annual evaporative depletions from the
Iron Horse Ponds is 1.5 acre-feet annually.
In pursuing adjudication of its water rights, Bovaird wishes to refill
the Iron Horse Ponds' evaporative loss and augment the Vipond Ditch
with a portion of Bovaird's senior water right to Mill Ditch. In doing
so, Bovaird is also applying for an additional surface water right of 1.0
c.f.s. from Vipond Ditch, and requests the court to decree a change of
the Vipond Ditch right to allow for water to pass through the Iron
Horse Ponds for irrigation. By augmenting the Vipond Ditch with its
own senior water right, Bovaird intends to prevent material injury from
other water right holders.
Approximately 1.2 acres of property currently irrigated by water
from the Mill Ditch appropriation will be allowed to dry up, freeing
the water for augmentation purposes. In doing so, Bovaird will be
permanently changing the traditional irrigation use, resulting in a
consumptive use credit to the stream of approximately 1.5 acre-feet
annually.
Bovaird plans to monitor evaporative depletions and
consumptive use credits on a monthly basis, and may store
consumptive use credits in excess of evaporative depletions in the Iron
Horse Ponds. Alternatively, the level of one or more of the ponds may
be reduced to account for evaporative depletions.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
KatharineJEllison
APPLICATION OF THE WILLIS FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP FOR WATER
RIGHTS, CHANGE OF WATER RIGHTS, AND APPROVAL OF PLAN OF

AUGMENTATION. Case No. 2002CW179 (Water Division 2, Dec. 30,
2002) (Original Decrees:June 12, 1889; Oct. 3, 1921; May 10, 1974,
Case No. W-31 11). Applicant: Willis Family Limited Partnership
(Attys. David C. Hallford, Nicole D. Garrimone, Leavenworth & Karp,
P.C.).
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1. Application
The Willis Family Limited Partnership ("Willis FLP") requests: (1)
an absolute decree for diversion of groundwater; (2) changes in water
rights; and (3) approval of a plan for augmentation. Willis FLP asks
the court to enter decrees for its three requests to provide water to the
Huajatolla Mesa Estates subdivision for in-house domestic uses, limited
outside irrigation of lawns and gardens, and limited domestic livestock
watering. These uses will deplete the water supply in the Huajatolla
Creek and R.B. Willis Ditch. As a result, Willis FLP is seeking these
decrees to replace the depletions.
First, Willis FLP seeks an absolute decree for the Mayfield Well No.
2 for groundwater tributary to the Huajatolla Creek, a tributary of the
Cucharas River, a tributary of the Arkansas River. The applicant
requests an appropriation date of September 10, 1980 for 0.045 cubic
feet per second ("c.f.s."), volumetrically limited to approximately 5.0
acre-feet per year, for the well. The applicant proposes to use the
water for domestic and livestock watering.
Second, Willis FLP seeks to change a portion of its water rights in
the Francisco & Daigre Mill Ditch and the Harry G. Hamilton
Reservoir from irrigation to augmentation use. Willis FLP also is
seeking to change a portion of these rights to storage for
augmentation purposes.
Willis FLP owns or controls a 1.75 c.f.s. interest in the Francisco &
Daigre Mill Ditch. The Huerfano County District Court decreed the
applicant's two senior water right priorities in the ditch on June 12,
1899. Willis FLP is asking the court to change 0.117 c.f.s. from Priority
No. 1 and 1.633 c.f.s. from Priority No. 2 to augmentation use.
Willis FLP additionally owns or controls a water right of 10.56 acrefeet adjudicated to the Harry G. Hamilton Reservoir
Third, Willis FLP seeks approval of its plan to augment its water
rights at Mayfield Well No. 2 with water from the Francisco & Daigre
Mill Ditch and the Harry G. Hamilton Reservoir.
Willis FLP's engineer projected that annually Huajatolla Mesa
Estates will divert 4.86 acre-feet and return 1.57 acre-feet. The
diversions will deplete the Huajatolla Creek by 3.29 acre-feet per year.
Willis FLP proposes two methods to replace these depletions. First,
Willis FLP will release storage water from the Harry G. Hamilton
Reservoir through a pipeline facility into the Huajatolla Creek.
Because the Francisco & Daigre Mill Ditch flows into the reservoir,
Willis FLP will deliver water from both sources into Huajatolla Creek
via the pipeline facility.
Willis FLP's depletions from the Mayfield Well No. 2 will occur
upstream from the point of delivery of its augmentation water. The
R.B. Willis Ditch lies in between the depletion point and the point of
delivery of the augmentation water. Willis FLP owns or controls a 3.2
c.f.s. interest in the R.B. Willis Ditch. The Heurfano County District
Court decreed these rights on June 12, 1889.
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In addition to Willis FLP, other owners have rights in the R.B.
Willis Ditch. To prevent out-of-priority depletions to those owners,
Willis FLP will relinquish a portion of its rights in the R.B. Willis Ditch
when the Mayfield Well No. 2 causes depletions in the R.B. Willis
Ditch.
Willis FLP asserts the change of use will not injure the vested or
decreed conditional rights of others, and asserts the exchange of
irrigation water within the R.B. Willis Ditch will not change or enlarge
the use of water rights.
As a result, Willis FLP requests the court enter a decree confirming
its absolute water right in the Mayfield Well No. 2, award its change of
water rights, and approve its plan of augmentation. Willis FLP also
requests the court find that the change of water rights and plan for
augmentation will not cause injury to the vested water rights or
decreed conditional water rights of others, and that the plan for
augmentation is sufficient to allow the Willis FLP to continue diverting
water when the State Engineer would otherwise curtail such diversions
pursuant to priority administration of water rights.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
Merc Pittinos
APPLICATION OF RICK ENSTROM FOR UNDERGROUND WATER RIGHTS IN

PROWERS COUNTY, COLORADO. Case No. 2002CW171 (Water Division

2, Dec. 16, 2002). Applicant: Rick Enstrom (Atty. Carmen S. Hall,
Petrock & Fendel, P.C.).
1. Application
Rick Enstrom ("Enstrom") seeks a two cubic feet per second
absolute water right to be drawn from Enstrom Spring, fed by the
Arkansas River and groundwater. Enstrom will use the water for a nonconsumptive wildlife habitat. Enstrom initiated the appropriation on
August 4, 1964 with the intent to appropriate water for beneficial use
and the issuance of Permit No. 5981-F. Enstrom is the owner of the
land on which the points of diversion are located.
Enstrom Spring is located in Section 25, north of the Arkansas
River and the Buffalo Canal, and south of the town of Bristol, in
Prowers County, Colorado.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
Kyle K Chang
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APPLICATION FOR CHANGE OF WATER RIGHTS, CONCERNING THE
APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS OF WOLLERT ENTERPRISES, INC.,

136TH & COLORADO, L.L.C., HIGH PLAINS A&M, L.L.C., AND MAGRO,
L.L.C., IN THE ARKANSAS RIVER AND ITS TRIBUTARIES IN OTERO, BENT,
PROWERS, CROWLEY, KIOWA, AND PUEBLO COUNTIES, COLORADO.

Case No. 2002CW183 (Water Division 2, Dec. 31, 2002). Applicant:
Wollert Enterprises, Inc., 136th & Colorado, L.L.C., High Plains A&M,
L.L.C., and Magro, L.L.C. (Attys. Harvey W. Curtis, David L. Kueter,
Patricia A. Madsen, Harvey W. Curtis & Assoc.).
1. Application
Wollert Enterprises, Inc., 136th & Colorado, LLC, High Plains
A&M, LLC, and Magro, LLC ("Applicants") seek to change the points
of diversion, storage location, manner and place of use of water rights
acquired by the applicants from the Fort Lyon Canal Company, a
Colorado mutual ditch company. The Applicants have contracted to
purchase 24.41% of the shares of the Fort Lyon Canal Company,
including rights to water currently diverted and stored in the following
structures: Fort Lyon Canal, Fort Lyon Storage Canal (a.k.a. Fort Lyon
Irrigating and Storage Canal), Horse Creek Reservoir (a.k.a. Timber
Lake), Horse Creek Supply Ditch (a.k.a. Supply Canal to Horse Creek
Reservoir), Adobe Creek Reservoir (a.k.a. Blue Lake), Adobe Creek
Supply Ditch (a.k.a. Branch of the Reservoir Canal), Thurston
Reservoir (a.k.a. Thurston Lake and Prince Reservoir), Thurston
Pipeline, Pueblo Reservoir, John Martin Reservoir and Queen
Reservoir (a.k.a. Nee Skah Reservoir), as well as the proportional share
of a 20,000 acre-foot storage account the Fort Lyon Canal Company
holds in John Martin Reservoir.
The Applicants request a change in place of diversion and storage
allowing for additional diversions on the Arkansas River Between
Adobe Creek and Purgatorie River, at the Holbrook Canal Headgate,
at the Colorado Canal Headgate. The Applicants request additional
storage at Holbrook Reservoir, Dye Reservoir, Lake Meredith
Reservoir, Lake Henry Reservoir and Pueblo Reservoir.
The Applicants propose new and changed uses of the water rights
to be acquired. Currently the water is decreed for irrigation use. The
Applicants request a decree designating the water for all beneficial
uses, including but not limited to municipal, domestic and household
purposes, while retaining the ability to utilize the water for agricultural
purposes, including in augmentation.
The Applicants propose new places of use as well. Specifically, the
Applicants request that permissive use locales be expanded from the
Fort Lyon Canal and underlying lands to any land potentially served
from the existing diversion and storage facilities in any of the following
counties: Otero, Bent, Prowers, Pueblo, Crowley, Kiowa, Custer,
Fremont, Chaffee, Park, Teller, El Paso, Lincoln, Elbert, Douglas,
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Jefferson, Lake, Clear Creek, Gilpin, Denver, Arapahoe, Adams,
Washington, Boulder, Broomfield, Larimer, Weld, and Morgan.
The Applicants claim that no vested rights will be injured and that
no new rights would be created by the requested decree. Additionally,
although Applicants propose to attempt to comply with the existing
bylaws and rules of the Fort Lyon Canal Company, Applicants reserve
the right to contest or amend these rules as needed.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
Chris Cummins
WATER COURT DISION 3
APPLICATION OF VACA PARTNERS, L.P. FOR CHANGE OF WATER RIGHT.

Case No. 2002CW067 (Water Division 3, Dec. 30, 2002) (Original
Decree: Mar. 28, 1890). Applicant: Vaca Partners, L.P. (Atty. Timothy
R. Buchanan, Timothy R. Buchanan, P.C.).
1. Application
Vaca Partners, L.P. ("Vaca") requests a change in the point of
diversion for Baca Grant No. 4, Irrigating Ditch No. 7, Priority No. 10
(the "Water Right"). The Water Right was appropriated on May 10,
1870 and subsequently decreed for four cubic feet per second ("c.f.s")
absolute on March 28, 1890. North Crestone Creek, tributary to San
Luis Creek, supplies the Water Right. The decreed use is for irrigation
on Baca Grant No. 4 ("Baca Grant"), servicing 200 acres.
Vaca's predecessor in interest changed the Water Right in Case
No. W-2997 on October 2, 1975 from irrigation to municipal uses,
including: fire protection; irrigation of lawns, gardens, and a golf
course; recreational purposes; clear water retention; temporary
storage; sewage disposal; industrial use; and irrigation of lands. An
additional decree entered on this date authorized Well No. 26,
drawing its water from Crestone Creek alluvium, as an alternate point
of diversion for the Baca Grant Water Right, provided the well may not
divert more than 1.33 c.f.s., conditional. On November 25, 1980, Case
No. W-2997-79 authorized yet another well, Well No. 27, as an
alternate point of diversion for the Baca Grant Water Right, provided
the well may not divert more than 1.33 c.f.s, conditional.
An Order Canceling Conditional Water Right entered in Case No.
95CW5 on July 17, 2002, canceled the use of Well No. 26 as an
alternate point of diversion for the Baca Grant Water Right. The
order of cancellation was brought about by a June 28, 1995 Judgment
and Decree for a sexennial finding of reasonable diligence. The
sexennial finding of reasonable diligence required the Applicant (at
that time, American Water Development, Inc.) to file for a finding of
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reasonable diligence or, alternatively, make the Water Right absolute
on or before June, 2001. Because Vaca's predecessor in interest failed
to timely file or make the Water Right absolute, the conditional use of
Well No. 26 as an alternate point of diversion was canceled.
Due to the cancellation, Vaca seeks a decree to again use Well No.
26 as an alternate point of diversion. Vaca intends to exercise the
Water Right pursuant to the terms and conditions of the previous
decree in Case No. W-2997, including municipal uses. Additionally,
Vaca grants use of the Water Right to the Baca Grande Water and
Sanitation District ("District") pursuant to the water service agreement
executed by the District and Vaca's predecessor in interest. That
memorandum is dated August 28, 1997 and recorded in Sagauche
County under Reception No. 321547. Vaca makes clear that the
District's rights shall be exercised in accordance with the water service
agreement and any decree issued in this or any subsequent case.
Therefore, Vaca requests Water Division 3 to enter a decree for a
Change of Water Right allowing Well No. 26 as an alternate point of
diversion for the Baca Grant Water Right.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
Kiowa K Engwis
WATER COURT DMSION 4
CONCERNING THE APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS OF W.A.
MONCRIEF, JR., Case No. 2002CW199 (Water Division 4, Oct.

31,
2002). Applicant: W.A. Moncrief, Jr. (Atty. Rufus 0. Wilderson,
Wilderson, O'Hayre, Daswon, McGinty & Frazier, P.C.).
1. Application
W.A. Moncrief, Jr. ("Moncrief') owns partial interest in numerous
surface decrees located on South Beaver Creek (tributary to the
Gunnison River) and on the Gunnison River. These interests include:
George Andrew No. 1 Ditch, Ditch No. 14; Alder Ditch, Ditch No. 20;
Cottonwood Ditch, Ditch No. 23; South Beaver Ditch, Ditch No. 29;
Frank Adams Ditch No. 2, Ditch No. 33; Browning Ditch, Ditch No. 39;
Beaver Creek West Ditch, Ditch No. 41; Passtime No. 1 and No. 2
Ditches, Ditch Nos. 59 and 58; Cooper Ditch No. 2, Ditch No. 60; and
Moore No. 1 and No. 2 Ditches, Ditch Nos. 75 and 77.
Moncrief requests the Division 4 Water Court to allow a change in
water right for alternate points of diversion on the aforementioned
water rights thereby allowing him the ability to divert his interests in
said water rights through some or all of the aforementioned ditches.
Additionally, Moncrief requests the ability to divert any or all the
aforementioned interests through C.B. Moncriefs ditches and Tom 0.
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Moncrief's ditches pursuant to a Ranch Management Agreement. C.B.
and Tom Moncrief s ditches utilized include: Kelmel-Ownes No. 1 and
No. 2 Irrigating Ditches, Ditch Nos. 18 and 58; Frank Adams Ditch No.
1, Ditch No. 59; April Ditch, Ditch No. 106; and Goodwin Knox Ditch,
Ditch No. 320 located along the Gunnison.
Moncrief desires said alternate points of diversion to account for
historic irrigation practices on his lands and to more efficiently irrigate
his properties adjoining said water rights. Additionally, Moncrief
requests said changes be allowed without limitation on his decreed or
owned amounts of water because he claims that none of the changes
will cause the historic return flows to bypass any vested water right or
decreed conditional water right and, therefore, will not cause material
injury to vested water rights or decreed surface water rights.
2. Opposition
Kenneth L. Spann of Virgil and Lee Spann Ranches, Inc. ("Spann
Ranches") filed a Statement of Opposition. This statement indicated
that Spann Ranches co-owned water rights in the same ditches as
Moncrief and was filed to protect said interests.
William H. Fronczak
CONCERNING THE APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS OF C.B.
MONCRIEF, Case No. 2002CW200 (Water Division 4, Oct. 31, 2002).

Applicant: C.B. Moncrief, (Atty. Rufus 0. Wilderson, Wilderson,
O'Hayre, Daswon, McGinty & Frazier, P.C.).
1. Application
C.B. Moncrief owns partial interest in the Kelmel-Ownes No. 1 and
No. 2 Irrigating Ditches, Ditch Nos. 18 and 58; and the Frank Adams
Ditch No. 1, Ditch No. 59 located on the Gunnison River.

C.B. Moncrief requests the Division 4 Water Court allow a change
in water right for alternate points of diversion on the aforementioned
water rights thereby allowing him the ability to divert his interests in
said water rights through some or all of the aforementioned ditches.
Additionally, C.B. Moncrief is requesting the ability to divert any or all
the aforementioned interests through W.A. Moncrief, Jr.'s ditches and
Tom 0. Moncrief's ditches pursuant to a Ranch Management
Agreement. W.A. Moncrief Jr.'s and Tom Moncrief s ditches utilized
include: George Andrew No. 1 Ditch, Ditch No. 14; Frank Adams
Ditch No. 2, Ditch No. 33; Browning Ditch, Ditch No. 39; Cooper
Ditch No. 2, Ditch No. 60; April Ditch, Ditch No. 106; and Goodwin
Knox Ditch, Ditch No. 320 located on the Gunnison River.
C.B. Moncrief desires said alternate points of diversion to account
for historic irrigation practices on his property and to more efficiently
irrigate his properties adjoining said water right interests.
Additionally, C.B. Moncrief requests that said changes be allowed on
his decreed or owned amounts of water because he claims that none of
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the changes will the cause historic return flows to bypass any vested
water right or decreed conditional water right and therefore will not
cause material injury to vested water rights or decreed surface water
rights.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
William H. Fronczak
CONCERNING THE APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS OF TOM 0.
MONCRIEF AND C.B. MONCRIEF, Case No. 2002CW201 (Water Division

4, Oct. 31, 2002). Applicant: Tom 0. Moncrief and C.B. Moncrief,
(Atty. Rufus 0. Wilderson, Wilderson, O'Hayre, Daswon, McGinty &
Frazier, P.C.).
1. Applications
Tom 0. and C.B. Moncrief own partial interest in the April Ditch,
Ditch No. 106 and Goodwin Knox Ditch, Ditch No. 320 located on the
Gunnison River.
Tom 0. and C.B. Moncrief, request the Division 4 Water Court
allow a change in water right for alternate points of diversion on the
aforementioned water rights thereby allowing them to divert their
interests in said water rights through some or all of the
aforementioned ditches. Additionally, Tom 0. and C.B. Moncrief
request the ability to divert any or all the aforementioned interests
through W.A. Moncrief, Jr.'s ditches and Tom 0. Moncrief's ditches
pursuant to a Ranch Management Agreement. W.A. Moncrief Jr.'s
and Tom Moncrief's ditches utilized include: George Andrew No. 1
Ditch, Ditch No. 14; Frank Adams Ditch No. 2, Ditch No. 33; Browning
Ditch, Ditch No. 39; Cooper Ditch No. 2, Ditch No. 60; Kelmel-Ownes
No. I and No. 2 Irrigating Ditches, Ditch Nos. 18 and 58; Frank Adams
Ditch No. 1, Ditch No. 59; April Ditch, Ditch No. 106; and Goodwin
Knox Ditch, Ditch No. 320 located on the Gunnison River.
Tom 0. and C.B. Moncrief desire said alternate points of diversion
to account for historic irrigation practices on their properties and to
more efficiently irrigate their properties adjoining said water right
interests. Additionally, the Moncriefs' request that said changes be
allowed on their decreed or owned amounts of water because they
claim that none of the changes will the cause historic return flows to
bypass any vested water right or decreed conditional water right and,
therefore, will not cause material injury to vested water rights or
decreed surface water rights.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
William H. Fronczak

CONFERENCE REPORT
THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL WATER LAW CONFERENCE INTO
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: WATER RIGHTS, WATER
SUPPLY, WATER QUALITY
San Diego, California

February 20-21, 2003

The Twenty-First Annual Water Law Conference provided two days
of informative discussions on various water rights and associated issues.
The conference opened with a keynote address from John D. Leshy,
former U.S. Solicitor, followed by two morning sessions attended by
all. Fortunately for attendees, U.S. Secretary of the Interior, Gale
The
Norton addressed the conference during the luncheon.
afternoon provided four breakout sessions spanning from multijurisdictional issues to Indian water law regarding quantity and quality.
The second day featured keynote speeches from Tom Sansonetti,
Assistant Attorney General, and Christine Klein, Professor of Law.
Two additional conference topics covered long-term implications of
drought management and contemplating the Endangered Species Act
balanced out the remainder of the conference. This report provides a
summary of the comments presented in each issue.
DAY ONE
KEYNOTE ADDRESS-THE FEDERAL ROLE IN WATER MANAGEMENT IN
THE WEST: TIME FOR NEW THINKING?
JOHN D. LESHY

John D. Leshy, former U.S. Solicitor and Professor of Law at the
University of California, Hastings College of Law in San Francisco
delivered the keynote address. Professor Leshy spoke about the role of
federal law and federal government in water.
Professor Leshy declared there was a problem with imperfect state
regulation systems. He used the Colorado v. New Mexico case as an
The case revolved around the State of Colorado's
example.
contention that inefficient delivery systems, not over-consumption by
Colorado, was the reason for New Mexico's perceived water shortage
on the Vermiejo River. It also revealed inadequacies in New Mexico's
system of accounting and record keeping and presented a complicated
issue over what Professor Leshy called "slop."
Professor Leshy contended the issue of "slop" or inefficient systems
with inadequate measurement and accounting tools present an
impending, contentious, costly and complicated problem. He noted

Issue 2

CONFERENCEREPORT

many states live with the reality of "slop" and few have taken legislative
steps toward stricter and more effective water rights administration.
Great water battles, like the one on the Klamath in Oregon, or the
battle over Colorado River water in California often involve a
significant issue of poor water regulation by the states.
Still
unquantified rights make Imperial Valley farmers' claims difficult to
evaluate, and the same issue complicates the plight of the silvery
minnow on the Rio Grande in Albuquerque.
However, Leshy noted the political and economic costs of tighter
water administration often prove too much for states to handle, and
things remain at status quo. Therefore, he suggested federal money
would be required to solve this problem given the states' financial
conditions and budgetary restraints. To do this effectively, the
professor suggested earmarking federal grants for state water
administration and attaching strings to this federal money, requiring it
be spent only on water uses, and attaching a pre-condition that
measurement and policing systems be put in place. Other suggested
pre-conditions included recognizing the connection between surface
and groundwater and recognizing the validity and importance of
stream flows.
Whatever money this would cost, the Professor contended, would
be less than the cost of having to bail out drought stricken farmers
with federal money.
SESSION ONE-TMDL'S: THE IMPACTS OF WATER QUALITY ON WATER
QUANTITY

William Hillhouse of White & Jankowski in Denver, Colorado
moderated the panel. The first panelist, Bruce Zander from the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") in Denver, Colorado, spoke
about the practice of using minimum stream flows as a means of
keeping Total Maximum Daily Loads ("TMDL") of pollutants
regulated. Mr. Zander called attention to the problem of what
constitutes a pollutant for the purposes of the CWA ("CWA"),
requiring a listing on the 303(d) list of regulated pollutants with
assigned TMDLs. Beyond the list of usual "suspects," Mr. Zander
noted other elements could act as stressors on a stream. While
waterbody impairments associated with low flow are not required to be
addressed in the TMDL program, Mr. Zander emphasized the fact
solutions can and have used flows to alleviate non-traditional, nonpoint source pollutant problems.
First, Mr. Zander showed the term pollutants as defined in the
CWA covered a more narrow class of things than all those capable of
causing pollution in a stream. In essence, a stream could be polluted
without containing pollutants. Pollutants, in other words, are a subset
of pollution. In 1978, Mr. Zander noted, the EPA published a final
identification of pollutants covered by the Act that did not expand the
definition of pollutant. However, in 1985 and 1992, EPA regulations
blurred the distinction between pollution and pollutant.
In a
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preamble of the EPAs 1992 amendments to its TMDL regulation at 57
Federal Register 33040,July 24, 1992, the EPA seemed to embark on a
new course where TMDLs applied not just to pollutants but to
"anything causing impairment," of stream habitat.
However, in its 2000 amendment, the EPA clearly showed its
interpretation of TMDLs did not apply to non-pollutants. Thus, Mr.
Zander stated, "EPA does not believe effects cause by an
anthropogenic alteration of a waterbody's flow regime is addressed in
the definition of pollutant in the Act." However, this interpretation
applies only to 303(d) and Mr. Zander stressed the fact that EPA
makes a clear distinction between that section and section 101 (a)
stating the overall intent of the CWA is to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." As
such, Mr. Zander contended the EPA might recognize modifications
to the environment such as reduced flow may constitute pollution
under the act, but 303(d) and TMDLs would not apply.
A recent Congressionally authorized study in 2001 conducted by
the National Research Council recommended that the TMDL program
should "encompass all stressors, both pollutant and pollution, that
determine the condition of a waterbody." Mr. Zander notes that low
flow may cause a pollutant problem, but finds other types of cases
where it does not. Using for example Big Creek in Montana, low flows
and not pollutants were determined to be the cause of problems and
thus despite a commendable collaborative effort, the EPA rejected a
plan for TMDLs because no pollutants were identified. Another
example from Montana came from Deep Creek where a similar
problem was approached as a siltation problem, and the agency
approved the TMDL.
In conclusion, Mr. Zander stated the EPA does not recognize
TMDLs for non-pollutants but does encourage "a broad approach in
overall water quality management programs, designing solutions for
both pollutant and non-pollutant problems."
And noted flow
management programs can assist in alleviating pollutant problems.
The second panelist, Arthur G. Baggett from the California
Resources Control Board in Sacramento, spoke about the effect of
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") and
TMDL regulations on California water users who are trying to solve
chloride problems in their water. One solution has been to pump well
water and relinquish stream rights, but problems with the chemical
composition of the water get in the way. This prompted Mr. Baggett
ask whether NPDES regulations impair effort toward cooperative instream flow programs by way of giving up stream rights and pumping
well water?
Mr. Baggett noted in order for California to meet current TMDL
standards for chlorides, it would cost the State $4 million and produce
briny discharge into the ocean requiring a permit. He also noted
water softeners and other outside contributors like the State Water
Project bring chloride into the system. In a question and answer
section after his presentation, Mr. Baggett stressed, given the vexing,

Issue 2

CONFERENCEREPORT

multifaceted public issues involved in creating cooperative solutions to
water quality problems planners, should be involved.
SESSION TWO-RUNNING A RiVER BY LITIGATION: A LOOK AT THE

COLORADO RIVER, MISSOURI RIVER AND RIO GRANDE

Robert Snow, of the Office of the Solicitor in Washington D.C.,
moderated the second session. He began this session by noting issues
about water appear in agencies, courts, and private boardrooms. This
framed the debate about whether a resource of such broad
significance and public importance as water is best administered
through a system where private litigation can play a large role.
The first panelist, Roger Patterson of the Nebraska Department of
Natural Resources in Lincoln, Nebraska, spoke about litigation
involving the Missouri River. Mr. Patterson discussed the Missouri
River Master Plan by the Missouri River Basin Association, its four
recommendations, and how support for the plan crumbled because of
controversial tailwater minimum flow proposals. Next, he discussed
the events spawning litigation during a drought.
Mr. Patterson noted many issues were not before the Eighth
Circuit in the consolidated appeal of cases from three District Courts,
suggesting therefore, the best and most comprehensive answer might
not come from litigation. However, he also talked about how litigation
in other big cases has brought important issues to the table.
"Litigation," he stated, "at least, can bring issues to light, or simply
force them to be addressed."
The second panelist, Michael J. Pearce of Fennemore Craig in
Phoenix, Arizona, spoke about the role of the courts and litigation in
regulating our rivers. Mr. Pearce began by asking, "Are the courts
going to run our rivers?" He says yes. Mr. Pearce concluded there was
too much instantaneous gain and shortsighted self-interest to expect
anything but for people to act in self interest and go to litigation.
Mr. Pearce noted the courts had long been involved in running
our rivers, but in the past the states had played an active role in the
litigation, often protecting the public interest. Now, he stressed, the
states cannot afford to litigate and the public interest is often
sidelined. Mr. Pearce concluded, "there needs to be more people at
the table to make this system of running rivers by litigation work."
The role of federal actions, in Mr. Pearce's view, cannot be
ignored. He suggested continuing enforcement of law so discretionary
action not benefiting species is always actionable is important in
keeping public interest in the game. To shut out interests and resolve
issues through incremental litigation, Mr. Pearce argues, is
problematic. He concluded while states' need for federal money is a
major concern, injunctions preventing states from intervening in large
decisions is more problematic, or is at least an antecedent issue.
The third panelist, Anne Klee from the U.S. Department of the
Interior in Washington, D.C., spoke about Endangered Species Act
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("ESA") suits. She noted ESA suits on rivers often seek increased flow,
and such suits rarely satisfy the parties or bring certainty. The
Department of Interior, she said, is reaching out seeking cooperative
solutions and new ways while getting away from bureaucratic rut, and
added, providing incentives to cooperate will be important, as will
respect for state law.
Klee asked whether the Bureau of Land Management could use
water for ESA purposes in violation of contractual obligations. She
discussed a collaborative effort in New Mexico having similar issues to
problems on the often-talked-about Klamath River. Klee noted battles
over water in litigation could become a zero sum game and be very
adversarial. However, she suggested cooperative collaboration could
be an alternative.
Aspects of Klee's vision of cooperative collaboration include having
parties come together to craft their own creative solutions to water use
and endangered species problems; federal and state agencies working
together, instead of against one another; a shift to better use of water
rather than simply looking for more water; and shared responsibility
among the parties.
In the question and answer segment that followed Klee noted
litigation did not necessarily have to polarize sides and impede
progress stating, " U] ust because you are in litigation doesn't mean you
can't reach settlement." She stressed, opposing sides could "find
overlapping consensus," and "issues [they] can work on." She also
warned a "trend in judicial decisions regarding risk to species makes
ongoing negotiation important even during litigation."
Regarding chances for ESA reform, Klee responded general
reform was unlikely because Congress is reluctant to act
comprehensively. However, she noted regulations not crafted to deal
with some specific section 7 situations may be reformed.
LUNCHEON WITH SPEAKER: GALE A. NORTON

Rod Walston, Deputy Solicitor of the Department of the Interior,
introduced Gale Norton, U.S. Secretary of the Interior. She stated that
water law exists to resolve conflicts in time of shortage. Water is short
in the West and population gains in the Southwest and West
contribute to challenge of addressing water needs when there is a
drought.
Secretary Norton used the Colorado River basin to help the
audience visualize the drought. Throughout the entire Colorado
River system, storage levels are low; therefore the system relies upon
spring runoff. She spoke of low water levels throughout the Colorado
River system such as Lake Powell and Lake Mead. Additionally, she
mentioned the stress the Rio Grande was under due to its extended
drought.
Secretary Norton then turned to public perception during the
drought, proposing to the attendees to stick to their guns and preserve
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the doctrine of water law because the law provides certainty. The law
directs future water planning, success of market based transfers and
environmental protection. To address water supply conflicts, she
applies two principles: (1) work with the states, tribes and local
interests to determine the best outcome; and (2) recognize that in
time of shortage, one and all must understand water allocation.
Congress has always deferred to state law when contemplating water
law, and Secretary Norton illustrates her local approach through
communication,
consultation,
and cooperation
to achieve
conservation.
Secretary Norton reviewed the history of the reserved rights
doctrine and reminded the audience that the United States does not
limit itself to this doctrine to acquire water rights. It also purchases
rights and obtains water rights within the rubric of state water law. She
excepted adjudicating Indian reserved rights, because such rights are
different in that the federal government must obtain rights in the best
interest of the tribe. She also spoke of the McCarran Amendment and
pledged her goal of living within the "letter and spirit" of this
amendment and fully participate in general stream adjudications
whenever possible.
Secretary Norton drew upon Ronald Coase's economic theory to
demonstrate the dilemma of unquantified water rights. The Klamath
River basin epitomizes unquantified water rights despite the efforts to
quantify. If each water user knew his exact rights, then parties could
negotiate to satisfy each user's needs, for example, by fallowing land or
restricting fish harvesting. She again turned to the Colorado River
basin discussing the basis for the Colorado River Compact and
California's 4.4 million annual acre-feet limitation. When California
failed to meet its December 31 deadline, the Law of the River required
Norton, without discretion, to limit the state to its 4.4 million acre-feet
allowance. She concluded that this failure was likely to lead to another
ten-year session of "divisive litigation."
Secretary Norton proposed solutions to some of the West's water
challenges.
First, the Interior plans to develop a resource
management plan. Second, it proposes to initiate twenty-first century
water management systems such as canal lining. Third, the Bureau of
Reclamation will further use water banking programs whenever
possible. Fourth, the Interior will research further desalinization
technologies.
Secretary Norton concluded with a call for ideas. She recognized
that there are a numerous challenging issues involved with water
management, particularly with ownership clarification. In searching
for solutions to water management challenges, she invited everyone to
contact her with solutions.
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BREAK-OUT SESSION ONE-MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE:

PROMISING OR PROBLEMATIC?
Kathleen Marion Carr, U.S. Department of Interior in Boise,
Idaho, moderated this panel.
The first panelist, Kenneth J. Warren of Wolf, Block, Schorr &
Solis-Cohen, of Philadelphia, spoke about the pros and cons of multijurisdictional practice, specifically pro hac vice admission and the
proposed revisions to Model Rules 5.5 and 8.5. Mr. Warren explained
pro hac vice stands as an exception to the usual rule a lawyer must be
licensed and in good standing in the state where he practices. The
reason for the usual rule, Warren explained, is the state's interest in
protecting clients from incompetent or unscrupulous lawyers, to
preserve integrity in the profession and protect local lawyers who
contribute to the community.
Pro hac vice exists to allow some
flexibility and allow multi-jurisdictional issues to be handled effectively
while attempting to safeguard local interests.
Mr. Warren noted the existing rules are unrealistic for
environmental and natural resources lawyers. He cited four reasons
for multi-jurisdictional practice in these areas: (1) cross-boundary
interstate issues are common; (2) cross-boundary interstate and
international activities by clients are common in this economy;
(3) multi-jurisdictional practice give clients an opportunity to seek
specialists or stick with familiar counsel without complication due to
jurisdictional matters; and (4) in-house and government lawyers move
around a lot.
In practice, Mr. Warren noted, transient provision of legal services
is rarely penalized, and in-house pracfice of law without license is
tolerated because employment with the in-state company usually
suffices as an ethical check provided the lawyer is acting for his
employer. However, prophylactic use of local counsel may not be
enough protection and the law is unclear about what specific conduct
violates ethical rules and who disciplines when lawyer retreats outside
state boundaries. Mr. Warren noted defining unauthorized practice
demands an examination of core values.
He discussed how the Birbower holding spawned an American Bar
Association rule change, which has not yet been accepted as law in the
states. Rule 5.5, he stated, does not take the "drivers license" or the
narrow "safe harbor" approach, but one somewhere in between. It
requires local counsel to be an active participant. Warren urged
involvement by lawyers to get the new rules promulgated in their
states.
The second panelist, the Honorable Ruth McGregor of the
Arizona Supreme Court spoke about Rule 33(d), adopted by Arizona,
concerning multi-jurisdictional practice. Justice McGregor stated the
goals of the rule serve individual interests of client choice and
sustained relationships between clients and lawyers, and state interests
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of maintaining standards and having an effective disciplinary system.
In 2001, the Arizona Bar stated enforcement of multi-jurisdictional
practice rules was lacking, abuse was prevalent and detrimental, and a
large non-resident lawyer problem existed. In response, the court
adopted Rule 33 (d).
Rule 33(d) is an onerous rule in many respects. For example, a
lawyer must provide certificates of good standing from jurisdictions
where they practice. Justice McGregor states this is not as onerous as
some lawyers make it out to be. Some onerous provisions include time
consuming procedures, payment of partial bar dues and separate fees
for each matter, and listing of all members in the firm. However, the
allowance for emergency applications probably keeps many of these
requirements from presenting real and immediate obstacles to justice
says Justice McGregor.
Later in her presentation, Justice McGregor also noted the
standard pro hac vice rule needs definition in the part that says one may
practice without license in a state if in a "complex area of law where
the non-lawyer has specific expertise." Exactly what would constitute a
"complex area" of law or "specific expertise" is somewhat of an open
question, and those practicing water law might be stuck in a gray area.
Thus, water practitioners ought to familiarize themselves with the rules
of any state in which they are dealing without being admitted to the
bar.
The final panelist, Peter R. Jarvis of Stoel Rives LLP, Portland,
Oregon discussed issues presented by the proposed revisions to Model
Rules 5.5 and 8.5. Jarvis said the problem of unlicensed practice by a
lawyer is similar to riding in a cab with a driver who does not know the
area. He noted a series of potential problems even with the new
uniform rules, revolving around definitions such as: "active
participation" "predominant effect" and "recognized expertise." Also,
Mr. Jarvis noted retained local lawyers can be subject to liability
exceeding their expertise, and outside lawyers can be liable for
problems caused by local counsel. To avoid such problems, Mr. Jarvis
recommended attorneys clearly define responsibilities in writing from
the outset on any project where multi-jurisdictional practice is
concerned.
Mr. Jarvis mentioned an alternative to creating in-state/out-of-state
teams for multi-jurisdictional problem: the reciprocal admissions
process. He asked, "How essential are state bar restrictions" now that
national law is taught pervasively? Jarvis says no one doubts the ability
of host state to discipline attorneys practicing within. Yet, with
increasing interstate issues, Jarvis wondered, will it continue to be
appropriate for state supreme courts to deal with discipline, or should
this be the responsibility of an administrative agency.
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BREAK-OUT SESSION TWO-MUNICIPAL STORM WATER REGULATIONS:
CONTROLLING THE TOXIC BREW IN CALIFORNIA

John Minan, University of San Diego School of Law, moderated
the second break-out session. In Mr. Minan's opening remarks, he
explained that the "toxic brew" of storm water runoff was the leading
cause of water quality impairment and typically included a mix of
metals, pesticides, fertilizers, animal waste, trash, and numerous other
toxic substances. Mr. Minan pointed out that unlike sanitary waste,
urban runoff is "discharged to receiving water without the benefit
of... treatment."
As a brief overview, Mr. Minan discussed the
structure of storm water regulations including the MS4 municipal
permit and explained "storm water regulation is part of the NPDES
permit program." In closing, Mr. Minan asserted that significant
regulatory actions regarding storm water pollution were occurring in
California and explained that the panelists would focus on a recent
lawsuit filed by the Building Industry Association, et al. challenging the
San Diego MS4 permit.
Shandra M. Stephenson, attorney from Latham & Walkins LLP
(representing the Building Industry), raised concerns that the San
Diego MS4 Permit requirements exceeded the "maximum extent
practicable" substantive limit of Section 4 0 2(p) in the CWA. Notably,
she claimed the permit would result in the unreasonable expenditure
of millions of dollars with no discernible water quality benefit,
required "strict compliance" with water quality standards, and set
unqualified requirements for new and existing developments.
Additionally, Ms. Stephenson argued that the water-quality based
provisions of the permit violated the Porter-Cologne Act of the
California Water Code, infringed on municipal land use authority, and
violated
California
Environmental
Quality
Act
("CEQA")
requirements.
The second panelist, David Beckman of the Natural Resources
Defense Council, disagreed with the Building Industry's position and
asserted that the San Diego MS4 Permit requirements were either not
stringent enough or should be viewed as the "very minimum"
allowable.
The last panelist, Craig M. Wilson of the California State Water
Resources Control Board, supported the provisions of the San Diego
MS4 Permit and opened by clarifying that the permit was originally
issued by the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board in
February 2001 and subsequently appealed to his office, the State Water
Resources Control Board ("Board"). Notably, none of the municipal
dischargers subject to the permit filed a petition. Mr. Wilson stressed
that it is within the States' jurisdiction to establish appropriate
requirements for the control of pollutants in their MS4 permits.
A recent Los Angeles case established precedent for the Board by
concluding "numeric standards for the design of Best Management
Practices to control runoff from new construction and redevelopment
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constituted controls to the maximum extent practicable." Similarly,
San Diego's Permit incorporates numeric design standards and was
upheld by the Board. Lastly, Mr. Wilson refuted several Building
Industry claims by stating that the CWA granted the permitting agency
discretion to determine pollution controls, by rejecting the claim that
separate wet weather water quality standards were required in the
Permit, and by contending that CEQA does not apply to NPDES
permits.
BREAK-OUT SESSION THREE-PRIVATE WATER RIGHTS OR PUBLIC
RESOURCE? OVERVIEW OF CURRENT TAKINGS ISSUES IN WATER LAW

Martha Pagel, Schwabe Williamson & Wyatt of Salem, Oregon,
moderated this panel. Art Littleworth, filling in for Nancy Marzulla,
spoke about takings, using the Tulare case as an example. Mr.
Littleworth noted takings issues often involve take or pay contracts.
State water contracts, he said, do not implicitly include a right for
government to disregard obligations to deliver the way federal
contracts could. State law takes into account all necessary things,
balances uses of water against one another, and not in a way that favors
endangered species. In the Tulare example, federal action overrode a
state agency, which it had a right to do, but then faced valid takings
claim because of this.
The second panelist, Barton ("Buzz") Thompson, Professor of Law
at Stanford University, stated that not much has changed in the takings
arena over the years, but Penn Central defined things categorically and
now the Supreme Court is moving back to a "muddy" balancing-testapproach to takings. Historically, "takings" have been a land issue, and
controlling doctrines in that area are often unable satisfactorily to
handle issues presented by water. Thompson predicts an increased
number of takings claims in water, including challenges to water
reform efforts such as well restrictions.
Thompson also noted ESA remedies, which often require
"cessation of use," can be harder on water owners than on land owners
due to the usufructuary nature of water rights. Furthermore, some
ESA remedies relating to land end up putting restrictions or total bars
on appurtenant water rights.
Thompson asked whether all forms of water entitlements deserve
the same kind of constitutional protection, and who should be able to
sue or enforce them? Thompson noted the difficulties presented
when trying to classify a water right that come from a contract with a
water district, and the concept of a "beneficial holder" of a water right.
Next, Thompson inquired into what constitutes a "traditional
expropriation" in a water context. Again, Thompson noted things that
look like regulatory takings in land may be a traditional expropriation
in the water context because a water right is usufructuary.
Furthermore, Thompson pointed to ambiguity in the test for a
regulatory taking, i.e. should physical occupation be used as a per se
rule, or does governmental purpose matter more in the water context?
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He went on to inquire whether, if physical occupation is the rule, it an
unmanageable one?
Because use is the core of a water right, a restriction on use violates
the core interest, which is what physical occupation of land violates in
the land context. But, whether this should likewise trigger per se
unconstitutionality is unclear. Background principles of water could
be interpreted to benefit the government in this context, raising
another issue. In all, Thompson highlighted numerous areas in need
of some attention.
The next panelist, David Haddock of Pacific Legal Foundation,
discussed how the Lucas case explored background principles of law in
its analysis of takings issues. He noted the courts would have to ask:
Were the proscribed uses by regulation part of the right originally? He
also noted, of Mr. Thompson's hypothesis about core interests being
usufructuary is correct, this question would not need to be asked.
However, he then asked whether beneficial use and waste would
become the standard.
Mr. Haddock compared background principles as a static notion of
stability for the law and beneficial use and waste as dynamic concepts
that are the background notions of water law. For example, he noted
in water law, beneficial use and waste are background principles, yet
they are dynamic ideas in the law.
The benefit to the public, and to private water rights holders may
depend on an interpretation of the underlying values of a water right.
Yet, as Mr. Haddock pointed out, the framework for interpretation is
not as capable of dealing fairly and easily with water law issues.
The final panelist, Alf Brandt of the U.S. Department of the
Interior in Sacramento, California, spoke about whether contract
rights to water deliveries from a water project equal a property right,
and if so, what the scope of that right is. He asserted that three factors
should be considered in making this determination: (1) the Project
authorization statute (which often has express language defining the
right, though that is not also unambiguous or controlling); (2) how
much deference to state water law should be given; and (3) an
evaluation of how the project is or was managed.
Brandt noted in the case in question the limits on water rights were
reasonable use, the public trust as put forth in Mono Lake, nuisance,
the California Endangered Species Act, and area of origin (basin
protection) laws. However, the contractual nature of water delivery
agreements injected other concerns. Mr. Brandt discussed how state
water project contracts involved issues of reasonable efforts to protect
water rights, distinguished water supply commitments, and involved
Board of Department of Water Resources' discretion.
In response to Mr. Littlefield, Mr. Brandt offered the idea that one
can learn from the Tulare case. The Tulare lessons were, first, to look
closely at the scope of the contract. One should ask whether property
is defined by the contract. One should also ask what means are
"available" in terms of commitment, when supply is low. Next, one
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must examine the government action giving rise to the takings claim
and whether it is within the scope of the property right. This involved
determining whether the action is a federal or state action. If it is a
state action, there can be no taking. However, if the state asks the
federal government to ask, there may be a takings issue, but this
remains an open question.
Mr. Brandt thought contract rights to deliveries are not property
rights and that Tulare and Lucas were decided wrongly. The issues he
sees are ambiguity, water versus water rights, location, parcel-as-a-whole
issues, and the effect of taking a market approach to water rights.
BREAK-OUT SESSION FOUR-SURVEY OF INDIAN WATER LAW: THE
INTERPLAY BETWEEN QUALITY AND QUANTITY

Ramsey L. Kropf, an attorney with Patrick, Miller & Kropf in
Aspen, Colorado, moderated the fourth break out session. The first
panelist, Robert Anderson, Professor of Law at University of
Washington, opened with a general discussion of federal reserved
water rights, Indian reserved water rights, and the application of the
McCarran Amendment. Next, Mr. Anderson outlined major caselaw
for Indian water rights quantification and the use of reserved water
rights for instream flows and fisheries. Mr. Anderson also pointed out
potential adverse effects of the Endangered Species Act on Indian
reserved water rights, noting two cases, United States v. Billie and United
States v. Dion, where the ESA abrogated treaty rights. However,
Professor Anderson noted that in one recent case, Klamath Water Users
Protective Association v. Patterson, the ESA and tribal rights were
complimentary because the court held that the Bureau of Reclamation
had to operate the dam consistent with the requirements of both the
ESA and the tribal water rights. Lastly, Professor Anderson briefly
discussed recent holdings requiring fish habitat protection in order to
satisfy tribal fishing rights.
The second panelist, Patti Goldman of Earthjustice in Seattle,
reviewed three ways tribes could use federal environmental laws to
protect water quality and quantity. First, tribes can use the CWA to
reduce point source pollution. For example, the Penobscot Indian
Nation challenged an NPDES permit authorizing Lincoln Pulp and
Paper Company to discharge dioxins into the Penobscot River,
impairing water quality and resulting in high levels of dioxins in fish
consumed by the Penobscot. The Penobscot appeal resulted in
significant pollution controls placed on discharges. Secondly, the
tribes can use the CWA to reduce non-point source pollution. Here,
Ms. Goldman presented the example of the Lower Elwha Tribe
bringing a suit against the Forest Service to compel maintenance of
federal roads, thereby preventing stream-damaging landslides. Lastly,
Ms. Goldman described the use of the Endangered Species Act for
maintaining instream flows.
The third panelist, Rich McAllister with the Environmental
Protection Agency Region 10, described a tribe's ability to establish
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"treatment as a state" or "TAS" status under the CWA, a status that
allows tribes to set water quality standards and issue water quality
certifications for reservation waters. Notably, several EPA eligibility
decisions for TAS have been challenged in court. Mr. McAllister stated
that, of the fifty tribes that have applied for TAS status, only twenty-six
have been approved and "seven of those approvals have been
challenged." TAS status is contentious because tribal water quality
programs can be more stringent than state standards, can be applied
to non-Indian fee lands, and can be applied to "submerged lands
claimed by the state."
DAY TWO
FEATURED SPEAKER-CURRENT ISSUES IN FEDERAL WATER LAW

THOMAS L. SANSONEIrI
Thomas Sansonetti, Assistant Attorney General, Environmental
and Natural Resources Division at the United State Department of
Justice spoke about current issues in federal water Law.
FEATURED SPEAKER-EAST MEETS WEST: THE EMERGING WATER LAW

OF THE GREAT LAKES BASIN
CHRISTINE A. KLEIN

Christine Klein, Professor of Law at Michigan State University,
spoke about water law in the Great Lakes states. The Great Lakes
provide twenty percent of fresh surface water in the world, and ninetyfive percent of the fresh surface water in the United States. She
quoted Mark Twain "Whisky is for Drinkin,' water is for fightin"' to
characterize water law in the West. She quoted Joe Dellapenna "We'll
keep in touch" to characterize water law in the Great Lakes Region.
She discussed Great Lakes diversion schemes on a scale from
sublime to ridiculous. There are already existing diversions, such as
the Akron Ohio diversion taking three million gallons of water for
replacement water and the Chicago River reverse flow of
approximately two billion gallons per year. She exposed some
ridiculous ideas of diversion such as: (1) constructing a pipeline to
replenish the Ogallala Aquifer; (2) constructing a pipeline for coal
slurry in Montana; and (3) shipping about 160 million gallons
annually to Asia.
The Law of the Lakes encompasses state law, international treaties
and state compacts. The eight basin states are Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, Ohio, New York, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
The two basin provinces are Ontario and Quebec. Some of the states
have laws regulating surface water and groundwater. There are four
international documents in place: (1) Boundary Waters Treaty;
(2) Great Lakes Basin Compact; (3) Great Lakes Charter; and
(4) Great Lakes Charter Annex.
Professor Klein went on to explain some of the emerging law. The
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basic premise of the newest law is "Don't Dip Your Straw in our Basin."
For example, the Water Resources Development Act of 1986 proposed
that water could not be diverted out of the basin. If a state wanted to
do so, it would need permission from the other states. However,
Michigan can divert with impunity because it is the only state that
always drains within the basin. The Annex 2001 agreement proposed
to prevent water loss, protect water quality and quantity, and improve
ecosystems.
Professor Klein concluded by illustrating lessons the East can learn
from the West. Data is incredibly important. Groundwater is not
necessarily mysterious. Regulation is not inherently evil. She also
demonstrated lessons that the West can learn from the East.
Environmental protection is not synonymous with waste. Quality and
Quantity are interrelated. It is important to reach beyond our grasp to
improve ecosystems.
SESSION THREE-LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF DROUGHT AND WATER
MANAGEMENT

The first panelist, Reed Benson, Professor of Law at University of
Wyoming (stepping in for Karen Allston, Center for Environmental
Law & Policy) opened by pointing out that only a third of the water
districts in Wyoming had implemented water conservation programs in
response to the drought. Mr. Benson proposed several items for better
water management during the drought including: pricing water
higher, providing greater flexibility in water administration, better
promotion of reduced use, improved planning for drought, and
greater protection of recreational and ecological water rights (if all
else fails, prayer).
The second panelist, Joseph Dellapenna from Villanova University
School of Law, described three models of surface water allocation seen
throughout the United States: the riparian system, the prior
appropriation system, and the so-called "regulated riparianism" system.
Dellapenna asserted that the traditional riparian system treats water as
common property and, as in the Tragedy of the Commons, recurring
water shortages have resulted in an increased number of water
disputes. In order to avoid these conflicts, many eastern states have
adopted a system called "regulated riparianism." This new system of
law does not treat water as either common property or private property
(as in the appropriation system), rather, it treats water as a "species of
public property." Dellapenna asserted that half of the states east of
Kansas have developed a regulated riparian system described as an
"administrative permit system[ ] to replace traditional riparian rights."
Dellapenna concluded by acknowledging the significant financial costs
of the new system but claiming it was a "better suited" system for the
eastern states.
Next, David Hayes, former Deputy Secretary of the Department of
Interior and currently in private practice with Latham & Watkins,
discussed the clash of federal and state water law. Mr. Hayes pointed
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out that during times of drought demands intensify and,
correspondingly, federal presence in western water management
increases. The most common federal trigger is the ESA. Mr. Hayes
reviewed four prominent and on-going cases involving federal/state
conflict, including the silvery minnow conflict on the Rio Grande, the
downstream flow and lake level requirements in the Klamath Basin,
the water quality impacts on endangered fish in the California BayDelta, and lastly, the federal involvement in water shortage on the
Colorado River. In closing, Mr. Hayes asserted the best solution to
these conflicts was to include all stakeholders at the table.
Lastly, Colorado Supreme Court Justice Gregory J. Hobbs
discussed the historical context of the prior appropriation doctrine
and asserted that even in time of severe drought the reliability and
predictability of the system must be enforced. Additionally, Colorado
must live within its water constraints, namely rainfall, and the legal
constraints of nine interstate water compacts, in order to maintain instate and out-of-state uses. Justices Hobbs emphasized that "reservoir
storage was the key to Colorado water use" during the drought and
reported that Colorado used six million acre-feet in reservoir storage
during 2002 to supplement streamflow.
SESSION FOUR-MIXING OIL AND WATER: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT, STATE WATER LAW, AND "BEST SCIENCE"

Federico Cheever, Professor of Law at University of Denver,
introduced the session by pointing out that the ESA must act as a
balancing point between human endeavors and the continued
existence of listed species.
Professor Cheever stated that the
requirement of the use of "the best scientific and commercial data
available" is the means to that end. Despite the requirement of "best
science" in a wide range of contexts and processes, Professor Cheever
asserted that the ESA is vague in its definition of the requirement.
Professor Cheever also noted that the relatively short time
requirements of the ESA for activities such as listing determinations,
designation of critical habitat, and issuance of Biological Opinions
("BO") make is almost impossible to do the rigorous studies needed to
meet the best science requirement. Professor Cheever closed by
pointing out that, paradoxically, the absence of sound science is seen
by some to lead to over-application of the ESA and by others to lead to
its under-application.
Alletta Belin, of Belin & Sugarman, provided a history of the
operations of two federal water projects in New Mexico and their
effects on the Rio Grande silvery minnow, a species listed as
endangered under the ESA. Included in her history was a summary of
suits filed by six environmental groups against the Bureau of
Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers concerning water
operations in the Middle Rio Grande, the lowest sixty miles of which
provide habitat for most of the remaining minnows. Ms. Belin
discussed several issues raised during litigation over the defendants'
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consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service and resultant BOs and
issues associated with court rulings on reducing contract deliveries of
water and private water rights.
Jennifer T. Buckman, with Best, Best & Krieger, provided a
summary of ESA consultation and litigation associated with the
endangered Lost River and shortnose suckers present in the Klamath
Basin. In the Klamath case, the Fish and Wildlife Service's BO stated
that operations of reservoirs would jeopardize the suckers and that the
reasonable and prudent alternative would be to establish minimum
water levels. This original BO was ruled "arbitrary and capricious."
The Service again proposed minimum lake levels in a subsequent BO
on a ten-year operation plan proposed by Bureau of Reclamation. The
proposed minimum levels were higher than the levels proposed in the
invalidated BO. Ms. Buckman outlined a position that as with the
invalidated BO the Service's most recent BO is not based on "best
science" and should be invalidated. Overall, she argued that lower
lake levels did not harm the fish and biologists had selectively used
data to support their position.
The final panelist J.B. Ruhl, Professor of Law at Florida State
University proposed a methodological framework for use in decision
making under the ESA. Professor Ruhl discussed a spectrum of
decision-making methods that range from "sheer arrogance" to
scientific method. Professor Ruhl's proposed framework includes
using a mix of professional judgment (the workhorse), scientific peer
review (to guard against arrogance or ambition), and the
precautionary principal (for infrequent use when evidence is
inconclusive, or even contra-indicative of protective measures, but not
taking measures could reasonably lead to extinction). Professor Ruhl
also provided commentary on provisions in a proposed act to codify
the use of "sound science" in application of the ESA.
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